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For Mom and Dad 
Preface 
The Republican Right. Few terms in American political history have con-
jured up more meanings, more emotions, and more myths than this one. 
But more historical understanding is needed, now that a Right Wing Re-
publican currently presides in the White House over perhaps the most im-
portant restructuring of American society since the New Deal. 
This is not to imply that contemporaries failed to analyze or sought to 
ignore the Republican Right. How could they? In much of the post-New 
Deal period, hard-line Republicans commanded the Republican party in 
Congress, often enhancing their power by working with conservative south-
ern Democrats. Also, GOP conservatives drew attention by bucking the 
trends of the era, and political observers constantly speculated about their 
motives-benighted obscurantism? ideological or constitutional scruples? 
economic self- or class-interest? As for historians, much has been written on 
certain aspects of the Republican Right-"McCarthyism," foreign policy, 
and the presidential campaigns of 1948 and 1952-and there are several ex-
cellent biographies on Right Wing leaders during the period. But an ade-
quate, full-scale treatment of the Republican Right in the post-World War 
II era has been conspicuously missing. This book attempts to fill that gap in 
American political history. 
The major focus of this work is the period from 1945 through 1965. 
These twenty years represent a natural and tidy period. The year 1945 was 
crucial for all Americans. Roosevelt had died and World War II had come to 
an end. But for Right Wing Republicans that year was especially important. 
Republican conservatives now faced a national and international world 
wrought by Roosevelt, but without the intimidating presence of that pop-
ular figure. By 1965 Right Wing Republicans had confronted this post-
Roosevelt world, the foreign policy demand of fighting the Cold War 
against the Soviet Union, as well as Eisenhower's "Modern Republicanism." 
And, finally, they had nominated their own GOP standard-bearer. 
Beginning in 1945, the present work investigates the general doctrine of 
the Republican Right, and the Republican Right's successful and unsuccess-
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ful response to major post-World War II domestic and foreign policy issues. 
It attempts to show how GOP conservatives controlled important party posts 
and how during the various political battles within the party, such as the 
nomination struggles of 1948, 1952, and 1964, they tried to retain the old-
line conservative faith. It also examines the Right Wing response to Eisen-
hower's "Modern Republican" administrations, as well as such related sub-
jects as the postwar conservative intellectual movement and the emergence 
of the Radical Right. 
If the current political scene in Washington underscores the importance 
of an historical understanding of the Republican Right, the existence of 
many valuable manuscript collections provides the basic material for this 
first portion of the study. The Robert Taft Papers at the Library of Congress 
are only the most. important of the available collections. The Hoover Papers 
and related holdings at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library in West 
Branch, Iowa, as well as manuscript collections at the Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Library in Abilene, Kansas, also contain much of value. Besides some rich 
personal collections, the Olin Library at Cornell University houses the rec-
ords of the Republican party for part of the period. The papers of important 
Right Wing figures are found at the Chicago Historical Society, and sections 
of the Everett Dirksen papers at the Dirksen Center in Pekin, Illinois, were 
open. These are but a few of the more than thirty-five collections examined 
during the course of the study. Material found in these collections helped 
confirm, contradict, and otherwise enhance the accounts and viewpoints 
found in memoirs, oral history interviews, newspapers, periodicals, govern-
ment documents, and, of course, works of historical scholarship. 
The final two chapters cover the period from 1965 to the inauguration 
of Ronald Reagan. They differ in content and tone from the preceding ten 
chapters, which make up the bulk of the book. Although these earlier chap-
ters hardly cover ancient history and may be considered current events by 
many historians, the contemporary nature of post-1965 America required a 
slightly different approach. In the last two chapters, therefore, the coverage 
is less detailed and there is virtually no use of personal papers, which are un-
available for obvious reasons. Moreover, time and perspective are needed to 
put the events of this most recent period into clearer focus. 
Despite the hazards involved in writing contemporary history, it seemed 
important to bring the history of the Republican Right Wing forward to the 
beginning of 1981. First, there was the altogether natural desire-a desire I 
hoped the reader would share-to "complete" the chronological story. Fur-
thermore, the historiographical limitations, though admittedly significant, 
were not paralyzing. Finally, even if the implications of many post-1965 
events remain unclear, these developments can still be considered in the 
context of the more fully treated period from 1945 through 1965. 
Thus, this present work is hardly a definitive treatment of conservative 
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Republicanism in the thirty-five years after World War II; not all issues are 
examined, not all questions answered. It is a necessarily selective, old-fash-
ioned political narrative that seeks to explain larger social, economic, and 
political forces and trends by examining the ideas and activities of some of 
the major political actors. 
A study of almost any movement presents the problem of definition. 
Who is included? Who is excluded? And why? These problems are com-
pounded when one is examining the world of American politicians. Of 
course, certain common positions, outlooks, or dispositions characterized 
the Republican Right Wing throughout the post-World War II period and 
will become obvious during the course of this book. Generally, conservative 
Republicans stood in arch opposition to the domestic, foreign, and political 
changes wrought by Franklin Roosevelt and later the Great Society of Lyn-
don Johnson. They opposed a strong chief executive like FDR and a power-
ful federal government that overregulated business and meddled in the 
affairs of state and local governments. They supported only limited govern-
ment intervention in America's capitalistic economy. Federal budgets 
should be kept low (and in balance), along with federal taxes. In foreign af-
fairs, Right Wing Republicans generally favored a strong American defense 
that relied heavily on air and sea power, and a foreign policy that allowed 
the United States to "go it alone" in pursuit of its own national interest. 
Fierce anticommunism was also a hallmark of conservative Republicanism, 
and this influenced their foreign and domestic programs. Right Wing Re-
publicans consistently argued that the Republican party had to offer a real 
choice to Democratic domestic liberalism and internationalism. 
Yet other Republicans, and indeed other Americans (Democrats in-
cluded), embraced many of these same conservative positions in the twenty 
years after World War II. The "Radical Right" of the early 1960s, for exam-
ple, shared many of these outlooks, yet these ultras are not properly consid-
ered Right Wing Republicans, despite the fact that many probably gave 
their support to Right Wing Republican candidates. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, much the same could be said of the "New Right." Distinctions 
between American political parties and among party factions or even groups 
outside political parties are often merely matters of degree or differences of 
temperament, tone, rhetoric, or style. It is the Radical Right's all-encom-
passing conspiratorial view of American politics that places it apart from 
Right Wing Republicans, who may themselves entertain limited conspirato-
rial notions. Nevertheless, these differences-however subtle they may 
seem-can be crucial, as this work will demonstrate. 
Another difficulty in tracing the history of one element of an American 
political party is that neither American political parties nor their factions are 
bastions of ideology. This study examines practical politicians going about 
their business of trying to get elected and trying to represent their constitu-
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encies. In this political world, they represent different regions and interest 
groups-imponant factors which serve to waylay anyone hoping to find an 
orderly movement in American politics. American politics is, at base, local 
politics, and mainly pragmatic politics. The special needs of local voters, as-
sessments of personality and electability, and subtleties of disposition and 
style are often far more imponant than a politician's stand on panicular is-
sues, let alone his philosophy. This fact will be demonstrated time and again 
throughout the course of this study. 
How then to define and delimit the Republican Right? There is no tidy 
way. In this case, reality scrutinized tends to become more confusing than 
reality unsctutinized. The task is made more confusing by the fact that over 
the postwar period, Right Wing Republicans, and even other Republicans, 
were constantly reading cenain Republicans in and out of the Republican 
Right. Despite these difficulties, the present study works from rather broad 
definitions and contemporary designations. If certain Republicans consid-
ered themselves at this time to be Right Wing Republicans, or were consid-
ered Right Wing Republicans by other Republicans or national political ob-
servers, then Right Wing Republicans they remain, while the confusions of 
image, record, and categorization are straightened out in the course of the 
present work. Along this same line, many contemporary terms for Right 
Wing Republicans are used interchangeably. Some of these tags-Old 
Guard, Diehards, Hardshells, and others-may seem to be terms of denigra-
tion. This is not intended. Such "loaded" phrases are employed chiefly be-
cause they had real, though perhaps imprecise, contemporary meaning, 
and because they also convey much of the feeling and color of a particular 
period. 
In the end, any attempt to give adequate definition to the Republican 
Right holds all of the lessons of the story of the six blind men who rendered 
six different descriptions of the same elephant. Trying to comprehend one 
portion of the Republican elephant as it lumbers over roughly thirty-five 
years of American history is all the more difficult. But such a task is insur-
mountable only for those who seek a nutshell understanding of such a com-
plex intraparty political movement as the Republican Right Wing. 
Perhaps the most illuminating and certainly the most rewarding find in 
the course of such a project is the large number of individuals who offered 
their expertise, their time, and their encouragement. In the course of my 
writing my doctoral dissertation at the Pennsylvania State University, the 
people in Pattee Library's Inter-Library Loan Office and the Microforms 
Room met my many requests with efficiency and good cheer. The staff of 
the Liberal Arts Data Laboratory answered all kinds of anguished cries for 
help. I am especially grateful to the College of the Liberal Arts for its Sparks 
Dissertation Fellowship. The Penn State Department of History has pro-
vided aid and comfort throughout my graduate studies, first through grad-
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uate assistantships and then through teaching fellowships and its Hill Dis-
sertation Fellowship. 
On the road, I was constantly amazed by the willingness of librarians 
and curators to explain manuscript collections and to lighten the load of the 
wayworn scholar. James]. Kiepper, editor of the Styles Bridges collection, 
James J. Kenneally, professor of history at Stonehill College, Edward J. 
Boone, Jr., acting director of the Douglas MacArthur Memorial Library, and 
Gary Arnold of the Ohio Historical Society all deserve special thanks. The 
staffs of the Library of Congress, the Department of Manuscripts and Uni-
versity Archives at Cornell University, the Lilly Library at Indiana University, 
the Kansas State Historical Society, the William Penn Memorial Museum 
and Archives, as well as the presidential libraries of Dwight D. Eisenhower 
and Herbert Hoover also made my research that much easier by their unceas-
ing efforts and kindnesses. Archie Motley of the Chicago Historical Society 
and Frank Mackaman of the Dirksen Center and their staffs cheerfully con-
tributed everything from guidance through their manuscript collections to a 
ride to the airport. I thank all these professionals and the many others too 
numerous to mention. 
I am also grateful to the members of my doctoral committee, Gerald Eg-
gert, Charles Ameringer, and Philip Young, for their helpful suggestions 
and comments in overseeing the dissertation that led to this work. The in-
adequacy of such acknowledgments becomes painfully obvious in trying to 
thank my thesis advisor, Robert K. Murray, who, in giving this book the 
benefit of his keen editorial eye, has given me a lifelong model of a scholar, 
a writer, and a teacher. 
Most happily, I wish to acknowledge the selfless labors of the person 
most responsible for the completion of this book-my wife, Susan. 
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If Roosevelt Lives 
Forever 
"Hell," rumbled Kenneth S. Wherry, Senate Republican whip, "the way 
things are going now it'll take a national catastrophe, revolution or great de-
pression or something before we get Roosevelt out, if he lives." 1 
It was mid-November, 1944, and the Republican party had just lost an-
other election to Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He had defeated four consec-
utive Republican contenders, and the Grand Old Party had not controlled 
Congress since 1930. FDR's 1944 showing-25.6 million popular votes (432 
electoral votes) against the 22 million (99 electoral votes) for Thomas E. 
Dewey-surprised even "Mr. Republican," Senator Robert A. Taft of 
Ohio. 2 In the Senate, the Republicans had gained one seat overall, but three 
of their veterans had lost. In addition, the Democrats had added over twenty 
seats in the House of Representatives, giving them a 242-to-190 vote com-
mand over the GOP. Also, there were five new Democratic governors as of 
1944. With results like these, Kenneth Wherry was probably just the man to 
consult on the Republican plight; his Senate colleagues, recalling Wherry's 
prior occupation, had dubbed him "the Merry Mortician." 
Definitely dead was the Republican political world that existed before 
the first election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932-except for Right 
Wing or Old Guard Republicans. That pre-Roosevelt day remained alive as 
an ideal, as a foundation for the Right's continued opposition to liberal 
Democratic policies and politics, as well as for any statement of Republican 
first principles. Right Wing Republicans simply rejected the "Roosevelt Rev-
olution" -rejected its economic and diplomatic changes and rejected its po-
litical challenge. 
Beyond question, however, was the reality that Franklin Roosevelt and 
his New Deal had altered the course of American society since his inaugura-
tion on March 4, 1933. Gone were the remnants of laissez faire philosophy 
as the federal government attempted to shape the economic affairs of the 
nation in unprecedented ways. Businessmen, farmers, workers, and the un-
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employed all had come to count on the government for something-aid or 
regulation or both. Although New Dealers-especially Roosevelt-had 
prided themselves on their realism and pragmatism in attempting to handle 
the problems of the Great Depression, Right Wing Republicans such as 
Noah Mason of Illinois claimed that the New Deal was a "brand of social-
ism." His House colleague Wat Arnold of Missouri went further: "It is diffi-
cult to distinguish between the New Deal and Communism." 3 Right-wing 
columnist Westbrook Pegler saw no such order at work. "Actually the New 
Deal is not a reform but a debauch," he said. 4 In GOP conservative eyes, the 
New Deal was a disaster that had given the United States "the most extrav-
agant government ... on the face of the globe." 5 
By 1945 Franklin Roosevelt represented the Right's major institutional 
enemy-the strong chief executive. The presidency and the entire executive 
branch had mushroomed in size during the 1930s and 1940s, becoming sy-
nonymous with New Deal reforms and later the bureaucratic wartime intru-
sions. The new agencies of the executive branch, often mandated by Con-
gress, now frequently made policy-hitherto a congressional prerogative, 
thus destroying many fundamental safeguards through bureaucratic regula-
tions, decrees, and directives served up, said one Right Wing Republican, by 
a "bunch of professors, theorists, nitwits and nincompoops." Basically, the 
eradication of the New Deal was still the primary Old Guard hope in 1945. 
"True a sudden and complete repeal of the New Deal legislation would sub-
ject the country to violent shock," conservative Representative Clare Hoff-
man of Michigan admitted, "but it would ... not be fatal and a recovery 
would be comparatively quick and more important complete. "6 
In contrast to New Deal "socialism," Republican Right Wingers offered 
in 1945 "Americanism," a term that later made it easier for Republicans to 
use "unAmerican" to malign their political foes. This was not the first use of 
"Americanism" in America's political battles. In 1920 Pennsylvania Old 
Guardsman Boies Penrose had declared Americanism to be one of the main 
issues in that year's presidential campaign. When asked to explain its mean-
ing, Penrose replied, "Damned if I know, but you will find it a damned 
good issue to get votes in an election," If, in 1945, Americanism was less 
vote-worthy than in Penrose's day, it was at least more clearly definable. 7 
In opposing the New Deal, the Republican Right used "Americanism" 
to mean a strict construction of the Constitution, fiscal sobriety, and local 
control rather than federal regulation. Conservative Republicans staunchly 
defended local rule and business from encroachments by Washington. The 
Republican Right was most vociferous in resisting New Deal economic pol-
icies. Although the Old Guard normally squawked at the mention of gov-
ernment regulation, pure laissez faire was seldom advocated. For conserva-
tives, government was not the issue, big government was. It was a menace to 
liberty and brought the United States that much closer to socialism. "Liber-
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ty" meant the opportunity to freely pursue one's economic welfare, and a 
federal government that overregulated and overtaxed could quash the indi-
vidual's incentive to improve his material well-being and jeopardize the pi-
oneer virtues of individualism and self-reliance. All Republicans, of course, 
espoused fiscal conservatism, but for the Right it was dogma. The Rej>Ubli-
can Right Wing scorned Keynesian economics. Limited government spend-
ing and low taxes-these were the bases of real prosperity, a prosperity as-
sured by a balanced budget. As conservative Nebraska congressman Howard 
Buffett intoned in May, 1945, "A balanced budget is the all-American goal, 
and the future of American depends on it. " 8 
The Republican Right was no less set against the sweeping changes in 
American foreign policy under Franklin Roosevelt. Although in his first 
term Roosevelt generally followed existing public attitudes, he moved away 
in his second term from one of the prevailing foreign policy ideas of the 
American people and the Republican party: isolationism. From the time of 
his quarantine speech in 1937 to the undeclared naval war with Germany in 
the fall of 1941, FDR labored to involve the United States more deeply in 
world affairs, particularly in the European conflict. Inevitably, the Japanese 
bombers that hit Pearl Harbor in late 1941 propelled the United States into 
global war and left American isolationism gasping. Yet prewar isolationist 
assumptions persisted as new issues emerged-among them, the administra-
tion's culpability in the Pearl Harbor debacle and the troubling trends in 
American-Russian wartime relations. The Republican Right represented the 
primary source of such sentiment. 
Republican Right foreign and domestic policy went hand in hand, with 
some observers even contending that the Right used foreign policy issues pri-
marily to discredit Roosevelt and the domestic New Deal.9 Indeed, theRe-
publican Right believed that the New Deal's "destruction of free enter-
prise" had enfeebled America in its foreign dealings. Roosevelt's foreign 
and domestic policy had but one aim-collectivism. Moreover, heavy inter-
national commitments inevitably increased federal spending. Some Right 
Wing Republicans even suspected that traitors in the government encour-
aged foreign spending in order to bankrupt the United States and sap its 
military strength. 
New international commitments also enhanced presidential power, and 
GOP conservatives naturally opposed this trend. Congress had a constitu-
tional right to be consulted on foreign policy matters. Robert A. Taft con-
stantly warned against "the unlimited delegation of discretion to the Pres-
ident in all foreign affairs." 10 In addition, FDR' s style of diplomacy-
personal and secretive-encouraged suspicion and hostility. Often criticized 
for a myopic view of foreign affairs that denied the relevance of events in 
Budapest or Istanbul, the Republican Right linked the conduct of foreign 
affairs with conditions at home. 
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"I'm no isolationist," conservative Republican Kenneth Wherry in-
sisted in late 1946. 11 Clearly, astute GOP politicians wanted to avoid the iso-
lationist tag after Pearl Harbor, a fact further evidenced by the many isola-
tionists who joined the congressional majorities in support of a postwar 
world peace organization. Instead, "unilateralism" became the foreign pol-
icy of the Republican Right. It was, in Taft's words, "the policy of the free 
hand." Unilateralists shied away from alliances that committed the United 
States to any advance action. The United States must "go it alone" in its for-
eign dealings. Right Wing Republicans relied on air and naval power as the 
means to safeguard American independence. Unilateralism also meant eco-
nomic self-sufficiency. "We must look out for our own economic interest," 
said Taft, "because no one will do so for us. " 12 Such an attitude partly ac-
counts for the orthodox Republican advocacy of protective tariffs and oppo-
sition to foreign aid. 
Above all, there was the Republican Right's assumption of American 
omnipotence and moral superiority. Paradoxically, this fundamental belief 
fostered an inner struggle between strict noninterventionism and spread-
eagle adventurism. For some, like Taft and Hoover, American might and an 
oceanic moat were sufficient to shield America's superior institutions. Med-
dling in the affairs of others, with expanded presidential powers and federal 
spending, would in the long run imperil "liberty at home." Taft himself 
feared a "garrison state. " 
Other Right Wing Republicans, however, championed the benefits of 
American action abroad. Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire had "no 
squeamishness about throwing our full weight at all times and everywhere 
on the side of freedom." 13 Nevertheless, the Republican Right urged inter-
national restraint more than adventurism in the first five years after World 
War II. This was a result not only of the isolationist legacy from the 1930s, 
but also the dominance of the Right by Taft, who lacked the "messianic im-
pulse." 14 Yet even Taft flirted with a more militant foreign policy from time 
to time, thus reflecting the ambivalence of the Republican Right about for-
eign policy in the face of the Cold War and communist aggression in the late 
1940s and 1950s. 
The Roosevelt Revolution certainly brought down the whole political 
world of the Republican party. Republicans, first identified with the restora-
tion of the Union and then with the post-Civil War "Full Dinner Pail" pros-
perity that lasted generally up to the Great Depression, had established 
themselves as the majority political party in the United States. Only two 
Democrats were elected president from 1860 to 1932, and their initial vic-
tories came when the Republican party was split. When intact, the GOP 
presented a formidable coalition of midwestern farmers, Negroes, urban 
workers, small businessmen, and corporate moguls. 
But FOR and the Great Depression changed all that. Republican for-
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tunes collapsed after 1932. Loss followed Republican loss. The Great De-
pression forced Herbert Hoover, the most promising of the GOP post-
World War I presidents, out of the presidency in a landslide and also fJXed 
the primary issue for the next generation: Republican culpability for the 
Great Depression. Franklin Roosevelt made constant capital out of it. Fol-
lowing 1932, Roosevelt had forged a new majority party in American pol-
itics. Consolidated by 1936, the Roosevelt coalition dominated American 
politics for the next generation. It had room for the Negro, who abandoned 
his Republican habits by 1936, and southern Bourbons, who maintained 
their Democratic allegiance. Roosevelt also tied the urban, ethnic machines 
to the Democratic party, while blue-collar labor, too, took a place under the 
Democratic tent. In addition, the New Deal embraced the farmer, who, al-
though appreciative of its efforts to stabilize farm prices, was possibly the 
most unsure member of this coalition. 
Composed of urbane intellectuals and blue-collar urbanites, hayseeds 
and slickers, bourbons and blacks, the Democratic party was an impossible 
coalition that FDR made possible. Of course, the Great Depression spurred 
Democratic unity, and international crises had helped hold the party to-
gether. But for many, Roosevelt was the Democratic party. "No other per-
sonality," admitted Westbrook Pegler (no FDR fan), "could have held to-
gether in one political household the standard, old-style Democrats of the 
deep South and the Communists of New York and Hollywood who con-
stantly snarled horrendous insults, but yielded, in all showdowns to the 
Chief." 15 
Roosevelt was a master politician. He loved the game and played it well. 
FDR attended to political detail like a precinct captain, and on the hustings, 
in his floppy campaign hat, he was a seasoned and subtle performer. He had 
many moods and knew when to use them. "He's all the Barrymores rolled in 
one," remarked one reporter. 16 The radio airwaves supplied one of Roose-
velt's most important stages; he grew up with radio and knew it required a 
different technique than the tub-thumper's harangue. At no time and 
under no circumstances could Republican opponents match his silver tone. 
"The Crooner," H.L. Mencken christened him. Initiated in March of 1933, 
FOR's fireside chats were master strokes of compassion, education, and 
propaganda. With his radio magic and his genius for timing and maneuver, 
Roosevelt bedeviled Republicans unmercifully. 
Right Wing Republicans reserved a special hatred and respect for Frank-
lin Roosevelt, who seemed to dominate American politics through the force 
of his personality. The depth of such sentiment manifested itself when con-
servatives talked of FDR as "that man." Newsweek columnist Ray Moley, 
who had himself broken bitterly with Roosevelt after his first term, once 
urged Republicans to stop spending so much time hating FDR. But GOP 
concentration on the Squire of Hyde Park was inevitable. A decade earlier, 
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before the 1936 election, Roosevelt had told Moley, "There is one issue in 
this campaign. It's myself and people must be either for me or against 
me." 17 That situation never changed. As Taft grudgingly admitted in early 
April, "If Roosevelt lives forever, and gets re-elected, it might be hope-
less .... " 18 
In the face of FDR's Democratic challenge, the Republican Right was 
determined to maintain the GOP faith. It rejected "patty-cake" politics. Re-
publicans must oppose, not ape, the New Deal. In contrast to the liberal 
and moderate Republicans whose "me-too" positions blurred distinctions, 
the Republican Right wanted to offer fundamentally different approaches to 
domestic and international problems; the parties should have radical dis-
agreements between them. Conservative Republicans correctly detected the 
political pitfalls of "me-too" Republicanism. Their ally in criticism of "Re-
publican New Dealers" ironically was FDR, who constantly belittled moder-
ate Republican claims that they could run New Deal programs better. For 
Republican Right Wingers, fair, efficient, and economical administration of 
the New Deal was intrinsically impossible. Such programs were unwise, un-
wanted, and unconstitutional, and politically unprofitable. As Daniel Reed, 
conservative Republican from upstate New York, saw it: "We cannot out-do 
the New Deal in a spending program of waste, extravagance and infla-
tion." 19 
Paradoxically, the failure of GOP conservatives to nominate and the Re-
publican party to elect a candidate after 1936 bolstered the Republican 
Right's political claims. Roosevelt's victories, conservatives contended, were 
largely personal victories, unrelated to program or philosophy. But Right 
Wing Republicans also held that GOP "kingmakers"-primarily from the 
East-had plotted over the years to persuade Republicans to name "me-too" 
standard-bearers who differed not at all from New Deal Democrats. This 
contention had real meaning for Right Wing Republicans, although it ig-
nored the very significant non-"me-too" positions of Roosevelt's Republican 
presidential opponents. After unprecedented losses in the 1934 congres-
sional elections, Republicans nominated Kansas governor Alfred Landon for 
president in 1936. Landon ran on a fairly liberal platform, and the voters 
again chose Roosevelt-overwhelmingly. Landon's failure to defend Hoov-
er's record and his silence on constitutional issues irked the former pres-
ident, who blamed these omissions for Landon's dismal showing. Landon, 
in turn, thought he knew what ailed the 1936 Republican campaign effort: 
"the appearance that the Old Guard (i.e. Hoover and his conservative back· 
ers) was still doing business at the same old stand. " 20 
Despite substantial gains in the 1938 congressional elections, the Re-
publican party was desperate by 1940 and fell prey to a savvy band of ama-
teurs. On the sixth ballot of the 1940 GOP convention, Democratic ren-
egade Wendell Willkie won the party's nomination before going on to lose 
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to FOR by some five million votes. Although Willkie in 1940 ran ahead of 
Landon's 1936 showing, he encountered even greater hostility within the 
party in defeat. Willkie's lack of partisanship accounted for much of this 
hostility. Not only did he declare in his acceptance speech that "party lines 
are down," rattling Republicans who liked their politics orderly, but this 
former Democrat also snubbed local Republican politicos throughout the 
campaign. Willkie's post-convention organization was amateurish, chaotic, 
and ineffective--"a whore house on a Saturday night when the madam is 
out," claimed one Willkie aide. 21 Willkie further compounded his' troubles 
after the election by trying to shepherd the GOP along more liberal, more 
internationalist lines. His One World, a best-seller in 1943, consolidated in-
ternal party isolationist resistance, and his inattention to political detail and 
local leaders reduced his weight within the party. 
In 1944, Thomas E. Dewey, governor of New York since 1942, won the 
party's nomination but then lost to Roosevelt-the Republicans' fourth con-
secutive presidential defeat-as Taft and others muttered. about the candi-
date's dawdling and about the Dewey team's predilection for "the New 
York viewpoint." 22 But Dewey's presidential bid impressed some. His team 
had begun much-needed work on the national organization. Dewey was 
young, and the electoral statistics had a bright side. He lost by a smaller plu-
rality than any contender that year. Moreover, since 1924, no presidential 
loser had topped Dewey's 99 electoral votes. These figures, however, left 
one critic unmoved. "Mr. Dewey and his blueprinters had better forget 
about the smallest margin since 1916; it means nothing," Bernard DeVoto 
wrote in Harper's magazine. "The crucial question is whether or not the Old 
Guard is going to remain in power. " 23 
The Republican Old Guard. The term itself had first appeared at the 
1880 Republican convention when a group working for the renomination of 
former President U.S. Grant identified themselves by badges bearing the 
legend "The Old Guard." Over the years, "Old Guard" came to define reg-
ular or organization Republicans, primarily economic conservatives. The 
Old Guard, however much it differed from one era to the next, represented 
one of the critical factions in a perennial intraparty struggle. 
The political and economic hard times of the 1930s obviously created 
many new party fissures. FOR and the challenge of the New Deal, the de-
pleted GOP congressional ranks, and the party's repeated failures in pres-
idential elections made united policy all the more important-and all the 
more difficult to achieve. Roosevelt's skilled use of divide-and-conquer tac-
tics especially compounded GOP woes. 
Indeed, so pressing was concern over GOP harmony by September, 
1943, that a Republican Postwar Advisory Council met with limited success 
at Mackinac Island, Michigan. By the close of the Roosevelt reign, there were 
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obviously many kinds of Republicans and many valid ways to dissect theRe-
publican party, a condition that persisted duri~g the years from 1945 to 
1965. 
The Republican party was neither as neatly nor as deeply divided as the 
Democratic party. The Democracy basically broke horizontally, North-
South, over race and related issues like states' rights. Republican party divi-
sions, on the other hand, were less visceral but far more complex, and any 
broad categories must give on specific issues. Local pressures naturally af-
fected GOP ideological concerns, making intraparty barriers easily breached. 
"I doubt that any member of Congress, whatever his political philosophy in 
general, adheres rigidly to any mainstream of political thought," Ohio sen-
ator John Bricker once told historian Eric Goldman. Bricker also noted that 
his congressional colleagues would be hard pressed to describe their partic-
ular philosophy "without elaborate qualification." 24 
Yet a general kind of sorting, imprecise thought it was, was useful to 
Republicans themselves. Whether to designate or denigrate, terms like "Old 
Guard," "Conservative," "Right Wing," "Modern Republican," "Liberal 
Republican," "Taftite," and "Deweyite" had meaning. They helped fash-
ion alliances and remained vital to any understanding of the battle within 
the Republican party between 1945 and 1965-and beyond. Generally in 
the 1945-1965 period, Republicans recognized themselves basically as either 
liberal, moderate, or conservative Republicans. 
Liberal Republicans believed the party had to enter the twentieth cen-
tury. Perhaps not in the same way as the Democratic party, but the GOP 
had to put forth programs offering the social services required by an urban, 
industrial people. For them, the activist state, responsible for social welfare 
programs, was no bogey. These progressive Republicans favored Republican 
legislative remedies for the ills of society. They believed that the GOP, as 
represented in Congress, was generally too negative. Liberal Republicans 
were also primarily internationalists and favored the basic approach of the 
Roosevelt administration in world affairs. Governors and congressmen with 
urban constituencies (mostly from the Northeast) ftlled this, the smallest of 
the Republican factions. 
Unlike Republican liberals, the moderates wanted to check increased ac-
tivity by the federal government. GOP moderates accepted, rather than ap-
proved of, New Deal innovations. They wanted no wrecking of New Deal 
contributions like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A) or Social Security; 
their constituents would not like that. But the moderates did favor reduced 
appropriations for New Deal welfare programs, coupled with lower taxes, a 
balanced budget, and more efficient administration. Sometimes called 
"garden variety" Republicans, these moderates were partisans, who, al-
though unready to assault the New Deal structure, pounced on Democratic 
soft spots-communists in government, high taxes, crippling government 
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regulations, corruption, and so on. Republican moderates readily supported 
internationalist foreign policy but were quicker than their liberal brethren to 
exploit Democratic blunders. Moderate Republicans constituted the largest 
and most important GOP group and held the balance of power within the 
party. They were also the most sensitive meters of public opinion. 
The willingness of liberal and moderate Republicans to go along with 
New Deal-like policies made them "me-too" Republicans, according to 
their conservative kin. Conservative Republicans-loosely dubbed "theRe-
publican Right" -chose few of their many other names: Rock-Ribbed Re-
publicans, the Dinosaur wing, Mossbacks, Hardshells, Standpatters, Nean-
derthals, and, until the young conservative influx of the early 1960s, the 
famed Old Guard. 
If one heeded professional political pundits, however, the Old Guard 
was a cold corpse indeed by 1945. During the Roosevelt era, the Old Guard 
had often been left for dead. The 1936 convention, wrote Irvin S. Cobb at 
that time, was the "quiet interment for the Old Guard." After election day, 
political sages could agree on one thing, as Newsweek noted: "the Old· 
Guard brand of Republicanism was dead." Republican triumphs in 1938 
were judged a repudiation of the Old Guard, and the Willkie and Dewey 
nominations were hardly considered Old Guard victories. Still, GOP conser-
vatism was alive in 1945-commanding the party in Congress and dominat-
ing national and state party machinery. Even the hostile remarks of Bernard 
DeVoto inJanuary, 1945, attested to Old Guard durability: The Republican 
party "can choose the Old Guard and die or choose someone else and live, 
but it must choose soon. The sun is well past midafternoon and winter days 
are short." 25 
For the Old Guard, Congress remained the primary key to its continued 
survival. As Harrison Spangler wrote, "In our successful days, the policies 
and philosophies of the Party were evolved by and through the Republican 
members of Congress ... that is the only practical way they can be worked 
out." 26 Policy worked out there, of course, would bear the Old Guard im-
press, and in 1945 Robert Taft was seeing to it that congressional Republi-
cans set policy. 
After his 1944 defeat, New York's Governor Dewey had pressed for the 
announcement of a specific Republican legislative program, inviting GOP 
congressional leaders to New York to talk about it. The Republican congres-
sional command worried that such a program might spur Democratic unity 
and Republican disunity, as well. Besides, with the war in Europe winding 
down, the times were too unsteady to set a legislative agenda with authority, 
and any Republican program would also require Democratic backing-a du-
bious prospect. More important, a program fashioned by the defeated stan-
dard-bearer would mean the surrender of power by congressional Republi-
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can leaders-leaders who were suspicious of Dewey's liberalism anyway and 
proud of their own orthodoxy. In the end, they convinced the New York 
governor of the dangers of a specific legislative program. 
By April, however, Taft was attempting to fashion some policy state-
ment "so the country may know where we stand." Dewey would have no 
part in this effort. Taft's labors came to a successful end in early December, 
1945, when House and Senate Republicans issued "a statement of aims and 
purposes." After gaining Republican National Committee (RNC) approval, 
this statement was intended to serve as a blueprint for the 1946 campaign. 
Although the input came mainly from conservatives, the statement was 
no conservative manifesto. Rather, it supplied balm for all factions and ba-
nality for its readers. The statement pledged Republican support for the 
United Nations and other international assistance, provided American self-
interest was protected. The Republicans also eschewed partisanship, "secre-
cy, inefficiency and drift" in American foreign policy. On the domestic 
front, they assailed radicalism, regimentation, bureaucracy, deficit spend-
ing, and machine politics. Equality of opportunity and economy in govern-
ment got unsurprising endorsements in the Capitol Hill document. The 
Republicans also declared their support for collective bargaining that 
recognized reason, fairness, and the rights of the general public. Most sig-
nificant for the upcoming campaign were the words "Wartime limitations, 
restrictions and controls must be removed." Hardly a war whoop, the dec-
laration was, Taft even admitted, "satisfactory, though not inspiring. " 27 
But the bland Capitol Hll document dissatisfied some hard-line Repub-
licans from the Middle and Far West who threatened to fight for the inclu-
sion of greater blasts against radicalism and labor. At the opening of the 
RNC meeting in Chicago, Illinois governor Dwight Green expressed their 
resentment: "Our party has failed nationally chiefly because it has not been 
true to the faith that is in us." 28 Nevertheless, a day later the RNC approved 
the congressional principles, but not without a c-oncession to party hard-
liners. At the urging of Illinois committeeman Werner P. Schroeder, nation-
al Chairman Herbert Brownell created a seven-man committee to revise the 
statement as events dictated. The RNC then unanimously endorsed the 
Taft-sponsored congressional statement. 
While the liberal Nation bewailed Old Guard dominance at Chicago, 
the Chicago Tribune thought the congressional statement "wishwashy" and 
advised the Republicans to unearth some "fresh platitudes." 29 Despite the 
Tribune's displeasure, Republican solons had wisely pussyfooted on the 
statement of principles. The postwar scene was too unsettled, party unity too 
important for the victory-starved Republicans. Caution was good politics. 
Besides, the Old Guard still retained control in party councils and had 
yielded only slightly to preserve party harmony. And with the creation of the 
seven-man subcommittee, even more determined hard-liners were given a 
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voice in the future statement. (Four months later, the National Committee 
accepted this subcommittee's update-a peppery catalogue of Democratic 
failings.) Moreover, noneastern influence was acknowledged not only in the 
conference's handiwork but outside the official proceedings, as well. Taft's 
and Bricker's names, for example, were on many tongues at Chicago as pos-
sible 1948 presidential candidates. 
The various sectional, ideological, and personal strains within the GOP 
became evident again when Herbert Brownell-a Dewey campaign hold-
over-indicated in early 1946 that he would resign as national chairman in 
April in order to devote more time to his law practice and his family. With a 
Democrat in the White House, the party chairmanship-a control post of 
the national party machinery-was especially prized, and news ofBrownell's 
departure naturally sparked talk of his successor. Tending to view the con-
flict in the context of 1948 presidential politics, pundits and politicos both 
watched developments with interest. 
By mid-March, Taft was lobbying openly for Representative B. Carroll 
Reece of Tennessee. Reece's rival in the Dewey camp was John A. Danaher 
of Connecticut. Like Brown and Reece, he also had Capitol Hill ties. A for-
mer senator and now a congressional aide for the RNC, Danaher shared 
Reece's approach to foreign and domestic questions-an indication that at 
the moment differences between the Dewey and Taft camps were slight. 
But, when the RNC finally met in Washington on April 1, Reece be-
came the new national chairman on a third ballot. Mter his selection was 
made unanimous, Danaher rose and offered to help Reece-a gesture that 
initially underscored the amicable tone of the gathering. At this time divi-
sions between moderates and conservatives were neither deep nor acrimoni-
ous. The two main contenders agreed on much; their differences were sec-
tional, not political or philosophical. Besides, Reece had won with both 
conservative and moderate support. 
In April, 1946, B. Carroll Reece was no household word. But Reece was 
well known in the halls of Congress and the hills of northeastern Tennessee. 
Lawyer, teacher, banker, and World War I hero, Reece had come to Con-
gress at age thirty-one on the Harding coattails in 1920. And, except in 
1930, Reece had won reelection ever since. In the House, he had made a 
staunchly conservative record in domestic affairs and a "noninterventionis-
tic" one in the foreign field. Yet only Reece's record was staunch; a soft-
spoken affability marked all his dealings in Congress. 
Although news-hungry reporters naturally highlighted an exceedingly 
mild anti-Reece remark by unofficial presidential candidate Harold Stassen, 
the selection of Reece actually pleased the majority of Republicans. Dewey 
quickly pledged his support to Reece, and Taft immediately proclaimed the 
new chairman "very satisfactory." Colonel Robert R. McCormick's Chicago 
Tribune hailed the choice both as "a victory for real Republicans and a dis-
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tinct setback for the Me-Too Republicans." 30 Some other papers saw in 
Reece's selection a win for the Old Guard, or "the champions of reaction," 
as the Philadelphia Record expressed it.3' But Taft himself placed Reece's 
election in a clearer perspective: "It is really a victory for the Republicans in 
the House of Representatives, who felt very strongly that the campaign this 
fall should be conducted with a single thought to the election of a Republi-
can House of Representatives." 32 
On April 12, 1945, the Republican Right lost a bete noire and gained 
an opportunity. In Warm Springs, Georgia, Roosevelt died, and an era 
closed. Vice-President Harry S. Truman became president, leaving the fu-
ture of American liberalism, as historian Alonzo Hamby has written, in "a 
fog of uncertainty." 33 A goodwill visit by the Republican Steering Commit-
tee signaled, many believed, a new day in executive-congressional relations. 
"I am hopeful," Indiana's Capehart wrote Herbert Hoover, "that things 
may be some better under President Truman." 34 
Truman was a man of the Senate, and this encouraged hope. After the 
aristocratic Roosevelt, Truman's homely way appealed to the Congress and 
prompted early GOP goodwill. Before becoming vice-president, Truman 
had been a solid if inconspicuous second-term senator from Missouri. Be-
sides conducting an unsplashy investigation of waste and corruption in the 
defense effort, Senator Truman had consistently voted for the New Deal. 
But his loyalty was to party, not ideology, and he remained friends with 
anti-New Deal Democrats. 35 By temperament and geographical base, the 
senator from Missouri was the ideal border-state Democrat, a fact that had 
made him Roosevelt's runningmate in 1944. A bespectacled, natty little 
man, Truman was popular in the Senate, but he could be intensely combat-
ive under fire. Taft admitted he was a "straightforward fra~k man," who 
had "a quality of decision which is a good thing in an executive." However, 
Taft also noted that Truman's decisiveness was often only "impulsive-
ness. " 36 
Truman inherited all sorts of problems at home and abroad. In Europe, 
the final assault on Hitler's Germany had begun, and many new issues 
sprouted on the battlefield. Control of eastern Europe and growing tensions 
between the United States and the Soviet Union became major concerns. 
The San Francisco conference, which officially launched the United Nations, 
also became a showcase for the breakup of the wartime Grand Alliance and 
convinced Americans that the Soviets were to blame for most postwar diffi-
culties. 
Even as Germany was caving in and European postwar problems were 
emerging, Allied men and materiel were being shifted to the Pacific. Allied 
planners anticipated that it would take a year, perhaps longer, and a million 
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American casualties to crush Japan. The atomic bomb, of course, over-
whelmed these plans. The blasting of Hiroshima and Nagasaki abbreviated 
the conflict, and by August 14, World War II was suddenly over. In the rev-
elry that erupted, America's postwar Asian problems were temporarily ob-
scured, especially the hope of making China a great pro-Western power. As 
the war ended, the Communists of Mao Tse-tung and the Nationalists of 
Chiang Kai-shek were preparing to resume their civil war. 
But it was domestic matters that first absorbed war-weary Americans-
jobs, homes, and meat on the table. The war's abrupt end added to the 
usual problems of demobilization. Jobs were an important matter, as the 
army disgorged 200,000-300,000 men a month. Yet prices not jobs, infla-
tion not depression, proved to be the first major postwar issue. The economy 
quickly absorbed postwar job-seekers. Meanwhile, prices soared as the econ-
omy retooled and people began to spend their wartime savings. There were 
shortages and black markets. Truman's State of the Union message calling 
for price controls to continue for another year refueled a battle that had 
raged since the end of the European war in May. Business wanted to strike 
these wartime "shackles from American business." 
Led by Taft, the Congress passed a price control bill that hobbled the 
Office of Price Administration (OPA) and its pricing structure. OnJune 25, 
1946, with a blast at Congress, Truman vetoed the bill. Without any con-
trols, prices suddenly skyrocketed. In July, 1946, the index of retail prices 
jumped twenty points, only ten points lower than it had risen during the en-
tire war. In August, Congress attempted to end the frenzy with a short-term 
price control bill freighted with restrictions, which Truman reluctantly ac-
cepted. The index, however, climbed, another twenty points by year's end. 
When take-home pay failed to keep pace, trouble on the labor front in-
evitably ensued. Labor chieftains planned to recoup these losses as well as 
win raises denied during the war. The first major postwar strike occurred 
with the United Auto Workers struck General Motors in November, 1945. 
Strikes in steel, coal, and transportation followed, as 1946 became a year of 
labor unrest with strikes in the coal fields triggering brownouts, shortening 
work weeks, and causing factory closings. In the spring of 1946, stalled rail-
road talks so exasperated President Truman that he asked Congress for au-
thority to draft striking railworkers. The Senate refused. When the coal 
miners struck, Truman seized the mines. 
Although strikers often won new wage increases, the labor movement in 
general suffered as antilabor sentiment grew. Drastic pay demands, jurisdic-
tional strikes, and news of communist-infiltrated unions helped shape pop-
ular beliefs on labor. United Mine Workers president John L. Lewis, pomp-
ous and arrogant, personified a labor movement that, in many eyes, had 
grown disdainful of the commonweal. In 1946 Congress responded through 
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the Case bill, an attempt to remedy the imbalance in labor-capital relations 
by revising the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. A Truman veto killed 
the bill. 
As the ftrst postwar congressional elections of 1946 approached, it was 
clear that Truman intended to continue FDR's New Deal policies. Taft and 
other Republicans could only hope that Truman lacked Roosevelt's appeal. 37 
At the moment, Truman and his party were scapegoats for foreign policy re-
verses, the high price of steak, and the misdeeds of John L. Lewis. Moreover, 
many issues divided the Democrats. Southerners realized shortly after Tru-
man took over that while he downed their bourbon, his policies were pro-
urban and pro-North. Liberal Democrats likewise had great doubts about 
Truman. He was certainly no Roosevelt. Entering the presidency, Truman 
had capitalized on his simplicity and his commonness. By November, 1946, 
however, the GOP was preparing to capitalize on the growing popular view 
that Harry was too simple and too common. Taft's wife, Martha, concluded, 
"To Err is Truman," and this pun made the political rounds. "If Truman 
wanted to elect a Republican Congress," Taft wrote to Dewey in the fall of 
1946, "he could not be doing a better job." 38 
Arrogant labor bosses, government meddling in the economy, Demo-
cratic "cronyism, " and foreign policy worries and blunders-all these were 
tailor-made Republican issues, particularly Right Wing Republican issues. 
And Democrats could no longer count on the political magic of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. But the GOP was asking voters to do something they had not 
done for sixteen years: return a Republican majority to Congress. Writing in 
early 1946, Alf Landon correctly gauged the importance of the upcoming 
congressional election: "If the Republicans don't win the National House 




"What a glorious victory for the freedom loving citizens of this Republic!" 
crowed Daniel Reed. His fellow representative Howard Buffett of Nebraska 
called the returns "a titanic ballot-box uprising." US News, in turn, said the 
1946 elections represented "a new cycle in American political history." The 
Chicago Tribune was absolutely giddy, calling the outcome "the greatest 
victory for the Republic since Appomattox." 1 
The Republicans had at last recaptured Congress. In the Senate, theRe-
publicans gained twelve seats, for a 51-to-45-vote majority. In the House, 
they held a 242-to-188 command. The GOP carried twenty-eight of thirty-
six states outside of the Solid South. Moreover, certain GOP presidential 
prospects won big, thus bolstering the notion that the 1946 congressional 
elections were only a harbinger of 1948. 
The defeat of important New Dealers by conservative Republicans was 
added cause for revelry. In the spring of 1946, Time and its "political dope-
sters" had named the Pennsylvania Senate contest "a key race." And after 
election day, the Pennsylvania race did tell the story of the 1946 elections. 
Ardent New Dealer and state Democratic boss Joseph Guffey fell to Edward 
Martin. Despite a liberal record as governor of the Keystone State, Martin 
himself often bragged of his ties to Old Guard boss Boies Penrose and An-
drew Mellon, secretary of the treasury during the 1920s; his future votes 
were therefore being counted on as "uncompromisingly conservative." 2 
Other avowed right-wingers came to Capitol Hill in the "Class of 
1946." Delaware cashieredJames M. Tunnell, a New Deal loyalist, andre-
turned John J. Williams, a political tyro who ran against government con-
trols. Montana sent its first Republican to the Senate in thirty-three years, 
electing Zales Ecton over left-wing Leif Erickson. Campaigning against New 
Deal bureaucracy and Pendergastism, James P. Kern crushed Frank P. 
Briggs, the Missouri Democrat who had filled Truman's seat since 1945. 
There were other winners who would later play important roles on the Re-
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publican Right. Conservative-isolationist Representative Henry C. Dwor-
shak became Idaho's senator. In Nevada, George W. "Molly" Malone won a 
Senate seat by assailing the OPA. And Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin 
hustled his way into the Senate, first edging out progressive incumbent 
Robert M. La Follette, Jr., in the GOP primary and then winning easily in 
the fall with the slogan "Congress Needs a Tail Gunner." 
William Jenner of Indiana and William F. Knowland of California, 
both elected in 1946, also later became important figures in the Republican 
Right. Like others, Jenner, who had been appointed to a partial term in 
1944, attacked the economics of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. 
Amid shortages, jungles of bureaucracy, and high prices, Jenner had cried 
out on behalf of "the forgotten man." In 1945 Know land of California had 
been appointed to that body by Governor Earl Warren to complete the term 
of the deceased Hiram Johnson. Now, Knowland walloped the popular Will 
Rogers, Jr., for election in his own right. 
Of immediate interest, however, was the election of Ohio's Governor 
John W. Bricker to the Senate. Tall and handsome with premature gray 
hair, Bricker was an effective speaker with a melodic voice. Bricker had al-
ready served four consecutive two-year terms as Ohio governor. In 1944, 
with Taft's support, Bricker campaigned for the GOP presidential nomina-
tion and had to settle for the second spot on the ticket, but Bricker's claim to 
60 percent of the vote in the 1946 Buckeye Senate race heightened specula-
tion on a renewed presidential bid. Still, Bricker had his critics. Some feared 
his good looks and winning ways obscured an exceptionally shallow mind. 
William Allen White of the Emporia Gazette had concluded, "Bricker is an 
honest Harding. Thumbs down." 3 In another significant return on election 
day 1946, Bricker's former ticketmate, Thomas Dewey, won reelection as 
governor of New York by more than the half-million-vote plurality pundits 
had said he needed to stake a presidential claim for 1948. 
Before the election, Democratic congressional boss Sam Rayburn had 
groaned, "This is going to be a damn beefsteak election. "4 Indeed, many 
Republicans of the so-called "Meatshortage Congress" ascribed their GOP 
victories in 1946 to resentment over the price of steak. Of course, more than 
meat was involved; labor problems, housing shortages, building restric-
tions-all the problems of reconversion-contributed to Republican victory. 
The candidates themselves found the major issues to be communism, the ac-
tivities of labor political action committees (PACs), foreign affairs, and 
economy in government. "People are fed up with the bureaucratic, corrupt, 
conniving, Communist cabal of controls," one GOP winner flatly con-
cluded. "The Republican ticket," he quickly added, "apparently gave assur-
ances of trading horsemeat for horse sense."~ A young California Republican 
by the name of Richard M. Nixon won a House seat in 1946 with an anti-
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labor campaign, handing out plastic thimbles labeled "Elect Nixon and 
Needle the P.A.C." 
"Had Enough?" the Republican slogan had asked, and apparently the 
voters had. But enough of what? What kind of mandate, in brief, did the 
GOP win? Were the voters only vexed by the headaches of postwar reconver-
sion and the failures of Harry Truman? Or was there a more profound un-
happiness with the reforms of the New Deal? Roben Taft returned to Wash-
ington convinced that beefsteak was, for the voters, only a symbol of faulty 
past Democratic policies. Republican winners, after months on the hustings, 
naturally saw in the returns an endorsement of their standard stump 
speeches. Among those political expens who rejected their elated musings 
was pollster Louis H. Bean. Warning that congressional elections seldom 
mandate anything, Bean found no evidence that people had voted against 
the social, economic, and international programs of the New Deal but in-
stead attributed Republican victory to the rising cost of living and a small 
voter turnout-the upshot of apathy or discontent with Truman's reconver-
sion policies. 6 Sharing Bean's concern that the Republicans might misread 
the November returns and mindful of Republican negativism during the 
New Deal, Life magazine warned, "they may be tempted to launch an orgy 
of mere de-controlling, repealing-a saturnalia of sauve que peut. If they so 
interpret their mandate they will regret it." 7 
But these were heady days for Republicans, and they were unfazed by 
such warnings. National Chairman Reece boasted that Republicans would 
liquidate 90 percent of the federal bureaucracy-a move that would, some 
scribes joked, disrupt the care and feeding of congressmen. Harold Knutsen, 
chairman-to-be of the House Ways and Means Committee, declared he was 
going to slash income taxes 20 percent for 1947. He also promised to balance 
the budget and trim the national debt. Ohio's Clarence Brown prophesied, 
"We will open with a prayer and close with a probe." Indeed, probes of 
almost every aspect of New Deal foreign and domestic affairs were antic-
ipated. "Given a Republican Congress," a delighted Westbrook Pegler ex-
claimed, "the Pentagon Building may yet be put to good use as a prison to 
house the grafters and other miscreants of the long debauch. It will be a 
tight fit at that. " 8 
On election night 1946, as RepublicanJoseph Martin sat in the office of 
his Evening Chronicle in North Attleboro, Massachusetts, his political career 
was about to take a new turn. His own reelection had been constant since he 
had first gone to congress in 1924, but after his 1946 victory he was slated to 
be Speaker of the House. 
Martin had commanded House Republicans since 1938, gagging them 
in those early days, letting Democrats scrap among themselves, and deliver-
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ing Republican votes to kill New Deal bills. A former Republican National 
Committee Chairman and always a possible compromise presidential can-
didate, Martin was so prominent that FOR had included him in his famous 
"Martin, Barton and Fish" litany. It was admitted that Martin would bring 
no flashy parliamentary skills to the Speaker's post. But he had close ties 
with southern Democrats and usually could count on a party discipline 
achieved at no cost to his casual good nature. 
The post of majority leader was not so open and shut. There were sev-
eral claimants. "Hell, I am the next majority leader," Charles A. Halleck 
had boasted in mid-November-a typical brisk and blunt Halleck remark. 9 
But this fourteen-year Indiana representative had reason for confidence, 
since reportedly he was Martin's pick for the job. Moreover, as recent chair-
man of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, Halleck had 
signed campaign checks and talked to most new members. 
But Halleck's election became entangled in 1948 presidential politics. 
Clarence Brown, Taft's floor manager in the 1940 GOP convention and 
Bricker's campaign manager in 1944, was also running for the majority post. 
Brown was popular in the House and had secured his reputation as an able 
strategist when he directed the RNC's election campaign. But Brown's ties 
to Taft and Bricker hurt him. Some House members were reluctant, given 
Taft's power in the Senate, to place the House also under Buckeye com-
mand. If Brown's Taft and Bricker connections put the majority leader's race 
in the presidential context, so did Dewey's subsequent endorsement of Hal-
leck. 
Actually, little save their backers divided Halleck and Brown; these two 
personal friends both opposed FOR's policies. But with Dewey behind Hal-
leck and Taft behind Brown, the contest was naturally seen as a rehearsal for 
1948. When House Republicans caucused in early January, the Taft-Brown 
forces, apparently realizing their weaknesses, finally let Halleck become ma-
jority leader. Yet Dewey's meddling had irked many GOP representatives. 
Halleck's designation was probably more of a defeat for Taft forces in the 
House than a clear-cut Dewey victory. 
Conservative Republicans filled most of the major House chairman-
ships. Reforms had not yet gutted the seniority system; Republicans who 
had piled up seniority during the long Republican drought were usually 
from safe, rural districts that had consistently elected opponents of FOR's 
New Deal and foreign policy. Harold Knutsen, who was in line to chair the 
Ways and Means Committee, possessed an isolationism so deep that before 
Pearl Harbor he had commended Hitler's "forebearance" and had claimed 
that he could not see "much difference between Germany's action in Nor-
way and the New Deal program in this country." 10 John "Meat Axe" Taber, 
whose thunderings against a wages and hours bill in 1940 had allegedly re-
stored the hearing of a hitherto deaf colleague, became the self-styled 
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"watchdog of the Treasury" as chairman of the Appropriations Committee. 
Jesse Wolcott, a Michigan conservative with a knack for finances and debate, 
took over the Banking and Currency Committee, and conservative J. Parnell 
Thomas of New Jersey was in charge of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, however, was headed 
by Charles Eaton, a liberal internationalist. Nonetheless, Right Wing Re-
publicans clearly controlled the House. 
In the Senate the story was similar. The Old Guard dominated the high 
command. Taft, of course, had great power in the Senate, but he ruled 
through compromise and maneuver. He had his opponents-and from 
widely divergent elements of the party. Conservative Kenneth Wherry and 
liberal Wayne Morse, for example, had each said that Taft would be unac-
ceptable as Senate majority leader, and there was talk of a "fight to the bit-
ter end." Taft probably could have won any such skirmish, but there were 
good reasons to avoid it. Taft's real power in the Senate was secure anyway, 
and the responsibility of floor leadership would shackle him as 1948 ap-
proached. Ultimately elected as GOP Senate floor leader was Wallace H. 
White of Maine, an elderly New Englander who was a moderate internation-
alist and who planned to retire at the end of the Eightieth Congress. Since 
he readily deferred to Taft, the Ohioan in reality was the majority leader, 
and White never had any illusions about this. One wag suggested easing 
GOP signal-calling by placing a rearview mirror on White's desk twelve rows 
in front ofTaft's. 11 
Taft could well afford to let White exercise nominal control, since Mr. 
Republican headed the important Steering or Policy Committee, where he 
earlier consolidated his hold on Senate Republicans, injecting them with 
discipline and direction. The committee met weekly and was largely com-
posed of orthodox Republicans. Those who held other important posts 
added to the Right Wing tilt. Chief among them was Kenneth Wherry. In 
1946 no one to Taft's right had more clout than Wherry-blunt, tough, and 
rambunctious. Even some of Taft's moves drew Wherry's thunder, and this 
sometimes posed problems for both Taft and the Republican Right. 
Wherry's days as progressive Senator George Norris's "errand boy" were far 
behind him. A staunch conservative-or, as he called it, "fundamental-
ist" -Republican, the former errand boy succeeded in unhorsing Norris in 
1942. Wherry, an old carnival barker, was always a talker, and when he left 
for the Senate, his father counseled, "Ken, remember to keep your big 
mouth shut." Ken ignored his father's advice with such wayward intensity 
that over the years he peppered Senate debate with numerous "Wherry-
isms": verbal misfirings like "Indigo China," "the issue is clear and indis-
tinct to me," and that Truman was "sugar-coating his red ink." 12 In spite of 
these malapropisms, "Lightnin' Ken" rose quickly among Senate Republi-
cans, and the "beefsteak" election of 1946 made him majority whip. 
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Except for the Foreign Relations Committee, which Arthur Vandenberg 
of Michigan guided along internationalist paths, major Senate committee 
chairmanships were squarely in Old Guard hands after 1946. Styles Bridges 
of New Hampshire presided over the Appropriations Committee; Wayland 
Brooks of Illinois handled the Rules Committee; and South Dakota's Chan 
Gurney was at Military Affairs. By right of seniority, Taft was expected to 
head the Finance Committee. But Eugene Millikin of Colorado, "who 
looked and voted like an austere banker" and had impressed Taft, was re-
warded with the Finance chairmanship. Taft, in turn, took over the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, a hot spot, over the protests of George 
Aiken of Vermont, a scrappy liberal Republican who was in line for the 
chairmanship of Education and Labor. 
Truman had said little while watching the Democrats lose Congress. But 
several days later, he indicated the elections had impressed him. On Novem-
ber 9, 1946, the president ended all wage, salary, and price controls except 
those on sugar, rice, and rents. Sounding like the Chamber of Commerce in 
citing the "market place" and the "law of supply and demand," Truman 
admitted price controls had lost popular favor. Then, on December 31, 
1946, the president proclaimed the end of the "period of hostilities." With 
that, eighteen emergency powers instantly died, and thirty-three other 
emergency statutes would lapse in six months, among them emergency taxes 
and the Smith-Connally War Disputes Act. Truman's declaration also de-
prived Republicans of an issue in the Eightieth Congress. Republicans hailed 
Truman's actions but promised their own scrapping of special war powers. 
There were plenty of other GOP issues. Budget and tax-cutting had a 
special political appeal for Republicans and allowed an indirect attack on the 
New Deal. During the campaign, Taber pledged to brandish a "sledgeham-
mer" and knock $9 billion from the budget; on election night Knutsen re-
peated his campaign boast of lopping 20 percent off income taxes across the 
board. Under the new Reorganization Act of 1946, the Republican Congress 
did deal with the budget quickly. OnJanuary 10, 1947, Truman proposed 
his budget for fiscal 1948-expenditures of $37.5 billion. What Truman 
called "a tight budget," Republicans called "a cold shock." Although Taber 
was unable to remove his $9 billion, the Joint Committee on the Economy 
voted for a $6 billion cut over the protests of Taft and other Senate Republi-
cans, who favored cuts of only $4.5 billion. Taft believed it a "tremendous 
mistake" for Republicans "to quibble" over the total reduction, the lower 
figure being "just as good" for political purposes. 13 
In the end Bridges and Wherry supported the Economy committee's 
figure, but Vandenburg, White, and Millikin backed Taft. Taft won, the 
Senate voting, 51 to 31, in favor of the lower Taft figure. Opposition to 
Taft, however, cropped up in another quarter. William F. Knowland of Cal-
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ifornia wanted $3 billion earmarked for payment on the national debt. Ob-
viously, this tactic would delay a tax cut, a Taft priority. Taft agreed to $1 
billion for mandatory payment, then finally fell back to a $2 billion figure. 
But Knowland held firm, and Taft lost-the Senate ticketing $2.6 billion 
for debt payment. Ironically, after this Senate squabbling, the House rat-
ified the joint committee's preferred figures, and when the House-Senate 
conference deadlocked, Congress adjourned without a legislative budget. As 
a result, budget reduction came through cuts in individual appropriations 
bills, usually with the Senate tempering the more slash-happy House. 
The tax-cutting problem proved barely more solvable as Republicans 
again suffered from their own differences. Knutsen, chairman of the House 
Ways and Means committee, had already indicated on election night that he 
favored a 20-percent slash in taxes. Although other Republicans-Taft, for 
instance-agreed that total relief should be about 20 percent, they felt that 
such a severe horizontal cut on all taxes was too drastic. In this matter, the 
ardor of GOP representatives clearly outstripped that of GOP senators and, 
in the first month of the Eightieth Congress, an interbranch-intraparty con-
frontation loomed. Finally, Speaker Martin decided to intervene in this 
"spectacle." The Republican goal was still20 percent, explained Martin, but 
GOP tax bill writers had to consider other goals like payment on the nation-
al debt and a balanced budget. 
Ultimately, Knutsen's Ways and Means committee produced H.R. 1. It 
was not all that Knutsen had promised on election night, but it did provide 
for tax cuts ranging from 30 percent for the lower income brackets to 10.5 
percent at the top levels. After making some revisions that gave further tax 
relief to lower income taxpayers, the Senate passed the House measure. The 
House members of the conference committee basically accepted these Senate 
changes onJune 1, 1947. Two weeks later, calling the bill inflationary and 
"neither fair nor equitable," Truman vetoed it. The House failed to over-
ride. Just a month later, another Republican tax cut bill suffered a similar 
fate as the Senate failed by five votes to override a Truman veto. 
During the second session, a tax cut was finally achieved. Presidential 
election-year realities prompted additional Democratic and Republican sup-
port. Furthermore, Republicans revised their tax bills in 1948, and this 
helped Democrats buck their president and back the proposed cuts. The 
new Republican bill cut tax rates to levels just below those of the 1947 pro-
posals. It also included a number of general exemptions as well as income-
splitting provisions for couples. The House approved the bill, 297 to 120. In 
the end, all Senate Republicans along with thirty Democrats backed the bill, 
which had been further revised. Truman then vetoed it, railing against its 
unsound economics and inequities. But this time both houses held firm and 
thus fulfilled a GOP campaign pledge. Still, it was a limited victory. Repub-
licans had to pay for Democratic support by sponsoring a diluted tax bill. 
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Another thorny issue that appeared in the early days of the Eightieth 
Congress was that of atomic energy control, and it involved an old target of 
conservative GOP opposition to the New Deal, David E. Lilienthal. Lilien-
thal had been director of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the most 
extensive of New Deal reform efforts. Tough, able, ambitious, and artic-
ulate, he typified the New Deal bureaucrat. Now Truman was naming him 
to another major post as chairman of the new Atomic Energy Commission. 
Lilienthal was automatically sure of one Senate foe, Democrat Kenneth 
McKellar of Tennessee. Before the Senate wing of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, McKellar, a nonmember but a "guest inquisitor," badgered 
Lilienthal for almost three weeks, contending the former TV A administrator 
followed the "Communist line." 
From the beginning, Lilienthal's confirmation was in trouble-and not 
just because of McKellar. "Mr. Lilienthal is an extreme New Dealer," Styles 
Bridges exclaimed in early February. In claiming this, the New Hampshire 
senator was indicting, not describing Lilienthal. Bridges's objections, unlike 
the personal ones of McKellar, were purely political. Bridges judged the last 
election to represent a repudiation of Lilienthal and the New Deal philos-
ophy. The New Hampshire senator would therefore oppose the nomination 
of Lilienthal, who Bridges claimed could "probably spend Government 
money . . . faster than almost any other man in the country." 14 
There were other opponents such as Kenneth Wherry and Oklahoma 
Republican senator E.H. Moore. A major blow to Lilienthal's chances came 
on February 22, when Taft joined the opposition. The Ohio senator placed 
the issue squarely in the context of the previous fall's election. "Mr. Lilien-
thal is a typical power-hungry bureaucrat," he explained, "one of the group 
of men who, in recent years, dominated the thinking of perhaps half of the 
Government departments and bureaus in the manner seen so clearly in the 
administration of the OPA." 15 While Taft based his opposition on "govern-
ment philosophy," Senator Bricker said the main issue was Lilienthal's ad-
ministrative incompetence. 
Debate on the Lilienthal nomination began on March 10, 1947. With 
Bricker and Taft leading the opposition, a serious Republican rift appeared 
in the person of Senator Vandenberg. Secretary of State George Marshall 
had personally sought Vandenberg's help on the Lilienthal matter. Waiting 
until Lilienthal's enemies had spoken, Vandenberg rebutted them. In the 
end, his support clinched it for Lilienthal, as seventeen other Republicans 
joined Vandenberg to defeat a Bricker motion to recommit the nomination. 
But the entire Senate GOP leadership-Bridges, Taft, Wherry, and 
White-opposed Lilienthal's nomination. On April 9, when the Senate 
voted, SO to 31, to confirm Lilienthal, Senate Republicans were badly di-
vided on the issue. While a conservative like Millikin voted for Lilienthal, a 
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liberal like Flanders stuck with Taft and Bridges. Generally, however, liberal 
Republicans voted for Lilienthal, and Right Wing Republicans opposed the 
"extreme New Dealer." 
Clearly, the first days of the Eightieth Congress were troubled ones for 
the victorious Republicans. Difficult issues, poor coordination, and rivalries 
within the party pl;tgued their efforts. Republicans in Congress clashed over 
fundamentals and the meaning of the election. The root of GOP woes was 
essentially political and remained so. Writing later, liberal Senator Ray-
mond Baldwin of Connecticut, showing his own bias, claimed, "Everyone 
but die-hard Republicans will admit we started off very badly." 16 
George Aiken certainly agreed. By February, Aiken was chiding party 
chieftains for spoiling GOP prospects in 1948 with a "narrow and reaction-
ary" GOP program. 17 Chairman Reece, meanwhile, tried to spur Republican 
unity. A Reece editorial in the party's Republican News of March coached 
congressmen on team play. "A successful team ... executes the signals 
called by a duly chosen quarterback," said Reece. But Reece's coaching only 
brought about a locker room revolt. Wayne Morse immediately called Reece 
the "chore boy" of the Old Guard; Reece's plea for team play was only "a 
brazen demand for reactionary control of the Republican Party. " 18 
The Gallup poll of early March touched off more GOP wrangling-and 
some conservatives now joined liberal complainers. The poll indicated that 
51 percent of the electorate would now vote for a Democratic president and 
only 49 percent would vote Republican. Truman's popularity had jumped 
six points since November. Conservative Harlan Bushfield, senator from 
South Dakota, blamed the Republicans themselves. "We have failed in 
everything which we promised the voters," he said. What had the Republi-
cans done on taxes, economy in government, and revising labor laws? "Prac-
tically nothing," Bushfield thundered. 19 
At the same time, Republican rookies in the Senate griped about these-
niority system as well as party policy. Sheer size made the GOP "Class of 
'46" unusual. The sixteen new Republicans constituted one-third of the 
Senate's entire GOP contingent. According to Connecticut's liberal GOP 
Senator Ray Baldwin, Republican freshmen were unique in their "rich back-
ground and experience." Some-Bricker, Baldwin, and Martin, for in-
stance-had been governors, and their energies and egos chafed under Sen-
ate strictures. Since the opening of Congress, these newcomers had lunched 
together on Thursdays. At these luncheons, GOP rookies, liberals and con-
servatives alike, blamed their party's early performance-whether they 
deemed it too conservative or too liberal-on the leadership's failure to use 
their talents. The Senate Republican command treated them like "little 
boys," one complained. Baldwin claimed that the result of relaxed seniority 
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rules would be more liberal policies. Conservative Republican freshmen 
shared Baldwin's impatience with the status quo but favored policies of the 
opposite kind. 20 
Such discontent finally resulted in the presentation of a round-robin let-
ter to Millikin, the chairman of the Republican conference. One thing the 
"Class of '46" demanded was more conferences. Millikin indicated he 
would be happy to oblige. Also, the new senators were offered two nonvot-
ing, rotating seats on the Senate Republican Policy Committee. Further, 
Kern and Baldwin-a conservative and a liberal-were named to the House-
Senate Policy Committee. 
"Not even in the latter stages of the New Deal," the Nation wrote in 
late March, "were the Democrats battling each other as Republicans are 
today." "Had Enough?" the Nation asked tauntingly. Shortly after the 
1946 election, Taft had warned liberal Senator Aiken about "New Deal 
writers" who would undoubtedly labor to sow dissension in Republican 
ranks. By March, 1947, however, writers-and not just New Deal writers-
needed only to report, not concoct, GOP differences. "Rumblings," "Splits 
that Trouble G. 0 .P.," and "Republican Dividing Line" were headlines that 
told the story. Newsweek wondered if restlessness might turn to revolt, and 
US News explained that no single Republican had enough power to settle 
the question: "How conservative shall the Republican Party be?" 21 
No single Republican did have full control in the Senate. Taft had 
enough pwoer to command attention, but not enough to rule absolutely. 
On domestic issues he was vulnerable at this time, both on his left and right. 
Republican presidential rivalries doubtless fostered GOP division in the ear-
ly Eightieth Congress. Yet some of the GOP problems were beyond the 
party's control. As Wallace White noted, this Republican Congress was the 
first to grapple with the reforms of the Congressional Reorganization Act of 
1946. Also, Truman had sent up many nominations in the first months, and 
these took up much congressional time. Considering these factors, the Sat-
urday Evening Post slapped at "lame-duck columnists" who disparaged the 
GOP congressional effort. "Nothing is perfect," it admonished, "but ... 
the Republicans don't look so bad except to those who wish they weren't Re-
publicans at all." 22 Fortunately for the Republicans, the conservative con-
gressional leadership's concessions to the GOP freshmen group represented 
a "turning point," and indeed, after the spring of 1947, such unruliness 
never again surfaced in the Eightieth. Differences, however, continued. The 
Republicans were never a whole and happy family. 
No domestic issue handled by the Republicans in the Eightieth Con-
gress proved to be more controversial or catalytic with regard to future Re-
publican fortunes than labor relations. Yet the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, de-
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nounced variously by its opponents as a "nightmare" and a "slave labor 
law," was neither in plan nor practice an Old Guard Republican triumph. 
Some kind of labor legislation was inevitable in the Eightieth Congress. 
For a decade there had been attempts to reform the Wagner Labor Relations 
Act of 1935, a New Deal mainstay. Postwar labor problems and the 1946 
election had moved such legislation that much closer. Even Truman asked 
Congress for labor law reform. On the opening day of the Eightieth, solons 
placed seventeen labor bills in the legislative hopper; by mid-March, that 
number had grown to over sixty-five. 
Fred A. Hartley, Jr., was an unlikely coauthor of a major piece of labor 
legislation. Until 1947 few knew of him outside the New Jersey district that 
had reelected him since 1928. Moreover, the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) had even supported his reelection in 1940. When congressional con-
servatives removed unfavored liberal Republican Richard Welch from the 
chairmanship of the Labor Committee, Hartley was next in line. 
Hartley's committee obviously knew the kind of bill it wanted, for it 
began writing it before the close of investigative hearings. As in tax and 
budget cutting, early House action with regard to labor reform was more 
drastic than the Senate's. The House bill contained several extreme provi-
sions that were inserted, Hartley later claimed, to draw fire and make the 
Senate measure appear more reasonable and thereby veto-proof. 23 In any 
case, the House, after brief debate, approved the Hartley bill, 308 to 107, 
with twenty-two Republicans opposed. 
Things were different in the Senate. There, the Taft-led Education and 
Labor Committee was dominated by Republicans, eight to five. But the 
makeup of the GOP group posed problems for Taft. To his left were two un-
ruly Republicans-Morse and Aiken-and one Dewey loyalist, Irving Ives, a 
liberal Republican from New York. As for potential trouble on his right, 
Taft also had to move warily. Joseph Ball of Minnesota favored harsher mea-
sures than Taft and had twenty to thirty likeminded senators behind him. 
Finally, there was for Taft not only the reality of a slender GOP majority in 
the Senate, but the prospect of a Truman veto in the end. 
One early Taft move to preclude a successful Truman veto was to pre-
sent an omnibus labor bill, and not a series of labor reform bills. The bill 
that emerged was Taft's handiwork; he knew when to abandon severe re-
strictions and when to acquiesce in milder demands. For example, Taft had 
supported the right of employers and employees to seek injunctions in sec-
ondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes, but when faced with committee 
opposition, he did not press the issue on the floor. When Joseph Ball per-
sisted in doing so, Taft simply abandoned him as the Senate then passed a 
more moderate Taft substitute. Even in defeat, Taft always worked to en-
hance the chances of overriding an expected presidential veto. For instance, 
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in committee Taft offered an amendment restricting industry-wide bargain-
ing, which Ives and Morse opposed. On the Senate floor, when lves barely 
mustered votes to beat Taft on this issue, Taft accepted defeat and congrat-
ulated lves. 24 On May 13, 1947, the Senate finally passed the total Taft 
package, 68 to 24. Morse and William Langer of North Dakota, two Senate 
mavericks, and Nevada's conservative freshman, Senator Malone, were the 
only Republicans opposing. 
Quickly and decisively, Congress accepted a House-Senate conference 
report that left out certain House provisions, such as a ban on industry-wide 
bargaining and subjection of unions to antitrust laws, but accepted House 
bans on strikes by government workers and campaign contributions by 
unions. Then, on June 20, the last possible day for such action, Truman 
vetoed the resultant Taft-Hartley bill. The House, 331 to 83, overrode the 
president's veto that same day. Three days later, Taft-Hartley became law 
when the Senate voted 68 to 25 to override. Mavericks Morse and Langer 
continued to be foes of the measure in the Senate. George Malone also voted 
against Taft-Hartley simply because he opposed all federal regulation of 
labor. This, he claimed, was the states' domain. 
The Taft-Hartley Act outlawed certain unfair labor practices like juris-
dictional strikes, secondary boycotts, and the refusal to bargain in good 
faith, and it banned the closed shop. A union shop, in which a worker had 
to join a union after a certain period on the job, was provided for, but states 
could prohibit compulsory membership in a union. These right-to-work 
laws, allowed under Taft-Hartley's section 14b, quickly became identified 
with conservative policies, and state right-to-work movements thereafter 
sprouted in various areas of the country. Also, Taft-Hartley required union 
leaders to sign noncommunist affidavits and unions to make yearly financial 
reports to the Labor Department and to their members. Perhaps the most 
important fearure of the Taft-Hartley Act allowed the president to seek a 
court injunction for a cooling-off period in strikes threatening a national 
emergency. 
"You have restored representative government to mastery in its own 
house," former President Hoover wrote to Taft after the successful passage 
of the Taft-Hartley Act. 25 Following this display of Taft political skill, Re-
publicans on Capitol Hill talked with renewed enthusiasm about a Taft pres-
idential bid. But many conservative Republicans and businessmen quickly 
found fault with Taft-Hartley, claiming that Taft had coddled the unions. 
Such complaints belied a knowledge of the political process in general and 
the realities of congressional power in 1947 in particular. Taft-Hartley had 
successfully revised a key tenet of the New Deal labor policy. It had also 
taken aim at one of the sources of New Deal political power: organized 
labor. Certainly it was the Republicans' most specific and important assault 
by the Eightieth Congress on the New Deal legacy. But as illustrated by the 
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grumblings of numerous conservatives, it was hardly the Old Guard tri-
umph that some liberal critics claimed. On the other hand, Taft's prudence 
and willingness to compromise-qualities essential to putting Taft-Hartley 
on the statute books-may have in the long run harmed Taft's bid for the 
GOP presidential nomination precisely because some Old Guardsmen saw 
Taft's maneuvering as cowardice and backsliding, not smart politics. 
Taft-Hartley was not the only instance during the Eightieth Congress 
when Taft confounded some Right Wing Republicans. Although a conserva-
tive himself, Taft was a "rounded" conservative. Certainly his basic princi-
ples and preferences were conservative: fiscal restraint, a balanced budget, 
state over federal authority, and so on. But Taft was no ideologue, and this 
irked the most conservative Right Wing Republicans. Part of the problem 
was the way Taft's mind worked. He studied each problem and valued the 
facts more than his preconceived notions. With these facts, Taft then fash-
ioned solutions that he hoped would complement his political principles. In 
explanation, Taft once wrote, "If the free enterprise system does not do its 
best to prevent hardship and poverty, it will find itself superseded by a less 
progressive system which does." 26 
Housing was one such example. The caustic slogan "Under Truman: 
Two Families in Every Garage" pointed up the postwar shortage of housing 
for families with low and moderate incomes. Mter thorough study, Taft had 
joined Allen Ellender of Louisiana and Robert F. Wagner of New York, the 
Senate's "Mr. New Deal," in late 1945 to sponsor housing reform. The Taft-
Ellender-Wagner bill (T-E-W) provided federal support for middle- and 
low-income housing, slum clearance, and urban renewal. The cost of the 
public housing section of the measure over the next four years was a pro-
jected $90 million. For this reason, the head of the National Association of 
Real Estate Boards called Taft "a fellow traveller held captive by the bureau-
cracy which is running this government." "We will take Taft's presidential 
nomination away from him on this issue," he addedY The Senate finally 
passed T-E-W by voice vote in 1948. In the House, however,Jesse Wolcott, 
the conservative-dominated Rules Committee, and the House leadership 
combined successfully to kill T-E-W. This failure to promote major housing 
legislation was, historian Susan Hartmann has concluded, the Eightieth 
Congress's "most notable failure." 28 
The House also foiled Taft's federal aid to education initiatives. In 1948 
Taft reintroduced a bill providing aid to poorer states for upgrading public 
education. It called for an outlay of about $300 million, as well as federal aid 
to parochial schools where states allowed it. Despite opposition from many 
quarters, the Senate finally approved Taft's proposal, 58 to 22, on April1, 
1948. Twenty-seven of the forty-four voting Republicans supported Taft. 
Although GOP conservatives like Albert Hawkes of New Jersey and James P. 
Kern of Missouri opposed Taft, numerous conservatives voted for federal 
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school aid. There were some surprising foes, too. Raymond Baldwin and 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., though liberals, had big Catholic constituencies, 
and they opposed Taft's measure. Nevertheless, after favorable Senate ac-
tion, Taft's bill languished in the House Labor and Education Committee, 
never to come to a House vote during the Eightieth Congress. 
Obviously, Taft's moves in housing and education vexed those conser-
vatives who worshipped the "let the devil take the hindmost" philosophy, as 
Taft put it. Perhaps, if pressed, some of these conservatives might have 
grudgingly conceded, as did Taft, that the federal government had to "put a 
floor under the essential things to give a minimum standard of living and all 
children an opportunity to get a start in life." 29 But no other Right Wing Re-
publican except Taft was willing to lead the way. And, given the prospect of 
additional taxes and an expanded bureaucracy to achieve such goals, few fol-
lowedhim. 
But these housing and education initiatives made good conservative 
sense to the Ohio senator. "I believe in the principles of insurance to every-
one unless he refuses to work," Taft had explained earlier in his career, "but 
it must be held within a reasonable cost, without setting up a vast Federal 
bureaucracy, without destroying local self-government, and without remov-
ing the incentive .... " Taft's biographer, James Patterson, has said that 
Taft was "consistent and seldom uninformed" in applying this philosophy. 
Taft believed that even if Congress lacked specific constitutional authority to 
spend money for general welfare, the practice was "well established" and 
would be ruled constitutional. Taft admitted that there was a "theoretical 
argument" against federal aid in matters of health, housing, and relief. But, 
he wrote, "I am quite sure that any party that took that position would have 
only a short tenure of office and the opposition party would soon enact the 
legislation anyway, in a much more extreme form." 30 
Many rock-ribbed conservatives, of course, did not agree with Taft's rea-
soning. The real estate lobbyist's tirade quoted earlier was to be expected, 
rooted as it was in special interest. But the criticism of Taft by some conser-
vatives marked highs in political stupidity. For hard-liners on the right, 
Taft's mild housing and education proposals were already "extreme forms." 
These measures had a New Deal smack. John Taber claimed Taft had no 
popular touch and was "seeking to establish himself with the public by rack-
ets" like T-E-W. Bricker reportedly offered a crisper explanation: "I hear the 
socialists have gotten to Bob Taft." Wherry also saw a "touch of socialism" 
in the senior Ohio senator.31 
On March 18, 1947, Nebraska Congressman Howard Buffett told the 
House: "I am not happy talking about foreign affairs. I would prefer to 
leave that field to others." 32 Buffett spoke for many Right Wing Republi-
cans who had isolationist roots and believed the real battle for America 
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should be waged primarily on American shores against New Deal blueprint-
ing, deficit spending, and the Roosevelt coalition. The advent of the Cold 
War, however, forced the Republican Right to confront foreign policy ques-
tions whether it really wanted to or not. 
The lines of command in the Senate with regard to foreign policy clearly 
reflected the Republican Right's emerging role. Senator Vandenberg dom-
inated foreign policy in the Senate, just as Senator Taft led in domestic af-
fairs. This arrangement-tacit and informal-was natural. Taft's paramount 
interest was domestic policy. He showed talent here, but on foreign policy, 
said William S. White, he lacked a coherent view. Furthermore, Taft 
thought Congress could have little impact on foreign policy. 33 Besides, there 
was Vandenberg. Long on seniority, political know-how, and vanity, the 
Michigan senator had definite ideas about foreign policy and the desire to 
fight for them. The former isolationist's conversion to internationalism, 
coming as it did in a much-ballyhooed speech at the war's end, made Van-
denberg's position that much more important. The Truman State Depart-
ment realized this and openly courted him. For rising above party, Vanden-
berg was hailed a statesman, and as his power grew so did his reputation for 
selfless nonpartisanship. 
Vandenberg used his power to advance the hazy concept of bipartisan-
ship. Bipartisanship stressed interparty agreement on the essentials of Amer-
ican foreign policy and no retreat from international commitments. Biparti-
sanship related primarily to European affairs, Asia and Latin America largely 
remaining outside of it. As Vandenberg once put it, "Partisan politics 
stopped at the water's edge." Differences over foreign policy should not 
"root themselves in partisanship." 34 But even for well-wishers, bipartisan-
ship posed problems. Where was the line between constructive criticism and 
partisan harping? And would not the harshest foreign policy critic always 
claim that his judgments looked to the national good and not to partisan 
gain? 
Bipartisanship had many GOP foes. These Republicans flatly rejected 
bipartisanship: it menaced the national and Republican interest. Herbert 
Hoover privately fretted over "Republican crumb-eaters of the State Depart-
ment."35 Although Wherry spearheaded open opposition to Vandenberg's 
leadership, only Taft had the intellectual and oratorical wherewithal to 
bring off such a challenge, and he had no desire to do so. 
The Taft-Vandenberg dyarchy was not without its stresses. From the 
outset of the Eightieth Congress, there were reports of trouble in this ar-
rangement. Taft believed the duty of the Republican opposition was to op-
pose-in both domestic and foreign affairs. And Taft often found fault with 
the direction of American foreign policy. But a Taft-Vandenberg break 
never actually occurred, for both men worked hard for harmony. Taft kept 
busy with domestic legislation and once told columnist Dorothy Thompson 
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that he did not wish "to promote a major battle among the Republicans of 
the Senate over foreign policy." 36 Further, Taft leaned heavily on southern 
Democratic support on domestic issues, and a sally against a foreign policy 
that most Bourbons favored might have proved costly on the home front. 
Hard-line conservative Republicans deplored such caution on the part of 
Taft and bluntly attacked him for it. Vandenberg, wrote Chicago Tnbune 
publisher Robert McCormick, had long since sold out to the internationalists 
and "eastern bankers," and now Taft was doing so too. 37 
In foreign affairs, postwar Republicans faced a difficult situation. Rela-
tions between the United States and the Soviet Union had deteriorated rap-
idly at the end of the war. Total war had not brought total peace. In early 
March, 1946, Winston Churchill had spoken of an "Iron Curtain" across 
Europe, and by mid-1947 many spoke of the "Cold War." For Americans 
who eyed Soviet activity in Poland, Rumania, and Germany, there was su-
preme disappointment, followed by rancor. As Howard Buffett said, "Even 
yet it is hard to believe that 400,000 American boys died for the Atlantic 
Charter and that instead their sacrifice was used to expand communism over 
two continents." 38 
To stop communist expansion would obviously require American aid. 
The most immediate problem was Greece. A corrupt, reactionary, and un-
popular monarchy, propped up by Britain, was under fire. A guerrilla ele-
ment opposed the Athens regime, and that movement was dominated by 
communists who, Western diplomats erroneously assumed, took their orders 
from the Kremlin. 
On February 21, 1947, the British minister in Washington told Secre-
tary of State George C. Marshall that the British, financially strapped at 
home, were pulling out of Greece in thirty days. Though hardly unex-
pected, the news sparked a crisis in Washington. Greece's strategic position 
in the Mediterranean was crucial-a communist Greece might serve as a 
gateway to Soviet influence in Turkey, the Middle East, and perhaps western 
Europe. 
The upshot of this assessment came on March 12, 1947, when Truman 
asked the Eightieth Congress for $400 million in military and economic aid 
for Greece and Turkey. Forewarned by Vandenberg to "scare hell" out of 
the American people, Truman painted the clash between communist total-
itarianism and democracy in stark colors. He proclaimed that the new global 
mission of the United States was that it must "support free people who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pres-
sures." This was the Truman Doctrine, which one historian has called "a 
form of shock therapy." 39 
Was the voltage high enough to galvanize cost-cutting, isolationist Re-
publicans of the Eightieth into backing this new departure? Vandenberg 
had already promised his support. But Right Wing Republicans were an-
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other matter. In the previous major foreign policy test on Capitol Hill, Sen-
ate Republicans had voted overwhelmingly but unsuccessfully against a loan 
for Britain. In the present situation, Taft realized that the Congress must 
back the president, but the senator fretted over the Republican majority's 
loss of honor if it accepted "goods as packaged at the White House." Not so 
concerned were other conservative Republicans like John Taber. He re-
mained convinced that we should "first put our own house in order before 
we attempt anything else. " 40 
Opposition to Greek-Turkish aid made for strange bedfellows. Demo-
cratic liberals like Florida's Claude Pepper and Idaho's Glen Taylor joined 
Right Wing Republicans generally from the Midwest. These Republicans 
were as anticommunist as anyone, but they worried about the aid's impact 
on the domestic economy. American resources were limited, they con-
tended, and huge outlays might require the reestablishment of wartime eco-
nomic controls. Further, such political and economic commitments might 
suck America dry, leaving it prey, said Jenner, to a "bloodless Soviet take-
over."41 The Right, with its isolationist legacy, nevertheless remained puz-
zled over how to fight communism yet stay free of political and economic 
commitments. It had been easier at the war's end, when anticommunism 
had merely meant yanking back lend-lease or opposing a posrwar loan to the 
Soviets. Now anticommunism required positive action. 
Strangely, some of these conservative GOP guardians of American 
shores suddenly spoke as defenders of the United Nations. Kern of Missouri 
chided Truman's "fatal mistake" of ignoring the United Nations, and Clar-
ence Brown called the Greek-Turkish aid bill a "dagger aimed at the very 
heart of the United Nations. "42 In view of some of their past remarks and ac-
tions, the conservatives' concern for the United Nations was ludicrous. Still, 
the criticism had potential punch, and Vandenberg, seeking to block the 
"neoisolationist line of retreat into the United Nations," offered an amend-
ment allowing the U.N. General Assembly or Security Council, with the 
United States waiving its right to veto, to end the Greek-Turkish aid pro-
gram. 
Because it was crisis-bred and also represented a blow against commu-
nism, the Greek-Turkish aid request ultimately overwhelmed its foes. In the 
end, Taft, with no desire to "discredit" the president while Truman bar-
gained with the Soviets, indicated he would vote for Greek-Turkish aid. The 
Senate passed it, 67 to 23, after relatively harmonious debate. Taft joined 
thirty-four other Republicans in support of the president. Sixteen diehard 
GOP senators voted against it. 
There were also problems in the House. House GOP leaders had to in-
tervene in order to get the Greek-Turkish aid bill out of the Right 
Wing-dominated Rules Committee and on to the floor. There, the leader-
ship promised, the bill would be no test of party loyalty. As a result, on May 
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9, the Greek-Turkish aid bill won House approval by a vote of 287 to 107, 
with ninety-three Republicans on the losing end. Then, when the aid re-
quest reached the House Appropriations Committee, John Taber bran-
dished pencil and paper and did what he called some "ftfth grade arith-
metic." The upstate New York banker's math was severe. He and the 
Appropriations Committee slashed $3 million off the appropriation. Taber 
had made his point. At a White House powwow, Taber agreed to restore 
all funds only after the administration promised not to spend the $3 mil-
lion, but merely announce the sum for propaganda purposes. 43 In such 
fashion the Eightieth Congress approved aid to Greece and Turkey. 
The larger problems of war-torn Europe still remained. The ravages of 
two wars had left the continent financially and spiritually bankrupt. Sup-
plies of food and raw materials were low; the capital equipment of Europe 
was rundown; industry was stagnant. The severe winter of 1946-1947 com-
pounded European economic and spiritual woes. Millions were jobless, and 
across the continent people starved. In this setting, Communist party ranks 
swelled; in Italy, a quarter of the electorate was Communist, and in France, 
the figure was one-third. If the Communists did not initiate strikes, they at 
least exploited them. This was their moment; civil disturbances and parlia-
mentary disruptions were opening gambits to governmental control. 
At Harvard's June commencement in 1947, Secretary of State George 
Marshall presented the administration's plan for the economic rehabilitation 
of Europe and prevention of further Communist exploitation. Marshall 
called on the nations of Europe-east and west, Communist and non-Com-
munist-to prepare a plan for the economic recovery of all Europe. Marshall 
pledged American aid to this collective enterprise. Three weeks later, Euro-
pean leaders met in Paris to discuss Marshall's idea. The Russians quickly de-
cided to withdraw, dragging the east Europeans with them. 
What ailed Europe and what could be done? Conservative Republicans 
had their own prescriptions. Freshman Senator George Malone of Nevada 
had addressed Europe's troubles even before Marshall. At Malone's first 
GOP caucus, he explained: "All these sons-of-bitches need is a referee in 
bankruptt;:y. " 44 In that kind of gathering such a remark raised few eyebrows. 
With the unveiling of the Marshall Plan, Republicans of more seniority also 
had something to say. Herbert Hoover feared the Marshall Plan was "an in-
vitation to gang up on the United States." "Of course, we all want to do 
what we can, but we do not want to exhaust this country," concluded the 
former president in a letter to Taft. Complaining of the administration's 
lack of economic analysis and its propensity to give in to the "unreasonable 
demands" of the Europeans, Taft muttered to Hoover, "We always seem to 
be begging them to let us help them as if it were to our ftnancial or eco-
nomic advantage to do so. "45 
Such comments indicated that the European Recovery Program (ERP) 
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would be a major issue on Capitol Hill. Another indication came in late 
1947 when a special session of the Eightieth Congress took up the adminis-
tration's request for interim aid-$597 million in stopgap funds for France, 
Italy, and Austria. The request passed, despite hefty midwestern GOP op-
position and conservative bids to alter and cut the aid. 
Truman, meanwhile, formally proposed the European Recovery Pro-
gram. He asked Congress to appropriate $17 billion for its first four years. 
The call for a four-year commitment drew fire immediately, as Right Wing 
Republican resistance to the proposal mounted rapidly. Taft, who called the 
plan a "global WPA," worked quietly for the formation of an Anti-Marshall 
Plan Committee, or a committee to lobby for reduced ERP funds. Said Taft, 
"The State Department is smearing us with propaganda just the way it did 
on the British loan. " 46 
As an unannounced presidential candidate, Taft had to be wary. Polls 
showed growing public support for the Marshall Plan idea. Moreover, key 
tallies indicated congressional Republicans were badly split over the matter. 
Whatever the Republicans did, Taft, as a presidential candidate, desired 
GOP harmony as 1948 approached. 47 Such unity seemed unlikely, when 
news leaked that a group of twenty GOP senators was meeting secretly at a 
downtown Washington hotel to discuss the Marshall Plan. The bulk of them 
were conservatives with isolationist credentials-Bricker, Brooks, Jenner, 
Capehart, Kern, and others. But a few-Knowland and Ball, for instance-
were internationalists who basically favored the Marshall Plan. Taft himself 
stayed away from all this. If the group had any objective, it was to scale 
down Marshall Plan funds. As a result, the Washington hotel meetings pro-
duced no band of party insurgents, and the group merely chose a committee 
of five to take its thoughts to Vandenberg. 
Little that was new appeared in the Right Wing critique of the Marshall 
Plan. Again, safeguarding the American economy was mentioned as being 
foremost-the drain on the United States would leave American institutions 
vulnerable. As Taft wrote, "I have found that the Secretary of State is always 
more anxious to give American money away than he is to preserve the econ-
omy of this country." 48 This "globaloney" would bring high prices, high 
taxes, and ultimately, Senator Kern predicted, dry up the middle class as a 
capital source. In addition to new taxes, there would have to be new controls 
and regimentation-"a police state at home," warned Wat Arnold, conser-
vative congressman from Missouri. 
But more than the American economy concerned the Republican Right. 
The continued debasement of the European economy was feared, too. Like 
Taft, Jenner branded the Marshall Plan a "boondoggling PWA," which, 
like its domestic kin, would prove no fmal solution. Their remarks illus-
trated the link between Right Wing international and domestic outlooks. So 
did their emphasis on self-sufficiency and initiative-equally as important 
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for nations as for individuals. "They [the Europeans] are not doing their 
part," Taber complained. "They work four days a week in France and they 
are on strike a lot of the time." 49 If European nations failed to balance their 
budgets, reduce their expenses, and stabilize their currencies, they would 
continue to wallow, no matter how great the infusion of Yankee cash. 
The possibility of European governments' taking the kind of action that 
would please most members of the Old Guard was slight. Their nationalized 
industries placed these governments even to the left of FOR's New Deal. 
This fact irritated. Noting the "strange paradox" of fighting Marxist com-
munism while subsidizing Marxist socialism, Senator Kern later tried unsuc-
cessfully to deny aid to nations that further nationalized their basic indus-
tries. (Taft had doubts about this intrusion in the inner workings of other 
nations.) Homer Capehart, meanwhile, offered a complete alternative to the 
Marshall Plan, which he thought was "socialistic on both the procurement 
and distribution end," since it involved government-to-government aid. 
Capehart proposed instead to raise the lending power of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation and create an international division that would assess 
foreign industries in need of aid and would then buy preferred stock in qual-
ified foreign corporations. The beauty of the plan, Capehart believed, was 
that one nation's private enterprise would help another's. However, only 
twenty-two senators ultimately voted for the Capehart plan. 
In the fall of 1947, Vandenberg worried most about possible trouble 
from Taft. But the primary concern of Taft and many of the other Right 
Wing Republicans was the "lavish distribution of dollars" envisioned in the 
Marshall Plan. How much would the Congress give the European Recovery 
Program? Vandenberg himself soon realized the importance of this issue 
and responded by pruning the administration's request of $6.8 billion for 
fifteen months down to $5.3 billion for twelve months. The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee accepted Vandenberg's figures on February 13, but 
Right Wing Republicans wanted still greater cuts. Finally, as Vandenberg 
had feared, there was trouble with Taft. The Ohio senator, although basic-
ally sympathetic to the goals of the Marshall Plan, introduced along with 
Wherry a measure to cut the Foreign Relations Committee's figure to $4 bil-
lion for the first year. 
If the GOP trimmers ever had the votes, they were surely gone after a 
coup drove Czechoslovakia behind the Iron Curtain in February, 1948. Her-
bert Hoover, for example, in an open letter to Speaker Martin, subsequently 
backed the full $5.3 billion authorization. Still, GOP conservatives in the 
Senate showed surprising strength in the March 12 showdown on the Taft-
Wherry amendment. The Senate rejected this cut, 56 to 31, Republicans ac-
counting for 23 negative votes-the maximum Senate opposition to foreign 
aid in the Eightieth Congress. Then the Senate, Taft included, approved the 
Marshall Plan with the original authorization of $5.3 billion. Ultimately, 
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the House, too, passed the $5.3 billion dollar allotment by an overwhelming 
vote. 
After the Marshall Plan became law, Taber's House Appropriations 
Committee again posed a problem. In recommending the enabling legisla-
tion for the plan's funding-almost a year after the Harvard address-the 
Appropriations Committee made cuts almost equal to those rejected by the 
Senate in March. A new battle between isolationists and internationalists 
loomed. On the House floor an attempt to shorten the agreed-upon time 
period from fifteen to twelve months-and thereby reestablish the original 
appropriation-failed as the House GOP leadership, unwilling to advertise 
party splits on the eve of the Republican convention, backed Taber's Appro-
priations Committee proposal. 
Over in the Senate, Vandenberg reacted quickly. Permitted by chair-
man Styles Bridges to speak before the economy-minded Senate Appropria-
tions Committee, Vandenberg persuaded it to maintain all the funds orig-
inally authorized, and the full Senate then ratified this action. Only ten sen-
ators opposed Vandenberg, who even got support from Taft and Wherry. If 
Taber and other Marshall aid House slashers had a strategy, it was the belief 
that the senators would finally yield and accept the House Appropriations 
Committee cuts in order to depart for the Philadelphia convention. Yet 
Taft, an earlier advocate of cuts, now declared he would hold Congress in 
session until it backed the original "moral commitment." Such opposition 
was too much for Taber. House conferees began to buckle, and finally Taber 
did too. On June 20 the House followed the Senate in keeping the original 
funding intact. 
The Republicans went off to Philadelphia in June, 1948, and the Con-
gress went down in history as the "Do-Nothing, Good-for-Nothing Eighti-
eth." That was unfair, but then Truman, the chief name-caller, was scram-
bling for the presidency and was hardly a disinterested bystander. 
The Eightieth Congress, in fact, accomplished much in foreign affairs. 
Among its other achievements, it extended the Reciprocal Trade Act, a 
mainstay of New Deal foreign policy, and it generally continued to practice 
bipartisanship. Foes of these actions consistently included Right Wing isola-
tionist Republicans, but they offered no real threat. European troubles de-
manded action, and conservative GOP opponents offered almost nothing. 
Furthermore, Senator Vandenberg was at the peak of his power. Indeed, the 
passage of the Vandenberg Resolution, which cleared the way for later 
American participation in NATO, capped his mastery of foreign affairs in 
the Eightieth Congress. The Senate passed, 64 to 4, the Vandenberg Resolu-
tion just before the Republican convention in June, 1948, with its oppo-
nents generally avoiding debate and roll calls. Such surrenders led the Chi-
cago Tribune to grumble: Republicans "no less than the New Dealers, are in 
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the control of the Wall Street crowd and all the other economic interests 
which seek to turn the foreign policy of the United States to private 
profit. " 50 
But that was foreign affairs. On the domestic front Republicans had 
acted independently and now had to bear the consequences for such actions. 
Was the domestic record of the Eightieth, as historian Eric Goldman has 
claimed, really "an assault on the legislation and tendencies of a Half-Cen-
tury of Revolution?" 51 Perhaps oratorically, but GOP action amounted to 
only a foray, at most. In the end, Old Guard fulminations against the New 
Deal gave way to practical politics, as tax laws and Taft-Hartley attested. 
There were some minor Old Guard triumphs. The Eightieth Congress 
passed, and Truman accepted, laws nullifying workers' portal-to-portal 
claims, laws excluding some workers from Social Security coverage, and cuts 
in funds for soil conservation and crop storage. Generally, however, it was in 
its obstructionist capacity that the Eightieth earned its "Do-Nothing" tag. 
Still, Truman was imprecise even here. House Republicans, in blocking ac-
tion on such matters as housing and school aid, actually were repudiating 
the Republican Senate as much as the White House, along with the leader-
ship of Robert Taft. 
Truman's broad swipes, however, were good politics, and historians 
have generally agreed with his analysis. Congressional Republicans, histo-
rian Susan Hartmann has concluded, failed to express the dominant views of 
their own party and to recognize the appeal of "social welfare" legislation. 
In so doing, they appeared to oppose the reforms of the past fifteen years. 52 
Conclusions like Hartmann's, of course, were made long after the 1948 pres-
idential election. At the time, Right Wing Republicans, before and even 
after that surprising election, sincerely believed that voters had firmly re-
jected "social welfare" and New Deal programs. For them, the 1946 con-
gressional elections had proved this beyond doubt. During the Eightieth 
Congress, such Right Wing Republicans were absolutely certain of their 
mandate, and only Washington political realities tempered their attacks on 
the New Deal structure. "A vast amount of New Deal rubbish will have to 
be removed before even the outline of our free institutions will become visi-
ble," Daniel Reed had written after the 1946 elections. "The task ... rests 
with Congress, and that which cannot be accomplished now because of Exec-
utive interference will be made possible by voters in 1948. " 53 
3 
The Philadelphia Story 
At Philadelphia in June, 1948, Dwight Green gave the Republican conven-
tion's keynote address. "We are here," the Illinois governor boomed, "to 
nominate the 34th President of the United States." 1 He did not have to 
rummage far through the attics of political bombast for that one. But 
Green's use of such a stock phrase was understandable. Things looked good 
for the GOP in 1948, and had for some time. 
All Republicans had presumed that the 1946 elections heralded a GOP 
presidential victory in 1948. One Democrat, Senator]. William Fulbright of 
Arkansas, wanted a Republican in the White House even sooner, suggesting 
in 1946 that Truman step down and let a Republican take over. Indeed, 
Democratic woes accounted for the sunny Republican picture. In Septem-
ber, 1946, Henry A. Wallace, the former vice-president, had been forced to 
quit as commerce secretary after attacking the administration's "get tough" 
policy toward the Soviet Union. Popular among certain Democratic liberals, 
Wallace had launched a presidential drive at the end of 1947. Other liberal 
Democrats who were dissatisfied with Wallace had initiated their own 
"dump Truman" movement. Further, Truman could not count on the 
backing of Bourbon Democratic conservatives, since his civil rights proposals 
had upset the South. 
The spectacular Republican gains of November, 1946, and spirited 
Democratic squabbling all added luster to the 1948 Republican presidential 
nomination. The race began early. The GOP had its first official candidate 
by December, 1946. Harold E. Stassen's announcement indicated that he 
was still a man in a hurry. Winning the Minnesota governor's race at the age 
of thirty-one, he had become the youngest man ever elected governor in the 
United States, and he had" been reelected twice. After wartime duty as Ad-
miral William Halsey's assistant chief of staff, Stassen had returned home to 
resume his political career-with a run for the Republican presidential nom-
ination. 
A quick start was what Stassen needed, and he began to campaign for 
progressive Republican candidates around the nation. Stassen evoked the 
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liberal Republicanism of Wendell Willkie, and this provoked Old Guard 
suspicion and fear. There was cause for concern. As a Young Republican and 
as a gubernatorial candidate in 1938, Stassen had taken on the Old Guard 
and had won. Now, on December 29, 1946, when the tall, blond, and blue-
eyed private citizen with the winning smile formally announced for the pres-
idency, he pledged "to move the Republican party along the path of true 
liberalism." In fact, Stassen differed hardly at all from most Republicans. 
Theoretically, his nebulous, if not meaningless, liberalism called for the 
"maximum . . . freedom . . . consistent with the same degree of freedom 
by his or her fellow man." Practically, Stassen positions that set him apart 
from his GOP rivals for the nomination amounted to the few trivial caveats 
he had made in endorsing the Taft-Hartley Act and his belief that the Com-
munist Party, U.S.A., should be outlawed. Writing at the time, Arthur 
Schlesinger properly found Stassen to be an "appropriate partner of Senator 
Taft." Nonetheless, Stassen's "cosmopolitan approach" to national and in-
ternational problems and his aggressive pursuit of the liberal tag were 
enough to make him the "liberal Republican" candidate in the 1948 Re-
publican nomination struggle. 2 
The Stassen announcement was widely regarded as the opening shot in 
the Republican presidential wars, and GOP eyes quickly focused on Ohio. 
Ohio-Mother of Republican Presidents-had two GOP hopefuls, and the 
Ohio Republican organization was faced with the problem of an embarrass-
ment of riches. Would John Bricker or Robert Taft be the Buckeye presiden-
tialfavorite come 1948? 
By late December, 1946, some of Ohio's riches had diminished. The 
fortunes of freshman Senator Bricker had indeed fallen since election day. 
His off-the-record Gridiron Dinner speech in mid-December, according to 
Arthur Krock in the New York Times, led many listeners to question the 
new senator's "perception and judgment." 3 Afterward, Bricker's stock suf-
fered in the eastern press, and this troubled even staunch midwestern Re-
publicans. Bricker was also a victim of his own senatorial election success. He 
now found himself in the Senate, where Taft dwarfed him. As one Republi-
can expressed it, the main result of Bricker's move to Washington was to 
"blanket Bricker. "4 
Not that there were any serious personal problems between Bricker and 
Taft. In fact, they got along well. Reportedly, they had had an earlier agree-
ment regarding presidential politics. Bricker had supported Taft's 1940 bid, 
and Taft had "let John try it" in 1944. But 1948 was another matter, and 
neither was the other's uncritical admirer. Taft's sometimes "leftish" tilt 
distressed Bricker, and Taft doubted Bricker's political skill and sagacity. 
Taft had privately criticized Bricker's 1944 campaign and was not convinced 
that Bricker could beat Dewey or Stassen. 5 
In early 1947 Taft told one supporter that he had had no final talk with 
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Bricker, "although [Bricker] apparently has every intention of withdrawing 
and has told many people so. " 6 But Bricker's delay in publicly bowing out 
fired speculation, and reporters began to wonder if he would ever do so. 
Bricker ultimately ended speculation onJuly 31, 1947, by pledging to sup-
port Taft. Subsequently, on October 24, Taft informed Ohio Republican of-
ficials that he wanted the backing of the Buckeye delegation at the GOP 
convention. He named Congressman Clarence Brown of Ohio and Kath-
arine Kennedy Brown to represent him in the preconvention delegate drive, 
since Senate duties, he claimed, would keep him from campaigning for the 
nomination. 
For many, Robert Taft with his balding dome and hornrimmed specta-
cles embodied the conservative statesman. Neither tub-thumper nor glad-
bander, Taft was shy, industrious, and, most of all, dependable. However 
poorly these qualities translated in presidential politics, his background had 
certainly prepared him for public life. Son of President William H. Taft, 
graduate of Yale College and Harvard law school, Taft had done his political 
apprenticeship in Ohio politics, serving as majority leader in the Ohio As-
sembly and later going on to the Ohio Senate. 
Although the son of an influential father and a graduate of the finest 
schools, Taft lacked the stuff of Camelot legacies. Indeed, Time had tagged 
him the "Dagwood Bumstead of American Politics" after some public rela-
tions blunders in his 1940 presidential bid. Taft always appeared cold, stiff, 
and dogmatic. The public never saw the warm, private Taft, and he resisted 
efforts to "humanize me." Some of the attempts that he acquiesced in were 
painfully amateurish. The "selling job," one aide told Taft at the end of 
1947, was "STINK0." 7 
Taft had other problems, too. His speeches, which he insisted on writ-
ing himself, were "clumsy, dry, and disputatious." 8 Yet, tucked among the 
arid facts, figures, and logic were ideas or ways of expressing ideas that some-
times sparked controversy. Here was irony-the colorless Taft was also highly 
conuoversial. The Nuremberg trials, Taft told a Kenyon College audience in 
1946, violated American principles of law. At a beefsteak banquet, Taft ad-
dressed the problem of the rising cost of living by admonishing his listeners 
to "eat less." Such gaffes and Taft's lack of political glamor fortified the ar-
gument that haunted him throughout his career-"Taft can't win." His 
friend and advisor Ben Tate encountered this belief everywhere on a polit-
ical scouting trip in late 1947. Taft obviously rejected the "Taft can't win" 
thesis, but he realized its impact and the difficulty of combating it in a sys-
tematic way. 9 
"Taft can't win" would also describe the nature of Taft's leadership in 
Congress. Taft's power was so great in the Eightieth Congress that Time 
wrote of "The Age ofT aft." Even the Nation concluded: Taft's "willingness 
to assume responsibility is poles away from those former G.O.P. New Deal 
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critics who were merely willing to attack." 10 But in winning such praise, Taft 
paid dearly. Moreover, certain Senate GOP colleagues resented all the atten-
tion paid to Mr. Republican. 
Taft's cool, abrupt manner compounded the usual hazards of strong 
congressional command. But the direction of Taft's rule, as seen earlier, 
troubled archconservatives most. The initiatives that won acclaim from the 
Nation, Time, and others set Right Wing Republicans muttering-and Taft 
knew this. He once lamely tried to explain his actions to conservative Senator 
John]. Williams of Delaware by saying: "Probably you think I have been 
somewhat too liberal with government money in the positions I have taken, 
but I was most anxious to maintain a unified party during this period in 
order that we might reach the one essential goal of ousting the present gang 
from control." 11 
On January 16, 1948, Thomas E. Dewey announced as candidate for the 
Republican nomination, thereby testing Alice Roosevelt Longworth's wise-
crack on Dewey: "You can't make a souffle rise twice." The New York gov-
ernor cut a more dashing figure than Taft. Short, with dark good looks, 
Dewey had piercing brown eyes, heavy eyebrows, and a mustache. He was 
almost a matinee idol. As district attorney for New York County, Dewey 
had earlier won national attention by busting rackets figures such as Lucky 
Luciano and Dutch Schultz. But Dewey had his problems, too. Many found 
him stiff, conceited, and pompous. Conservative philanthropist Sterling 
Morton, for example, described Dewey as a self-made man who worshipped 
his creator. 12 
Dewey himself had wondered if a defeated presidential candidate could 
rise again, and he had surrendered control of the national party organization 
after his 1944 defeat. But Dewey's stunning 1946 reelection as governor of 
New York and Truman's low ratings had encouraged him to make another 
run for the presidency. His gubernatorial victory reportedly had even 
boosted his strength in the Midwest. 
Most political observers agreed that the major divisions of the GOP cen-
tered on Robert Taft and Thomas Dewey. Few could pinpoint the precise 
reasons; no issues really separated Dewey and Taft in 1948. Taft and his fol-
lowers constantly worried that Dewey might accommodate the New Deal. 
He might do so, said Taftites, because Dewey was inclined to pander to what 
was popular. The New York governor, said Herbert Hoover, lacked deep in-
tellectual commitment. "A man couldn't wear a mustache like that without 
it affecting his mind," he once told an associate. 13 Taft, for his part, be-
lieved that Dewey had muffed his chance for the presidency in 1944, and 
now it was Taft's turn. Clearly, at this time, there was no deep-seated hostil-
ity between the Taft and Dewey wings, and estimates of voter appeal were 
determining GOP alliances more than were weighty questions of policy. 
If his Albany post helped Dewey keep clear of any early GOP precon-
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vention wrangling, General Douglas MacArthur's Tokyo base offered a sim-
ilar advantage. But an Asian military headquarters had disadvantages, too. 
In the summer of 1947 the New York Times reported a Republican pres-
idential boom for MacArthur, the overlord of the Allied occupation of 
Japan. 14 Although a professional military man, the hero of the Pacific had 
figured in GOP presidential politics before, finishing second in the 1944 
Wisconsin GOP primary. Now, MacArthur-for-President clubs began 
sprouting up again in Wisconsin. In a straw poll at the Wisconsin Republi-
can State Convention, the general amassed 157 votes-eye-catching when 
compared with Taft's 97. 
MacArthur speculation intensified when the Chicago Tribune's pub-
lisher Robert R. McCormick toured the Far East in October, 1947, and 
stopped in Tokyo "to look Mac over." 15 Upon returning home, however, 
McCormick disappointed those expecting him to bring back word of 
MacArthur's candidacy. He denied ever urging MacArthur to run and told 
reporters that only in a convention deadlock would he, McCormick, switch 
from Taft to MacArthur. 
If McCormick and MacArthur discussed a possible MacArthur candi-
dacy, that kind of talk was not new at Tokyo headquarters. MacArthur cov-
eted the Republican nomination, although the general did not want it to 
seem that way. He followed an "ambiguous and disingenuous" strategy that 
allowed him to encourage backers but eschew any personal political ambi-
tion.16 In October, 1947, citing the increasing flow of letters from nearly 
every section of the country, MacArthur privately asked General Robert E. 
Wood-former America First Committee chairman and GOP conserva-
tive-for political counsel. 17 At the same time, a highly placed member of 
MacArthur's staff told Hanford MacNider, an Iowa MacArthur booster, that 
he had talked with MacArthur about running and believed him "willing." 18 
On the home front, the MacArthur-for-president drive rapidly ad-
vanced. On November 25, 1947, MacArthur backers met at the Chicago 
Club with Wood, MacNider, and newspaper mogul Frank Gannett, among 
others. Many participants were wealthy midwestern businessmen and retired 
army officers with ties to conservative and old isolationist organizations. No 
doubt they relished the assurance of Colonel H.E. Eastwood, their Tokyo-
based liaison, that MacArthur was a "dyed-in-the-wool Republican and feels 
everyone of consequence knows this." 19 One notable MacArthur enthusiast, 
however, thought otherwise. Phillip La Follette, the one-time governor of 
Wisconsin and a progressive who had served on MacArthur's staff during 
W odd War II, believed that the general's occupation policies in] a pan re-
vealed him to be a "liberal." La Follette and the "dyed-in-the-wool" Re-
publicans at Chicago did have one thing in common, however-a belief that 
MacArthur could handle foreign policy matters. 20 
At the Chicago Club parley, the MacArthur boosters mapped a strategy 
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built around a deadlocked GOP convention. But MacArthur had to first 
prove his popularity among Republicans, and almost all the Chicago strat-
egists believed the general had to return home in the spring or his cause 
would founder. Yet even before the Chicago powwow MacArthur had 
dashed that prospect, believing that a preconvention homecoming would 
"crystallize bitterness in other Republican camps" and would be "indulging 
in the cheapest form of theatricals." A disappointed Wood could only hope 
that "the very fact that you [MacArthur] choose a course contrary to all ac-
cepted ideas of political strategy might be the wisest course of all." 21 MacAr-
thur nevertheless cooperated with his backers in all else. 
"The big test," MacArthur called the Wisconsin primary, where his 
strength was supposedly greatest. But when Phillip La Follette opened the 
MacArthur-for-president campaign in that state in late January, there were 
already problems. Two days earlier General Eisenhower had removed him-
self from consideration for the presidency, saying that nothing in the in-
ternational or domestic scene especially qualified a military man for the 
presidency. A factional battle in the Wisconsin GOP further hampered 
MacArthur's chances. Led by boss Tom Coleman and Senator Joe McCarthy, 
the Wisconsin machine supported Stassen. McCarthy, with Coleman's back-
ing, had beaten Robert La Follette, Jr., in the 1946 GOP Senate primary, 
and the Coleman machine deeply resented this new La Follette challenge. 
There were also rumors that MacArthur was only a "stalking horse" for Taft 
and would decline the GOP nomination in favor of the Ohio senator. In ad-
dition, questions persisted regarding MacArthur's stand on the issues. Al-
though Tokyo provided the illusion of remoteness from political combat, it 
also helped keep MacArthur "the Great American Enigma," or as Lindesay 
Parrott of the New York Times concluded, "the darkest of the political dark 
horses. " 22 
The Coleman machine-and Stassen with it-won the Wisconsin pri-
mary on April6. Stassen captured 40 percent of the popular vote and 8 del-
egates. MacArthur ran second with 36 percent of the popular vote and 8 
delegates. Dewey got 24 percent of the popular tallies and no delegates. 
Wood told MacArthur that the outcome indicated no change in the gen-
eral's strategic position. A convention deadlock was still the main hope. 
Most analyses, however, said Wisconsin doomed MacArthur. His fame and 
favorite-son status had demanded an extraordinary showing, and this he did 
not receive. 23 
Nor did MacArthur get it elsewhere. The Nebraska preferential primary 
was the next test for all GOP hopefuls, since all contenders were on the bal-
lot. The odds were with Taft. Nebraska was in the isolationist heartland, and 
Taft had use of Senator Hugh Butler's state organization. Senator Wherry 
reportedly also favored Taft but remained ostensibly neutral since he himself 
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was running for reelection. Yet Stassen surprised everybody by amassing a 
winning plurality of 16,000 over Dewey and 60,000 over Taft. 
Stassen's victory in isolationist country suddenly made him something 
more than the choice of party liberals. Taft, who had only campaigned four 
days in the state, was "naturally disappointed." But MacArthur was the big 
loser. He limped in fifth, behind Vandenberg. As a result, Wood now urged 
the general to return home quickly, for the GOP organizations disliked Stas-
sen, and other candidates, hoping to block Stassen, might be willing to ac-
cept MacArthur as a "compromise candidate. " 24 
Talk of compromise candidates and dark horses did indeed begin after 
the Nebraska voting, but MacArthur's name seldom came up. Stassen's tri-
umph had obviously "rocked" the Old Guard. Arthur Krock reported that 
Taft and Dewey forces had started to discuss forming an anti-Stassen coali-
tion. Party regulars dusted off the old saying, "Primaries indicate, conven-
tions nominate," and Taft himself said that primaries have "no great influ-
ence in determining the result," statements that led to charges that Taft and 
Dewey were plotting to keep the nomination "within the GOP Old 
Guard." 25 
On January 26, 1948, Harold Stassen had announced that he would 
enter the Ohio Republican primary. Stassen wanted "a test on foreign and 
domestic issues" on Mr. Republican's own turf, where he could highlight his 
position as a GOP liberal. While warning that this Stassen gambit was "con-
trary to the usual practice among those interested in maintaining Republi-
can harmony," Taft called it Stassen's "greatest mistake," for "if a primary 
battleground must be chosen, I am delighted he has selected Ohio where he 
has no chance of success. " 26 
Stassen's campaign had plenty of drive coming out of Wisconsin and 
Nebraska, and Taft's campaign manager, Clarence Brown, returned to Ohio 
"petrified" by "the Stassen thing." 27 Both Taft and Stassen stumped hard 
throughout the state, but as James Reston pointed out, it was hardly a "test 
on fundamental issues." At best, the Ohio contest presented voters with a 
broad choice between age and youth, liberalism and conservatism. On elec-
tion day, Taft got 14 and Stassen 9 of the 23 contested delegates. Both 
claimed victory. In fact, neither made a dramatic showing. Stassen had re-
duced Taft's strength in the Ohio delegation from 54 to 44 but had gained 
only 9 votes and much enmity from within the party for himself. Thereafter, 
Stassen's difficulties in securing delegates grew. Taft, in turn, had failed to 
carry his home state convincingly, and after the Ohio primary the Old 
Guard-at least those uncommitted to Taft-looked anew for a proven 
vote-getter. 
Oregon, where Stassen and Dewey next squared off, provided Repub-
licans-Republicans of all kinds-with a potential winner. Dewey garnered 
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53 percent of the vote and 12 delegates. Even though Taft was not in the 
Oregon race, the results there also further clouded his candidacy. Reports 
out of the Taft camp told of disappointment: a Stassen victory in Oregon, 
instead of a sweeping one for Dewey, would have allowed them at least to 
make a pitch for Taft on the basis of party regularity. Now even that argu-
ment was gone. 
In June, 1948, the Republicans descended on Philadelphia for the GOP 
convention. The city was ready. Red, white, and blue lights decorated 
Chestnut Street. A giant rubber elephant stood atop the Bellevlie Stratford's 
marquee, although once it collapsed and had to be reinflated. (No portents 
were noted.) Happily, cool temperatures spared the delegates from the 
sauna that summertime Philadelphia can become. Furthermore, designers, 
working for a cool "psychological effect," had decked out Convention Hall 
in "sylvan garb." There was, of course, some traditional bunting, but de-
signs of flowers and greens mainly filled the convention site. 
Columnists Stewart and Joseph Alsop wrote on convention eve: "The 
stage is set at Philadelphia for the final struggle between isolationists and 
men of the Vandenberg school, between backward looking and modern-
minded Republicans." 28 But instead of a titanic clash between good and 
evil, delegates had to settle, according to most preconvention analyses, for 
one merely between Taft and Dewey. Campaign managers' forecasts aside, 
each of these two men had between 277 and 300 votes. Stassen had about 
150, and favorite sons harbored what remained of the 1,094 votes. As the 
convention opened, Dewey had the edge. But it was only slight, and a dead-
lock was a real possibility. 
The likelihood of deadlock enhanced the positions of the favorite sons 
and dark horses. MacArthur still hoped the convention would turn to him. 
The conservative biweekly Human Events trotted out Senator Bricker as a 
compromise candidate. 29 California Governor Earl Warren was mentioned as 
a possible nominee, as was Senator Edward Martin of Pennsylvania. But 
most talk centered on Vandenberg and House Speaker Joseph Martin. 
Vandenberg, the much-ballyhooed leader of GOP internationalists, 
had let others boost him for the presidency. His silence had given him lever-
age in the Senate and provided reporters with something to scrutinize at the 
convention. Many observers believed him to be the "most available" com-
promise choice. But Vandenberg was uq.popular among Taft followers, for 
he had defeated Mr. Republican on the Lilienthal nomination and on var-
ious foreign policy questions. A day before the convention began, Michigan 
Governor Kim Sigler announced that Vandenberg was available. 
Joseph Martin, on the other hand, had been available for some time. 
Despite his great support in the House, he had nevertheless resisted calls to 
take the House floor and make a speech highlighting his presidential qual-
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ifications. Martin was more acceptable to Taft enthusiasts than Vandenberg. 
He was, in fact, a perfect compromise candidate. But as permanent chair-
man of the convention, Martin's ability to drum up support for himself was 
limited and, to his credit, he worked scrupulously to do nothing to bring 
about a deadlock. 
Another Martin also figured highly in the GOP presidential derby. "Ifl 
was Taft," Alf Landon had written after the 1946 elections, "I would give 
Martin of Pennsylvania ... a lot of attention. " 20 By the start of the Republi-
can convention, everyone-journalists, politicians, and presidential aspi-
rants-was closely watching Senator Edward Martin and the entire Pennsyl-
vania delegation. At the moment, the Republican party in Pennsylvania was 
badly split between the Grundy and Duff forces. In the 1920s, Joseph P. 
"Uncle Joe" Grundy had succeeded Boies Penrose as boss of the Keystone 
State GOP, and he ruled it from his perch as chairman of the Pennsylvania 
Manufacturers Association (PMA). This devout Quaker, who wore staid dark 
suits and filled his talk with the traditional "thee," had founded the PMA 
in 1909 as a business lobby. It soon became an adjunct of the Pennsylvania 
GOP. It championed high tariffs and low taxes, and displayed a repugnance 
of all reform. In 1946, with Grundy's support, James Duff had been elected 
governor of Pennsylvania to replace Edward Martin, a Grundy loyalist who 
had lured Duff into politics and had himself just been elected to the Senate. 
The Grundy-Duff alliance, however, was short-lived, and at a PMA retire-
ment banquet for Uncle Joe in 1947, Duff had hailed a new day of enlight-
ened politics in Pennsylvania. "Cigars shifted," noted Time, and a bitter 
patronage battle ensued. 3! 
There had been plans in early 1948 to unite the Pennsylvania delegation 
to the convention behind House Speaker Joe Martin. But these efforts had 
collapsed when Duff became excited by the Vandenberg-for-president talk. 
Although Duff had no specific candidate, he was definitely against New 
York Governor Dewey. Dewey's agents immediately spotted an opportu-
nity. They approached the Grundy faction through Senator Edward Marcin 
and National Committeeman G. Mason Owlett, plying the Grundyites with 
anti-Taft propaganda. The overtures succeeded. A week before the conven-
tion, Grundy reportedly branded Taft "a socialist. " 32 
On Sunday-convention eve-the Pennsylvania delegation caucused 
and gave 72 favorite-son votes to Senator Martin and one vote to Vanden-
berg. Following the first three or four ballots for the presidential nomina-
cion, the delegation planned to caucus on the floor. Duff was reported to 
have 45 to 52 votes ready to switch to Taft at that time in order to stop 
Dewey. Dewey strategists, however, believed that as a result of their work 
the Grundy faction actually commanded a majority of the Keystone State 
delegates. 
Tuesday afternoon, following a meeting with Dewey, Senator Edward 
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Martin stunned the convention by announcing his withdrawal as a favorite 
son and his decision to nominate the New York governor. Martin's with-
drawal sparked many rumors-a Dewey-Grundy patronage deal had been 
sealed, Dewey had assured Grundy on future tariff policies, and the new Re-
publican National Committee Chairman would come from Pennsylvania. 
(Later in the week, Dewey did choose Pennsylvania Congressman Hugh 
Scott as the new Republican national chairman.) "I moved," Martin said at 
the next day's Pennsylvania caucus, "because I did not want a debacle like 
we had eight years ago." (At that time, Willkie had won the GOP nomina-
tion without Pennsylvania's help.) Martin later said his fear that a conven-
tion deadlock would leave the party in shambles for the campaign had 
prompted his quick action. Actually, there was nothing spontaneous about 
his move. His admiration for Dewey was longstanding and well known. 
Moreover, Martin had devised his convention plans even before departing 
Washington for Philadelphia. 33 Whatever the explanation, the Dewey forces 
had snared a key conservative bloc. 
Clarence Brown of Ohio, Taft's campaign manager, declared that Mar-
tin's Tuesday announcement represented "the height of the New York Gov-
ernor's blitz." Actually, it only got the Dewey bandwagon rolling. Wednes-
day-the day of the nominating speeches-saw the full impact of Martin's 
move. The Pennsylvania delegation met, and after Martin silently endured 
the blasts of some furious delegates, it gave Dewey 41 first-ballot votes. 
Duff, whose endorsement of Taft was purely an anti-Dewey gambit, carried 
only 26 Pennsylvania delegates to Mr. Republican. Stassen and Vandenberg 
picked up one vote each, and three delegates expressed no preference. 
Grundy, Owlett, and other Pennsylvania GOP leaders stood behind Dewey, 
while Joseph Pew and state chairman Harvey Taylor stuck with Duff and 
Taft. The damage to Taft was irreparable. 
This happened late Wednesday. Earlier, New Jersey's Governor Alfred 
E. Driscoll had announced that he would release his 35-member delegation 
after the first ballot and that he himself would be voting for Dewey. Gover-
nor Robert Bradford of Massachusetts stated that after his delegation's com-
plimentary vote for Senator Leverett Saltonstall, he, too, would urge 
Dewey's nomination. Numerous conservatives also joined the Dewey band-
wagon. James P. Kern was one. This rookie senator from Missouri was far 
more conservative than Taft, yet he declared for Dewey on Wednesday. Ex-
plaining his action later, Kern stated that no leading candidate entirely satis-
fied him, but that Dewey promised an "efficient and business like job of 
cleaning house" and was "a great vote-getting candidate." 34 Kern subse-
quently carried the bulk of the Missouri delegation to the New York gover-
nor. Also, early on Wednesday evening, amid gossip of a deal for the vice-
presidential spot, Charles A. Halleck revealed that Indiana's 29-member 
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delegation with an estimated 10 votes for Taft would vote unanimously for 
Dewey on the first ballot. 
A quick stop-Dewey coalition was Taft's only hope. A Taft-Stassen 
ticket was one possibility, although Stassen's attacks on the Old Guard's 
"Maginot-line type of reactionary thinking," delivered at the Union League 
Club of Philadelphia just before the convention opened, made such a "shot-
gun marriage" seem unlikely. Still, Martin's blockbuster and its fallout 
sparked a flurry of stop-Dewey meetings. Taft, Stassen, and Governor Kim 
Sigler, Vandenberg's representative, met three times on Wednesday about 
the situation. Taft insisted that they all back him. After their Ohio combat, 
however, Stassen could hardly knuckle under to Taft. Stassen suggested they 
support Vandenberg instead, but Taft refused. In the end, the talks got no-
where. Stassen then angered Taft by telling reporters afterward that a Taft-
Stassen ticket was "impossible," thus breaking their agreement to make no 
comments. 
The weather turned hot and muggy on Thursday, and in the afternoon 
the balloting began. Dewey showed surprising first-ballot strength. He won 
434 votes to Taft's 224, Stassen had 157, and Vandenberg totaled 62. On 
the next ballot, Dewey scored gains in Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachu-
setts, and so on into New Jersey, which gave him 33 of its 35 votes. Dewey 
was on the move. At the end of the balloting, Vandenberg held at 62, Stas-
sen fell to 149, and Taft climbed to 274. But Dewey shot to 515-just 33 shy 
of the nomination. Despite the pleas of Connecticut's Senator Ray Baldwin 
to hold up the official announcement until Connecticut could caucus, Mar-
tin recognized Pennsylvania's Governor Duff, who asked for a recess until 
the early evening. New York delegation chairman William F. Bleakley con-
fidently agreed over the boos of other Dewey supporters, and the Republi-
can convention recessed. 
At the Ben Franklin Hotel, Taft contacted Stassen once more and asked 
him for his delegates. Stassen refused but said he might reconsider after an-
other ballot. Back in Convention Hall, as the third ballot was about to 
begin, the convention buzzed with word that Earl Warren was freeing his 
California delegates and many would vote for Dewey. Aware of this and the 
impending release of the Connecticut delegation, Taft decided to withdraw. 
Shortly after 7:30 P.M., John Bricker read Taft's statement. Senator Wiliam 
F. Knowland did the same for Warren, and Sigler for Vandenberg. Then, 
Stassen bowed out. "The unanimous nomination," exclaimed the Chicago 
Tnbune, "ended one of the greatest party battles ever waged." 35 
The Tn.bune's owner, however, had not stayed for the finish. Before the 
band could strike up "Hail to the Chief," McCormick had left Convention 
Hall, wanting neither to join nor spoil the unanimous vote, and sputtering, 
"Well, it might have been worse; it might have been Vandenberg." 36 In-
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side, Dewey addressed the by-now riotous gathering. Accepting the nom-
ination, he pledged, "I come to you unfettered by a single obligation or 
promise to any living person." 
Charles A. Halleck, House majority leader from Indiana, had reason to 
doubt this. He believed that the Dewey forces had promised him the vice-
presidency. In addition to the House majority leader's other successful pro-
Dewey efforts, Halleck had delivered the Indiana delegation to the New 
York governor. Halleck thought this was part of a deal. On Wednesday, 
Halleck had told his Indiana delegation that he would be the vice-presiden-
tial nominee if they followed him to Dewey. Dewey personally had not 
talked to Halleck, but]. Russell Sprague, his advisor, had. According to 
Halleck's biographer, Dewey later admitted that Sprague had told Halleck 
that he would urge Halleck's nomination. Yet Dewey also stated that he 
learned of this Sprague-Halleck conversation only on the night of his own 
nomination. 37 
Recently there has been much criticism of the way vice-presidential can-
didates are chosen. With the nomination won, the exhausted presidential 
nominee repairs to a hotel suite, where he and other politicos ruminate 
through the night and into the early morning. Then, for a variety of reasons, 
they pick a runningmate. Thus it happened in 1948, and it killed Halleck's 
chances of becoming Dewey's vice-president. Halleck's name came up for 
consideration at such a gathering. Dewey later recalled his own favorable re-
sponse to Halleck's name, which Sprague advocated. 38 But Halleck's isola-
tionist past made him unacceptable, and the group quickly dismissed him. 
Taft, who declined an invitation to this parley, had suggested Bricker or Illi-
nois governor Dwight Green, but they were also passed over. "Tom's whole 
concern seemed to be about carrying the Atlantic seaboard," Taft later told 
Green, "and he seemed to be afraid of all midwestern candidates because 
they were too isolationistic!" 39 Early Friday morning, the meeting settled on 
Governor Earl Warren of California. 
Later that day, when the convention learned of the choice, Clarence 
Brown leaned over to Halleck to say, "You've been doublecrossed." Halleck 
agreed. 40 The Indianan later dubbed it "The Philadelphia Story." For 
others, such action merely underscored the continuing importance of "New 
York kingmakers" within the GOP. The June 25 New York Times editorial 
entitled "Surely not Mr. Halleck" was later accepted as proof by Phyllis 
Schlafly in A Choice Not An Echo that "certain powers" intent on maintain-
ing the Roosevelt foreign policy had "stepped in to scotch" a Dewey-Halleck 
ticket. 41 
The platform also passed with smoothness and dispatch. It triggered no 
Alsopian "final struggle." Instead, the platform reflected the existing dual-
ity of authority in the Senate. Its domestic section was a Taft document, and 
its foreign policy section was Vandenberg's. The planks on civil rights and 
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housing were the most troublesome domestic issues. Southerners wanted to 
soft-pedal civil rights, and one concession to the South was the exclusion of a 
plank favoring a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee. But the 
platform did include planks supporting an antilynch law and the abolition 
of the poll tax. On the housing issue, unlike in the previous Congress, Taft's 
position prevailed. The platform acknowledged that private enterprise was 
the best remedy for the housing problem but advocated federal aid for slum 
clearance and low-rent housing. In reference to education, however, the 
mention of federal aid was omitted in deference to hard-line party conserva-
tives. While calling for a minimum of government controls, the Philadel-
phia platform did recognize the federal government's responsibility for a 
long-range farm program, public health, old-age security, and conservation. 
Vandenberg worked with Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the Resolutions 
Committee chairman, to insure the GOP platform became no isolationist 
manifesto. He and Lodge inserted several provocative statements in the com-
mittee's working paper, including a condemnation of House Republicans 
for not appropriating the necessary ERP funds. 42 As expected, these provi-
sions drew the fire of isolationists, who, led by Senator Brooks of Illinois, 
knocked them out of the final draft. In the end, the convention roared its 
approval of the final document. Taft and Dewey found it acceptable, as did 
Vandenberg. The GOP platform even pleased the liberal Senator Wayne 
Morse, who termed it "the death knell of the Old Guard. "43 
The Old Guard-Republican conservatives-had had a tough time at 
Philadelphia and had split badly. Among the midwestern-dominated Taft 
Republicans, there were many who, more conservative than Taft himself, 
had doomed any compromise stop-Dewey movement. James Reston of the 
New York Times had noted even before the flurry of stop-Dewey confer-
ences on Wednesday that the idea of the Taft forces' throwing their support 
to Vandenberg, as Stassen had urged, was doubtful. 44 Could even Taft have 
promised that his delegates would follow him in such a venture? Actually, 
Taft's problems had appeared long before this. Directed by Clarence Brown, 
"a small-town operator," according to WilliamS. White, Taft's campaign 
had already floundered. 45 His headquarters' order of 10,000 copies of "This 
Week in Philadelphia," an entertainment guide with Dewey's picture on 
the cover, was just one of the Taft operation's many blunders. 
Dewey's nomination had really been won before the delegates met in 
Philadelphia. The Nebraska, Ohio, and Oregon primaries had mattered far 
more than any convention week mistakes or the difficulties of the stop-
Dewey movement. And the evidence contained in these springtime contests 
had influenced the Right Wing's calculations of electability more than the 
mere delegate count. Taft later admitted that his own optimism had flagged 
after the Nebraska primary, because that outing had given "some reality" to 
the "Taft can't win" thesis. Although Taft did not say so, his unspectacular 
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showing in Ohio also had bolstered this belief. Taft himself realized that the 
"basic reason" for his loss at Philadelphia was that Republican politicians in 
general lacked confidence that he could be a winner. 46 
Significantly, many of these Republicans were Old Guard conservatives 
who, at this particular moment, saw little difference between Dewey and 
Taft politically or philosophically. Their belief that Dewey was a winner, 
along with their own chances for political gain, eased their switch from Taft 
to Dewey. Such an attitude among the Old Guard naturally helped defuse 
the tension at the Philadelphia convention. It was not the "greatest party 
battle ever waged," as the Chicago Trzbune claimed. Taft had lost the nom-
ination, but the platform generally reflected his views, and he accepted it. 
He also admitted later that Dewey's political beliefs were "about the same as 
mine." 47 
Still, defeat stung. Taft wrote of his "resentment over the defection of 
the conservatives like the Pennsylvania Manufacture [sic] Association, the 
Duponts and Senator Kern. " 48 And as an indication that Taft was not fin-
ished as a presidential possibility, this note, scrawled on the announcement 
board in Taft's Ben Franklin headquarters, greeted departing delegates: 
"Taft in '52." 
Three weeks later in the same city of Philadelphia, Harry Truman sat in 
a steamy off-stage room, waiting to address the Democratic convention. His 
cause appeared hopeless. Southern Democrats, enraged over the passage of a 
strong civil rights plank, had bolted the Democratic convention and would 
soon launch their own Dixiecrat or States' Rights party with South Caro-
lina's Governor]. Strom Thurmond as their standard-bearer. On Truman's 
left were the Progressives, who later, also in Philadelphia, would select 
Henry Wallace as their presidential nominee. The kind of news that Truman 
could consider good indicated his plight-a "dump Truman" drive at the 
convention had failed largely for lack of a suitable candidate. 
Well past midnight, Truman stepped before this divided and downcast 
convention. "Senator Barkley [Alben Barkley, Truman's runningmate] and 
I will win this election and make those Republicans like it-don't you forget 
that," he declared. Suddenly the dispirited delegates perked up. Citing na-
tional needs and GOP platform promises, the president then announced 
that he was calling the Eightieth Congress back into session. This ploy was 
no simple soapbox inspiration, but the result of much White House delib-
eration. A special session, Truman believed, would advertise the "lacklus-
tre" record of the Eightieth Congress and compel the GOP ticket-a non-
Washington duo-to confront squarely the issue of the GOP Congress. 
Further, it would divide the Republicans on major issues and spotlight 
"the neanderthal men of the Republican party ... who will embarrass 
Dewey and Warren." 49 
The Philadelphia Story 51 
Truman's action was blatantly political. "It's the same old New Deal 
Stuff," said one Ohio Republican, "a synthetic emergency warmed over 
once more in a last desperate bid to spend and elect." Nevertheless, the call 
for a special session did pose problems for the GOP. Some, like Vanden-
berg, favored further major legislative action. But others resisted. Iowa's 
Representative BenJensen suggested the lawmakers assemble and immedi-
ately adjourn. Taft, affronted by Truman's "abuse" of his office, told a 
meeting of GOP leaders, "No, we're not giving that fellow anything." As a 
result, no major measures-minimum wage, aid to education, or public 
housing-passed the special session. As Halleck told a friend: "We do not 
want to open the Pandora Box of legislation." 5o 
After the close of the special session in mid-August, the presidential 
campaign turned listless. Dewey was a sure winner, and the campaign be-
came memorable only after the returns were in. In the area of foreign policy, 
the 1948 contest witnessed a "peak" of bipartisanship. Despite his early in-
tention to make the administration's foreign policy a major campaign issue, 
Dewey announced on July 24 that he was committed to Vandenberg's con-
cept of bipartisanship. In doing so, historian Robert Divine has pointed out, 
Dewey gave up an issue that polls showed held promise as a vote-getter for a 
Republican candidate. Further, Dewey's decision freed Truman to concen-
trate on blistering the "Do-Nothing Republican Eightieth. " 51 
As a result, Truman and Dewey avoided foreign policy debate until 
almost the last week of the campaign. Even areas normally outside the scope 
of bipartisan cooperation-Latin America and the Far East-escaped parti-
san wrangling. The crisis in Berlin, of course, provided the backdrop of the 
1948 election and put a premium on national unity. Moreover, the Republi-
cans-all Republicans-were certain of victory. Dewey, in turn, seemed to 
have unilaterally initiated a bipartisan domestic policy. His speeches were 
high-sounding calls for national unity and "American Destiny," and they 
lacked punch. On the other hand, Truman's whistle-stopping blasts against 
the Republican Eightieth Congress provided the only real campaign fire, 
and to these Dewey offered no defense. 
Overconfidence only partly explains Dewey's toothless 1948 campaign 
style. The New York governor believed that his 1944 presidential campaign 
had sputtered after he switched to a scrappy prosecutorial approach on the 
hustings. In 1948, therefore, he began by trying to avoid his earlier mis-
takes. Sometime in October, however, Dewey came to fear that his cam-
paign needed a lift. But Republican leaders counseled against a change in 
tactics, fearing it would be seen as a sign of weakness. So Dewey continued 
his lofty campaign. Dewey's own criticism of congressional Republicans and 
his knowledge that Taft still had their basic loyalty also helps to explain the 
New York governor's failure to rebut Truman's "Do-Nothing" barbs. 52 
During the campaign, Dewey's style had its critics, but not many 
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among Republicans. House Speaker Joe Martin later recalled that he had 
urged Dewey to defend the Eightieth Congress. In fact, as he and Dewey 
stumped together, Martin's own newspaper, the North Attleboro Evening 
Chronicle, ran an editorial that was critical of Dewey's campaign speeches. 
"A newspaper accident," Martin tried to explain at the time. 53 During all of 
the campaign, however, there was virtually no direct, public Republican 
criticism of the Dewey campaign effort, and the many manuscript collec-
tions of Right Wing Republicans reveal no private fault-finding before elec-
tion day. 
Although H.L. Mencken concluded that Dewey's recitations sounded 
like the "worst bombast of university professors," a majority of the nation's 
editors and commentators praised the Dewey unity tactics over "Give-'Em-
Hell" Harry's whistle-stop performances. 54 For them, Dewey spoke like "a 
president." Political seers everywhere awaited his triumph. Several days be-
fore the election, the New York governor even leaked the names of his fu-
ture cabinet officers to the press. Such GOP confidence extended far beyond 
the Dewey campaign train. Taft, for example, predicted a record vote and a 
Dewey victory. Long before this, the Republican Eightieth had voted the 
money for a gala Republican inauguration. 
Ohio did it. The Mother of Republican Presidents-Taft country-vac-
illated all during election night, then finally fell to Truman. Dewey had 
lost. No election since 1916 had been closer. Truman was still president. He 
won 24.1 million popular votes and twenty-eight states, for 303 electoral 
votes. Dewey garnered 22 million popular tallies, sixteen states, and 189 
electoral votes. Thurmond and Wallace each won less than 1.2 million pop-
ular votes, but the Dixiecrat gained 39 electoral votes, while Wallace got 
none. 
GOP losses were nationwide. In the House, Democrats picked up 
seventy-five seats and now boasted a 262-to-172 majority. Republican losses 
were big in Pennsylvania and Ohio, where eight GOP solons fell. Tradition-
ally Republican seats in farm states also went Democratic. Important House 
Republicans were stunned. Harold Knutsen, Ways and Means chairman and 
tax-cut advocate, lost. George Bender was one of the Ohio losers. Charlie 
Halleck's normal victory margin was cut considerably. In the Senate races, 
the Democrats doubled their top preelection forecasts. Gaining nine seats, 
they now enjoyed a 54-to-42 edge over the Republicans. Although Wherry 
and Bridges were reelected and Representative Karl Mundt won a Senate 
seat from South Dakota, Right Wing Republicans incurred heavy losses. In 
Minnesota, Joseph Ball, who was becoming increasingly conservative, lost 
his Senate seat to Hubert Humphrey, the liberal mayor of Minneapolis. Sen-
ator Brooks of Illinois lost his reelection bid, as did Governor Green. Also 
toppled were Edward V. Robertson of Wyoming, Chapman Revercomb of 
West Virginia, and Henry Dworshak ofldaho. In Tennessee, former nation-
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al chairman Reece came up short in his Senate race with Democrat Estes Ke-
fauver. Nor did Republicans fill the seats of retiring conservatives Edward 
Moore of Oklahoma, Albert Hawkes of New Jersey, and Harlan Bushfield of 
South Dakota. 
The outcome at all levels was a shocking surprise. Dewey and Taft and 
Republicans of all stripes could at least agree on that much. 
4 
A New Set of Guts 
Dewey's loss stunned the Republican party. Joe Martin returned to Wash-
ington in "deep gloom." Taft was almost "beside himself." "A national 
tragedy," moaned former National Committee Chairman B. Carroll Reece. 
Walter S. Hallanan, the femporary chairman at Philadelphia, thought the 
election "may be the turning point to national socialism." 1 
Hallanan accepted some of the blame for the November loss himself. 
He wrote to Pennsylvania's Edward Martin, whose bolt had triggered 
Dewey's convention bandwagon: "Our defeat ... showed that we made a 
grievous blunder at Philadelphia." Though Martin acknowledged no error, 
other Republicans did. Senator Kern of Missouri reportedly admitted his 
mistake in switching to Dewey at Philadelphia, and Taft told of" quite a few 
recantations" by Republican politicos. 2 
There was indeed plenty of GOP interest in solving what Arthur Krock 
called the "political whodunit" of the century. John Sherman Cooper, GOP 
liberal defeated in the Kentucky Senate race, believed the defeat spotlighted 
the need for new leadership and an "affirmative constructive philosophy." 
Another liberal, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts, saw 
hope for a modern Republican party in the 1948 returns. Believing modern 
political parties resembled political "service stations," Lodge wanted to 
make sure the "gas, oil, and water and windshield cleaning we offer is better 
than the other parties." 3 
Conservative Republicans naturally rejected Lodges filling-station meta-
phor, as well as the liberal analyses of the Dewey defeat. Lodge's gas station 
smacked of the Dewey campaign's "me-too" approach, and after 1948, con-
servative and moderate Republicans alike joined to reject "me-tooism" and 
Republican "pussyfooting." For C. Budington Kelland, the conservative Re-
publican national committeeman from Arizona, there was no mystery about 
the Dewey smashup. On November 5 he wrote his fellow Republicans that 
the 1948 campaign-"a private Albany enterprise''-was "smug, arrogant, 
stupid and supercilious." Kelland had wanted the Republican party to draw 
a "definite line of demarcation" between Republican and Democratic 
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tenets. This Dewey had failed to do. 4 Numerous other party members 
seemed to agree with Kelland and demanded that the GOP stand staunchly 
for principles, though there was little agreement on what those principles 
should be. 
Virtually every aspect of the Dewey campaign bothered conservative and 
other Republicans. Kelland groused about the Dewey unity pitch. Hallanan 
criticized its "milque toast character" and Dewey's "repetitious monotone." 
"The people," Kern concluded typically, "were not interested in his pious 
platitudes and his faith, hope and Dewey stuff." Taft, in turn, believed that 
he and even Dewey could have won the White House with any kind of 
fight. 5 
Most Republicans held that better "salesmanship" had been, and was 
now, necessary. In early 1949 Senator Homer Capehart oflndiana, who had 
made his fortune marketing jukeboxes, told Republicans that they were the 
"world's worst salesmen." The Eightieth Congress was the primary Republi-
can product that could have been peddled as an "affirmative asset." Harry 
Truman had maligned Republican goods at every whistle-stop-and all 
without rebuttal from the GOP standard-bearer. As a result, Kelland said, 
Republicans allowed themselves to be attacked as the party of "special inter-
ests, entrenched wealth" and "mossbacks dominated by the mythical Old 
Guard." 6 
According to conservative Republicans, Dewey had not only allowed 
Truman to abuse the Republican Eightieth, but he had also snubbed partic-
ular GOP candidates for reelection. Wayland Brooks of Illinois, Chapman 
Revercomb of West Virginia, and Edward B. Robertson of Wyoming were 
allegedly victims of the Dewey brand of Republicanism. Further, Reece sus-
pected that a "strange trick" by Dewey campaign manager Herbert Brown-
ell had aided the Dewey group in Tennessee that "concertedly knifed" him 
in his unsuccessful Senate bid. 7 
All losing candidates for the presidency, H.L. Mencken once urged, 
should be quietly hanged, "lest the sight of their grief have a very evil effect 
upon the young." Dewey had remained generally quiet since the November 
disaster, but at the Lincoln's Birthday meeting on February 8, the New York 
governor finally broke his silence. "The Republican party is split wide 
open," he told Republicans gathered at Washington's Mayflower Hotel. "It 
has been split wide open for years, but we have tried to gloss it over. I am a 
living example that that doesn't work." A minority of Republicans who con-
fused personal prejudice with party aims, Dewey continued, seemed to 
"make all the noise" and, if triumphant, would make the GOP "the dead-
est pigeon in the country. " 8 
Dewey was hardly blowing the bugle for party unity, and the Lincoln's 
Birthday celebrants gave him "less than deafening" applause. In fact, on 
this unhappy Lincoln's Birthday most Republicans could hardly see what 
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right Dewey had to read anybody out of the GOP. While most Republicans 
had been surprised by Dewey's recent defeat, they ultimately found little 
mystery in it. Krock's "political whodunit" had quickly become a "hedun-
it"-Dewey. 
The contrary analyses of political pundits-and later historians-had 
little impact on most Republicans during this period of rumination follow-
ing the election. Defeat-so habitual, yet this time so surprising-had left 
the majority of Republicans frustrated, bitter, and desperate. Moderate Re-
publicans generally accepted the conservative critique of the Dewey cam-
paign, which signaled a new drift for the GOP. "These boys [Deweyites] 
have wrecked the party in three different elections," said one Old Guards-
man. "Now it's only fair to give us a chance to wreck it our way. " 9 
He was only half-kidding. 
"There is no time for recrimination or alibis," said the RNC chairman 
in a letter of early December. 
But the chairman, Hugh Scott, was already a party to the most notable 
squabble arising from the Dewey defeat. Actually, Scott was more a pawn 
than a full-fledged participant. Before becoming chairman in June, 1948, 
he had been an unheralded congressman from Pennsylvania. Few doubted 
Scott's energy and enthusiasm as national party chief, but many believed he 
had allowed the Dewey "clique" to disregard the national party apparatus 
throughout the campaign of 1948. A combination of Taft and Stassen loyal-
ists now wanted Scott's gavel. Scott, however, believed he had a four-year 
contract. 
Scott's lack of political identity underscored the symbolic stakes of the 
conflict. For the Taft wing, Scott was inextricably tied to the ill-fated Dewey 
campaign. For Dewey supporters, Scott's retention was naturally important. 
For the Pennsylvania organization, the post of national chairman was re-
garded as a prize for its key role at the Philadelphia convention, and in De-
cember, Pennsylvania's Senator Edward Martin assured Colonel McCormick 
of the Chicago Tribune that Scott "was at heart one of us." 10 Indeed, the 
suspicion that Scott, despite his ties to Dewey, was actually an emissary of 
Uncle Joe Grundy's "reactionary" Pennsylvania machine did confuse many 
party liberals. As a result, the Old Guard and liberals alike were divided 
among themselves on the Scott matter. 
Scott had prominent enemies-among them former RNC chairman 
Harrison Spangler of Iowa and the recently deposed Reece, who allegedly 
wanted another stint as GOP boss. Joseph Martin was also anti-Scott, for the 
Pennsylvania upstart had "more or less" ignored the former House Speaker 
during the campaign. But Taft, who later called Scott "a compete screw-
ball," initially balked at his ouster. The Stassen-Vandenberg-New York 
Herald Tribune crowd, he feared, would then install Everett Dirksen, are-
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cently retired congressman from Illinois who was regarded as an internation-
alist. Taft suggested that Scott relinquish either the chairmanship or his seat 
in Congress, and merely allow Taftites to help in the selection of the RNC 
executive committee. 11 Scott, however, refused to budge or to "deal" with 
the Taft forces. In fact, he named his own executive committee, packing it 
with Dewey supporters and excluding such heavyweights-from different 
party factions-as Ralph Cake of Oregon, Sinclair Weeks of Massachusetts, 
and Clarence Brown of Ohio. 
In late January, the RNC met at Omaha in, appropriately, the Black 
Mirror Room of the Hotel Fontenelle. There, Scott denied responsibility for 
the 1948 campaign and announced an end to "me-too" Republicanism, said 
Dewey "should not, could not and will not be a candidate in 1952," but si-
multaneously rebuffed party "cliffhangers" who would take the GOP back 
to Garfield, not forward to victory. 
Scott, who offered to negotiate everything except his own resignation, 
was sure his foes lacked the votes to sack him, divided as they were over are-
placement candidate. Furthermore, it soon became known at Omaha that 
Scott had taped his fall conversations with GOP politicians who had ap-
proved of the Dewey campaign. Anonymous messages that such tapes 
existed mysteriously found their way under the delegates' hotel doors. 
Clarence Brown immediately yelled "Blackmail." Scott, in turn, denied any 
intention to use these tapes to stay in power and denounced the "high 
school" tactics of the opposition. But he did confess that he had brought 
transcripts of the tapes to Omaha-"to keep the record straight." Thus 
began, some may claim, a Republican preoccupation with transcripts and 
tapes. In the end, anti-Scott forces, led by Clarence Brown, failed to unseat 
Scott, although they did force him to agree to unstack the executive commit-
tee. 
But the Scott story was not over. C. Budington Kelland of Arizona was 
one conservative who saw to that. Actually, Kelland had left Omaha "pretty 
well content," pleased by the new executive committee and the powwow's 
anti-Dewey tone. Still, Scott had to go. "I think we have abolished Al-
bany," Kelland wrote, "but we really won'tget moving until Hugh Scott 
surrenders the citadel." Shortly after the Omaha meeting, therefore, the 
Arizona committeeman initiated a drive to make Guy Gabrielson, a New 
Jersey committeeman whose "thinking is a hundred percent right," the next 
Republican national chairman. 12 
In mid-July, Kelland and Gabrielson surfaced in Pittsburgh. They were 
among the twenty-five national committeemen-strange bedfellows that in-
cluded Taft and Stassen supporters-who met at the Duquesne Club to plot 
Scott's ouster. The Duquesne group, convinced that it now had the votes to 
dump Scott, gave him three days to resign. In the face of such pressures, 
Scott finally bowed to what many believed was inevitable, and quit. Re-
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marked one GOP veteran, "Hugh Scott promised to make us Republicans a 
fighting party, and he sure has succeeded." 13 
It was hoped that Scott's departure would bring peace to the troubled 
GOP. Dewey and Taft were reportedly conferring to avoid further party dis-
cord. Taft hoped that Gabrielson's New York connections would help him 
unite all wings of the party, and there were reports that Gabrielson was talk-
ing to the Dewey people. But two weeks of maneuver brought party har-
mony no closer. Gabrielson became an active candidate with only the Taft 
wing behind him. The former Scott backers-Dewey lieutenant Russell 
Sprague and G. Mason Owlett, national committeemen from Pennsyl-
vania-working to find a candidate, forged ties with RNC members from 
the West and came up with Axel]. Beck of Elk Point, South Dakota. A 
Swedish immigrant, farmer-lawyer Beck was an American success story. But 
Beck's thick accent proved a liability in his bid to become GOP national 
spokesman, and Gabrielson ultimately won by a narrow 57 -to-47 margin. 
The new chairman had come far from his Iowa beginnings. Heavy set, 
with hornrimmed glasses, Gabrielson was a polished Wall Street lawyer with 
corporate ties. His selection was hailed by the political pundits as a Taft 
victory-but not by Taft. Certainly Mr. Republican respected Gabrielson-
"although he comes from the East" -and believed the new chairman would 
join the battle against Truman. But the real issue, Taft maintained, had al-
ways been Dewey's continued control of the National Committee. 14 
Gabrielson's election was mainly an anti-Dewey move. Still, after the 
November smashup, that was enough. 
The shocks of election day 1948 also reverberated on Capitol Hill during 
the first days of the Eighty-first Congress. Joe Martin'~minority leadership 
in the House went unchallenged, but Republican rumblings began shortly 
after election day over in the Senate. Party liberals wanted to sack Taft as 
GOP Senate boss. Led by New York's Irving Ives, whobelieved the party 
under Taft had remained "in a state of suspended animation," a group of 
so-called Young Turks wanted the GOP to offer constructive, intelligent 
remedies for national and international problems. Henry Cabot Lodge was 
their choice to replace Taft as Policy Committee chairman. California's Wil-
liam F. Knowland would take over for Wherry as floor leader, and Leverett 
Saltonstall of Massachusetts was the Young Turks'. pick for party whip. But 
these "liberals" had little chance of winning. Actually, according to Arthur 
Krock of the New York Times, they were only after favorable press notices, 
which they hoped would result in giving them greater weight in party coun-
cils. 1 ~ 
They got little of either. At a caucus on january 3, 1949, Senate Repub-
licans again made Taft the chairman of the Policy Committee. He received 
28 votes to Lodge's 14. In his bid to become floor leader, Young Turk 
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Knowland lost to Wherry by the same margin. Then, Taft supporter Hugh 
Butler of Nebraska nominated Saltonstall for party whip, and he won by ac-
clamation. GOP leaders also voted to enlarge the Policy Committee, and 
Ives and Saltonstall filled these two spots. "Not much of a gesture," said one 
of the leaders of the revolt, but it was enough to keep the Young Turks off 
balance. 16 
Compounding Young Turk woes was the bad publicity generated by 
the revolt. Their concern with style over substance quickly became apparent. 
When Taft appeared before reporters with the voting chart of the liberal 
New Republic, the point was firmly made-Taft was generally as liberal as 
his Young Turk foes. Taft himself believed the Young Turk move had ad-
vanced his cause. The Ohio senator's only trouble, noted writer john Cham-
berlain, was that he could never be cast as a "streamlined" Republican. 17 
Postelection tremors also shook party doctrine. After all that "Dewey 
stuff," many Right Wing Republicans yearned for a clear statement of party 
principle. Said the busy Kelland, "The Republican Party must go to the 
operating room and get a new set of guts." 18 But congressional GOP conser-
vatives resisted. Clarence Brown maintained that Republican policy would 
be found in congressional tallies-and nowhere else. Still, pressures 
mounted for a new, conservative GOP manifesto, and inJuly, 1949, the Na-
tional Republican Round-up formed to promote unabashed orthodox Re-
publicanism. Also, there were reports that some GOP conservatives were 
withholding contributions until the party shaped up. One example was 
Sterling Morton, who told Alf Landon, "The National Committee will get 
no contributions from me until I find some signs . . . the Republican Party 
is to present an alert and active opposition, and not to constitute themselves 
into a board of ratification of the actions of Truman and his associates." 19 
The party's half-million dollar deficit for 1949 suggested similar tightfisted-
ness on the party of other wealthy GOP conservatives. 
The trend within the GOP soon became more obvious when the RNC 
strategy committee met in Chicago in December, 1949. The committee 
chairman, Arthur Summerfield of Michigan, a Vandenberg supporter in 
1948, now called for an end to "me-tooism." The strategy for the 1950 cam-
paign would be uncompromising opposition to Democratic programs and 
proposals, and the committee appointed a group to flesh out this position 
by the RNC's Februaty meeting. Reminded that Taft supported some ad-
ministration proposals, one strategist snapped, "Well, that will be just too 
damned bad forT aft." 20 
This December development demonstrated that the movement for a 
statement of Republican principles had overtaken Taft and other congress-
men. In early Februaty, House and Senate GOP representatives met, how-
ever reluctantly, with the emissaries of the drafting committee to hammer 
out a policy declaration. 
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On February 7, 1950, Republicans gathered at the Uline Arena in 
Washington to celebrate another Lincoln's Birthday. The 11,000 Repub-
licans got a "poor man's" box supper of fried chicken, followed by the un-
veiling of the "Statement of Republican Principles and Objectives." The 
paramount issue, proclaimed the new document, was "Liberty against So-
cialism." It rejected Fair Deal features like "socialized medicine," deficit 
spending, and the administration's proposed farm program, the Brannan 
Plan. The GOP statement advocated a balanced budget, further rural elec-
trification, expanded Social Security, federal aid for "subsistence, shelter, 
and medical care," and freer world trade, provided industry and farmers 
were protected from the products of "underpaid foreign labor." The GOP 
also endorsed a tightening of the Truman administration's loyalty program. 
Bipartisan foreign policy should continue, said the document, but the ad-
ministration must supply necessary information, and secret diplomacy must 
end. 
This 1950 "Statement of Republican Principles and Objectives" only 
updated the declaration of 1945. Although the 1950 model was longer and 
more specific, the tone was identical. In fact, the 1950 authors ransacked 
whole phrases from the earlier version. Both statements were conservative 
but contained room for government action on certain social problems. 
Even before its official unveiling, the policy declaration had sparked 
GOP dissension. Illinois committeemen Werner Schroeder had tried unsuc-
cessfully to include an official repudiation of continued bipartisan foreign 
policy. The Chicago Tribune had labeled the declaration "dismal, weak and 
inadequate." "The best that can be said of this statement of lack of princi-
ples," it continued, "is that it will soon be forgotten." 21 Even party liberals 
shared the Tribune's judgment that "The Republicans Lay an Egg" and of-
fered their own substitute declarations. 22 
That the statement did not bring unity became clear only two days after 
Uline. Dewey, while delivering lectures on "The American Political System" 
at Princeton University, chided those who attacked party candidates with the 
epithet "me-too." These "croaking voices," charged Dewey, were conserva-
tive, isolationist, or both. 23 Thus, on two successive Lincoln's Birthdays, 
Dewey had seized the occasion to focus on the growing gap between himself 
and conservatives. In doing so-and he certainly had some cause to be de-
fensive-he helped to widen that gap, intensifying and personalizing the 
continuing hostility within the GOP. 
The Ohio Women's Republican Club would unveil no official state-
ment of principle at its Lincoln's Birthday observation in 1950. Instead, an 
inconspicuous first-term senator from Wisconsin-identified with no partic-
ular issue-had been invited to address the ladies. 
What Joseph R. McCarthy came to Wheeling, West Virginia, to talk 
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about was Communists in the U.S. government. Exactly what he said was 
debatable. According to one report, McCarthy stated: "I have here in my 
hand a list of 205 that were known to the Secretary of State as being mem-
bers of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and 
shaping the policy of the State Department. " 24 There was, however, no de-
bating the impact of whatever McCarthy said. He had unveiled a Republican 
manifesto of another kind. Within weeks, RNC Chairman Gabrielson was 
declaring the uncovering of Communists was the GOP's major new busi-
ness. McCarthy and this issue would rock American politics-and the Re-
publican party-for the next five years. 
The "Commie issue" was far from new in American politics. Most re-
cently, amid the investigative craze of the Eightieth Congress, the House 
Do-American Activities Committee (HUAC, originally created in 1938) had 
won notoriety for its probe of subversion in the motion picture industry and 
the indictment of the Hollywood Ten. HUAC had then capped its work in 
the Eightieth Congress with some splashy revelations. Whittaker Chambers, 
a former Communist and currently a Time editor, charged that Alger Hiss, 
the current president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
had been a Communist during the 1930s. Conservative columnists such as 
Fulton Lewis and Westbrook Pegler had long charged that New Deal offi-
cialdom was honeycombed with Communists, and Hiss, as a high-level State 
Department official, had been an FDR advisor at Yalta and an organizer of 
the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations. With the subsequent 
unearthing of the famous Pumpkin Papers-microfilmed copies of State 
Department reports that Chambers claimed Hiss had passed to him-the 
charge against Hiss escalated to Communist espionage. Coming as the Cold 
War continued to rage, and given the anticommunist tone of Truman's for-
eign policy, the Hiss charges naturally gave rise to suspicions that Commu-
nist foul play in Washington had undercut American foreign policy from 
Europe to China. Mao's Communists had just run Chiang's Nationalists off 
mainland China. The nation learned in September, 1949, that the Soviets 
now had the atom bomb. A month after a jury convicted Alger Hiss of per-
jury in January, 1950-the statute of limitations having expired for espi-
onage-Canadian authorities arrested Klaus Fuchs, a German-born physicist 
accused of being a spy. FBI agents followed months later with the cracking 
of the atomic spy ring that included Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The stage 
was well set for McCarthy. 
Legend has it that Senator Joe McCarthy, hungry for an issue to shore up 
a deteriorating Wisconsin political base that would be tested in two years, 
discovered the communist issue over a strategy dinner at Washington's Col-
ony Restaurant in December, 1950. But the careful researches of historian 
Michael O'Brien make plain that McCarthy had begun exploiting the com-
munist issue a full three months before, when he attacked a Wisconsin 
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newspaper and its city editor on this basis. This strike generated a good deal 
of favorable McCarthy publicity and led to similar incidents before McCar-
thy's "discovery" of anticommunism. Although he entered the Senate in 
1947 labeled a liberal Republican and backed the liberal Stassen for theRe-
publican presidential nomination in 1948, McCarthy's early voting record 
frustrated attempts at categorization. He had voted with Vandenberg on 
foreign policy matters and Taft on most domestic issues. In December, 
1949, Chicago Tribune correspondent Walter Trohan had written of McCar-
thy as a "me-too" member of the "Eastern Seaboard internationalists," but 
"Tailgunner Joe" was mainly a Senate Republican backbencher with a 
doubtful Senate future. McCarthy's Wheeling remarks changed all that. 
Prior to Wheeling, the Wisconsin senator had been a largely indistinguish-
able garden variety Republican. Within months, McCarthy's name became 
synonymous with the anticommunist crusade. He offered what earlier anti-
communists lacked-flamboyance, tenacity, and a knack for self-promo-
tion. Moreover, the gentlemanly rules of the Senate just could not contain 
McCarthy. 25 
The Hiss conviction, the spy revelations, and other accompanying 
events made McCarthy's charges seem plausible. Post-1948 GOP despera-
tion made them seem politically profitable. What McCarthy required most 
of the Republican command was tolerance. This he received, along with 
varying amounts of encouragement. Returning to Washington after his Lin-
coln's Birthday junket to West Virginia (along the way he changed the num-
ber of Communists in the State Department to 57), McCarthy spoke to the 
Senate on February 20 about the State Department's Communist problem. 
Two days later, the Senate unanimously voted to investigate McCarthy's 
charges. The resultant committee, headed by Millard Tydings, a conserva-
tive Democrat from Maryland, began its probe in March. 
Anticommunist Right Wing Republican senators found McCarthy's cru-
sade at once attractive and repellent. Taft initially described one McCarthy 
performance as "perfectly reckless, and unfounded charges could prove _em-
barrassing to the GOP." Wherry reportedly confided to one State Depart-
ment officer, "Oh Mac has got out on a limb and kind of made a fool of 
himself and we have to back him up now." Wherry later denied saying this, 
but according to his biographer, he hated demagogues like McCarthy, who 
"would not put his cards on the table." 26 
Nevertheless, the Wisconsin senator's stature in the GOP grew during 
the first half of 1950. GOP fortunes were low with Dewey's loss. Right Wing 
Republicans had fretted for years over the "socialist-tainted" New Deal bu-
reaucracy. And anticommunism was now a hot issue. Moreover, foreign pol-
icy setbacks encouraged the search for culprits-and scapegoats. Republicans 
who were worried about Asian affairs naturally applauded when McCarthy 
set about investigating America's China policy. Taft, for his part, allegedly 
A New Set of Guts 63 
told the Wisconsin senator to move quickly to another cause if one did not 
work out. He also passed along possible subjects for McCarthy to investigate. 
McCarthy often went too far, but the partisan Mr. Republican found McCar-
thyism hard to resist. Perhaps Bricker best expressed the Right Wing atti· 
tude when telling McCarthy: "Joe, you're a dirty son of a bitch, but there 
are times when you've got to have a son of a bitch around, and this is one of 
them. " 27 
A knot of GOP senators agreed heartily that McCarthy was a "dirty son 
of a bitch" and could find no excuses for his unconscionable buccaneering. 
Onjune 1, 1950, Margaret Chase Smith and six other moderate GOP sen· 
ators issued a "Declaration of Conscience" that scolded nameless Republi-
cans who exploited "fear, bigotry, ignorance, and intolerance" for political 
gain. Roben E. Wood angrily informed Smith that the "Declaration" 
"pretty well illustrates the deep gulf between ... Eastern Republicans and 
the Midwestern Republicans." 28 
The Tydings committee report, issued injuly, 1950, momentarily pre-
vented additional wrangling among Republicans over McCarthy's activities. 
Even before the report's official appearance, Republicans as a whole were 
calling the Tydings hearings "Whitewash Incorporated." Actually, the re-
pon made McCarthy, not his original charges, the major issue. It accused the 
Wisconsin senator of perpetrating a "fraud and a hoax" -rough language to 
use against a Senate colleague. The repon closed Republican ranks and 
made for an ugly partisan mood in the Senate, even triggering a brief shov· 
ing match between Senator Wherry and Edward P. Morgan, the Tydings 
committee counsel and the report's author. In the end, the Senate endorsed 
the Tydings committee's findings, but along straight patty lines. Lodge, a 
committee member, filed his own "Individual Views." Even some of the 
most liberal signers of Smith's "Declaration of Conscience" expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the Tydings report and their suppon for McCanhy's 
ends-but not his means. 29 "McCarthyism" was now clearly a political issue, 
and the Tydings report made sure that it stayed that way. 
A "conservative revival" is sweeping the nation, declared Life magazine 
in the spring of 1950. The "conservative revival" cut across party lines, but 
as Life advised, "The obvious opportunity of the Republicans is to develop a 
small-c conservatism which can be explained to the country as something 
different and more constructive than the old special interest standpat· 
tism. " 30 
Right Wing Republicans may have suspected that Life's "enlightened 
conservatism" was not really their brand of conservatism. In some important 
GOP primaries in 1950, Right Wing hopefuls had failed to unhorse liber-
al or moderate opponents. Party renegade Wayne Morse of Oregon over-
whelmed primary challenger David I. Hoover, a professed ultra-conservative 
64 THE REPUBUCAN RIGHT 
who had tried to link Morse and communism. In New Hampshire, Wesley 
Powell, the thirty-five-year-old former aide to Styles Bridges and the benefi-
ciary of his organization, challenged incumbent Charles. Tobey. "I'm proud 
to be a conservative," declared Powell, who branded the liberal Tobey a 
"Truman Republican." But Tobey squeaked by. Only in South Dakota did 
a truly Right Wing Republican, Francis Case, topple a less staunch incum-
bent. Case had campaigned against bipartisan foreign policy and his rival's 
spending record. Still, even the springtime successes of Earl Warren in Cal-
ifornia prompted Life's somewhat confusing conclusion that "enlightened 
conservatism" was "causing a ruckus" in the GOP. 3! 
The national gaze focused particularly on the ruckus in Pennsylvania in 
1950, where observers looked for clues to the national GOP drift. The "Bat-
tle of Pennsylvania" pitted Governor James Duff against the Old Guard Re-
publican machine of Joseph Grundy, now headed by G. Mason Owlett. 
Duff wanted the Republican Senate nomination. Duff was heavily favored 
against the Grundy outfit's selection, Representative John C. Kunkel. Real-
izing this, the Grundyites therefore decided to concentrate on the nomina-
tion for governor. Their candidate was the former GOP chairman of Phil-
adelphia, Jay Cooke. Duff backed Judge John S. Fine of Luzerne County. 
Knowing that a victory for himself would mean little if the Grundy-Owlett 
faction controlled patronage in Harrisburg, Duff declared he would not run 
if Cooke were his fall ticketmate. Actually, Cooke was no cog in Grundy's 
Old Guard, but Grundy's backing nevertheless made Cooke the candidate 
of the Grundy Old Guard machine. Indeed, many other contrary considera-
tions complicated "The Battle of Pennsylvania." Taft, for example, private-
ly preferred Duff and Fine, partly out of gratitude for Duff's convention aid 
in 1948. 32 
Political observers and stump speakers generally disregarded these fine 
points. "The Battle of Pennsylvania" pitted Duff's "liberalism" (Life's "en-
lightened conservatism") against GOP Old Guard "standpattisms." Born of 
bitterness, this power struggle degenerated into a meaningless volley of de-
nunciation, charge, and countercharge. The issue, said Duff, was "Grundy-
ism" -government by the few, for the few, and at the expense of the many. 
He lambasted the "high-button shoes" Old Guard reactionaries-"old 
fogies and sourpuss fakers." The Grundy forces, in turn, said that Duff was 
"power mad" and "a would-be Caesar" whose politics were New Dealish, 
not Republican. They charged that Duff used the state police for political 
bullying, and that Fine had winked at gambling and vice and made an alli-
ance with a "whisky ring" when he was county political boss. 
Duff's two-to-one victory margin over the Keystone State Old Guard, 
wrote Frederick Nelson in the Saturday Evening Post, "started a wave of 
speculation all over the country." Duff emerged as one of Lzfe' s "conserva-
tive revivalists." US News and World Report discerned a swing to the polit-
A New Set of Guts 6 5 
ical middle. But given the complexities of the Pennsylvania GOP infighting 
and the confusions of political labeling, there was relatively little the 1950 
GOP primary season could presage. If anything, the GOP was settling for a 
position between "hell, no" and "me-too," a position eschewing Dewey's 
meek partisanship and embracing McCarthy's anticommunist charges, if not 
his methods. 33 
That exact position became clearer during the fall congressional cam-
paign. The GOP slogan for 1950-"Liberty against Socialism" -was pure 
conservative Republicanism. Despite hopes in some quarters for an enlight-
ened conservatism, this was the spirit that had governed the GOP in the 
aftermath of the Dewey defeat. In ascribing Dewey's setback to insufficient 
partisanship-"me-tooism" -Right Wing Republicans insured that the 
1950 canvass would be spirited indeed. Actually, it turned into a political 
brawl, with McCarthyism and foreign policy questions highlighted by the 
Korean war, which made the combat all the more intense. 
Out of all this came Republican victory-" indisputably Republican," 
judged the New York Times. 34 Republicans gained twenty-eight seats in the 
House, leaving the Democrats with a 234-to-199 command. Republicans 
won eighteen of thirty-six senatorial contests, for a total of five new seats. 
Senate Democrats maintained only a 49-to-47 edge. A southern Demo-
crat-Republican alliance was expected to block all future Fair Deal reform 
on Capitol· Hill. Moreover, Republicans had toppled two key Fair Dealers, 
majority leader Scott Lucas of Illinois and majority whip Francis Myers of 
Pennsylvania. GOP conservatives had promised big gains with a partisan 
campaign, and they delighted in them. The Chicago Tribune boasted, "The 
national election showed that our kind of middlewestern Republicanism is 
the winning kind." 35 
Such Republicanism certainly won in Illinois, where national GOP 
trends were clearly apparent. Ambitious and voluble Everett Dirksen had 
been a highly regarded representative with international tendencies before 
eye problems had forced him to retire from Congress in 1948. His medical 
troubles over, Dirksen in 1950 sought the GOP Senate nomination. He then 
displayed his well-known political flexibility. By concentrating on Demo-
cratic threats to individual freedom and even repudiating his prior vote for 
the Marshall Plan, which he now tagged "Operation Rathole," Dirksen fi-
nally won both the backing of the Chicago Tn'bune's Robert R. McCormick 
and the GOP nomination. 
Dirksen was now a certified Right Wing Republican. In the general elec-
tion he blasted Democratic foreign policy bungling, had McCarthy cam-
paign for him, and walloped majority leader Scott Lucas. In explaining 
Dirksen's victory, Old Guard Republicans chose to overlook Lucas's consid-
erable campaign difficulties and instead credited Dirksen's new-found 
rightish ways. 
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Conservative Republicans were also successful elsewhere in the Midwest 
and Far West. Homer Capehart was reelected in Indiana, as were Bourke 
Hickenlooper of Iowa and Alexander Wiley in Wisconsin. Idaho replaced 
Glen H. Taylor, Wallace's 1948 runningmate who had lost in the primaries, 
with Herman Welker, a McCarthy admirer. In South Dakota, conservative 
Representative Francis P. Case won promotion to the Senate. Wallace Ben-
nett, the former president of the National Association of Manufacturers, 
knocked off Elbert Thomas, a Fair Deal senator from Utah. In Colorado, 
Eugene Millikin held off a stiff challenge from Fair Deal Democrat John 
Carroll. Another classic liberal-conservative battle resulted in California's 
Congressman Richard Nixon's advancement to the upper chamber. Nixon, 
who had won notoriety for his pursuit of Alger Hiss while a member of 
HUAC, had successfully made an issue of the Truman administration's 
Asian policy and his opponent Helen Gahagan Douglas's liberal record. 
There were some disappointments. Missouri's conservative Forrest Don-
nell failed in his reelection bid. And despite the much-noted victory of John 
Marshall Butler over McCarthy foe Millard Tydings in the Maryland senate 
race, the GOP trend throughout the East was largely liberal. Duff, slayer of 
the Pennsylvania Old Guard, defeated majority whip Francis Myers in a 
rugged battle. In New England, Senators Aiken and Tobey held their own. 
John Lodge, the Massachusetts senator's brother, was elected governor of 
Connecticut, and New York Governor Dewey again won reelection. The 
"only problem" for the Republican future, Wood wrote in his postelection 
roundup to MacArthur, was the continuing "gulf' between midwestern Re-
publicans and these eastern ones: "The Eastern Republicans are almost as 
much New Deal and Fair Deal as the Democrats themselves." 36 
A giddy Taft was making no such distinctions after election day 1950. 
"All the eight new senators look to me like stalwarts," he wrote to Styles 
Bridges. Taft did not know how the Senate picture could be better for the 
GOPY Mr. Republican had even greater reason to cheer. His own reelection 
bid.against the fired-up opposition of organized labor had turned out well. 
Labor had had a ready war chest and had fielded zealous political workers 
against him in Ohio. Taft faced a popular opponent in state auditor Joseph 
T. Ferguson. Although Ferguson's reputation as a lightweight caused pun-
dits to treat his candidacy as a joke and encouraged speculation that the Tru-
man White House, wanting Taft as the GOP standard-bearer in 1952, had 
connived in "Jumping Joe's" selection, Taft had awaited nobody's help-
shoring i:Jp his Ohio organization, working to win over the press, and grudg-
ingly surrendering to public relations advice. He also labored hard on the 
hustings, taking his "Liberty against Socialism" pitch to hospitable and to 
hostile crowds, alike. 
On election day, Taft beat Ferguson by almost 550,000 votes, scoring 
one of the great triumphs of Ohio's senatorial history. Robert McCormick 
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and the Chicago Tribune spoke for many in proclaiming Taft to be "the log-
ical" Republican presidential candidate. "People who are lukewarm towards 
you said you would have to have a smashing victory to be nominated," 
McCormick wrote to Taft. "Well, you have had it." Had this victory really 
finished the "Taft can't win" bogey? Taft himself put off all presidential 
talk but exultantly concluded that Republicans could recapture the White 
House in 1952 by employing the 1950 general strategy. 38 
Clearly, the Republican Right as a whole was encouraged. Sizing up the 
1950 congressional races, Senator James Kern of Missouri, who would be up 
for reelection in two years, concluded that "clear and outspoken," "no-
holds-barred" criticism of certain Truman administration policies had as-
sured GOP victories. 39 The extreme expression of this administration opposi-
tion was anticommunism, and GOP winners believed that its impact was 
indeed powerful. James Reston's campaign sampling led him to see the 
importance of McCarthyism. Even Republicans like Duff had echoed Mc-
Carthy's charges during the campaign-and some Democrats had also 
joined in. In the end, the electoral defeat of Maryland senator Millard Tyd-
ings, whom McCarthy had personally campaigned against, gave the Wiscon-
sin senator an undeserved reputation as a national political power. McCarthy 
himself was one of many Republicans who saw visions of 1952 in the 1950 
congressional returns. Wrote McCarthy, "I sincerely hope we can continue 
on now, and elect a real American president in 1952. " 40 
No issue mattered more to Americans in the 1950 elections than foreign 
policy, especially American foreign policy in the Orient. Republicans as a 
party had a longtime traditional interest-emotional and political-in the 
Far East. American triumphs there-the acquisition of the Philippines, the 
Open Door notes, and the Treaty of Portsmouth-had come with Republi-
cans in the White House. Far Eastern trade had boomed during GOP times, 
and American missionaries in the Orient largely had been recruited from 
and reported back to the Republican Midwest. 
Although the GOP was no Asian party, as some suggested, it did in-
clude a cluster of" Asia Firsters." Republicans like Wherry, Bridges, Jenner, 
Judd, and Knowland often charged that the Truman administration's Euro-
pean-oriented foreign policy slighted the Orient. While Knowland and 
Bridges said they only wanted greater balance in American foreign policy, 
some prewar isolationists like Taft and Wherry consistently displayed far 
greater interest in Asia than Europe. These men were frequently so much 
less interventionistic about the Far East than about Europe that some of 
them embraced, in the words of WilliamS. White, an "Asian Cult. "41 
With the passage of the Marshall Plan, Republicans-initially Right 
Wing Republicans-quickly turned to the Far East. Since American foreign 
policy in that area lay outside the limits of bipartisan cooperation, here was 
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partisan pickings aplenty. Beset by revolution, China had been the major 
Far Eastern concern since V-J Day. By the fall of 1949, Mao's Communists 
had pushed Chiang's Nationalists off the mainland and established the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. Moreover, Mao himself had aligned China with the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War. 
The State Department's White Paper on China, issued in August, 
1949, blamed Chiang's downfall on the internal failures of the Nationalist 
movement, not the inadequacy of American economic and military aid. 
Senators Bridges, Wherry, Know land, and Democrat Pat McCarran of 
Nevada immediately branded the White Paper "a 1054-page whitewash of 
wishful do-nothing policy." The Nationalists had had no guns to fight with, 
and Democratic administrations were responsible for that failure, they said. 
Late in 1949, when the New York Times reported the administration's deci-
sion to stop American military aid to Chiang's Nationalists on Formosa, 
GOP conservatives exploded. "Cowardly bungling and groveling," declared 
Bridges; the policy of a "small group of willful men in the State Depart-
ment," charged Taft and Knowland. 42 
"Who Lost China?" Right Wing Republicans had found their answer 
well before the fall of 1949, and other Republicans were in varying degrees 
of agreement. "The New Deal coddled communism in China from the 
start," explained Daniel Reed. 43 Conservative Republicans gave their un-
stinting support to the Nationalist Chinese. They blistered the Roosevelt 
and Truman administrations for compromising Chinese sovereignty at 
Yalta, for pressuring Chiang to form a coalition with the Communists, and 
for limiting military and economic aid to the Nationalist Chinese. America 
might have been able to keep China from the Reds, their argument con-
tinued, but "willful men" in the State Department-the "China Hands"-
had subverted American might. This "conspiracy theory" had, of course, 
gained currency beginning inJune, 1945, when an FBI raid on the New 
York office of the leftish Asian affairs journal Amerasia led to the arrest of, 
among others, China Hand John Service (who was later exonerated of these 
particular espionage charges). Senator McCarthy, although never before 
linked with the Republican Right, gave this conspiracy theory its fullest and 
timeliest expression in Wheeling in February, 1950. 
Korea was another Far Eastern concern that soon dominated newspaper 
headlines, as the North Korean army invaded South Korea on June 25, 
1950. Although Secretary of State Dean Acheson had failed to include 
South Korea within the American defense perimeter in January, 1950, the 
United States attempted quickly but unsuccessfully to stem the North 
Korean advance with air and sea forces. With the Soviet Union boycotting 
its meetings, the U.N. Security Council voted to repel the North Korean ad-
vance by force. 
GOP conservatives, Asia Firsters, and prewar isolationists-all generally 
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applauded President Truman's quick deployment of American troops to 
Korea and of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol the waters between Red China 
and Formosa-all done without the authorization of the Congress or the 
United Nations. It was high time for such action. Still, there was no cease-
fire in the Old Guard's condemnation of administration foreign policy. 
Democratic presidents were still disregarding established constitutional 
channels. Moreover, the rough early going of U.N. forces under General 
Douglas MacArthur also prompted GOP muttering over the administra-
tion's lack of preparedness and aggressiveness. Along with increased grum-
bling about the containment policy came Republican calls for the reunifica-
tion of Korea. And frustration on the Korean battlefield bred further ideas 
of conspiracy at home. Senator George Malone of Nevada, for instance, saw 
a deliberate pattern of" losing strategic means throughout the world." 44 
MacArthur's stunning amphibious assault at Inchon on September 5 
and the subsequent rout of the North Korean army broke this pattern. After 
Inchon, the Truman administration made a reunited Korea under a freely 
chosen government its own goal. For the GOP, the Inchon landing created, 
according to historian Robert Caridi, "rather spectacular visions" of the po-
tential of more aggressive policies. 4~ By mid-October, U.N. forces seized the 
North Korean capital, Pyongyang. As the congressional elections ap-
proached, these gains helped focus Republican criticism on the administra-
tion's general bipartisan foreign policy, and for the most part away from its 
Korean War effort. 
Mter election day, however, the character of the conflict quickly 
changed. In late November the Chinese entered the war and ultimately 
overwhelmed the U.N. forces, driving them deep into South Korea. Chinese 
intervention forced the administration once again to limit its war aims only 
to a free South Korea. But Right Wing Republicans now saw the Korean 
conflict as a full-fledged Sino-American war, and they rejected the concept 
of limitation. Either declare war on China or bring American boys home, 
and Right Wing Republicans advocated both policies simultaneously. The 
root of this seeming inconsistency was their belief that Truman, as Jenner 
put it, "blundered, tricked and betrayed us into a war." Truman's half-
hearted prosecution of the war made withdrawal that much more attrac-
tive. 46 
MacArthur also rejected the concept of limited war and pressed the ad-
ministration to expand the conflict by blockading the Chinese coast, bomb-
ing Chinese targets, and using Chinese Nationalist troops. Rebuffed, the 
general complained of administration restrictions in a letter to Joseph Mar-
tin. When the House Republican leader made the general's letter public on 
April 5, 1951, the president was forced to meet this constitutional chal-
lenge. Truman stripped MacArthur of his command. 
MacArthur's stature in the GOP and the belief that "there is no substi-
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tute for victory" prompted the Republican Right to take up MacArthur's 
cause immediately-although it continued to talk of withdrawal. Jenner saw 
the MacArthur sack as the work of a secret inner coterie directed by the 
Soviet Union, while the Right's new ally, Joe McCarthy, cited another rea-
son for the sack of MacArthur: Truman-"the sonofabitch" -had acted 
after a night "of bourbon and benedictine." 47 With news of MacArthur's 
dismissal, Republican Capitol Hill leaders huddled inJoe Martin's office. 
Afterward, Martin announced that the GOP conference had resolved to in-
vestigate American foreign policy and to ask MacArthur to address Congress. 
Martin told reporters that possible impeachments had also been discussed. 
Americans, as frustrated as the general with containment and limited war, 
welcomed him home as a messiah. MacArthur, in turn, did not disappoint 
his Capitol Hill hosts. His "Old Soldiers Never Die" speech brought some 
solons to tears. One Right Wing Republican was absolutely spellbound. 
"We heard God speak here today, " claimed Representative Dewey Short, 
"God in the flesh, the voice of God. " 48 
But this was MacArthur's high point. After the long congressional in-
vestigation, the conclusion grew that MacArthur wanted, in the words of 
General Omar Bradley, "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong 
time and with the wrong enemy." In the end the Republican Right only 
challenged the wisdom, not the right, of Truman's move. They supported 
MacArthur's bid to widen the war, but, failing that, they wanted American 
withdrawal. Either get on with the fighting or get out, alternatives repre-
sented in the two unsuccessful resolutions ofWashington's Senator Harry P. 
Cain. 
The MacArthur-Truman clash, with all its complications for American 
policy in the Far East, was only part of the larger debate over bipartisan for-
eign policy. Dewey's extension of bipartisanship into new foreign policy 
areas during the 1948 campaign left the concept extremely vulnerable upon 
his loss. Bipartisanship, said its critics, was nothing more than "me-too" for-
eign policy. Even Vandenberg, the chief architect of bipartisan foreign pol-
icy, puzzled over its political impact. "How is it possible to have a dynamic 
party system when paramount questions are to be exempted from politics?" 
he wondered. 49 
Although the 1948 electoral debacle amply answered such questions for 
Republicans of many different persuasions, more than GOP political needs 
helped to undermine bipartisanship. The Truman administration had be-
come increasingly independent, consulting with Republicans only when ab-
solutely necessary and, complained Republicans, withholding necessary for-
eign policy information. For example, the designation of Dean Acheson as 
secretary of state was sprung on the Republicans without prior consultation. 
Worse, post-1948 foreign policy setbacks and alleged Democratic blun-
ders-China, for instance-jeopardized a policy that had been built on ear-
A New Set of Guts 71 
lier international triumphs such as the Marshall Plan. Finally, bipartisanship 
depended on delicate personal bonds, and Vandenberg, now dying of can-
cer, was often absent from the Senate. 
By mid-1950, even before the Korean War, the Republican assault on 
bipartisanship was already mounting. Senator Bridges said that it was high 
time for a "showdown" on bipartisan foreign policy. In May, 1950, Senator 
Jenner charged that bipartisan foreign policy had resulted in "a disgraceful 
abandonment. of our vital interests, a vicious undermining of our economic 
and financial solvency, and the flagrant neglect of even the minimum re-
quirement for an impregnable national defense. ")o A "chorus of disapprov-
al" of Truman foreign policy came in late August when four GOP members 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a manifesto excoriating 
Democratic failings-the past "blunders" of Yalta and Potsdam, as well as 
present American military weakness. Among the fault-finders were H. Alex-
ander Smith of New Jersey and Lodge, both of the "Vandenberg school." 
From a hospital bed in Michigan, Vandenberg himself indicated his "gen-
eral agreement" with this manifesto. )I 
The fall campaign of 1950 merely hastened the neo-isolationist drift. 
"On the political stump [the Republicans] sound angry enough to make Joe 
McCarthy Secretary of State," reported James RestonY Republicans did hit 
the administration's foreign policy all along the line. Only in its exultant 
tone was the Chicago Tribune different from other quarters of opinion in 
predicting a "wholesale revision of our foreign policy." At the very least, the 
1950 congressional returns signaled the emergence of foreign policy hard-
liners as the "major political force" in the GOP-a power shift symbolized 
by the departure of internationalists such as Vandenberg, Ives, and Margaret 
Chase Smith from the Senate GOP Policy Committee. B 
By December, 1950, a "Great Debate" had begun. In that month, the 
administration made public its decision to send American troops to Europe 
as part of its NATO commitment and to appoint General Dwight D. Eisen-
hower as the head of NATO forces. Conservative Republicans were out-
raged. Why beef up Europe when American boys were on the run in Korea? 
they asked. Far Eastern events had only served to heighten their latent hos-
tility toward Europe. Britain, for example, had recognized Red China, and 
the failure of the allies to support United States policy in Korea was taken as 
proof of European unfaithfulness. "The old 'empire' has doublecrossed us 
at every turn," Representative Daniel Reed wrote, "and the tragedy ... is 
that we are paying for it with the lives of our boys. . . . ")4 
On December 20, 1950, Herbert Hoover made a nationwide address 
that expressed the foreign policy beliefs of many Right Wing Republicans. 
Korea was obviously a defeat for the United Nations, said the former pres-
ident. In fact, the United Nations had become "a forum of continuous 
smear on our honor, our ideals and our purposes." Great Britain was "flirt-
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ing with the appeasement of the Communist bloc," and Europe had failed 
to develop "unity of purpose." The United States must realize the futility of 
throwing ground troops into war against the Communist land mass. The de-
fense of continental Europe was a European matter, Hoover believed. Amer-
ica could neither create nor buy with money the spiritual force that Europe 
needed. The United States must arm "to the teeth" air and naval forces in 
order to control the Atlantic and Pacific and to guard against a possible 
Communist invasion of the Western Hemisphere. Hoover noted that this 
hemispheric approach would ultimately reduce costs, allow for a balanced 
budget, and free the United States from "inflation and economic degenera-
tion." In short, Hoover would make the Western Hemisphere the "Gibral-
tar of Western Civilization." 55 
On Capitol Hill, the central issue of this Great Debate became clear 
when Taft took the Senate floor onjanuary 5, 1951: Did the legislative or 
executive branch control the commitment of American troops abroad? Well 
into his full-fledged attack on bipartisan foreign policy, which he claimed 
had ended with the 1948 election, Taft turned to the content of American 
foreign policy. Despite some private doubts about Hoover's hemispheric ap-
proach, Taft defended the former president's general stand. Moreover, 
while dissenting from those who would abandon the rest of the world and 
rely solely on continental defense, Taft reiterated his strong belief in a strong 
sea and air defense. The United States should not try to be a controlling 
power on the European land mass. Hence, Taft opposed the stationing of 
American troops in Europe at this time. But whatever was to be the policy, 
concluded Taft, Congress must have an equal role in determining it. Foreign 
policy was not, as Truman maintained, the absolute right of the president. 56 
Among Republicans, eastern internationalists such as Lodge, Salton-
stall, Dulles, and Duff immediately criticized Taft's address. They tended to 
support the essentials of the administration's diplomatic moves and to grant 
the executive, not the legislative branch, the right to control the stationing 
of American troops. Dewey judged the latter to be "a job for experts, not 
politicians." Right Wing Republicans, on the other hand, lauded Taft and 
stood against the president's claim to an absolute right to station troops, as 
well as to determine the foreign policy that required such action. Conserva-
tive hopes along this line ultimately rested on the Wherry Resolution. Intro-
duced on January 8, this resolution prohibited the sending of American 
troops to Europe until the formulation of a congressional policy. According 
to Wherry and other Right Wing Republicans, "Congress must recapture its 
own responsibilities, which New Deal Presidents usurped. " 57 
But Right Wing Republicans also took this opportunity to flog Tru-
man's basic foreign policy, especially with regard to our allies. Reflecting the 
current American experience in Korea, Senator Kern declared, "We need 
friends with cool hands, not cold feet." The longstanding Right Wing con-
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cern about overcommitted American resources also persisted. The Truman-
Acheson containment policy, exclaimed Bricker, "would bleed us white 
both physically and financially. "58 
The most forceful presentation of the administration position came on 
February 1, 1951, when General Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke before a joint 
session of Congress. Eisenhower, who was highly esteemed in both parties, 
urged that the Congress place no limits on the number of troops that could 
be sent to Europe. Eisenhower further recommended that the United States 
arm Europe on a scale comparable to that of lend-lease days. While most Re-
publicans remained deferential to Ike during investigative hearings, Taft 
stood out in his vigorous questioning of the general. 
Actually, the Ohio senator was showing considerable flexibility on the 
troops-to-Europe issue, finally agreeing to accept more than three divisions 
"to show Europe we will participate." But the constitutional issue still re-
mained. On the troop question, at least, Taft proved to be a stand-in for 
Vandenberg among Republicans. 59 
When Democratic leaders in the Senate also proved willing to compro-
mise over troops for Europe and the legality of it, the Great Debate sput-
tered to a close in early April. The Senate passed, 49 to 43, the McClellan 
amendment, which stated that it was the sense of the Senate that no troops 
in addition to four earmarked divisions could be sent to Europe without spe-
cific Senate approval. Only eight Republicans, all from the East, opposed 
the McClellan Resolution-a clear sign that the "neo-isolationist" assump-
tions of Hoover, Taft, Wherry, and other conservatives had a strong grip on 
the GOP by 1950. Later, Taft joined the majority in voting, 69 to 21, to 
table the Wherry Resolution, which would have prohibited any troops from 
being sent until Congress set a policy. 
Taft was quite happy with the result; the McClellan amendment was no 
law, but he believed that it represented a "clear statement" of the Senate's 
right to pass on the sending of troops to Europe to implement NATO. The 
Truman administration, having opposed the proviso for further congres-
sional approval, rejected Taft's interpretation. Acheson called the McClellan 
Resolution "a present for everybody," without legal force. 60 The Great De-
bate thus left the constitutional question unsettled-and the McClellan Res-
olution would never be tested. 
However valid, the McClellan Resolution represented an important con-
cession to Taft and the Republican Right on the issue of executive-legislative 
prerogatives. Democrats-at least those on Capitol Hill-realized that if bi-
partisan foreign policy was to be continued, the legitimate concerns of its 
foes would have to be addressed. Although Taft and other Right Wing Re-
publicans had recognized the need for American troops in Europe, the 
Europe-first, internationalist, bipartisan policy had lost considerable ground 
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since 1948. The defeat of Dewey and the effective departure ofVandenberg 
hampered a policy that was already hurt by mounting foreign policy reverses 
and the Truman administration's deteriorating political position. Most sig-
nificant, events in the Far East shifted the focus of national attention after 
the 1948 election, and this clearly redounded to the benefit of the Republi-
cans, particularly Right Wing Republicans. Still, there was no certainty that 
the Old Guard's foreign policy-inconsistent, confused, narrow, and neg-
ative as it sometimes was-offered an appealing alternative for the American 
people. 
The story was similar on domestic policy in the four years after the 1948 
election. By early 1951, according to historian Alonzo Hamby, President 
Truman's Fair Deal represented "more of an inspirational banner than a real 
political program. " 61 It was getting nowhere on Capitol Hill. Symbolically, 
there was no repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, the main achievement of the 
Republican Eightieth Congress. A combination of GOP gains in the 1950 
congressional elections and China's entry into the Korean conflict had 
merely secured the anti-Fair Deal work of a coalition of southern Democrats 
and Republicans. 
But GOP conservatives offered no real program of their own to replace 
the Fair Deal. As far as they were concerned, the 1950 election returns 
proved that crying "socialism" about the Truman program was enough. 
Subsequently, tales of influence peddling, petty corruption, and political 
cronyism in the Truman administration made an aggressive, negative ap-
proach all the more inviting-and the Republican Right responded with 
gusto. After 1948, even Taft, who had always distinguished himself by his 
broad, reform-minded conservatism and his political integrity, entered what 
his biographer, WilliamS. White, called his "sad, worst, period" -a time 
of negativism and even political cynicism. 62 This kind of disposition, along 
with a sincere belief in anticommunism, ultimately led the Republican Old 
Guard to support McCarthy and McCarthyism, despite the realization by 
some Right Wing Republicans such as Taft that the Wisconsin senator's po-
litical swashbuckling posed definite hazards. 
Right Wing Republican assumptions clearly held sway in the GOP in 
the years following the Dewey debacle. Nowhere was this more obvious than 
in the Great Debate. But if the Great Debate clearly demonstrated that the 
Republican Right had gained commanding power in the GOP, it also spot-
lighted the nature and severity of the ideological and sectional cleavage in 
the party. Along this line, GOP presidential politics complicated matters, 
especially when Taft and Eisenhower differed so markedly over the troops 
issue. Both had been mentioned as possible GOP standard-bearers in 1952, 
and their clash fueled political gossip. James Reston thought this "one of the 
most interesting aspects" of the Great Debate. 63 
5 
If the Elephant 
Retnetnbers 
Sometime during the Great Debate of early 1951, Senator Robert A. Taft 
had an appointment at the Pentagon. Upon arriving at a secondary en-
trance, Taft was met by two Pentagon officials who whisked the senator to 
the office of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower had initiated this 
secret meeting and Taft had quickly accepted, even offering to come to the 
Pentagon. As Eisenhower later recalled, he had hoped that their meeting 
would produce assurances from Taft that collective security would remain a 
"definite feature" of future American foreign policy. 
Their talk was long and friendly, although Eisenhower noted that Taft 
seemed a bit suspicious. During the discussion, Taft kept returning to the 
central question of the Great Debate-the specific number of American 
troops to be sent to Europe. Taft would give no direct pledge on the future 
of collective security, and this increased Eisenhower's fears about the 
strength of isolationism in Congress and the Republican party. The general's 
fears were in turn damaging to the presidential hopes of Robert Taft. Assur-
ances from Taft on the future of collective security might have allayed Eisen-
hower's fears and encouraged him to drop any political ambitions for him-
self. Eisenhower intimated as much and had already prepared a statement 
that he believed would squash all speculation regarding any Eisenhower 
presidential candidacy. But because Taft had made no explicit promise, 
Eisenhower finally decided to destroy this statement after their meeting. 1 
At the conclusion of the Great Debate in the spring of 1951, Eisen-
hower departed for Europe to set up the NATO command. Senator Taft re-
mained on Capitol Hill to chart another bid for the GOP presidential nom-
ination. Speculation continued, however, regarding a possible Taft-Eisen-
hower contest for that prize. 
On October 16, 1951, Senator Robert A. Taft officially became a candi-
date for the Republican presidential nomination. He promised a "vigorous 
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presentation" of such principles as "liberty of the individual," state and 
local control, and economic freedom. As he again reached for the GOP pres-
idential nomination, Taft displayed "a kind of quiet confidence." 2 He had 
reason for such confidence. This was his third bid; the signs were favorable. 
Dewey's 1948 setback had left the party more open than ever to a conserva-
tive takeover. Conservatives claimed that Taft could do no worse than the 
four prior GOP "me-too" standard-bearers. Taft's 1950 landslide victory in 
Ohio, many believed, had buried the "Taft can't win" argument. Indeed, 
this win helped Taft to strengthen his hold on organization Republicans 
around the country as well as the GOP congressional delegation. There was 
talk of a "New Taft" -one radiating confidence and personal warmth. 
Also fueling the bandwagon was the Taft organization, seasoned and 
determined not to repeat earlier blunders. This organization boasted some 
GOP bigwigs. Former national chairman B. Carroll Reece joined the Taft 
camp, as did John D.M. Hamilton, GOP chairman from 1936 to 1940. A 
big catch for the Taft side was Tom Coleman, Wisconsin GOP boss and 
engineer of Stassen's primary triumph there in 1948. What the Taft organi-
zation had in experience, however, it lacked in breadth. There had been no 
effort to bring in political professionals from the East. As a result, Taft was 
surrounded mainly by midwestern right-wing advisors. The Taft team re-
mained confident. And, although opponents doubted the validity of this 
optimism and refused to believe Taft's claims that as of February, 1952, he 
had 635 delegates, there was still much concern in liberal quarters about the 
boom for Mr. Republican. 
Not even all conservatives had confidence in either Taft's electoral pros-
pects or his policies. The Ohio senator's independence, of course, had trou-
bled some conservatives for many years. Senator George "Molly" Malone of 
Nevada was one GOP hard-liner who was especially rattled by Taft's irreg-
ular ways. Malone constantly favored a return to high protective tariffs, and 
he often urged Taft to take a similar stand. "Bob badly needs some positive 
program," Malone told a Taft aide in early 1951. Later that year, one scout 
reported that "Molly is still carrying a peeve" because Taft had once voted 
for reciprocal trade extension. 3 
Outside of Washington, Taft's waywardness also disturbed conserva-
tives. George Creel, who had been a Wilson administration official and was 
now a dissident California Democrat, was interested in South Dakota Sen-
ator Karl Mundt's scheme to join together southern conservative Democrats 
and Republicans. Taft was one possible candidate for such a union, and Taft 
supporters hoped for Creel's help. But the Ohio senator's "adventures in 
me-tooism" distressed Creel. When Mundt tried to ease Creel's worries by 
explaining some of Taft's legislative stands, even he had to admit that Taft 
was "a little on the socialistic side" on the public housing issue. 4 
Creel also complained that Taft lacked the "evangelical fervor that wins 
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enthusiasm." Indeed, many conservative Republicans who supported Taft's 
public policies had doubts about his chances for electoral success, especially 
in the new television age. Conservative newspaper mogul Frank Gannett 
thought that television would merely advertise Taft's lack of "political sex 
appeal." Even Taft supporters often winced at what television brought into 
their living rooms. One expressed shock upon watching the Ohioan 
thoughtlessly push aside a little girl on his way to a New Hampshire cam-
paign appearance. Taft well-wishers recommended that the senator see a 
public relations specialist. 5 
In the meantime, two personalities with plenty of political sex appeal 
were presenting Taft and the conservative cause with problems. Wisconsin's 
Senator Joseph McCarthy had expressed no presidential ambitions, and 
there had been no serious talk of a McCarthy run. But McCarthy would cer-
tainly figure in the GOP presidential equation. Exactly how became a crit-
ical question in late 1951, when reports circulated that Republican leaders 
were attempting to drop the McCarthy issue. Taft himself indicated as much 
by a speech in Des Moines, Iowa, criticizing McCarthy's attack on General 
George Marshall. Taft claimed that the Wisconsin senator had gone too far 
in this instance, and he expressed doubt that communism would be an issue 
in 1952. 
Ambivalence had always marked Taft's attitude toward McCarthy, and 
publicly Taft had basically kept quiet. Now was certainly no time for a clash 
with the Wisconsin senator. Although McCarthy's general popular appeal 
had never been tested, he did have a loyal and vocal following. Many conser-
vatives, even critics of McCarthy's slam-bang approach, believed that any at-
tack on his methods would seriously undermine anticommunism. George 
Creel, for example, complained of the constant "note of deprecation" in 
Taft's references to McCarthy. 6 Moreover, McCarthy had considerable clout 
in Wisconsin, an important GOP primary state. 
Robert Taft feared any potential McCarthy trouble and asked Tom 
Coleman for help. As Wisconsin GOP boss, Coleman knew that conditions 
had changed since he had engineered McCarthy's Senate victory in 1946. By 
late 1951, McCarthy had developed a "Christ-like complex," Coleman re-
ported. McCarthy told Coleman that Taft would have to support him totally 
before he would endorse Taft. Taft nevertheless informed Hoover that Cole-
man still believed that he could bring McCarthy around. 7 It was Taft, 
though, who seemed to make "amends with McCarthy." Taft gave McCar-
thy a strong plug in early 1952. McCarthy, for his part, remained silent, and 
there were even reports he favored General Douglas MacArthur as the next 
GOP presidential candidate. In the end, however, the Wisconsin GOP 
backed Taft in the primary. 
It was inevitable that General Douglas MacArthur would also figure in 
the 1952 nomination battle. He simply would not fade away. A war hero 
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and a great orator, MacArthur was a demigod to those who seethed at the 
stalemate and indecision in Korea. Paradoxically, he had become a favorite 
of both isolationists and internationalists. Since his homecoming, he had 
also trumpeted the conservative vinues of individualism and self-reliance. 
And despite his public repudiation of political aspirations, political specula-
tion concerning the general persisted. Gannett maintained that television 
would be crucial in the upcoming presidential campaign, and unlike Taft, 
MacArthur was superb on television. 8 South Dakota's Senator Karl Mundt, 
in turn, believed that a MacArthur-Taft ticket would be a "wonderful tonic 
for America. "9 
Although MacArthur insisted throughout that Taft should be theRe-
publican choice, his public statements often proved vague and inconclusive. 
Some MacAnhur moves appeared to be either politically self-serving or just 
plain foolish. In September, 1951, he spoke in Cleveland of Ohio's historic 
role in national leadership-a role, MacArthur added, that may increase "in 
the not too distant future." Political observers and some Taft partisans saw 
MacAnhur's words as a definite endorsement for Taft. 10 But Taft campaign 
operative John Hamilton was not satisfied and took up the matter with 
MacArthur. The general maintained that the speech had been a Taft en-
dorsement. Perhaps it was, wrote Hamilton, but it seemed that way only to 
some. "A substantial group must have their answers spelled out for them 
and cannot rely on their powers of deduction." Hamilton wanted a bolder 
declaration. Several days later, the Mtlwaukee]ournal reported that MacAr-
thur had urged Wisconsin backers to get behind Taft in the spring pri-
maries. Two weeks later came the news that MacAnhur's aide, Major Gen-
eral Counney Whitney, had informed one MacArthur enthusiast that the 
general would enter no presidential primaries. 11 
Still, this was hardly the kind of support Taft's managers had in mind. 
MacArthur's ambiguity vexed Taft supporters, as did the activities of newly 
hatched MacArthur-for-President clubs in the key primary states of Wiscon-
sin and Minnesota. In December, 1951, Hamilton met with MacArthur to 
discuss these matters. The result of their meeting, Hamilton reported, 
"could not have been more disheartening." The general believed that to 
squelch these pro-MacAnhur movements would be "a most harmful influ-
ence," since they were along "conservative lines." He also claimed an inabil-
ity to keep people from organizing MacArthur clubs if they wanted to. 
These movements, which had already put up primary delegate slates in Min-
nesota, would not divide the conservative vote, MacArthur claimed; rather, 
they would split up those voters who wanted a general for president, thus 
cutting into Eisenhower's support. "Unbelievable," wrote Hamilton. 12 
The MacArthur-Hamilton conference obviously settled nothing. Either 
MacArthur was being coy or had left his knack for strategy on the battlefield. 
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Just what was MacArthur up to? Conservative columnist George Sokolsky, 
believing that all the mail he had received on the subject gave him a right to 
know, went to MacArthur's Waldorf Astoria suite to find out for himself in 
December, 1951. The general assured Sokolsky that he was absolutely for 
Taft-an assurance Sokolsky quickly relayed to the Taft camp. 13 In the end, 
Taft and Herbert Hoover got MacArthur to ask all Minnesota delegates 
favorable to him to withdraw. Even so, there was no outright MacArthur en-
dorsement of Taft. MacArthur remained, wrote Arthur Krock, the "political 
xof1952." 14 
A far more definite political factor by early 1952 was General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. MacArthur's former underling was on the minds of most Re-
publicans, since this military hero was a political natural. With an easy way 
and an infectious grin, Eisenhower had the common touch and, unlike 
MacArthur, never aroused the public's fears about a military man in the 
White House. If Eisenhower was a natural politician, he also seemed apolit-
ical. Unlike MacArthur, he carried no political battle scars. Indeed, the 
question was constantly asked: Was Ike a Democrat or Republican? In 1948 
some members in both parties had wanted Ike to top their ticket, but he 
stayed out of politics for that season. Presidential talk nevertheless persisted, 
becoming louder and more Republican as time went on. A year later, Kansas 
City Star president Roy Roberts gave assurances that Ike, who had grown up 
in Abilene, Kansas, was "a good Kansas Republican." Not only that, said 
Roberts, but Eisenhower would accept a draft and might be persuaded to 
run. 
Subsequently, at a crowded news conference onJanuary 5, 1952, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts announced that Eisenhower's name 
would be entered in the New Hampshire primary. Next day came word out 
of NATO headquarters in France: The general would indeed accept theRe-
publican nomination, but he would neither seek the nomination nor join in 
any preconvention political activities. The New York Times and the Chicago 
Sun Times quickly joined Lzfe and other publications in support of Ike. 
Taft, for his part, interpreted Eisenhower's statement to mean he would not 
be an active candidate, although he would accept a draft. MacArthur, in 
turn, viewed the Eisenhower candidacy within the framework of his own un-
successful presidential bid in 1948. "Eisenhower's absence will be a telling 
factor against him," wrote MacArthur. 15 
The battle lines for 1952 were finally shaping up. There were, of course, 
other aspirants. California's Governor Earl Warren was an active candidate, 
as was Harold E. Stassen (although Taft managers felt sure that the latter was 
only a "hatchet man" for Eisenhower). But the main contenders were Taft 
and Eisenhower, and shortly after the Lodge announcement, the Taft camp 
joined the battle. "Hero worship is no substitute for faith based on known 
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performance. Neither is glamour, or sex appeal," Taft aide David Ingalls 
told the RNC in early January, 1952. 16 Ingalls's remarks presaged the rough 
political combat ahead. 
Hero worship, glamor, sex appeal-were these all that separated Taft 
and Eisenhower? Not entirely. There were differences of political style and 
strategy. Where Eisenhower's Republicanism had to be vouched for, Taft's 
was unassailable. While Taft relished political battle, Ike shunned it. Mter 
1948, Right Wing Republicans-especially those who had supported Dewey 
at the 1948 convention-were certain that the GOP needed a fighting stan-
dard-bearer. Ike would blur party lines in the Willkie tradition, while Taft 
would sharpen them. General Albert C. Wedemeyer reported that, al-
though a "capable army officer" and "lovable character," Eisenhower was 
"an appeaser, an individual either incapable or unwilling to meet issues 
headon." 17 
Yet it was precisely this ability to dull political differences that Ike's 
boosters claimed the GOP needed, since, as a minority party, the GOP had 
to lure independents and disaffected Democratic voters into its ranks-
voters who would be put off by the Old Guard's negativism and partisan-
ship. Conservatives naturally rejected this notion, mainly because they dis-
puted the premise that independent votes were automatically liberal votes. 
Right Wing Republicans like Taft believed that the independent voter was 
only waiting for the Republicans to offer a real choice-that is, a conserva-
tive choice. Finally, the makeup of Eisenhower's support annoyed Right 
Wing Republicans. Scott, Duff, Lodge, and Dewey-this was an Old Guard 
enemies list. WroteJohn Taber, "Eisenhower has the support of the crowd, 
who, three times before, have been back of a 'me-too' campaign." 18 
Taft's suspicions that an Eisenhower presidency would result in a Re-
publican New Deal administration with as much spending and socialism as 
under Truman stemmed only from his appraisal of Ike's character and back-
ers, since there were few other clues to the general's attitudes. Naturally, 
Taft people hoped Ike would lose support as he took specific policy stands. 
Eisenhower's early primary wins made this haziness all the more tormenting 
for the Taft camp. One Taft aid suggested revising the popular phrase "I 
Like Ike" into "But What Does Ike Like?" 19 
When Ike finally returned home and began discussing domestic policy, 
it proved a mixed blessing for Taft. Eisenhower told a news conference in 
early June, 1952, that the 1950 GOP statement of principles was "the best 
statement" of his own political beliefs. Taft, of course, had been largely 
responsible for that document, as the Ohioan quickly pointed out. But in 
the end, domestic policy questions never really became important in their 
preconvention clash. Any distinction ultimately rested not on specific policy 
proposals, but on tone or emphasis and on the makeup of each candidate's 
supporters. Taft had battled Democratic presidents and programs since 
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his arrival on Capitol Hill. Yet Taft, himself, was not ready to dismantle the 
New Deal structure. In some cases, he had even advanced proposals of a lib-
eral character. Still, Taft continued to rail against Democratic New and Fair 
Dealings. This fact, along with his conservative following, helped maintain 
Taft's conservative image. On domestic matters, Eisenhower conveyed and 
retained the more progressive or liberal reputation. 
On foreign policy matters, however, there was much less mystery about 
the differences between them. And these were basic to the nomination 
struggle. Taft and Eisenhower had clashed before over the basics of Amer-
ican foreign policy, and supporters of each predicted dire results for Amer-
ican foreign policy should the other win the nomination. While both agreed 
that the nation's NATO obligation must be met and that the United States 
must aid in the rearmament of Europe, Taft-Eisenhower differences over 
this specific American role in Europe were especially wide. Further, Eisen-
hower championed the infantry's role in military policy; Taft stressed air and 
sea power. Eisenhower still had faith in the United Nations; Taft thought it 
a failure. Overall, Taft shared the Republican Right's preoccupation with 
the Far East; Eisenhower did not. Ike stressed the advantages of collective ac-
tion; Taft, who had gone along with most of these efforts, focused on the 
disadvantages. 
Political wisdom nevertheless suggested that Taft soft-pedal foreign pol-
icy disagreements with Eisenhower in the preconvention period. As the con-
vention neared, Taft even claimed that there was little distance between him 
and Eisenhower on foreign policy. Privately, Eisenhower forces shared this 
assessment, but they felt that the differences were wide enough to be worth 
exploiting during the battle for the GOP nomination. Eisenhower, whose 
style was usually not to underscore differences in public, told reporters that 
Taft was an "isolationist." 
The Taft-Eisenhower battle actually began in New Hampshire. Initially 
there was to be no test in the Granite State. Polls showed that Taft had no 
chance to win there, and he planned to stay out. But after canvassing the 
local situation, Hamilton talked Taft into entering the New Hampshire pri-
mary on the last possible day. The Taft camp had some reasons for hope, but 
even these had a dark side. The editor of the Manchester Union Leader, Wil-
liam Loeb, who was on his way to becoming a conservative ftxture, had come 
to support Taft after failing to interest MacArthur in the fray. For its part, 
the Taft team was wary of Loeb. Fearful of his "bad personal reputation" 
and his paper's "vitriolic personal attacks," the Taft group wanted his good-
will, but they did not want him to lead any Taft drive. 20 Nonetheless, the 
Union Leader became the trumpet of the Taft candidacy in New Hampshire. 
Since the polls forecast a victory for Ike, who also boasted a star-studded 
delegate slate, Taft and his handlers downplayed their chances for success. 
Even so, Eisenhower's election victory was impressive. He amassed 46,661 
82 THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT 
votes to Taft's 35,838 to win full control of the fourteen-member Granite 
State delegation. Some Taft supporters were dismayed, believing Taft had 
made a grave mistake in challenging Eisenhower in New Hampshire. Clar-
ence Brown, for example, had urged Taft to stay out of this race and now 
complained, "The whole situation is a story of too many cooks spoiling the 
broth-and that nobody can actually manage the candidate." 21 
The next blow to Taft came in Minnesota. Stassen won control of the 
delegation, but Ike won the headlines by garnering 108,000 write-in votes to 
the 24,000 of Mr. Republican. The results prompted Eisenhower to "re-
examine" his political position, and two weeks later Eisenhower asked to be 
relieved of his NATO command. Adding to Taft's woes at this time was the 
action of Governor Alfred Driscoll of New Jersey. On the eve of the Minne-
sota vote, Driscoll had announced his support for Eisenhower. Senator Taft 
seethed over this bad news from the East, for he believed that Driscoll had 
pretended to be neutral only until Taft could no longer legally withdraw 
from the New Jersey primary. Knowing it would be senseless to battle the 
Garden State Republican organization, Taft tried to withdraw anyway, but a 
court ruled his name had to remain on the New Jersey ballot. "The eastern 
seaboard," Brown wrote, "is enemy territory. " 22 
After New Hampshire and Minnesota, even Taft's managers conceded 
that a loss in Wisconsin would virtually knock their candidate out of the 
race. On April 2, however, Taft won over Stassen in Wisconsin and over 
Eisenhower in Nebraska. Suddenly Taft saw the makings of a midwestern 
groundswell. This dual win did buck up the Taft campaign and helped set a 
pattern for the drawnout springtime struggle for the GOP nomination. Taft 
went on to score primary victories in Ohio and Illinois, and he also tri-
umphed in the state conventions in West Virginia, North Dakota, Wyo-
ming, and Indiana. But Eisenhower piled up wins in New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Massachusetts, and Missouri, as well as in Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont. The last Taft-Eisenhower primary contest came in South Dakota. 
Taft won South Dakota's 14 delegates, nosing out Ike in the winner-take-all 
primary. This contest also brought another important advantage to the Taft 
drive. General Douglas MacArthur had personally written to former South 
Dakota governor Leslie Jensen, asking him to help Taft. 
By this time, events in Texas attracted national attention and eventually 
proved to be the single most important factor in the preconvention struggle. 
Small and designed to stay that way, the Republican party in Texas was fairly 
typical of GOP outposts in Dixie, organizations that were basically "per-
sonal preserves" of the national committeeman-patronage dealerships 
when a Republican sat in the White House. But small as it was, the Texas 
GOP was split. Longtime Texas GOP boss Colonel R.B. Creager had died in 
1950, and now Henry Zweifel-a Taft man-and J.H. Oack) Porter-an 
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Eisenhower man-were battling for control. Early on, Taft campaign strat-
egists expected problems in Texas, and the precinct and county caucuses in 
early May, 1952, confirmed their worst fears. 23 At both stages, the Porter 
faction swamped the Zweifel-led Taft forces by using Texas Democrats fa-
vorable to Ike. Zweifel tried to block this approach by requiring delegates to 
sign a loyalty pledge to the GOP, but Porter countered by instructing his 
forces to sign the pledges-they were unconstitutional anyway, he claimed. 
In response to this "near revolutionary movement" of Porter's "One Day 
Republicans," the Zweifel-Taft forces held rump precinct and county caucus 
SeSSiOnS. 
Henry Zweifel was one Republican who admitted openly that he would 
rather lose with Taft than win with Eisenhower. He now decided to play 
rough so that he would have to do neither. When the state convention met 
in late May at Mineral Wells, the mood was bitter and ugly. Zweifel was 
even charging that Eisenhower had the backing of the communist Daily 
Worker. The Texas state executive committee stood by Zweifel in rejecting 
the Porter delegates' claims of GOP loyalty. At the convention, the Zweifel 
forces then put together a 38-member national convention delegation that, 
while technically uninstructed, included 30 to 34 Taft supporters. The 
Porter faction, in turn, held its own gathering in Mineral Wells and formed 
a national convention delegation that favored Eisenhower, 3 3 to 5. 
The Eisenhower forces immediately branded the Mineral Wells episode 
the "Texas Steal." Phrases like "Rob with Bob" and "Graft with Taft" pep-
pered reports out of Mineral Wells. Eisenhower himself claimed that "Rus-
tlers stole the Texas birthright instead of Texas steers." Although Zweifel 
followers believed that the Taft-dominated National Committee would 
"barrel-house 'em through," Taft, whose aides B. Carroll Reece and David 
Ingalls bore some responsibility for events in Texas, was not yet ready to go 
this far. 24 Compromise over the contested delegates was still possible, Taft 
remarked at the Indiana state Republican convention in early June. 
Taft and his team remained confident despite the Texas difficulties. 
Taft's offer to compromise on the contested Texas delegates was, after all, 
nothing more than his first step in uniting the party for the fall canvass. 
Upon returning to the states in June, Eisenhower eased any Right Wing wor-
ries with the general's first nationwide address from his hometown of 
Abilene, Kansas. A general ramble of platitudes, the speech was seen as a 
dud. Snorted B. Carroll Reece, "It looks like he's pretty much for home, 
mother and heaven." 25 
But Taft's campaign tactics, not Ike's hazy policy stands, became the 
main issue in the month before the July convention. The Eisenhower camp 
kept the image of a Taft "steamroller" alive. Initially, Eisenhower had wel-
comed Taft's compromise offer on the Texas situation. But Lodge, the mas-
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termind of the Eisenhower campaign, spotted a hot issue. He therefore 
framed the Texas problem in moral terms and undercut all hope for a nego-
tiated settlement. :'It's never right to compromise with dishonesty," he 
said. 26 
The announcement of the convention agenda prompted further charges 
of a Taft steamroller. The Taft-dominated RNC had packed the convention 
agenda with pro-Taft speakers. MacArthur was slated to give the keynote ad-
dress. The next evening, former President Hoover was scheduled to speak. 
There were also to be talks by Bridges, Kern, and McCarthy-a Right Wing 
spectacular. Only two of the twenty-five GOP governors were placed on the 
list of speakers. Moreover, the convention officials-permanent chairman 
Joseph Martin and temporary chairman WalterS. Hallanan-were known 
Taft supporters. Charges of strongarm tactics grew even louder when the 
RNC, against Taft's wishes, barred television cameras-but not reporters or 
other media representatives-from its hearings on contested delegates. On 
the steamroller matter, Taft stood firm, branding such charges "a fake 
. " ISSUe. 
Taft was already complaining about the opposition of GOP governors 
when the National Governors Conference assembled in Houston practically 
on convention eve. The GOP governors were a stronghold of Eisenhower 
support, and some of them wanted to do something at Houston to further 
the general's cause. But three of the GOP governors at Houston were strong 
Taft backers, and without unanimity, any such move would have been seen 
for what it was: a pro-Ike gambit. But the pro-Ike governors were un-
daunted. Led by Colorado's Dan Thornton, they fashioned a manifesto call-
ing on the GOP convention to prohibit contested delegates from voting on 
the seating of other delegates. When an utterly bamboozled Taft supporter, 
Governor H. Bracken Lee ofUtah, signed this manifesto, the other Taft gov-
ernors-Len Jordon ofldaho and Norman Brunsdale of North Dakota-fol-
lowed suit. So unwitting was Lee that he even read the manifesto's first 
page-a harmless call for honor, fairness, and integrity at the GOP conven-
tion-at a joint news conference with Thornton. Mter Lee then rushed off 
to catch a plane out of Houston, Thornton continued the press conference, 
delivering the bombshell on page two-the GOP governors' proposal for a 
change in party rules. In Chicago, Chairman Gabrielson immediately re-
jected the governors' move as "contrary to all customs and former rulings." 
But the issue was far from dead. 
Despite the Houston handiwork and the current Gallup poll that 
showed Taft, unlike Eisenhower, running behind possible Democratic can-
didates, Mr. Republican beamed confidently as he arrived in Chicago. He 
claimed 537 delegates; the Associated Press gave him 534 delegates to the 
425 of Eisenhower and the 131 of other hopefuls. The magic number for the 
nomination was 604. 
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Chicago. There would be no GOP jubilee. The carnival aspect of Amer-
ican political conventions was largely absent. Convention sidelights inevita-
bly returned to a central theme-bitter and intense intraparty warfare. Re-
minding delegates of Texas shenanigans, one sound truck blared, "Thou 
shalt not steal." Another ricocheted its bitter message off Windy City build-
ings: "Two-time loser Dewey wants to be president by proxy. Phooey on 
Dewey." Taft enthusiasts brandished buttons with the Republican Right's 
credo since 1948: "No me-too in 1952." Intoned the Chicago Tribune, "If 
the elephant remembers, he should be all thru with 'me too.'" 27 
Even before the opening gavel of the convention, chairman Guy 
Gabrielson had to arbitrate what was called the "battle of the banners" -a 
surprisingly grim fracas over poster space at the Conrad Hilton hotel, site of 
the Taft and Eisenhower headquarters. There was one report that Eisen-
hower workers, unappreciative of some serenading by young Taftites, 
booted them down a stairwell of the Conrad Hilton. Other testimony only 
confirmed what occasional delegate fisticuffs demonstrated-the preconven-
tion struggle had left Republicans unnerved, and this promised to be a 
mean convention indeed. 
The gathering itself was to be held in the International Amphitheatre. 
The arena had been built for livestock shows and rodeos, where, unlike po-
litical parleys, the bull generally threw the men around. In fact, before the 
newly installed air conditioner went on, the hall "smelled like the old bull 
ring at Juarez," according to writer Gene Fowler. 28 At the west end of the 
hall, a blowup of Lincoln's sober gaze reminded the Chicago Tribune that 
Lincoln was a rail- not a party-splitter. 29 Chicago seemed r~ady for battle. 
"There is more than a personal battle that is going on here," Reston ob-
served; "the conservative wing of the party is fighting for its life." 30 
On Monday the delegates waited an hour for the proceedings to begin. 
Five minutes before the convention was scheduled to start, Lodge unveiled a 
"Fair Play" amendment in the chairman's office behind the stage. This 
amendment was an offshoot of the Houston manifesto and provided that no 
temporary, disputed, or alternate delegate be allowed to vote until the con-
vention had decided on that delegate's legitimacy. Unlike the Houston 
manifesto, however, it exempted delegates previously certified by over two-
thirds of the RNC. The Taft camp wanted to avoid a floor fight, and they of-
fered a compromise: the exemption of seven Louisiana delegates from Fair 
Play provisions. Louisiana was a truly special case, since the state's GOP 
committee had legally approved these delegates. But the Eisenhower strat-
egy depended on a floor fight, and Lodge, afraid the Taft forces might ac-
cept the Fair Play resolution, rejected any compromise. 
The Fair Play resolution caught the Taft managers off guard, and poor 
communication on the convention floor made matters worse. As soon as the 
convention opened, Gabrielson promptly recognized Senator John Bricker, 
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who moved that the 1948 convention rules be in effect. It was obviously a 
mistake for the Taft camp to make this first move; Bricker had even declined 
Gabrielson' earlier backstage request to do soY But once at the podium, the 
chairman called on Bricker anyway, and the startled senator complied. 
Immediately, Governor Arthur B. Langlie of Washington introduced the 
Fair Play amendment. 
This led to uproar. Clarence Brown, one of the Taft strategists, edged 
his way to the podium. The jammed aisles hampered communications be-
tween Brown and Coleman, the Taft floor manager. The Taft team had left 
the chairman's office believing that Gabrielson would rule favorably on 
their point of order to exempt the Louisiana delegation from Fair Play provi-
sions. Once on stage, Gabrielson apparently told Brown that he had 
changed his mind. Brown broached the point of order, but amid the boos of 
the Ike supporters, he offered instead an amendment excluding the Louisi-
ana delegates from the Langlie provisions. Taft, watching on television, ex-
ploded in anger and frustration: the proposed Brown amendment would re-
quire a convention vote and would thus provide an early test of strength 
between Eisenhower and Taft forces. 
A furious two-hour debate ensued. Bricker offered to swap acceptance 
of the Langlie resolution for the Brown amendment. The Eisenhower camp 
would not budge on what New Hampshire governor Sherman Adams said 
was a "moral issue." Finally the convention spiked the Brown amendment, 
658 to 548, and then passed Langlie's Fair play resolution by acclamation. 
The vote had exposed latent Eisenhower strength: California and Minnesota 
gave all their votes to Ike; Pennsylvania-again a key delegation-voted 57 
to 13 against the Brown amendment; Michigan voted 45 to 1 against. Al-
though Taft managers nevertheless smiled to the end, one Taft worker re-
called that the "psychological defeat" was "overpowering." 32 
Taft followers suffered other disappointments on convention Monday. 
During the Brown amendment debate, Bricker had urged a quick solution 
in order for the convention to hear from "that most gallant American in his-
tory except George Washington," General Douglas MacArthur. The key-
noter was known to be friendly to Taft, and Taft supporters hoped for an 
emotional plea for Mr. Republican. Appearing out of uniform in a dark blue 
suit and tie, the general flayed the Democrats but blew no bugle for Taft. It 
was one of MacArthur's worst speeches. "One could feel the electricity grad-
ually running out of the room," wrote C.L. Sulzberger of the New York 
Times. "I think he cooked his own goose and didn't do much for Taft."33 
On opening day, about all Taft won was the applause sweepstakes, a sign 
that Taft owned the hearts if not the minds of Republicans at Chicago. 
By Wednesday the convention was hopelessly behind schedule. Despite 
the appeal of Styles Bridges for an end to the fighting and bitterness, it was 
still too early for that. Properly accredited delegates were still the main issue. 
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The Saturday before the convention, the RNC had ruled on the disputed 
delegates. Its most important decision came when it accepted the Taft com-
promise formula and split the Texas delegation, 22 to 16 in favor of Taft. 
The second level of appeal was the Credentials Committee, which met the 
following Tuesday and ratified most of the RNC's Saturday rulings. Here, in 
a goodwill gesture, the Taft forces abandoned their Louisiana delegation in 
favor oflke's contingent. 
But Lodge and the Eisenhower forces still would not deal. On W ednes-
day evening-originally slated for nominations-the Credentials Commit-
tee reports on disputed delegates went to the convention floor. Here, Lodge 
continued the fight over the Georgia and Texas delegations. Georgia came 
first. Again, Taft followers believed that the pro-Taft delegation had legit-
imate claims, claims legally recognized by the Georgia secretary of state and 
the Georgia Superior Court. But whatever they thought, the Georgia issue 
quickly became another test of strength between the Taft and Eisenhower 
forces. 
The debate instantly became sharp, with Senator Everett Dirksen's ac-
tion capping it. In upholding the claims of the Georgia pro-Taft delegation, 
he pointed a finger toward Dewey in the New York delegation's section and 
said, "My friends on the eastern seaboard, re-examine your hearts on this 
issue because we followed you before and you took us down the path to de-
feat." The convention went wild. Convention eyes turned to the stone-faced 
Dewey. Some delegates booed Dirksen, but they were drowned out by the 
shrieks and bellows of the Taft partisans. Suddenly, there was a commotion 
in the Michigan delegation, and the police had to rush in to restore order. 
Astonished by his own handiwork, Dirksen then scolded Republicans for 
booing other Republicans. By now the GOP Chicago convention had be-
come a true political slugfest, the inevitable product of emotions that had 
simmered for almost four years. 
After this Old Guard catharsis, the convention voted just before mid-
night. By a margin of 607 to 531, the convention voted to seat the pro-
Eisenhower delegation from Georgia. "Some of the Taft delegates," Taft ex-
plained later, "couldn't or wouldn't recognize that Georgia was the first 
vote for the nomination." 34 Mterward, not wanting to further advertise 
their delegate strength, the Taft forces accepted the Credentials Commit-
tee's minority report calling for the seating of the pro-Ike Porter delegation 
from Texas. 
Unfortunately, there was still more bad news for Taft in a strategic spot. 
For days there had been convention rumors that Pennsylvania governor John 
Fine was leaning toward Ike. In fact, Fine and Michigan GOP boss Arthur 
Summerfield had agreed early to stand together for Eisenhower but to with-
hold news of their pact. Fine, who had come to Chicago determined "not to 
miss the boat," declared for Eisenhower immediately after the Georgia tally. 
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The Pennsylvania delegation then caucused before television cameras and 
gave Eisenhower 51 votes, with 16 going to Taft and 3 to MacArthur. Fol-
lowing this Keystone State action, the Associated Press estimated that Eisen-
hower commanded 501 delegates and Taft only 485. The other candidates 
split up 111 votes, and 109 delegates were still undecided. 
Thursday-the day of the nominating speeches-brought conservative 
desperation and more intraparty acrimony. The day began with fresh rumors 
that MacArthur had returned to Chicago from New York. Previously, most 
MacArthur talk had centered on the vice-presidential post. Even Taft had 
hinted publicly that MacArthur would be his pick for the second spot and 
privately told Bricker that he planned to choose the general. 35 Some Right 
Wing Republicans, though, preferred MacArthur at the top of the ticket 
and hoped a deadlocked convention would ultimately turn to him. By 
Thursday, a MacArthur-for-President boom appeared to some to be the only 
hope of the Old Guard. South Dakota's Senator Francis Case was openly 
urging the general's nomination. Taft, of course, was the key, since MacAr-
thur insisted he would never "stab Taft in the back." 36 
Faced with this dilemma, a group of GOP conservatives met in Herbert 
Hoover's suite at the Conrad Hilton on Thursday morning. Conservative 
columnist George Sokolsky and Albert C. Wedemeyer were among the par-
ticipants. Taft could not now win the GOP presidential nomination, and he. 
must therefore throw his support to MacArthur, Hoover told them. The 
group decided to dispatch Wedemeyer to talk with Taft. 
Later that afternoon, Taft received Wedemeyer's suggestion "in good 
faith" but replied that he would not switch to MacArthur on the first ballot. 
No first-ballot victory was possible for anyone, Taft believed. Besides, he 
wrote later, such a move would have been a surrender of principle and "a 
betrayal of thousands of workers and millions of voters." Taft did say that he 
might reconsider on later ballots. Then, according to Wedemeyer, Taft had 
him call MacArthur in New York with three questions. Would MacArthur 
announce his all-out support for Taft? No, said the general; this might be 
seen as an act of weakness and desperation. Would MacArthur accept the 
vice-presidential spot on the ticket? Certainly, replied the general. Then, 
Taft had Wedemeyer ask MacArthur if he would accept the presidential 
nomination if Taft switched to him. "Al," answered MacArthur, "Bob Taft 
is our captain and we must do whatever he wants us to do." 37 
Convention tensions flared again on Thursday. Taft's campaign man-
ager David Ingalls penned a vitriolic handout urging delegates to "SINK 
DEWEY." The sheet branded Dewey "THE MOST COLD-BLOODED, 
RUTHLESS, SELF-SEEKING BOSS IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY." 
That evening when Dirksen stepped to the rostrum to nominate Taft, 
Dewey walked out of the hall. 
Prior to the first ballot on Friday morning, many rumors ran through 
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the International Amphitheatre. There was talk of a stop-Ike movement. 
Had not Taft called California's Governor Earl Warren and Harold Stassen? 
Speculation about MacArthur persisted. Reports that the Ohioan would 
switch to Warren marked the silliest prevote babble. Actually, the only real 
hope for conservatives rested upon stopping Ike on the first ballot and then 
acting on a tentative agreement with Warren and Stassen to recess the con-
vention after that. 
As the balloting was about to begin, Taft made a last-ditch effort to 
contact California senator Knowland on the convention floor in order to 
work something out at the end of the first ballot. But the Californian in-
formed his Senate boss that there would be only one ballot. Knowland 
called it. The Eisenhower forces shot ahead quickly. With 604 votes needed 
to nominate, Ike rolled up 595 first-ballot votes to Taft's 500-before 
switches. Minnesota quickly provided Ike with 19 new tallies, and he was 
over at 614. The bandwagon rolled on, with pro-Taft votes beginning to 
change in Pennsylvania. "These bandwagon people," snarled one Taft del-
egate as he headed for the exits, would find they were boarding a hearse. 38 
When Joseph Martin finally announced the first-ballot totals, Eisenhower 
had 845 votes to the 280 remaining Taft stalwarts. Warren held on to 77 del-
egates and MacArthur 4. Then, for the third time in twelve years, Bricker 
conceded for Taft and moved that Eisenhower's nomination be made unan-
imous. Bricker also announced that Taft and Eisenhower had already met, 
and that Mr. Republican had pledged to support the general. 
With victory assured, Eisenhower had indeed immediately called on Mr. 
Republican at his Blackstone Hotel suite. Enduring the boos and catcalls of 
overwrought Taft workers as he arrived, the general conferred with Taft and 
secured his support. By the time the two men emerged for pictures, a Taft 
worker had successfully pleaded with his fellows to supplant their jeers with 
cheers. 
But one thing neither Eisenhower nor his managers did to mend the 
party breach was to offer Taft a spot on the ticket. In their various discus-
sions, Taft had been mentioned as a vice-presidential possibility but the sug-
gestion had gone nowhere. Taft, in turn, was known to favor Dirksen, but 
this possibility was regarded as ludicrous. Ultimately, the Eisenhower 
camp's vice-presidential choice was the young fust-term senator from Cal-
ifornia, Richard M. Nixon. Although Right Wing Republicans appreciated 
Nixon's anticommunist credentials, his selection was hardly a concession to 
them. While committed to Warren in the nomination battle, Nixon had 
worked quietly for Eisenhower. Yet Nixon did see himself as a party healer 
and therefore asked Bricker to second his nomination. The Ohio senator de-
clined, however, because of "what they [the Eisenhower faction] have said 
and done to Bob Taft." 39 Nixon nonetheless praised Taft in his own accep-
tance speech. 
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"The Old Guard never surrenders," Bernard DeVoto wrote shortly after 
the Chicago convention, "but that does not matter for it has lost the climac-
tic battle." Then DeVoto, whose smugness exceeded his political sense, 
added that the men who have restored the party's "sense of reality" would 
certainly "bar and triple lock the door" against the Taft wing's "rural bar-
bershop mind of 1880. " 40 
There was indeed much talk of a new GOP day, revolutions and party 
"rebirth," and the "New Guard" Republicans, who were liberal, young, 
many of them governors, and likely to be closer to Ike than the existing con-
gressional command. Many New Guard cheerleaders were giddy from the 
events of Chicago, but it was really too early for such rejoicing. After all, 
similar talk of revolution had accompanied the earlier GOP convention tri-
umphs of Willkie and Dewey. As in the past, a November loss would dash 
all hopes of revolutionary change. And the vanquishment of the Old Guard 
or Republican Right remained highly doubtful. A new face at the top of the 
party was one thing. Instilling the party wi~h a new philosophy and over-
hauling the party machinery-at all levels-was another. 
Besides, just what had the New Guard won at Chicago? It had snared 
the nomination, but little else. "It was clear from the time the first throng 
began to gather in the lobby of the Hilton," Richard Rovere reported, "that 
a lot of [Republicans], including a large number who wore 'I Like Ike' but-
tons the size of saucers, really didn't like him at all and were supporting him 
only because they had been sold on the Taft can't win theory." 41 Natural 
impulse would have normally led them to Taft. Fine, Summerfield, and 
other such GOP politicos had done their electoral figuring. Cold logic alone 
led them to Ike. 
Chicago hearts were still chiefly Right Wing hearts. The loudest conven-
tion cheers had gone to MacArthur and Hoover. Further, the platform, 
passed without protest, was no revolutionary manifesto. Indeed, Wayne 
Morse claimed that it was written under "reactionary domination. "42 The 
foreign policy section, over which a fight was expected, satisfied both Eisen-
hower and Taft. Its calls for the liberation of enslaved peoples rested on 
"nco-isolationist assumptions." And even on domestic policy, questions 
about where Ike stood persisted. Clearly, the platform was a product of com-
promise, and it remained Eisenhower's to interpret. 
Eisenhower's Chicago victory prompted a reassessment by Right Wing 
Republicans on their role in the GOP. They remained convinced that their 
kind of Republicanism had the support of most Republicans and most 
Americans. The Eisenhower forces had simply shanghaied the Chicago par-
ley. Analyzing the Chicago convention, Taft brushed aside his team's tacti-
cal errors and identified three major forces that defeated him. First was "the 
power of the New York financial interests and large number of businessmen 
subject to New York influence." Second were the influential newspapers, 
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four-ftfths of which, Taft contended, became virtual "propaganda sheets" 
for Eisenhower. Finally, there were the governors, who had greater sway with 
the delegates than Washington lawmakers, most of whom were friendly to 
Taft. 43 
Some Right Wing Republicans went even further. Where Taft talked 
generally of the "power of the New York ftnancial interests," others claimed 
that Wall Street and eastern media "kingmakers," had torpedoed Taft, 
swapping vice-presidential and Supreme Court posts for California votes in 
key Chicago delegate contests. The alleged wrongs of the Eisenhower forces 
at Chicago quickly became another chapter in the Republican Right's con-
tinuing saga of convention frustrations and, in the end, helped undermine 
the New Guard's claim on the Republican party. Ike had won the Republi-
can nomination. Now he would have to win the Republican party. 
In the meantime, what was the Old Guard up to after Chicago? It con-
tinued, of course, to seethe over "the methods of the Dewey-Lodge crowd." 
The Republican Right was also waiting and making itself scarce. Taft, for in-
stance, immediately left for a vacation in Canada. Herbert Hoover went ftsh-
ing. "I fear we are on uncharted waters," he told many, referring to the 
GOP, not his fishing trip. Hoover advised General Wedemeyer to "remain 
quiescent." 44 Disaffection rapidly spread through Right Wing Republican 
ranks. Tom Coleman reportedly declined an offer to manage the Eisenhower 
campaign. In Massachusetts, a group of Taft supporters went to work for 
John F. Kennedy, the Democratic rival of Lodge, and there were widespread 
reports that Taft followers were shunning campaign duty even at the local 
level. Party contributors had tight fists. Yet despite Colonel McCormick's 
talk of forming a new Right Wing "American Party," US News and World 
Report correctly noted early in August that there was more sitting on hands 
than open rebellion in the GOP. 45 
Meanwhile, the Republican Right waited for clues as to the men and 
message behind Eisenhower's fall campaign. Conservative Republicans, cer-
tain that Ike was only a reflection of his advisors, grew edgy over the possible 
campaign roles of Dewey, Hoffman, the Lodge brothers, and Duff. Hal-
lanan, in turn, noted the absence of Taft men among Eisenhower campaign 
braintrusters. "If they think they can win this election by having the Eisen-
hower pre-convention crowd run the show alone," he wrote, "they will be 
rudely awakened in November. "46 
Eisenhower, in fact, was acting swiftly to mend party rifts. A week after 
the convention, he told Paul Hoffman, the former Marshall Plan adminis-
trator who had big ideas about Ike as a party remodeler, to stop "pouring 
salt in the wounds of the defeated." 47 Eisenhower also kept Dewey and 
Herbert Brownell in the background of the campaign effort. In Illinois, Ike 
told former Taft supporters to cherish their old loyalties and pledged that 
"every section of the party would receive his support." This pledge was ac-
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tually part of a deal with the new national chairman, Arthur Summerfield, 
who made it a condition for his accepting the post. 48 Summerfield was one 
of the many wise selections for national campaign positions. Capitol Hill 
GOP conservatives Charles Halleck and Karl Mundt were named to head the 
Speakers Bureau. Also, Dirksen, the old Chicago firebrand, was asked out to 
Denver to meet Ike and quickly accepted a spot on the top campaign strat-
egy committee. 
Despite these peace offerings, the Eisenhower campaign was dragging 
by late August. Ike was pussyfooting on the major issues, grumbled numer-
ous Right Wing Republicans. A Scripps-Howard editorial said it best: "Ike is 
running like a dry creek. " 49 
Nebraska senator Hugh Butler's remedy for GOP campaign woes was a 
meeting between Eisenhower and Taft. The Eisenhower handlers had 
wanted such a meeting for some time. Taft's positive aid remained crucial, 
if only as a signal to many conservative Republicans, especially campaign 
workers. "Until Bob Taft blows the bugle," explained Cale]. Holder, the 
Indiana state chairman, "a lot of us aren't going to fight in the army. " 50 
Their leader, however, was in Canada. It was there that he wrote his 
postconvention analysis of his Chicago loss. His ruminations were sometimes 
bitter; one Chicago Daily News scribe reported after a visit to Taft's north-
ern retreat that Ike's chances of enlisting the senator were "about zero." 51 
Brooding over Chicago and complaining about the makeup of the Eisen-
hower campaign team, Mr. Republican planned to hold off cooperating 
until early September. "By that time I think the Eisenhower people might 
be fairly scared as to the result," he wrote, "and there may be a more bona-
fide effort to make real concessions on the running of the campaign and the 
setting up of the new Administration." 52 
Taft made it clear that his role in the fall canvass would ultimately be 
determined by Eisenhower's response to specific Taft demands regarding fu-
ture administration policy and personnel. He wanted no appearance of a 
sell-out of his own principles or "my friends to the purge that so many 
Eisenhower supporters seem to plan for them." Without such assurances, 
Taft would stump only for certain senatorial candidates, and his speeches 
would "not be too enthusiastic for the national ticket." 53 Furthermore, 
without assurances, there would be no Taft-Eisenhower meeting. 
Taft sent a list of these desired guarantees to Dirksen, who was to 
"sound out" the Eisenhower camp. Some of the demands, wrote Taft, 
might be made public, others not. Among the demands, Taft wanted an 
Eisenhower commitment to cut the budget to $60 billion for 1955 so there 
could be a tax cut by the spring of 1954. He desired Eisenhower's promise to 
support the Republican platform's Taft-Hartley section and to oppose flat 
90 percent farm price supports and the Brannan plan (the Truman Adminis-
tration's plan to guarantee fixed minimum incomes to farmers raising per-
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ishable crops), which Congress had rejected. Further, the Ohio senator re-
quired equal representation for Taft supporters in the Eisenhower cabinet. 
More specifically, he wanted neither Dewey nor "a spender" like Paul Hoff-
man as secretary of state. 54 
After some haggling and delay, Eisenhower and Taft did finally meet in 
New York at the general's Morningside Heights residence on September 12. 
During their breakfast conference, Eisenhower examined a statement that 
Taft had prepared for later distribution to the press. After making some 
minor suggestions, Eisenhower approved the document, and the photogra-
phers were called in. Their meeting ended when, standing on the steps of 
Ike's headquarters, both were asked if they saw eye-to-eye on McCarthy. Ig-
noring this question, they shook hands and parted. Eisenhower went back 
inside, and Taft walked to the King's Crown Hotel for a press conference. 
There, Taft read his statement urging full support for Eisenhower. Taft 
called their foreign policy differences only "differences of degree." On the 
homefront, both Eisenhower and Taft agreed that the major domestic issue 
was "liberty against the creeping socialization of every domestic field." The 
statement committed Eisenhower on budget and tax matters, as well as Taft-
Hartley. Missing, however, were Taft's strictures on the cabinet. 
Taft had blown the bugle. "I could see no choice except to support 
him," Taft wrote afterward. "It seems to me my job is to keep him as far on 
the conservative side as possible." Yet Taft men such as Tom Coleman and 
Ben Tate believed that Taft had knuckled under to Eisenhower. Ike, too, 
was promptly criticized for his harmony bid. Moderate Republicans dubbed 
the affair the "Surrender of Morningside Heights." 55 Ike's "great crusade," 
said his Democratic rival, Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson, had become a 
"great surrender. " 
After the Morningside Heights conference, Congressman Howard Buf-
fett was one "deeply disappointed" conservative who sought aid and com-
fort from General Douglas MacArthur. 56 But in doing so, Buffett was seek-
ing support from a soldier who had at last decided to fade away. Despite his 
entreaty, the Nebraska congressman got no reponse from the general. 
MacArthur retreated politically to his Waldorf-Astoria redoubt. With the 
August announcement of the general's appointment as chairman of the 
board of the Remington-Rand Corporation, came word that MacArthur 
would play no role at all in the fall political canvass. 
Some MacArthur role, however, was unavoidable. Right-Wing splinter 
parties such as the Christian Nationalist and Constitution parties had put 
MacArthur's name on the ballot in a number of states. Political observers 
believed that MacArthur's unauthorized candidacy might hurt Eisenhower 
in both Texas and Washington. Taft, Hoover, Wedemeyer, and others 
urged the general to disavow these movements and plump for Ike. But 
MacArthur baffled old friends and supporters by remaining silent. One 
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MacArthur intimate privately explained that one reason for the general's 
noninvolvement was his lack of confidence in Ike's "training, experience 
and natural abilities." 57 In any case, for the public and many friends, 
MacArthur still remained what he had always been on the postwar political 
scene: "The Great American Enigma." 
Even without MacArthur's aid, Dwight Eisenhower's crusade at last 
began to move ahead. The Middle West-stronghold of the Republican 
Right-had posed serious problems for Ike and his advisors. Controversial 
senators Joseph McCarthy and William Jenner were only the two most publi-
cized Right Wing candidates causing unease for the Eisenhower campaign. 
Attempting to "harmonize" these matters as much as possible at Indi-
anapolis, Eisenhower declared that Republicans were not "servile puppets" 
to any party line and, without naming Jenner, endorsed the entire GOP 
ticket for Indiana. Senator Jenner, who was aware that he could not be 
elected independently of the national ticket, was instantly up on his feet, 
embracing the general. This camera-conscious clutch galled Ike, and his 
managers found it "most embarrassing." As for McCarthy, he was clearly on 
the minds of the Eisenhower entourage as its campaign train rolled into Wis-
consin. Eisenhower had found McCarthy's earlier attacks on General George 
Marshall outrageous. But Ike, again aware of the need for party unity, called 
for McCarthy's reelection, saying that he and McCarthy differed only over 
the method of their anticommunism. Not only that, but it was reported that 
Ike had scratched a defense of Marshall from his Milwaukee speech-at 
McCarthy's urging. Ike's advisors at first denied these reports, but Eisen-
hower admitted subsequently that he had bowdlerized his Milwaukee re-
marks-but only at the insistence of Wisconsin governor Walter Kohler, not 
McCarthy. In fact, McCarthy himself had little to do with these editorial 
changes. Kohler, along with Eisenhower aides Sherman Adams and Jerry 
Parsons, had persuaded Ike to delete his Marshall remarks for fear of upset-
ting Tom Coleman and other Taft Republicans in such a politically impor-
tant and unpredictable state as Wisconsin. 58 
Other Right Wing Republicans, some of them archfoes of collective se-
curity, also gained Eisenhower's stamp of approval in 1952. For example, 
the general backed the senatorial reelection bid of James P. Kern of Mis-
souri, and also of Chapman Revercomb in West Virginia, whose candidacy 
Dewey had refused to endorse in 1948. 
The Eisenhower crusade sounded increasingly right-wingish as it came 
out of the Midwest. The formula, K,C2-Korea, Communism, and Corrup-
tion-represented the main campaign themes; it was the brainchild of Sen-
ator Karl Mundt, a preconvention Taft backer. By early November, Taft 
could say that Eisenhower was championing policies "I've been preaching 
for 14 years." Taft claimed that his own failed bid for the 1952 GOP nom-
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ination had succeeded in shaping the issues of the fall campaign. Crowed 
Indiana's Senator Homer Capehart in October: "In another two weeks, 
General Eisenhower will be thinking and talking just like Senator Taft." 59 
The Republican Right noted some problems in Eisenhower's newfound 
conservatism. The Chicago Tnbune grumbled about the general's tendency 
"to trim and waver. " 6° For Albert Wedemeyer, Ike's new ways merely con-
firmed old Wedemeyer impressions-Ike had "no strong convictions in the 
national and international fields because he has not read, discussed, or 
thought through ... present policies. " 61 Such concerns lingered, but ulti-
mately even one ultra-conservative chronicler of GOP history was forced to 
admit that the 1952 canvass did offer the voter "a choice not an echo. " 62 
In the end, the Republican Right finally fell in behind Eisenhower. In 
mid-October former President Hoover spoke out for the national ticket, and 
others followed. Howard Buffett and Wedemeyer both enlisted in the Eisen-
hower crusade. McCormick's Chicago Tribune came around, too. Reluc-
tantly, and aware of Eisenhower's debt to the "undesirable element in his 
party," the Tribune advised readers to vote for Ike-if only to bolster the 
"anti-Socialist" Republican vote in Congress. The Republican Right's back-
ing for Ike never revealed real fire. 63 In Right Wing Republican eyes, Ike was 
clearly superior to the Democratic Stevenson. Moreover, conservative Re-
publicans were certain that they would control the GOP in Congress. In 
short, Right Wing support for Eisenhower largely amounted to pure polit-
ical accommodation. In any case, on election day the GOP was, if not en-
tirely happy, at least temporarily united. 
And finally victorious. Eisenhower-the Republican standard-bearer-
won the White House and helped Republicans gain control of Capitol Hill. 
Moreover, the GOP claimed thirty governorships after election day, for a net 
gain of five. Eisenhower won in a landslide, capruring SS.4 percent of the 
popular vote to Stevenson's 44.4 percent. He piled up 442 electoral tallies; 
Stevenson gained only 89. The cracking of the Solid South made Ike's elec-
toral figures even more impressive. Florida, Virginia, Tennessee, and Texas, 
where old-line Democrats dug in, all fell to the general. He topped Hoover's 
1928 popular vote in the South. WilliamS. White proclaimed "the begin-
nings at least of a two-party system below the Potomac." 64 
Taft, for his part, believed that the public had voted primarily to end 
the New Deal and its "tax-spend" philosophy, and he maintained that he 
could have amassed "substantially the same" majority as Eisenhower. Later 
analysts disagreed. Samuel Lubell, for example, concluded that Taft-or 
any Republican-could have won, but not by the Eisenhower margin. Ike 
had run well among normally Republican groups, but he also managed to 
corral large numbers of white-collar voters, who would have been scared off 
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by the isolationist tone of Taft. The Chicago battle, in highlighting the dif-
ferences between Ike and Taft, had proved a boon to the general, and Ike's 
campaign effort to bind the party together may have been a mistake, costing 
him heavily among the young and other groups. 65 
The congressional results underscored Ike's personal triumph. He ran 
about 5 million votes, or 16 percent, ahead of Republican congressional can-
didates, contributing heavily to GOP majorities on Capitol Hill. Republi-
cans gained twenty-one seats to win control of the House, 221 to 211. In the 
Senate, the party won twenty-three of twenty-five races, leaving Republicans 
with a 48-to-47 edge. "The election represents," wrote a delighted Herbert 
Hoover, "a turning away from bad taste, corruption, Communism, and to 
some extent from socialism. " 66 
Despite the elation of Hoover and other GOP conservatives, the Old 
Guard, itself, suffered on election day. Taft, for one, held Eisenhower re-
sponsible for simply giving Republican conservatives "a formal pat on the 
back." They were then "pretty well left out on the limb," where they were 
targets of a "general smearing from General Eisenhower's eastern friends. " 67 
One can perhaps understand Taft's conclusion, since Right Wing Republi-
cans sorely needed a scapegoat. James Kern of Missouri, Harry Cain of 
Washington, Zales Ecton ofWyoming, and Patrick Hurley of New Mexico-
all Right Wing Republicans-lost their Senate races. 
Later analysis would reveal that twelve of thirteen Old Guard senatorial 
candidates ran behind Eisenhower. Most liberal Republican candidates for 
the Senate, on the other hand, ran ahead of the general. The average vote of 
Old Guard candidates for the Senate was only 51.6 percent, while moderates 
and liberals claimed 54.3 percent. 68 Right Wing winners such as Edward 
Martin in Pennsylvania and George Malone in Nevada were clearly beholden 
to Ike's popularity. In "one of the most startling upsets," Barry Goldwater 
knocked off Senate majority leader Earnest McFarland of Arizona-a result 
Goldwater attributed to Eisenhower's coattails. In two closely watched races, 
Jenner and McCarthy both won, but ran far behind the national ticket, and 
there were doubts they could have won without Ike's support. Jenner, for in-
stance, ran 150,000 votes behind Eisenhower's Indiana plurality of 300,000. 
Whatever later evaluations and analyses might reveal, Eisenhower had 
run and won as a Republican. And the GOP, along with the Old Guard, 
had won along with him. Election day 1952 was therefore no time for nit-
picking or sober self-scrutiny. It was a time for universal Republican rev-
elry-and it had been a long time coming. 
6 
Mr. Republican 
It was also time for the Republicans to brawl. So went the political wisdom 
of Will Rogers, who had once observed that Democrats battled each other 
before elections, and Republicans afterward. There was reason enough to ex-
pect a postelection GOP breakup. Eisenhower and Taft, McCarthy,Jenner, 
and others had soft-pedaled their differences during the fall campaign. Now 
the demands of agenda setting, the prerogatives of the executive versus the 
legislative branch, and the dictates of personality, all menaced future Re-
publican harmony. No sooner was the election finished than many pundits 
were prepared to declare that the GOP honeymoon was over. 
Eisenhower and his advisors, however, labored to keep the party togeth-
er. Shonly after the election, one of their first moves was to invite Col-
orado's Senator Eugene Millikin to visit Eisenhower in Augusta, Georgia. 
This preconvention Taft supporter, who was slated to be the chairman of the 
Finance Committee in the new Congress, was Ike's first official visitor. His 
Augusta pilgrimage underscored the importance of fiscal matters and also 
Ike's intention to live up to agreements made with Taft at Morningside 
Heights. In another goodwill gesture, the Eisenhower command asked for 
Taft's suggestions on executive appointments and established a committee 
through which he could channel recommendations. Still, as the New York 
Times said, the dominant question remained just what program Eisenhower 
would lay down and whether it would bring acollisi()n w'i_~h Taft.' 
For Right Wing Republicans, in particular, the link between policy and 
personnel was tremendously imponant. They feared, as they had during the 
campaign, that the politically innocent Ike would become "captive" to his 
advisors. Eisenhower might hold basically conservative views on certain 
issues, Taft conceded, "but he does not seem to understand ... that New 
Deal policies always dress themselves up in conservative argument." As a re-
sult, the character of Eisenhower's advisors and cabinet officers was viewed 
as crucial. If placed in key spots, worried Right Wing Republicans, the likes 
of Henry Cabot Lodge, Earl Warren, Paul Hoffman, and Thomas Dewey 
might ply the new president with too much "me-too" advice. 2 
Given these Right Wing fears and the makeup of Eisenhower's preelec-
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tion team, some public squabbles within the party were inevitable. Eisen-
hower's selection of new secretary of labor, Martin Durkin, prompted one of 
them. Durkin, who was head of the AFL' s plumbers union and a Democrat, 
had once advocated the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. Worse, he had sup-
ported Adlai Stevenson in the recent election. Taft called his appointment 
"incredible." He believed that this "terrible" choice would "make any job 
regarding Taft-Hartley infinitely more difficult." 3 The wisdom of the ap-
pointment was questionable enough, but Eisenhower aides had even failed 
to inform Taft or Everett Dirksen-Durkin's senator-of the selection be-
forehand. Taft hoped that his blast would "check the tendency toward a 
New Deal Administration with a Republican label. " 4 Journalists, in turn, 
used their flashiest headlines on the Durkin controversy. "The honeymoon 
is over," US News and World Report proclaimed, "and the battle lines are 
being drawn."~ 
Although political seers read too much into Taft's criticism of Durkin's 
appointment, other Eisenhower cabinet selections were little more comfort-
ing to Taft. The choice of Arthur Summerfield as postmaster general and 
Ezra Taft Benson (a distant Taft relative) as secretary of agriculture appealed 
to him, but Taft was known to be hostile to the new secretary of commerce, 
Sinclair Weeks-a traitor to the Taft cause before the Chicago convention-
and to the new attorney general, Herbert Brownell-political guru of the 
Dewey wing. For Taft, the considerable ties between General Motors and 
the government made the appointment of Charles Wilson as secretary of de-
fense a mistake. In fact, Taft privately complained about "so many business-
men in the Cabinet. " 6 
The treasury portfolio especially concerned Taft. The new secretary of 
the treasury, George H. Humphrey, should have pleased the senator. Hum-
phrey was a former Taft enthusiast and, in his own words, "a hard shell, 
non-progressive." He had been president of the Mark Hanna Company and 
a leading GOP fundraiser in Cleveland. But the Humphrey appointment 
disappointed Taft. First, the Eisenhower people had failed to consult with 
Taft on it. More important, Taft had his own candidate for the treasury 
post-Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia. Byrd, of course, was a Democrat, but 
he was a southern Democrat and a diehard ftscal conservative. Taft wanted, 
among other things, to consolidate the recent GOP gains in Dixie, and 
Byrd's appointment was part of his own southern strategy. Eisenhower, 
however, had explained earlier that he could not appoint a Democrat, an ex-
cuse that "looked foolish" to Taft after the Durkin selection. Taft explained 
to one southern backer, "For some reason the Dewey [-Eisenhower] group 
... never had any interest in the South because it interferes with their idea 
that we should appease the minorities of the North. " 7 
It soon became apparent that Taft's advice mattered only when it jibed 
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with the Eisenhower camp's goals. Taft rapidly came to regard the appoint-
ments committee as a farce. Although Taft conceded that the Eisenhower 
cabinet was basically conservative, he doubted that it would oppose "any 
truly liberal proposals. " 8 Other Old Guard Republicans also detected the 
"machinations" of Tom Dewey within the administration. For example, 
Senator Henry Dworshak of Idaho noted that such "pets ofF.D.R." as Nel-
son Rockefeller and Arthur S. Flemming were taking places in the new Re-
publican administration. 9 
Obviously, the same problem remained that had existed from the be-
ginning of the 1952 nomination battle-who actually had Ike's ear? This 
question was especially critical, said Taft, because Ike never read anything. 
Mr. Republican continued to hope that it would prove impossible for the 
Dewey people to keep the president "shut off'' from noneastern influence 
once Eisenhower got to Washington. 10 That failing, there was still theRe-
publican Right's strength on Capitol Hill. Eisenhower's appointment of 
FOR pets convinced Senator Dworshak by early December that steps must 
be taken to insure against the domination of Senate Republicans by the 
Dewey wing. Clearly, as Republicans prepared for their first administration 
in twenty years, a few party members anticipated fighting against, not for, 
other Republicans. 
Taft was not among them. Although the Durkin appointment had 
alarmed him, and he worried that Ike might become a prisoner of poor 
counsel, Taft wanted to make the new Republican administration a success. 
Taft believed he could help by becoming Senate majority leader. Taft had 
spearheaded Senate Republicans for years anyway. Now, after the election, 
he let it be known that he wanted the title. The Ohioan believed that his se-
lection afforded the "only chance for developing a harmonious program." 
He could present "both viewpoints" to Eisenhower, and arguments could be 
settled before they became public. 
The Eisenhower camp, in turn, reportedly wanted William F. Know-
land to lead Senate Republicans, and Taft to remain as head of the GOP 
Policy Committee. Taft realized, however, that the White House and not 
the Policy Committee would henceforth set Republican policy. He therefore 
offered Know land, who was low in seniority, the Republican Policy Com-
mittee chairmanship, and the California senator quickly accepted. Taft's 
next obstacle was Senator Styles Bridges. Since the Durkin conflict, pressure 
had mounted on the conservative internationalist from New Hampshire to 
become majority leader. Dewey forces were said to favor him, and, for a 
time, political observers billed the leadership contest as one between Taft 
and Bridges. 11 
But no clash of GOP Senate giants resulted. Bridges wanted to be pres-
ident pro tempore of the Senate-a position he had the seniority to fill. 
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Moreover, the New Hampshire senator did not want to give up the impor-
tant Appropriations Committee chairmanship in order to gain the floor 
leadership. Bridges would also be up for reelection in two years and feared a 
possible challenge from Sherman Adams, the state's governor, who was re-
signing to become Eisenhower's White House chief of staff. Ultimately, Taft 
and Bridges agreed that the post as president pro tempore would free 
Bridges to shore up his New Hampshire base. Taft promised his help and 
quickly asked publisher William Loeb of the Manchester Union Leader to 
give Bridges "all the favorable publicity you can." 12 
On December 16, standing in front of Ike's New York headquarters at 
the Commodore Hotel, senators Frank Carlson and H. Alexander Smith told 
reporters that they were backing Taft as majority leader. Smith and Carlson 
were close to Eisenhower, and the site of their announcement suggested that 
Ike approved of Taft's designs. Indeed, days later, Arthur Krock of the New 
York Times reported that Ike had authorized the Smith-Carlson endorse-
ment.13 
Three days after the Smith-Carlson plug, Taft publicly announced his 
candidacy for the majority leader's post. His legislative knowhow was well 
known, as were his ties to southern Democrats. More important, there was 
his standing as Mr. Republican. Making him a team player on Capitol Hill 
was only slightly less important now than it had been before Morningside 
Heights. Taft's cooperation would help Ike on Capitol Hill and across the 
country. The Ohioan, in turn, had assured Carlson of his desire for under-
standing within party ranks and his absolute loyalty to President Eisen-
hower. Paradoxically, his outburst over Durkin, which had initially ham-
pered his bid for the Senate post, ultimately helped him. Ike's continuing 
failure to consult with other senators on appointments irked Taft's col-
leagues, and many came to back Taft as a champion of senatorial prerog-
atives. And hence, when Senate Republicans caucused, Taft won unanimous 
approval. 
Under Taft's direction, Right Wing Republicans dominated the con-
gressional chairmanships in the Eighty-third Congress. In the Senate, the 
GOP Policy Committee was loaded with Taft followers. Everett Dirksen ran 
the Republican Campaign Committee. Styles Bridges, of course, was Appro-
priations Committee head. Joseph McCarthy chaired the Government Op-
erations Committee; and William Jenner, the Administration and Rules 
Committee. While Wisconsin's Alexander Wiley-a domestic conservative 
but a convert to internationalism-took charge of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Taft gave up a seat on the Finance Committee for one on For-
eign Relations, in order to watch over Wiley. Finally, Millikin headed the Fi-
nance Committee. The Colorado senator was one of the most powerful GOP 
conservatives in the Senate but, like Taft, was ready to get along with the 
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new administration. As Millikin wrote to Senator Frank Carlson, "I do not 
see any insuperable reasons against effective cooperation between the Con-
gress and President Eisenhower." 10 
In the House the situation was similar. The GOP leadership wanted the 
new administration to succeed, and again the committee heads were mainly 
older conservatives. As in the Eightieth Congress, Joseph Martin would lie 
Speaker of the House. He clearly saw himself as a soldier in Eisenhower's 
crusade-whatever that entailed. Martin liked to tell House colleagues what 
Senator Richard Russell had told him at a Washington cocktail party: "Joe, 
we've got to make the Eisenhower Administration a success. We've all got to 
cooperate to this end, because if it fails, the next administration will be a 
radical one." 15 
Martin was not the only House Republican ruler with leadership experi-
ence gained during the turbulent Eightieth Congress. Charles Halleck 
would again utilize his considerable legislative skills as GOP majority leader. 
Crusty, economy-minded John Taber of New York was back as chairman of 
the House Appropriations committee, as was Jesse Wolcott at Banking and 
Currency, and Leo Allen at Rules. Hard-line conservative Clare Hoffman 
now headed the Government Operations Committee, and Daniel Reed took 
command of Ways and Means. Finally, Robert Chiperfield, a conservative 
and an Old Marshall Plan foe, pounded the gavel in the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee. Ironically, like Chiperfield, most of these GOP committee 
heads had for years stood against what would shortly become the Eisenhower 
policies. For them, this would pose a personal political dilemma that would 
have ramifications for the Republican party as it entered a new era. 
Nothing could spoil the first Republican inauguration in twenty years. 
Held under sunny skies and mild temperatures, it was an excellent day for 
new beginnings. 
But Eisenhower proclaimed no new day. In a comparatively short inau-
gural address, the thirty-fourth president basically called for greater interna-
tional cooperation and more world trade. This was certainly not the kind of 
crusade many Republicans thought Ike had promised on the hustings, and 
the Chicago Trzbune said so. "So far as the intellectual content of the ad-
dress is concerned, it might have been written at Mr. Truman's orders," 
grumbled the Trz'bune. 16 Yet few newspapers echoed these complaints. Nor 
did Ike's internationalist message prompt much Capitol Hill grousing. In-
deed, Right Wing Republicans fairly bubbled over Ike's new start. 
Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower's State of the Union message provided 
additional cause for Old Guard applause. The president's program for 
"progress toward free enterprise" and "natural economic law" included an 
end to Korean War wage and price controls and steps toward a balanced 
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budget. Further, the administration promised to achieve maximum national 
security at a minimum cost. The foreign policy section ofEisenhower's State 
of the Union address was especially pleasing to the Republican Old Guard. 
Eisenhower outlined the beginnings of a "new positive foreign policy." The 
American Seventh Fleet, Eisenhower stated, would no longer "shield" Red 
China from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces on Formosa, thereby "un-
leashing" Chiang. Also, Ike called on Congress to repudiate any secret con-
cessions made to the Russians at World War II conferences. This "sure and 
substantial start" for his administration, as Ike called it, won a rousing GOP 
reception on Capitol Hill. House Speaker Joe Martin called the address "an 
outstanding exposition of clear thinking and sane policies," and Taft hailed 
it as a "great speech." 17 Given the right-wing tone ofEisenhower's message, 
it was only fitting that Ike left the chamber arm-in-arm with Taft. 
The State of the Union address did have some bad news in it for conser-
vatives of a tax-slashing bent. All tax reduction, the president stated, could 
come only after the achievement of a balanced budget at a later date. The 
Chicago Tribune complained only of this section, and Eisenhower's Capitol 
Hill hosts met his tax-cut strictures with little applause. The news especially 
disappointed one GOP House member. Without consulting the White 
House, Ways and Means chairman Daniel Reed had already introduced 
H.R. 1-a proposal for personal income tax cuts. The administration, in 
turn, had miffed Reed by failing to confer with him before the State of the 
Union message, as it had with Senate Finance Committee chairman Eugene 
Millikin. 18 
Opposing presidents was nothing new for Dan Reed, who had come to 
Congress in 1919 after coaching football at Cornell University. Now Reed 
was ready to hold the line against a Republican president in behalf of tradi-
tional GOP economic doctrine that stated that tax reduction would stim-
ulate the economy, thus raising revenues and ultimately bringing a balanced 
budget. Reed and other tax-cut proponents feared that with the Korean War 
winding down and the attendant decline in military spending, a recession 
was imminent. Conversely, the Eisenhower administration saw inflation as 
its major economic concern. 
On February 16, Reed's Ways and Means committee approved his H.R. 
1, 21 to 4. All Republicans supported the committee report, which declared 
that "tax relief must be the first order of business for this Congress." Eisen-
hower had already taken his stand against tax relief and now maneuvered 
against Reed. As a result, House Speaker Joseph Martin directed the Rules 
Committee to pigeonhole Reed's tax-cut proposal. 
Reed retaliated by next turning his attention to the abolition of the ex-
cess profits tax on business. The president, for his part, wanted to keep rev-
enues high from both income and excess profits levies. Moreover, Eisen-
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hower recognized the potential political damage to the Republican party-
commonly regarded as the party of big business-if corporations gained tax 
relief before individuals. Reed, too, acknowledged that this would be "dis-
astrous politically," but this realization only made him more determined to 
gain both personal tax relief and the end of the excess profits tax, which was 
scheduled by law to lapse on June 30, 1953. 19 Reed therefore announced 
that his Ways and Means Committee would sit on the White House's re-
quest for the extension of excess profits legislation as long as H.R. 1 re-
mained bottled up in the Rules Committee. For a time, Reed, who had 
failed to get enough signatures on a discharge petition for H.R. 1, blocked 
excess profits consideration by refusing even to convene his Ways and Means 
Committee. As Reed once said upon leaving the White House, "When I 
fight, I fight." 20 
As this conflict dragged on, news broke of additional GOP dissension 
over tax and budget matters. Senator Robert Taft was at the center of this 
struggle. Unlike many Republicans, Taft remembered the promises made at 
Morningside Heights. He counted on a balanced budget for fiscal1954, fol-
lowed by a budget reduced to $60 billion accompanied by a considerable tax 
cut for fiscal1955, but had little faith that the new administration would ac-
tually do so. Ultimately, Congress would probably have to lead the way. 
Taft gave the White House until May to "make recommendations for sub-
stantial reductions." 21 
Time ran out at the end of April when Eisenhower informed congres-
sional leaders that he would be unable to balance his first budget. The ad-
ministration could prune only $4.4 billion from the $9.9 billion deficit esti-
mated in Truman's 1954 budget, mainly because of military considerations. 
During Ike's briefing, Taft sat in "grim silence." Then he exploded. "With 
a program like this, we'll never elect a Republican Congress in 1954," he 
thundered, pounding his fist on the cabinet table. "You're taking us down 
the same road Truman traveled. It's a repudiation of everything we prom-
ised in the campaign." Military men had hoodwinked the president, Taft 
charged. 22 Eisenhower, flushed and furious, sat silently-astonished by what 
he later deemed the "demagogic nature of [Taft's] tirade." After Taft's 
flare-up, a thick silence filled the room. It was only the small talk of Trea-
sury Secretary George Humphrey and others that allowed the president to 
cool down. Then, Eisenhower calmly reviewed rising military costs and dis-
sented from Taft's dire political predictions. 23 
Taft's brief but bitter words were astonishing largely because up to that 
point he had been a prime exponent of GOP teamwork. Obviously, the de-
mands of cooperation and certain prior disappointments still weighed 
heavily on Mr. Republican. Despite Eisenhower's belief that this tirade 
"undercut Taft's leadership position," the Ohioan was merely voicing the 
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concern of many Old Guardsmen under the new party command. Still, 
Taft's budget blowup heralded no open break with the Eisenhower White 
House. 
Meanwhile, Daniel Reed remained dug in on Capitol Hill. Some of his 
trenchmates, however, were deserting him. For instance, budget-minded 
Congressman John Taber complained to Reed that his mulish obstruction 
was "designed practically deliberately" to elect a Democratic Congress in 
1954. Reed disagreed. He told Taber that they were both fighting the same 
battle for a balanced budget and tax relief. But, said Reed, the stakes were 
even greater than that. Claimed the former football coach, "I am fighting 
on a matter of principle to preserve the integrity of each chairman, the pres-
tige of the committee and the dignity of this House." 24 
Reed's words had the ring of a good pep talk, but he was competing 
against heavy odds. The administration finally resorted to the Rules Com-
mittee in order to force excess profits legislation to the House floor. This 
power play unsettled other committee heads, but there was still a premium 
on party cooperation in these early days, and the Ways and Means Commit-
tee ultimately reported out the excess profits tax bill over the opposition of 
its chairman. In the end, Congress approved it, and the president signed the 
bill for excess profits continuation on July 16, 1953. 
For Eisenhower's budget, the victory was of little importance, since the 
total revenue gained from the excess profits levies was slight. Nor were the 
president's political gains that clear-cut. Initially, Arthur Krock had re-
ported that White House "muscle-flexing" had made an impression on 
Eisenhower's GOP opponents, especially those with reelection campaigns in 
1954. But Ike's subsequent actions raised doubts. Hoping to alter the GOP 
through conciliation, Eisenhower had basically winked at Reed's half-year 
rebellion. In early August Ike purposely downplayed the administration's 
difficulties with Reed, even calling him an administration "wheelhorse" on 
most other Capitol Hill issues. 25 
Perhaps Ike was wise to soothe the Ways and Means chairman, but such 
leniency also characterized his dealings with other more recalcitrant law-
makers. Word naturally circulated on Capitol Hill that GOP solons could 
buck the White House and go unpunished. 
For Republicans, foreign policy was still the most explosive issue. The 
1950 and 1952 campaigns had shown that a surface unity could be achieved, 
but differences remained deep and volatile. With American boys still fight-
ing in Korea and the Cold War dragging on, Eisenhower's State of the 
Union message on foreign policy was not enough to change that. 
Skirmishing within Republican ranks began as soon as Ike took office. 
Indeed, Eisenhower's foreign policy appointments became the first targets 
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of Right Wing Republicans. With the Democrats ousted, GOP conservatives 
wanted no more of "Acheson's Architects of Disaster." As a result, the con-
firmations of General Walter Bedell Smith as undersecretary of state and 
James B. Conant as high commissioner to Germany encountered great diffi-
culty. These two appointments finally got through the Senate. On the other 
hand, Paul Nitze's appointment as undersecretary of defense never made it. 
But the major GOP foreign policy scuffle came in the first months of 
the Eisenhower administration over Charles P. Bohlen. "Chip" Bohlen had 
been a career officer in the State Department and had served as Franklin 
Roosevelt's translator at the Yalta conference. Now Eisenhower had chosen 
Bohlen as the new ambassador to the Soviet Union. Bohlen's continued en-
dorsement of the Yalta accords made him something more than just a State 
Department Russian-language specialist. Bohlen maintained that the viola-
tion, not the construction of the Yalta accords, was the basic problem-
precisely the position of past Democratic administrations. 
Bohlen thus personified past Democratic foreign policy failures in the 
eyes of many Republicans. His appointment drew heavy fire. Right Wing 
Republicans were horrified. "When Bohlen, the exponent of appeasement 
and containment is elevated to the vital role of Ambassador to Moscow," 
Senator Styles Bridges remarked, "the cause of freedom suffers the world 
over." 26 Taft believed that opposition to Bohlen was "perfectly reasonable," 
and, had Bohlen's prospective post been more important, Taft would have 
joined the opposition himself. 27 But Taft, still laboring for party harmony, 
voted with all the other Senate Foreign Relations committeemen to approve 
Bohlen. The conflict then mushroomed outside of the committee room. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles allegedly had earlier tried to appease 
McCarthy by making Scott McLeod, a fierce anticommunist and former aide 
to Senator Bridges, the State Department's new security officer. McCarthy 
and other Senate opponents shortly thereafter contended that Bohlen had 
flunked McLeod's security investigation. 
The Bohlen issue now became a classic confrontation between the Con-
gress and the executive, especially after McCarthy and other Right Wing Re-
publican senators demanded to see Bohlen's FBI security files. In response to 
their demands, majority leader Taft agreed to go to the White House with 
Mississippi's Senator John Sparkman, a Democrat, and check Bohlen's file. 
Two days later, Taft reported back to the Senate that Bohlen's file was clean. 
Despite Taft's report and support, eleven Republicans continued unsuccess-
fully to oppose Bohlen's confumation when the Senate voted on March 27. 
Bridges, Bricker, McCarthy, Dirksen, Goldwater, and others rejected the 
Bohlen selection without apology. Conservative columnist David Lawrence 
spoke for many disgruntled Right Wing Republicans when he called the 
Senate's confirmation of Bohlen "a tragic chapter in American history." 
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Even Taft reportedly told the White House, "No more Bohlens." The ad-
ministration subsequently did make more careful diplomatic appoint-
ments.28 
Although Taft won praise in some quarters for his display of loyalty to 
the administration during the Bohlen controversy, his position among GOP 
conservatives suffered considerably. The mood of the Senate lobbies among 
the Old Guard was "gloomy." "Taft-you can have him," exclaimed one 
senator, a former Taft backer. 29 
Bohlen's designation as American ambassador to Russia was only part of 
the GOP's problems flowing from Yalta. The 1952 Republican platform 
had pledged to "repudiate" all secret agreements made at World War II 
conferences and had specifically mentioned Yalta. President Eisenhower had 
asked for the same in his State of the Union message. The conservative posi-
tion on this matter was clear. Although to repudiate Yalta by joint action of 
the president and Congress would not undo the evil that was wrought there, 
it would mark a real break with the Democratic past. To this end, five res-
olutions disavowing Yalta were offered in Congress by the end ofJanuary. 
The Eisenhower administration offered its own Yalta antidote, known 
as the Enslaved Peoples Resolution, on February 20, 1953. The administra-
tion's proposal rejected any interpretation or execution of secret agreements 
that had been "perverted to bring about the subjugation of free people." 
However, there was no challenge to the fundamental validity of these prior 
pacts. Nor was there any mention of Franklin D. Roosevelt or the wartime 
conferences themselves. The administration appeared to be condemning 
only the Soviet Union's violation of the wartime accords. This fit precisely 
with Democratic views and, consequently, the Senate Democratic Policy 
Committee rapidly approved the Eisenhower proposal. Actually, the Eisen-
hower administration had designed this vague and toothless resolution to se-
cure just this support. Eisenhower deeply desired the continuation of bipar-
tisan foreign policy and knew the Democrats would abide no stronger 
language regarding Yalta, other wartime conferences, and past Democratic 
foreign policy. Moreover, the administration feared that an explicit denial 
of specific wartime accords might jeopardize certain favorable Western 
rights granted in those accords-for example, access to West Berlin. 
GOP congressional leaders gave the Enslaved Peoples Resolution a frosty 
reception. But the general tone and temper of Republican foreign policy was 
obviously beginning to change. Between 1949 and 1952, conservative neo-
isolationist opinions had held sway in the GOP. During that period biparti-
san foreign policy had come under fierce attack from Republicans of all 
kinds. The Republican platform of 1952, which had denounced the Truman 
administration's containment policy as "negative, futile and immoral" and 
had called for the liberation of captive peoples, was a showcase of this neo-
isolationist sentiment. But now that the party had won the White House 
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and had the primary responsibility for the nation's destiny, party moderates 
began to move away from the harsh foreign policy stands associated with 
GOP hard-liners. This shift to a more moderate position first became appar-
ent on the Enslaved Peoples (Yalta) issue. Moderate Republicans over-
whelmingly backed the president, while Right Wing Republicans staunchly 
opposed the White House move. 
This time, Taft stood by GOP conservatives. Not long after Eisen-
hower's Enslaved Peoples Resolution went to Capitol Hill, Taft told the 
president that GOP support for it would be limited without certain revi-
sions. Taft and Republican senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa later of-
fered one such change. Their amendment stated that the Enslaved Peoples 
Resolution should not be construed as a congressional determination of the 
validity of the secret wartime agreements. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee accepted this Taft-Hickenlooper reservation, but Senate Demo-
crats quickly made known their opposition. Stalemate ensued. 
By March 9 no solution was in sight, and congressional leaders coun-
seled the president to put off action on the administration's proposal. As a 
result, the Enslaved Peoples Resolution was sent back to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. The death of Soviet ruler Joseph Stalin provided a 
good excuse for such a move. Despite WilliamS. White's claim of a "subtle 
and negative little victory" for Taft, Eisenhower had actually won by keep-
ing Democrats friendly, precipitating no war in the GOP, and edging the 
party away from the issues of the past. 30 
Eisenhower had kept one foreign policy campaign promise even before 
inauguration day. His October pledge to go to Korea won him headlines 
and ultimately votes, holding out hope for an end to the Korean impasse. 
Still, neither Eisenhower's November trip to the Asian front nor his Decem-
ber meeting with General MacArthur brought any real change in the Amer-
ican position in Korea. Peace came, but it was indistinguishable from what 
the Truman administration could probably have achieved-except that it 
was achieved without the accompanying howls of the GOP. The armistice 
agreement, signed onJuly 27, 1953, left North Korea in essentially the same 
position as before the war. Even under a Republican administration, total 
military victory in Korea never became the American goal. The Eisenhower 
administration said that it would fight for the unification of Korea only at a 
political conference following the armistice. There would be no liberation of 
North Korea. 
Disgruntled by the Korean settlement, Right Wing Republicans mainly 
turned to blaming our selfish and irresolute European allies. Foremost 
among the critics was Robert Taft. In late May, 1953, he caused a stir by 
voicing dissatisfaction with both the impending Korean settlement and with 
the European allies. Taft was ill and had to have his son read his speech be-
fore the National Conference of Christians and Jews, but the Cincinnati 
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message lost nothing in the transmission. Taft traced the unfavorable 
Korean truce to the need to appease the United Nations. He concluded, "I 
believe we might as well abandon any idea of working with the United Na-
tions in the East and reserve for ourselves a completely free hand." Was an 
Eisenhower-Taft face-off at last in the making? At the news conference fol-
lowing Taft's speech, Eisenhower admitted Taft's right to his own opinion 
and even admitted his own irritations and frustrations in foreign policy mat-
ters. But the president stopped there. Those who wanted to "go it alone" in 
one place, he explained, had to "go it alone" everywhereY Occurring si-
multaneously with congressional moves to withhold funds from the United 
Nations if Red China were to enter, the Taft speech caused a considerable 
flap. US News and World Report wrote, "In Congress, the lines are drawing 
tighter." This marked the "deepest rift yet" in GOP ranks. 32 
Mr. Republican was largely unprepared for the speculation that fol-
lowed his Cincinnati address. He subsequently rejected Eisenhower's read-
ing of his remarks. The Cincinnati speech had said nothing about going it 
alone, Taft told Herbert Hoover. All he wanted was a "freer hand." Taft in-
sisted that he favored alliance building, particularly with Great Britain. 
"But," said he, "I don't think it is wrong to point out the difficulties of 
holding together such an alliance of nations whose heart is not in the job." 33 
As seen previously, Eisenhower's early foreign policy moves had cheered 
Taft. By early July his frustration had grown to the point where he could 
write, "I don't suppose we could be in a bigger mess in foreign affairs than 
we are." 34 Nevertheless, he kept his displeasure largely to himself after the 
Cincinnati address, unobtrusively joining a handful of old isolationists in 
Congress who were growing increasingly sour but were remaining basically 
quiet. 
On foreign and domestic matters both, Senator Taft was primarily re-
sponsible for the lack of conservative GOP carping about Eisenhower. His 
December pledge to cooperate with the incoming administration had 
proved sincere. Paradoxically, his sustained team play accounted for the 
headlines that followed his infrequent public criticisms. 
The attitude of the Eisenhower White House clearly helped Taft ease 
into this new role. Eisenhower had instructed subordinates to treat Taft with 
presidential deference. For Taft, White House doors were always open. Ike 
even chided the formal senator for making appointments. Moreover, both 
men grew more comfortable with one another as the months passed, learn-
ing where they agreed and disagreed. On international matters, Eisenhower 
discovered that he and Taft never disagreed when discussing "theoretical or 
academic" foreign policy essentials. Their clashes came only over specifics. 
Concerning domestic policy, Eisenhower liked to tell of Taft's reply to his re-
mark that the Ohioan was "twice as liberal as I." "Oh, you know how that 
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is," said the senator, "a label like that gets applied to you and afterwards 
you just have to live with it." 35 By the beginning of April, 1953, Ike could 
write in his diary, "I think it is scarcely too much to say that Taft and I are 
becoming right good friends." 36 
Taft, for his part, early came to appreciate the respectful treatment he 
received at the White House. Eisenhower still failed to understand what 
issues deeply divided politicians, Taft thought. But Taft believed that he 
had at least saved Ike from the counsel of the parry's Dewey wing. Late in 
June, 1953, Taft wrote, "I am quite convinced that Eisenhower is essentially 
conservative and if we keep working with him and pushing him in the right 
direction, we will make real progress." 37 
Major political observers, meanwhile, began to comment on Taft's new 
clout and statesmanship. William S. White watched Taft's growing influ-
ence in the White House and concluded, "This is an era that has raised pos-
sibly the longest bridge in the shortest time in American politics .... "38 
That bridge between the Republicans on Capitol Hill and the White House 
was Robert Taft. 
Comments like these prompted the conservative Human Events to re-
mark, "The scribes and Pharisees ... are apparently seeking to create a Taft 
myth-a myth of an amiable, but shortsighted fellow who had been rather 
sporting about his nomination and rather obliging towards Ike since Jan-
uary."39 However valid this comment, Eisenhower did come to value Taft. 
"His loss would be a little short of calamitous," he wrote in early June, 
1953. 40 
Ironically, just two months earlier on April19, 1953, Taft had conferred 
with Eisenhower in Augusta, Georgia. Golf being part of the presidential 
routine during the Eisenhower years, and with their legislative business out 
of the way, Eisenhower and Taft took to the links. It was a mark of their 
growing friendship, as well as their mutual enthusiasm for the game. On 
that day, however, Taft had complained of pains in his hip. Several weeks 
later, Taft learned that he had cancer. Keeping his exact medical problems 
private, he turned over his leadership duties to William F. Know land of Cal-
ifornia for the remainder of the congressional session. By a tragic turn of 
fate, just as his effectiveness was increasing, Mr. Republican was on his way 
out-a situation that, according to the Washington Post, was a real "blow" 
for the administration. 41 
Taft had long since secured his place as Mr. Republican. The "Taft 
Myth" of the committed helpmeet of President Eisenhower, on the other 
hand, was new. Like any myth, this one was based on some truth. The 
Ohioan had worked to quash antiadministration sentiment among Right 
Wing Republicans, and by mid-1953, no major break had occurred in Re-
publican ranks. Taft's partisanship and political realism helped to explain 
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his cooperation with the new administration. Eisenhower was, after all, aRe-
publican president, and Taft wanted him to succeed. Furthermore, during 
the early days of the administration, not only did Taft become more aware 
of Eisenhower's essential conservatism, but he also learned of the perils and 
restraints of governance from the vantage point of a Republican White 
House-an education few Republicans had had. 
By helping and defending the Eisenhower administration, though, Taft 
had suffered in certain right-wing quarters. Ironically, the same tart GOP 
partisanship that had led Taft to flay Democratic presidents and proposals to 
the delight of the Republican Old Guard now led him to defend a Republi-
can president whose policies were at best suspect from an orthodox GOP 
standpoint. Taft's latest activity was, to some GOP conservatives, positively 
"unRepublican." In short, Mr. Republican's sense of political reality and 
partisanship had won out over strict adherence to right-wing party doctrine 
of the New and Fair Deal days. This sense of reality had rankled some GOP 
diehards even in earlier times. Taft's legislative responses to critical postwar 
problems had already been variously denounced as socialistic and "adven-
tures in me-tooism" by his more conservative brethren. 
But Taft insisted that conservatism did not mean constant opposition to 
change or a failure to respond to problems that people were asking the fed-
eral government to address. Taft recognized, too, that far less conservative 
elements would quickly fill any political void left by "do-nothing" Republi-
cans. The Republican Right's failure to match the wisdom of Taft was its 
greatest mistake in the 1945-1953 period, a result of its constant rigidity. 
Still, to the end, not much separated Taft and the Republican Old 
Guard. Indeed, for over two decades Taft was not only Mr. Republican, but 
Mr. Republican Right in the popular mind. And during the early postwar 
years, nobody to Taft's right-not Kenneth Wherry on Capitol Hill or 
Douglas MacArthur across the nation-had Taft's political expertise or sig-
nificance. Furthermore, Taft generally supported the Republican Right in its 
opposition to Democratic policies and "me-too" Republicanism. Despite 
Taft's liberal legislative effortS in housing, education, and medical care, the 
popular picture of Taft remained that of a stalwart foe of Democratic domes-
tic and foreign policies. Unfairly, but understandably, Taft had often been 
portrayed as a cranky antagonist of all reform-cold and callous to the trou-
bles of the less fortunate. This was due in part to Taft's harsh and overblown 
partisan rhetoric, as well as his dreadful public relations. This Taft was some-
thing of a myth, too-but one that the general public embraced. Unfortu-
nately, Taft's efforts to advance federal housing and education were often 
forgotten, but his inflation-fighting advice to "eat less," easily remem-
bered. 
This conservative Taft, of course, fit neatly into the Republican Right 
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image. The Republican Right generally failed to identify with the aspira-
tions of a considerable segment of the American public. Although Old 
Guard Republicans often belabored the political machinations of Wall 
Street, the Republican party itself was commonly regarded as the party of 
big business. When conservative Republican fears about government con-
trols, high taxes, and the excesses of organized labor did coincide with those 
of the public, voters had responded favorably to them, as in 1946. But gen-
erally, in the postwar period, the Republican Right had offered no sus-
tained, integrated program. It proved most successful in its obstructionist 
role. From 1945 through 1952, the Right had consistently combined with 
southern Democrats to block Harry Truman's Fair Deal and other similar re-
form proposals. Taft had, at times, been both a benefactor and a victim of 
this success. 
In foreign affairs, the Republican Right (Taft included) was also sim-
ilarly negative. Faced with the realities of the Cold War, the Republican 
Right seemed content to declare its anticommunism, call for strengthened 
air and sea defenses, and wait for the Democrats to leave office. With few 
exceptions, theirs was a policy of remedy less carping. Although the Republi-
can Right's warnings about the limits of American power might by them-
selves seem prophetic in post-Vietr:tam America, they were hardly in keeping 
with the relative world position of the United States after World War II. In 
that period, the Right's fears about American overextension were unsub-
stantiated or simply a smokescreen for a parochial isolationism. And, many 
Old Guard predictions never came true. For example, the Marshall Plan, far 
from sapping the American economy, as GOP conservatives had fretted, 
gave it a boost. Moreover, in view of their stand on international coopera-
tion, the Right's concern over its potential harm to the United Nations in 
such ventures as the Greek-Turkish aid program was hardly credible-and 
even ludicrous. 
The Republican Right's Asian policy also suffered from confusion. Its 
preoccupation with communism in the Far East came late, leaving it open to 
charges of political opportunism. The Old Guard's China stand failed to ac-
knowledge present or past power realities with respect to Mao's Communists 
or Chiang's Nationalists. Regarding Korea, conservative Republicans had 
been partly responsible for cuts in aid to South Korea before the outbreak of 
hostilities. During the conflict itself, the Republican Right's simultaneous 
calls for all-out war and withdrawal, while expressing general public frustra-
tion with the new concept of limited war, illuminated the Right's failure to 
set realistic and steady goals for the Korean involvement. With some justifi-
cation, critics could charge that the Republican Right's vacillation was at 
once irresponsible and hypocritical. 
By 1952 the Republican Right had proved unable to turn the public's 
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obvious frustration and disappointment with American foreign policy to its 
lasting advantage. It simply offered no coherent and balanced foreign policy 
alternative. Significantly, the Eisenhower wing, which offered no radical 
break with Democratic foreign policy, was able to capitalize on this right-
wing, neo-isolationist sentiment. 
Politically, the Republican Right failed in the 1945-1952 period to 
nominate, much less elect, one of its own for president. Robert Taft had 
been the only real Right Wing hope, yet, ironically, Old Guard Republicans 
themselves were partly responsible for his persistent failure. In 1948 Taft's 
liberal legislative moves had angered some Right Wing Republicans suffi-
ciently that they switched to Dewey. Even in 1952, when most GOP conser-
vatives clearly wanted no repeat of Dewey's "me-too" disaster of 1948, their 
fears regarding the "Taft can't win" thesis led many of them to support 
Eisenhower. 
Still, Taft's losses in 1948 and 1952 were widely, and correctly, regarded 
as defeats for the Old Guard. A majority of Right Wing Republicans had 
never brought the "Taft can't win" theory and had stuck with Taft to the 
end. They believed that if Republicans would only eschew "me-too," hordes 
of conservatives-who were normally electoral no-shows-would reward the 
party for offering " a choice not an echo." Although Right Wing opponents 
claimed that stay-at-home voters were more likely to favor Democratic can-
didates and that Taft had far greater strength in the Republican party con-
ventions than in the nation at large, real flesh-and-blood voters in a general 
election for president were never given the chance to prove the "Taft can't 
win" thesis or disprove the Republican Right's political speculation. There-
fore, Right Wing Republicans continued to talk of the latent power of con-
servative "stay-at-homes." As Richard Rovere observed in the New Yorker 
shortly after the 1952 Chicago Republican convention, "The selection of 
Taft would at least have got him off the Republican conscience, where he is 
to remain whether or not Ike loses. "42 
That Taft never got a chance to present a "clear alternative" was solely 
'the fault of the eastern Republicans, claimed Right Wing Republicans. 
Political buccaneering on the part of the Dewey faction had denied the GOP 
nomination to Senator Taft and the Republican Right. The Republican Old 
Guard had ample reason to think unfair some convention moves of its adver-
saries, especially in 1952, but the Republican Right's broad charges that 
Wall Street and Madison Avenue forces had bought, bartered, and bally-
hooed the nominations of Dewey and Eisenhower remain unsubstantiated. 
Certainly, the methods used by Eisenhower backers at Chicago galled the 
Republican Right and were remembered for a long time. 
Taft's continual losing battle for the GOP nomination and the pres-
idency also confirmed numerous Right Wing Republican fears about pres-
idential politics. Taft had been a victim of image politics, which had re-
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warded FDR, Dewey, and Eisenhower. Taft simply lacked the stuff of mass 
appeal. Even one diehard Taft enthusiast later recalled that one had to know 
Taft well to understand him. 43 Such a personality was at a tremendous disad-
vantage in democratic politics. GOP conservatives believed that Taft's lack 
of the popular touch, as well as his unrelenting truth-telling, doomed his 
presidential hopes. He was simply no match for the reigning hucksterism of 
the East. Yet to many in the Old Guard, Taft had failed to gain the White 
House for all the right reasons and had made the proper enemies in doing 
so. 
With the departure of Taft from the Senate inJune, 1953, WilliamS. 
White wrote, midwestern conservative Republicans "stand at a twilight 
turning." 44 Clearly, these were dark days for the Republican Right. Old 
Guard ranks on Capitol Hill had dwindled with the last election. In the Sen-
ate the GOP leadership had been a bastion of conservative Republicanism 
for years. Taft had been much responsible for this, putting down periodic 
revolts by "liberal" GOP elements. Now, with one of these former insur-
gents, William F. Knowland, at the head of the Senate GOP and Eisen-
hower in the White House, Old Guard domination was in peril. Worse, the 
RNC, another traditional Right Wing stronghold, was coming increasingly 
under the sway of the White House. Moreover, as Taft himself realized, the 
national media was predominantly hostile to conservative Republicanism, 
and right-wing commentators like Westbrook Pegler and George Sokolsky 
possessed only narrow followings. Finally, the Old Guard had even less of a 
claim on the intellectual "egghead" vote than Eisenhower. 
Taft's departure further complicated matters for the Republican Right. 
While he had stifled dissent among Republican hard-liners, Taft had also 
carried the orthodox position to the White House. He had also been the 
most skillful legislator of the Republican Right and had shouldered much of 
the parliamentary burden for his Senate colleagues. His ties to southern 
Democrats in the Senate had been very close, and Taft's absence made the 
ongoing relationship between Republicans and southern Bourbons ques-
tionable. 
Thus, Taft's exit was a blow for the Republican Right, as well as for the 
Eisenhower administration. Although the relationship between Taft and the 
Republican Right had often been anomalous, Taft had always regarded him-
self as a GOP conservative. And the Republican Right, in turn, could never 
ignore him. As William S. White wrote in his prize-winning biography of 
Taft, [conservative Republicans] "wanted him whether they understood him 
always or not, sometimes they even wanted him when they did not at all ap-
prove of him. "45 
On the afternoon of July 31, 195 3, John Bricker, who had conceded for 
Taft at three GOP conventions, rose on the Senate floor. Shaken, his voice 
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barely audible, Bricker informed his colleagues that Robert A. Taft had just 
died in New York City. At the White House, Eisenhower mourned his "wise 
counselor and valued friend." The flag on Capitol Hill was lowered to half-
staff, and the House rose in silent tribute. The Senate quickly adjourned out 
of respect for Mr. Republican. 
7 
Stick with Ike 
Republican instability was inevitable after the death of Robert Taft. Iron-
ically, Mr. Republican had won a greater voice for the Republican Right 
Wing in the GOP administration by keeping it muzzled. Now, the fragile 
peace that had existed between the Eisenhower and Old Guard Republicans 
since the 1952 Chicago convention was in jeopardy. Were the Republicans 
on the verge of committing hara-kiri? 
After Taft's death, maneuvering began immediately over William F. 
Knowland's ongoing leadership of Senate Republicans. GOP-watchers 
could recall that Know land had joined with anti-Taft rebels in 1949 and had 
been mentioned as "Ike's candidate" for majority leader in late 1952. Ob-
servers also variously described Knowland's record as "middle of the road" 
or a "little to the left of the Republican Party." But despite Capitol Hill 
"corridor rumors" of a possible Right Wing challenge, the Senate Republi-
cans (with seven absent) unanimously chose William Knowland as their new 
majority leader on August4, 1953. 
The New York Times regarded this selection as a "significant victory for 
Eisenhower," and Knowland himself bolstered this view by publicly reject-
ing the Right-Wing contention that the Eisenhower administration was 
proving too hospitable to past Democratic foreign policy. Know land won, 
however, without active White House support, since Eisenhower had in-
structed administration officials to keep out of this Senate Republican busi-
ness. What really clinched it for Knowland was that Taft had picked him as 
majority leader in one of his last Capitol Hill acts. This undoubtedly helped 
the Senate GOP to avoid civil war at this time. 
If Knowland's moderate reputation put off some GOP conservatives, 
his own Republican credentials were reassuring. Twelve-year-old Billy had 
made speeches for GOP presidential candidate Warren Harding. He subse-
quently became the RNC's youngest member by age twenty-six. As a Cal-
ifornia state lawmaker, Know land had maintained close ties with liberal 
GOP governor Earl Warren, who appointed him to fill the Senate term of 
the deceased Hiram Johnson in 1945. Although initially seen as a liberal 
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Young Turk, the California senator was difficult to categorize-especially 
after 1949, when he became convinced that American foreign policy was 
slighting the Far East in relation to Europe. In fact, Knowland subsequently 
made the case of the so-called Asia-Firsters with such fire that critics soon 
dubbed him the "Senator from Formosa" -a nickname he deeply resented 
because he had consistently backed European aid measures. 
Knowland unquestionably had the respect of his Senate colleagues on 
both sides of the aisle. Nobody doubted his integrity. But Knowland was 
stiff, humorless, and ill at ease in the Senate cloakroom, where he was 
known as a "young fogey." He had yet to learn the value of a well-stocked 
liquor cabinet in doing Capitol Hill business. In fact, he rarely talked with 
fellow senators. Like Taft, Knowland had a precise, logical mind, and little 
political pizzazz. Unlike Taft, he lacked parliamentary know-how or pru-
dence. 
Knowland's helmsmanship and influence with the Old Guard received 
its first important test in connection with the so-called Bricker Amendment 
in 1953-1954. Ohio Senator John Bricker had already proposed a constitu-
tional amendment during the Truman years that would have reasserted 
Congress's primacy over treaties and executive agreements, and thus fore: 
stall a repetition of Yalta-like diplomacy. The 1952 Republican platform 
had touched on this issue, promising that no treaty or executive agreement 
would "deprive our citizens the rights guaranteed them by the federal con-
stitution." Therefore, when Bricker reintroduced his amendment in the 
Eighty-third Congress, forty-five of the forty-eight Republicans were among 
its sixty-three cosponsors. Such groups as the American Medical Association 
and the American Bar Association supported the Ohio senator's constitu-
tional proposal. 
One particularly controversial feature of the Bricker Amendment was 
the "which clause." It stated that a treaty would become effective only by 
legislation "which" would be needed in the absence of a treaty. This highly 
ambiguous phrase raised vital questions about the role of the states in the 
treaty-making process. This clause, which Eisenhower believed to have been 
introduced "insidiously," prompted the administration to oppose the Brick-
er Amendment. Ultimately, the administration saw Bricker's proposal as a 
symbol of the conservative Republicans' disinclination to have America as-
sume its global responsibilities. Given the administration's stand, many 
moderate Republicans, who had supported the Bricker Amendment when it 
was first introduced during the Truman years, began to cool in their desire 
to shackle the president's treaty-making powers. Bricker, in turn, blamed 
administration hostility to his amendment on "certain forces" in New 
York. 1 
Despite administration efforts to achieve some compromise with 
Bricker, the first session of the Eighty-third ended in stalemate over the 
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Bricker Amendment. Eisenhower had come to believe that the constitution-
al proposal merely represented the senator's "one hope of achieving at least 
a faint immortality in American history. " 2 When the Congress reconvened 
in January, 1954, Eisenhower informed Knowland of his continued opposi-
tion. 
The Bricker Amendment thus remained a major point of GOP conten-
tion, and never more so than after the sudden firing of Clarence Manion. 
The president had earlier selected the pro-Taft former dean of Notre Dame 
law school to head the President's Commission on Inter-Governmental Rela-
tions. But as the Senate debated the Bricker Amendment in mid-February, 
1954, news came of the forced resignation of Manion from the commission. 
Manion and the Right Wing charged that this action pointed up the White 
House's "fatal disposition to ride the saddle of faction" against anti-New 
Deal Republicans. The White House countered that it had known of Man-
ion's "orthodox" beliefs before his appointment, and that he was asked to 
leave simply because of his failure to devote the necessary time to the com-
mission. But Robert Donovan's inside account of the administration later 
made clear that Manion's "extreme right wing views" were largely to blame 
for his departure. 3 
By the close of Senate debate on the constitutional issue, Bricker agreed 
to the Senate GOP command's request to knock out the "which clause" 
from his amendment. The Senate, in the end, turned to a substitute known 
as the George Substitute. Named after the Democratic senator from Geor-
gia, this proposal was so similar to the Ohioan's original amendment that 
Bricker gave it his ap!'roval. Predictably, the Eisenhower administration op-
posed the George Substitute. But the proposal did enlist one surprising sup-
porter-William Know land, who temporarily left his seat as majority leader 
to speak for it during the debate. Despite what Ike later called Knowland's 
"ridiculous spectacle," the Senate killed the George Substitute-but only 
by one vote less than the required two-thirds needed to propose a constitu-
tional amendment. There were thirty-two Republicans among the George 
Resolution's supporters. For the Chicago Tribune, the administration's re-
sistance showed that New Dealers had hijacked the GOP and that conserva-
tive Republicans needed to find a new party. 4 
During the 1952 presidential campaign, commentators had written that 
the election of a Republican president would serve to check Senator Joe 
McCarthy and McCarthyism. With Eisenhower in the White House and Taft 
riding herd in the Senate, the prospects did indeed seem bright. The Senate 
Republican leadership quickly decided that Indiana senator William Jen-
ner's Internal Security Committee would have sole responsibility on the Red 
issue; McCarthy, in turn, was left to assume the chairmanship of the rel-
atively minor Committee on Government Operations and was expected to 
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use its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to probe government 
corruption. Said Taft, "We've got McCarthy where he can't do any harm." 5 
But there soon was trouble. Not only did Jenner allow the Wisconsin 
senator's committee to encroach consistently on his turf, but the Bohlen 
controversy, mentioned earlier, quickly showed that McCarthy's anti-Red 
crusade was nonpartisan and not necessarily confined to the committee 
room. McCarthy simply could not be muzzled-even by Republicans. That 
he would continue to grab headlines became obvious only a few days after 
Bohlen's controversial confirmation. Standing before television cameras, 
McCarthy baldly announced that he had just "negotiated" a pact with 
Greek shipowners that got them to halt trade with Communist China and 
North Korea. 
Although the administration's foreign operations director, Harold Stas-
sen, initially asserted that McCarthy "undermined" administration efforts 
by such negotiating activities, Secretary of State Dulles shortly thereafter 
claimed that McCarthy's exploits were actually in the national interest and 
that Stassen had really meant to say "infringed," and not "undermined." 
At this moment, administration flexibility seemed worthwhile in order to 
establish goodwill with McCarthy and Capitol Hill Republicans, who were 
themselves disgusted with the allied trade with the Communist enemy. 
Taft, for example, believed that McCarthy was at most guilty of a little 
grandstanding. 6 
Eisenhower, on the other hand, could bring himself to take public ex-
ception to McCarthy committee aide J.B. Matthews, who identified the 
clergy as "the single largest group supporting the Communist apparatus in 
the United States today." Indeed, throughout his first year in office, the 
president vacillated between opposing and appeasing McCarthy. What some 
regarded as a pitiful lack of leadership on Ike's part, others saw as a cagey 
program designed to give the Wisconsin senator "enough rope" to hang 
himself. In public, Eisenhower insisted that he would not discuss personal-
ities whenever McCarthy's name came up. "I will not get down in the gutter 
with that guy," the president once told his staff. 7 Such a stricture obviously 
made White House leadership extremely difficult on an issue that was one 
chiefly of personality. 
From time to time, the administration actually tried to outgun McCar-
thy on his own turf. The administration issued periodic reports on its secur-
ity risk dismissals, and in November, 1953, Attorney General Herbert 
Brownell charged that in 1945 President Truman had named Harry Dexter 
White as head of the International Monetary Fund while knowing that FBI 
reports indicated that White was involved in espionage activities. But this 
approach contained certain dangers. When Truman responded that the 
Eisenhower administration had stooped to McCarthyism, the Wisconsin sen-
ator quickly demanded equal time and attacked the present as well as the 
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past White House occupant. He charged that the Eisenhower administration 
had failed to fire enough security risks and chided it for allowing the "blood 
trade" between Red China and the allies to continue. 
While one Eisenhower aide termed this McCarthy speech "a declaration 
of war against the President," at least one Right Wing Republican urged the 
White House to heed McCarthy. McCarthy was "gaining rapidly," South 
Dakota's Senator Karl Mundt wrote to Republican national chairman Len 
Hall in late November, 1953. "We MUST keep the [Democrats] on the de-
fensive on Communism ... afterall, what other issue have we." Later, in 
December, Mundt observed that it was a "shame Ike cooled off" on 
Brownell's Harry Dexter White speech. "Check for yourself," he added, 
"the McCarthy viewpoints are popular and Dulles and Ike should have a talk 
with Joe. Work out an armistice and working arrangement and stop support-
ing the unpopular side of issues." 8 
But the Wisconsin senator was a creature of controversy, a public figure 
who fed on headlines, and by February, 1954, the Eisenhower administra-
tion and McCarthy were locked in their greatest confrontation. At the root 
of the trouble was an army dentist, Irving Peress, a member of the left-wing 
American Labor party. Hauled before McCarthy's committee, Peress refused 
to answer questions regarding his political views. When the army later gave 
Peress an honorable discharge, McCarthy demanded an explanation. Brig-
adier General Ralph Zwicker, however, refused to divulge the names of offi-
cials involved in the Peress matter, and the Wisconsin senator publicly be-
rated Zwicker as "not fit to wear that uniform." Even the Chicago Tribune 
thought the senator had gone too far. 9 
Although Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens immediately refused to 
allow Zwicker to appear again before McCarthy's committee, the adminis-. 
tration still hoped to mend the breach between the army and McCarthy. As 
a result, Secretary Stevens and senators Dirksen, Mundt, and McCarthy met 
for the famous "Chicken Luncheon" of February 24, 1954, regarding a com-
promise. When Karl Mundt announced the luncheon's "memo of under-
standing," it appeared that Stevens had eaten crow, not chicken, since he 
gave in to McCarthy's demands and gained none of the safeguards he had 
wanted. McCarthy exacerbated matters by telling one reporter that Stevens 
could not have surrendered "more abjectly if he had got down on his 
knees." 10 
McCarthy's triumph proved short-lived. On March 11, the army re-
leased information detailing attempts by McCarthy and his aide Roy Cohn 
to gain preferential treatment for army private G. David Schine, another 
McCarthy assistant. Although these charges had first appeared in the press 
in mid-December, 1952, McCarthy now claimed. the army was trying to 
"blackmail" him. There was also a mounting political challenge to McCar-
thy from within the GOP. On March 9, Vermont Republican senator Ralph 
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Flanders attacked McCarthy, characterizing him as a "one man party" who 
was doing his best to shatter the GOP. Even more significant, President 
Eisenhower now appeared ready to talk "personalities." At a news confer-
ence, Ike praised Flanders's "service" and pointedly warned of the "great 
danger" to the Republican party from "individuals seeking after personal 
aggrandizement." 
Clearly, McCarthy's support was falling off. Conservative John Taber 
was beginning to find McCarthy's statements to be "ridiculous." "I do be-
lieve," Taber continued, "that the country would be better off everywhere if 
all of us, including Joe, would devote our attention to rooting [Commu-
nists] out rather than talking quite so much about sidelines." 11 Finally, Vice-
President Nixon publicly chided McCarthy for "reckless talk" that ham-
pered the anticommunist cause. 
Angst-ridden Republicans had to watch in the spring of 1954 as the 
Senate investigated the army's charges against Senator McCarthy. The 
Democrats had insisted on public, even televised hearings, and, as a result, 
the army-McCarthy hearings became a national spectacle, as an estimated 80 
million Americans tuned in. The confrontation was indeed dramatic but 
generally inconclusive as far as the specific charges were concerned. McCar-
thy did, however, manage to alienate most of his moderate backers, and he 
began to tumble badly in the public opinion polls. 
Even before the close of the army-McCarthy hearings in June, Senator 
Ralph Flanders of Vermont, a liberal Republican, introduced a resolution in 
the Senate that proposed to punish McCarthy for various transgressions by 
stripping him of his committee chairmanships. Making it impossible for Re-
publicans to duck the McCarthy issue any longer, the Flanders resolution 
posed great dangers for the GOP, and majority leader Know land publicly la-
beled it a "mistake" -unjustifiable and an obstacle to the administration's 
legislative program. By mid-July, however, seeing that Flanders had won 
increased support by altering his original resolution to call only for McCar-
thy's censure, not the removal of his committee chairmanships, Knowland 
was forced to offer his own compromise resolution to create a special biparti-
san committee to examine McCarthy's activities. Although Flanders op-
posed this move, the Knowland measure passed, 75 to 12. Specific charges 
were added to the resolution, as well as a key amendment by New York Re-
publican Irving Ives that required the special committee to report back be-
fore the end of the Eighty-third Congress-a provision Knowland approved 
only grudgingly. 12 
Named after chairman Arthur V. Watkins, a conservative Utah Repub-
lican, the resultant special committee included two other Republicans and 
three Democrats. All six were fairly conservative and known as "Senate 
types." The McCarthy matter was locked behind closed doors-for the time 
being. 
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The McCarthy matter was, of course, only one of the problems plaguing 
the GOP in 1953-1954. Republicans had not ruled the White House in 
twenty years, and political savants often pointed out that only fourteen GOP 
House members remained from Herbert Hoover's day and not one senator. 
The Republican party was basically an opposition party that was no longer in 
opposition. Worse, the new president, however much a natural politician, 
was a military man and unfamiliar with the intricacies of civilian politics in 
Washington. In this environment, congressional-White House misunder-
standings were bound to occur, and as Ike complained of being "kicked in 
the shins" by Capitol Hill Republicans, they groused about "Just A Repub-
lican New Deal." 13 
The GOP's Lincoln Birthday bash of 1954 in Washington signaled a 
marked intensification of party troubles. There were many empty seats and 
"mountains" of unclaimed box suppers. Ike's remarks to the gathering were 
met with "less than deafening" applause. At about this same time in the 
American Magazine, C. Budington Kelland of Arizona held forth on ad-
ministration shortcomings. The crusty national committeeman from 
Arizona claimed that the Taft wing of the GOP had been restless since the 
senator's death, and the administration-especially the White House chief 
of staff Sherman Adams-was not helping to allay Old Guard fears. 14 
Old Guard criticism of the administration mounted throughout 1954. 
Bricker and McCarthy continued to cause problems for Ike. North Dakota 
senator Milton Young groused publicly about the White House, or the "Pal-
ace," where "you feel like an outcast." 15 Right Wing Republicans grumbled 
that the Eisenhower administration was calling on Congress to extend, not 
repeal, the old "Truman-Roosevelt" program. The concern that most Right 
Wing Republicans felt was revealed in Hoffman's letter to RNC boss Hall: 
"Some of us here want to help Ike and go along on every possible occasion, 
but will not do a right-about-face on policies we have taken for 25-40 
years." 16 
Conservative opinion makers gave Eisenhower-"a Fifth-Column 
Democrat" -an even rougher going-over. "He's a picnic pitcher in the 
world series," wrote Westbrook Pegler. Justifying the battering Ike was reg-
ularly receiving in his Chicago Tribune, Colonel McCormick said, "We treat 
Eisenhower as he deserves, and right now he doesn't deserve much." 17 
There was nothing surprising about this GOP wrangling. The funda-
mental problem in the party was still a basic lack of agreement on what the 
GOP's 1952 victory meant. When the Eisenhower administration brought 
no rollback of New Deal structures or scrapping of Democratic foreign pol-
icy, the howls and shrieks of conservative hard-liners naturally ensued. 
Eisenhower himself was partly to blame. His vague and honeyed words dur-
ing the 1952 canvass had allowed GOP conservative imaginations to run 
wild. For the moment, Republicans of all types came to believe their own 
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campaign rhetoric about a united party. Many Right Wing Republicans 
temporarily forgot why they had opposed Ike before the Chicago GOP con-
vention in 1952-a result, perhaps, of their belief that all the general 
needed was the proper advisors, which he would get in Washington. 
Also bothering Old Guard Republicans was the nonpartisan tone and 
style of the Eisenhower administration. The administration was just not bat-
tling Democrats, which they had been doing for the last twenty years. Of 
course, the administration felt that the slimness of GOP majorities on Cap-
itol Hill militated against "indiscriminant attacks on Democrats as a 
group." Such an approach rankled orthodox Republicans who, finding little 
positive to say about the Eisenhower administration, had to resort to malign-
ing Democrats. 
Old Guardsmen, like Kelland and Mundt, also correctly griped that 
administration patronage was not going to old-line, "regular" Republicans, 
but to political "late comers" instead. Patronage was badly handled in the 
first years of the administration, with many available jobs going to men of 
questionable Republicanism, and this galled old-time party wheelhorses. 
On the other hand, Eisenhower seldom used political patronage to punish 
Republican opponents. His light touch with the political lash stemmed from 
his belief that a conciliatory approach to party problems would help isolate 
and "reduce to impotence" the GOP extremists of the "McCarthy-Malone" 
axis. A related Eisenhower shortcoming by 1954 concerned his role in the 
upcoming elections. Under pressure from GOP leaders, Eisenhower main-
tained that he would set forth the Republican record and that there would 
be a pat on the back and a picture with the president for all GOP House and 
Senate candidates. Political pundits quickly observed that Eisenhower had 
surrendered a great deal of political leverage by giving such a blanket en-
dorsement. After a while, one top administration official realized that the 
White House needed a "ruthless s.o. b. to run its politics." 18 
Although journalists highlighted GOP differences, in reality the 
Republican party at the time was not all claws and fangs. In fact, during the 
Eighty-third Congress, the administration enjoyed its share of good news. 
Not all Old Guard Republicans were at war with the Republican White 
House. In the House, Eisenhower could count on the team play of Joseph 
Martin and Charles Halleck. Surprisingly, Senator Homer Capehart and rep-
resentatives Leo Allen and John Taber were GOP hard-liners who generally 
cooperated with the White House. There was also Dan Reed. After his ini-
tial tax rebellion, Reed proved extremely helpful on certain tax bills and suc-
cessfully shepherded Social Security extension through the House, despite 
the fact he had opposed the latter program since its inception in 1935. "I am 
part of the Administration," he now boasted. 19 
While the approaching 1954 congressional election prompted increased 
support for President Eisenhower-both in the Congress and on the 
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hustings-intraparty wrangling remained. A case in point was Chicago busi-
nessman Joseph Meek, a GOP hard-liner running for the Senate in Illinois 
against Democratic incumbent Paul Douglas. In order to gain Ike's cam-
paign support, Meek agreed to endorse the whole Eisenhower program and 
not invite McCarthy into the state. This latter prohibition especially irritated 
Meek, who complained further of the administration's continued coolness 
toward him. In the end, Meek believed his concessions to Eisenhower made 
him a "Johnny-Come-Lately" to "Eisenhower people" and "suspicious" to 
"Taft people" in Illinois. Internal splits also continued to rack the Republi-
can party across the nation. For example, a bitter New Jersey GOP primary 
left progressive Clifford Case the party's senatorial candidate and caused a 
great deal of apathy on the part of New Jersey's Right Wing Republicans in 
the fall campaign. 20 
A big Republican win would be Eisenhower's "greatest weapon" in 
future combat within the party, while a loss would bring intensified Right 
Wing criticism and perhaps all-out intraparty war. There was, however, no 
real political jackpot for any GOP faction on election day 1954. Only one 
thing was certain in its aftermath-the Republicans had lost control of Con-
gress. The Democrats took a 49-to-47 edge in the Senate, and they also won 
control of the House by a 232-to-203 majority. 
What did these tallies mean for the GOP? Right Wing Republicans, 
pointing to the reelection victories of Bridges in New Hampshire, Mundt in 
South Dakota, and the defeats of such liberal incumbents as John Sherman 
Cooper in Kentucky and Michigan's backsliding Old Guardsman Homer 
Ferguson, concluded that future GOP unity had to be based on "conserva-
tive terms." Party liberals, however, saw the victory of GOP progressive Clif-
ford Case in New Jersey and the defeat of hardshell Joe Meek in Illinois as 
proof that the Republicans could no longer run on the record of William 
McKinley. 
Senator Joe McCarthy had lost most of his party support even before 
candidates mounted the stump in 1954. A cluster of party bosses in the Mid-
west-supposedly the McCarthy heartland-requested that McCarthy stay 
off their turf. Although anti-McCarthy sentiment was far from total and the 
party's hard core deeply resented the administration's handling of the 
McCarthy issue, the general consensus was that McCarthy and his crusade 
had won nothing on election day. 
Nevertheless, William S. White of the New York Times reported 
shortly after election day that McCarthy was the catalyst for "the largest 
emergence and coming together of right-wing groups since the United 
States entered World War II." 21 The belief was common that the Republi-
can Right was backing the Wisconsin senator only in hopes of recapturing 
the Republican party. Eisenhower, for his part, realized that McCarthy's vot-
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ing record did indeed separate him from the GOP's "revolutionary fringe." 
"However," Ike added, "the members of that [Old Guard] gang are so anx-
ious to seize on every possible embarrassment for the Administration that 
they support him." 22 
Whatever the fall's election returns indicated, confronting the McCar-
thy issue at last became unavoidable. The Watkins committee bipartisan re-
view had proceeded deliberately during the summer of 1954. Unlike the 
army-McCarthy hearings, its closed hearings were relentlessly undramatic-
and also conclusive. On September 27, 1954, the Select Committee recom-
mended that the Senate censure Senator Joseph McCarthy on two counts-
contempt of the Senate for his failure to appear before the Subcommittee on 
Privileges and Election and his "reprehensible" abuse of General Zwicker. 
Knowland, of course, had gladly yielded to Republican pressure to delay full 
Senate consideration of the charges until after the congressional elections. 
When the debate finally began on November 10, 1954, the McCarthy 
censure question was in reality a test of what faction would control the fu-
ture "tone and spirit" of the Republican party. South Dakota conservative 
senator Francis Case offered the first compromise proposal-a call for a sim-
ple McCarthy apology. Case's and other such subsequent conservative com-
promise solutions highlighted the Old Guard belief that the McCarthy con-
troversy was just a problem of personality. Bricker, who had urged McCarthy 
"not to swing his shalaghley so wildly," believed that McCarthy's indiscre-
tions toward his fellow senators were primarily responsible for the censure 
movement. During the censure debate, Jenner told McCarthy that he had to 
restrain himself, and McCarthy agreed. But it was not long before he was on 
his feet challenging Watkins and the Select Committee. McCarthy's out-
bursts proved costly. After he branded the Watkins committee as the "un-
witting handmaiden" of the Communists, Senator Wallace Bennett of 
Utah, GOP conservative and former head of the National Manufacturers As-
sociation, tacked on an amendment condemning McCarthy for contempt of 
the entire Senate. 23 
As the censure debate continued, Right Wing supporters ultimately 
came to equate McCarthy's cause with the Congress's investigative author-
ity-a traditional Old Guard principle. Of course, Right Wing Republicans 
also believed that McCarthy and an anticommunist stance were inseparable. 
As Barry Goldwater of Arizona said, "a field day against Senator McCarthy 
in the Senate may well turn out to be a field day against America's global 
anti-Communist policy." 24 According to his backers, McCarthy was a 
marked Red hunter, for he had relentlessly attacked the "sacred cows of 
American politics." Bricker maintained, "The pack which hunts the hunters 
of Communists has caught the smell of blood." 25 
Blood was also on Senator Goldwater's mind, but it was the blood of 
the GOP. "We have the spectacle of cannibalism holding forth," the 
Stick with Ike 125 
Arizona senator declared. "We find the Republican Party ... busily chew-
ing on itself." Out of this spectacle, said Goldwater, only the Democrats 
could emerge winners. Old Guard Republicans tried to use this theme as a 
means to find some way out of the McCarthy dilemma. Their hope was to 
construct some solution that could win moderate Republican support. If the 
McCarthy matter could become a partisan issue only, the Senate might have 
to drop it. 26 
A potential break for pro-McCarthy forces came in early December as 
the harsh and vindictive debate reached a close. After a night of "prayerful 
consideration," majority leader William Know land, who had differed with 
McCarthy in the past, announced his opposition to McCarthy's censure. 
McCarthy's major offenses had occurred during an earlier Congress, and his 
reelection had wiped the slate clean, explained Knowland. Knowland's sup-
port, however, brought compromise no closer, and on the night of Decem-
ber 2, after a day of parliamentary maneuver, the Senate at last voted to cen-
sure Senator McCarthy. The vote was 67 for and 22 against. All Democrats 
and independent Wayne Morse voted to ground "Tailgunner Joe." Senate 
Republicans, on the other hand, split right down the middle. The list of 
censure opponents-Bridges, Bricker, Dirksen, Jenner, Welker, Goldwater, 
Malone, and so on-read like a roster of the Republican Right. Indeed, all 
Senate Republican leaders, except Leverett Saltonstall, voted for McCarthy. 
Following the vote, Right Wing Republican senators, in a mocking and 
derisive way, haggled over the resolution's exact meaning. This seamy end-
ing to the whole Senate affair did not fool McCarthy, who later told report-
ers, "Well, it wasn't exactly a vote of confidence." 27 The Republican party's 
McCarthy drama ended two days later at the White House. There, Eisen-
hower, who had stayed clear of the Senate battle, congratulated Select Com-
mittee chairman A. V. Watkins on a "very splendid job." 
The McCarthy affair left Right Wing Republicans and conservatives in 
despair. Hearst columnist George Rothwell Brown predicted that the hunt 
for Red hunters would go on, with Indiana senator Jenner being the next 
victim. As for Jenner himself, the McCarthy affair demonstrated the "high 
political mortality of anti-Communists in Congress." Former President 
Hoover also feared for the future of anticommunism since any such move-
ment would be henceforth tarred as McCarthyism. 28 
On November 15, 1954, Senate majority leader William Knowland in-
terrupted the McCarthy censure debate to speak urgently about recent 
events at home and abroad. 
Prior to this, Eisenhower administration moves in the national security 
area had prompted few complaints by Right Wing Republicans. Indeed, the 
major policies and pronouncements of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
genuinely appealed to the nationalistic wing of the GOP. For example, 
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Dulles announced in December, 1953 that there would be an "agonizing 
reappraisal" of the United States European commitments if the European 
alliance failed to bring in West Germany. A month later, Dulles declared 
that the United States would meet any new aggression with "massive retalia-
tory power." This policy combined with a "New Look" defense strategy of 
enhanced air and sea power and reduced levels of ground troops to yield, in 
the phrase of the day, "more bang for the buck." Further, Eisenhower's ap-
pointment of Admiral Arthur Radford as chairman of the Joint Chiefs as-
sured that a Taft favorite would oversee the new military stance. But was the 
stillness of the Right Wing on foreign and defense matters about to be shat-
tered as Knowland-the Republican Old Guard's new ally in the McCarthy 
censure battle-took the Senate floor? 
Knowland expressed grave fears that the administration was about to be 
duped by the "Trojan Horse of co-existence" being advanced by the Soviet 
Union. Then he called upon the Congress to investigate current American 
foreign and defense policy. Days later, after Communist China announced 
its imprisonment of thirteen Americans captured during the Korean War 
and fired on the Nationalist-held island ofWuchiu, Knowland urged an im-
mediate blockade of Red China. When Know land subsequently sided with 
Senator McCarthy, pundits believed that he had gone over to the Republi-
can Right, severing all connections with the Eisenhower administration. 29 
Actually, relations between Eisenhower and Know land had been 
strained for some time. The majority leader, choosing to believe Ike's plat-
itudes on the integrity of the coordinate branches of government, acted 
more like the Senate's representative to the White House than vice versa. 
The Senate's GOP leadership, Knowland said in late November, 1954, 
should not be "gagged and silent." For his part, Eisenhower spent much 
time brooding over Knowland's shortcomings as a party leader, especially 
after the majority leader's defection on the Bricker Amendment in 
February, 1954. By the middle of the year, Eisenhower concluded that 
Know land was the "biggest disappointment of his political life." 30 
Knowland's various proclamations on foreign policy had also rankled 
the administration. Although he suggested that the administration break 
diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, Knowland's Asian policy drew most 
attention. As one of the leaders of the Asia Firsters, Knowland took the Sen-
ate floor in July, 1954, to declare that if Red China were admitted to the 
United Nations-seen by many as the first step toward United States recog-
nition of the Peking regime-he would quit as majority leader and work full 
time to sever all United States ties with the United Nations. It was a grand 
gesture, and Knowland repeated it periodically. "Knowland has no foreign 
policy except to develop high blood pressure whenever he mentions the 
words 'Red China,"' wrote Eisenhower ,31 
The administration rejected Knowland's demand for a China blockade, 
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and Eisenhower stated that he had no interest in leading the GOP "off in 
extremes." Both Eisenhower and Know land stressed that their disagreement 
was mainly over methods, and not principle, but most observers remained 
unconvinced. Adlai Stevenson impishly suggested that Ike sign "a nonag-
gression pact" with Knowland and find some way of "peaceful coexistence 
with a large segment" of the GOP. 32 
More trouble for the administration along this line seemed to appear on 
December 16, 1954, when McCarthy lashed out at Eisenhower's Asian pol-
icy. Like the Wisconsin Tailgunner's previous sallies and unlike Knowland's 
criticism of the administration, McCarthy's blast was bitter and personal. He 
accused Eisenhower of a "tolerance of Chinese Communism" and a "shrink-
ing show of weakness toward Red China." But McCarthy went too far by 
publicly apologizing to the American people for supporting Ike in 1952. 
RNC chairman Hall said that "even greater" GOP unity would follow 
McCarthy's salvo, and even pro-McCarthy senators of days before rushed to 
disassociate themselves from the Wisconsin renegade. Ironically, McCarthy's 
actions temporarily served to bring the party back together-and make any 
Knowland-McCarthy axis impossible. 
If McCarthy continued to lose support for himself, Knowland mar-
shaled none with his antiadministration foreign policy statements. Big Bill 
nevertheless remained the GOP Senate chief. The administration lacked 
enough influence among Senate Republicans to make a sure move against 
Knowland, and an unsuccessful one would leave anti-Ike forces in an even 
stronger position. For both Knowland and the administration, there was no 
alternative to an uneasy truce. Time correctly stated that Knowland "will 
simply continue as the Republican non-leader in the Senate." 33 
Against this backdrop, GOP conservatives assembled in Chicago in 
mid-February, 1955, when the Abraham Lincoln National Eisenhower Club 
sponsored meetings to address the question: "What Must the Republican 
Party do to preserve the Republic and itself?" Over 1,700 participants from 
twenty-six states awaited answers from speakers such as senators George 
Malone, Everett Dirksen, and Joe McCarthy, as well as Governor). Bracken 
Lee of Utah. 
Chicago conservatives roared as Joe McCarthy assailed the Eisenhower 
administration's foreign policy of coexistence and Everett Dirksen vowed to 
fight the president on the Bricker Amendment. Luncheon speaker Governor 
Bracken Lee of Utah boldly charged that the Eisenhower administration had 
taken the nation further to the left in two years than it had ever moved in its 
history. Claiming that "the leadership in Washington hasn't been loyal to 
the Republican Party," Lee then declared that real Republicans and Demo-
crats might have to "sit down together and put somebody on a ticket who is 
going to run on the kind of platform we like." 34 
A few days after this Chicago gathering, the Abraham Lincoln Club 
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launched a national campaign to recapture the GOP from the "Eisenhower 
New Deal Wing." Yet Dirksen quickly came out against any third-party 
drive, and even McCarthy said that he hoped the administration would "co-
exist" with him for a while. For Right Wing Republicans, the Eisenhower 
administration's betrayal-both real and perceived-was great. But the Chi-
cago meeting and its aftermath also illustrated that Right Wing fortunes 
were, as the administration's Henry Cabot Lodge judged, "at the bottom of 
the barrel." 35 
Just how low these fortunes were became apparent on the issue of Eisen-
hower's role at the Big Four conference at Geneva in the summer of 1955. 
Geneva became a primary challenge to the Republican Right's neo-isola-
tionism. The fundamental issue was the desirability or possibility of "peace-
ful coexistence" with the Soviet Union-a policy that was in theoretical con-
flict with the administration's own policy of "liberation" of people living 
under communism. 
By early spring, 1955, McCarthy's own hoped-for coexistence with the 
Eisenhower administration was proving impossible, and he now took up the 
cause of the liberation of eastern Europe by offering a resolution to prohibit 
the president from discussing any other subject at Geneva until the Soviet 
Union resolved the "satellite question." This measure would, according to 
Senate Democratic majority leader Lyndon Johnson, "straightjacket" the 
president and torpedo the Geneva summit. Despite Knowland's opposition, 
Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations committee shrewdly forced 
McCarthy's resolution to the floor. 
There, after McCarthy attacked the administration and fought with 
Knowland over his anticommunist credentials, the Senate finally voted to 
spike the McCarthy resolutions, 4 to 77. Democratic support for the pres-
ident forced a high degree of GOP opposition to the McCarthy resolution, as 
only Republicans Jenner, Malone, and North Dakota maverick William 
Langer stood with McCarthy to the end. 
By the close of the first session of the Eighty-fourth Congress, Right 
Wingers were in retreat and disarray. Ike himself now believed that on Cap-
itol Hill there was "more cohesion on principle and greater dedication to our 
cause" than ever before. 36 In the Senate, where Right Wing Republicans had 
been so unruly, the GOP now became relatively peaceful. The Geneva ques-
tion had shattered any possible entente between Know land and McCarthy, 
and by midsummer, 1955, McCarthy was almost alone in rebellion against 
the administration. His crusade had become a caper. Knowland, for his 
part, remained the GOP Senate leader, but in name only. Despite his help 
on the Geneva matter, the administration generally sought the aid of other 
senators who had some connections with the Republican Right. 
Ironically, the demise of Know land and McCarthy-whose ties to the 
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Republican Right were actually new and tenuous-helped to undermine the 
Old Guard. Indeed, the power of the Republican Right had reached its low-
est point since 19 52 . 
When the lights went on in the guestroom of Mrs. John Doud in Den-
ver in the early morning hours of September 24, 1955, the Republican party 
suddenly faced a political crisis. Mrs. Doud's visitor was her son-in-law, Pres-
ident Dwight D. Eisenhower, and he had just suffered a moderate coronary 
thrombosis. Thereafter, Ike would remain at Fitzsimmons Army Hospital 
near Denver until November 11, 1955, while an anxious nation awaited his 
return to Washington. 
Political prospects immediately changed for Right Wing Republicans. 
L. Brent Bozell, columnist in the lively new conservative journal National 
Review, believed that Eisenhower's illness gave the Republican Right Wing 
a "new lease" after being finished as an important political factor just the 
preceding summer. Still, there was no quick grab for power, only a quiet 
stiring, causing Bozell to lament that the Right was experiencing "trepida-
tion and misguided notions about good taste," instead of properly exploit-
ing the situation. 37 
Eisenhower's heart attack was not, however, the first event to raise ques-
tions about a possible Republican presidential contender for 1956. In fact, 
only weeks earlier in the same city of Denver, Ike had reminded the RNC 
that "you never pin your flag so tightly on one mast that if a ship sinks you 
cannot rip it off and nail up another." Such talk had made even hard-boiled 
party professionals jumpy. Most Republican politicos-liberals, moderates, 
and conservatives alike-had already pinned their hopes for a 1956 GOP vic-
tory on Eisenhower in the belief that the Republican party was not strong 
enough to win without Ike. When asked about the possibility of an Eisen-
hower-less ticket in 1956, chairman Hall replied, "When I get to that 
bridge, I'll jump off." 38 
William F. Knowland was a notable exception to these gloomy Republi-
cans. He rejected the "doctrine of the indispensable man" and did not be-
lieve that the party needed a reluctant candidate. Indeed, Capitol Hill col-
leagues and pundits had long regarded Knowland as the Republican Right's 
possible candidate for 1956, and conservative journals were touting him for 
the top spot. Political gossip therefore spread on November 1, 1955, when 
Knowland urged the president to announce his intentions concerning reelec-
tion by early winter at the latest. 
Knowland's possible candidacy was really never a challenge to the con-
valescent president. It grew instead from widespread Old Guard fears of a 
possible "squeeze play." Allegedly, some Dewey-Eisenhower men wanted 
Eisenhower to delay any decision until perhaps mid-March so that they 
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could round up an alternative "Dewey-Eisenhower wing" candidate in case 
Ike chose not to run for reelection. Some senators fretted as GOP presiden-
tial talk focused on the president's brother, Milton, the head of the Pennsyl-
vania State University. There were also disconcerting sightings of Milton 
Eisenhower campaign buttons. 
Against this background, Knowland confirmed in mid-January that he 
would run for the Republican nomination if the president did not announce 
his political plans by February 15. Later in January, the Californian indi-
cated that he would not discourage a pro-Knowland slate of delegates from 
running in the New Hampshire primary. Eisenhower, for his part, remained 
silent about his intentions and ignored Knowland's deadline. Any Eisen-
hower decision, of course could come only after the doctor's go-ahead, 
which he got on February 15. But the medical report settled nothing. The 
president immediately flew to the Georgia plantation of Secretary of the 
Treasury George Humphrey for some dove hunting, golf, and political re-
flection. 
So the wait continued. Knowland reportedly believed there was only a 
50-50 chance that the president would run and was therefore gearing up his 
own campaign. Yet Knowland's mid-January announcement triggered no 
popular groundswell and no influx of campaign contributions. In fact, Right 
Wing circles remained cautious and tightlipped about the Knowland candi-
dacy. Big Bill Knowland nevertheless was prepared to press on. 
On February 29, Eisenhower ended all speculation by announcing for 
reelection. Instantly ending his unofficial campaign and predicting an 
Eisenhower reelection victory, Knowland publicly warned Ike how impor-
tant it was "to consolidate" the Republican party. Many in the "Taft 
Wing," said Know land, "feel they have not been made so much a part of 
the team as their long service in the party warrants." Know land urged the 
RNC to use these Republicans more fully and even suggested that Ike name 
a Taft Republican as a vice-presidential runningmate instead of Nixon. 39 
Representation and voice-these were Knowland's goals from the be-
ginning. Right Wing Republicans realized that there could be no fight with 
Ike in 1956. Yet take Eisenhower away-certainly a gloomy prospect for the 
party in 1956-and it was back to the trenches. Knowland's potential chal-
lenge was actually the first volley of the post-Eisenhower era of the Republi-
can party. It demonstrated that the Right Wing was not dead, and that the 
GOP was far from Eisenhowerized. 
The GOP political drama next centered on the vice-presidential nom-
ination. Eisenhower's health naturally made the office the object of renewed 
attention and political yearnings. Knowland heightened the drama by sug-
gesting the possibility of a Taftian stand-in for Nixon, but Eisenhower him-
self sparked political speculation by maintaining that he could not properly 
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endorse any runningmate until after his own nomination was secured. 
"Dump Nixon" talk began almost immediately. A week later, Eisenhower 
told reporters that he had directed Nixon to "chart his own course" -Nixon 
could remain as vice-president or take some cabinet post in order to gain 
more experience and exposure. 
Nixon and Eisenhower had indeed discussed this possibility before, and 
the vice-president told RNC chairman Leonard Hall he believed that this 
was Ike's way of dumping him. True enough for any seasoned politico, said 
Hall, but Ike was hardly that. Perhaps Hall really wanted Nixon to remain 
on the ticket. Or perhaps Hall lacked the political sophistication to ease 
Nixon off the ticket. Earlier, Eisenhower and Hall had discussed the possi-
bility of a major realignment of American political parties-a "turning 
point in history," Hall had called it. The plan was to name a conservative 
Democrat for the GOP second spot, and Ike and Hall considered a number 
of possibilities. But the question remained: What about Nixon? Hall said it 
would be best to get Nixon off the ticket "willingly," making him a "hero" 
in the process. Eisenhower agreed. "Talk to him, but be very gentle," Ike 
told Hall. 40 Was Ike really serious in this discussion with Hall? Eisenhower's 
well-known directions to Nixon and his silence in naming a runningmate 
made such an apparent "dump Nixon" desire highly plausible. If Eisen-
hower was truly serious, at the critical moment, Hall was either too gentle 
with the vice-president or acted as a political double agent. 
One contemporary observer judged that Eisenhower was only keeping 
the vice-presidential nomination open until Nixon's standing in the party 
could be tested. Nixon's exact place in the GOP had puzzled observers for 
some time and would continue to do so. One thing was certain by early 
1956-he was hardly "the darling of the Old Guard" that some writers 
claimed. In fact, his embrace of the Eisenhower program, which made for 
the first "New Nixon," rattled Right Wing Republicans and undercut his 
conservative support. When Eisenhower's own candidacy was in doubt, an 
ensuing Nixon "boom" began not among Old Guard Republicans, but 
Dewey forces. Indeed, Nixon-watch journalists-conservative and other-
wise-had come to appreciate Nixon's pragmatic approach to GOP politics. 
Given Hall's failure or disinclination to ease Nixon off the ticket, the 
mid-March New Hampshire primary, where the vice-president amassed a 
surprising 22,000 write-in votes, provided ample evidence of Nixon's stand-
ing with the party electorate. Eisenhower now modified his earlier strictures 
regarding any early endorsement, saying that he would be happy to run with 
Nixon. When, on April26, Nixon announced that he would accept the vice-
presidential nomination, Eisenhower said he was "delighted." 
Everyone assumed the vice-presidential problem was settled-until a 
month before the GOP convention. Then, onJuly 22, administration disar-
mament advisor Harold Stassen suddenly launched his own "dump Nixon" 
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movement. He favored Massachusetts governor Christian Herter as Ike's 
next vice-president. Not only did the allies have more confidence in Herter, 
but, said Stassen, independent voters did, too. He brought forward a poll 
showing that an Eisenhower-Herter ticket was about six percentage points 
stronger than the present GOP combination-an important difference for 
GOP House and Senate candidates. Although Stassen stated that he was not 
speaking for the president, he did indicate that he had talked to Eisen-
hower, who said he would be glad to run with Herter. 
There was no doubt about the Republican Right's position on this sec-
ond "dump Nixon" move. Conservative support for the vice-president was 
solid. "Republicans will resent the unwarranted arrogance of Harold Stas-
sen's attempting to suggest a Vice Presidential candidate," said Senator 
William Jenner. Further, Styles Bridges countered with his own poll show-
ing Nixon's strength. Nixon had certainly done no political somersaults 
since the earlier period of Right Wing coolness. But now he had the right 
enemies. Stassen was an Old Guard adversary, and his anti-Nixon an-
nouncement was seen as another GOP liberal gambit to revamp the party. 
Yet Stassen's campaign was in trouble from the beginning. A day after 
the Stassen declaration, Christian Herter himself stated that he would not 
campaign against Nixon but would in fact nominate him at the GOP con-
vention. This latter arrangement was the master stroke of chairman Hall. 
Then, when Stassen got lost on the way to the opening session of the GOP 
convention in San Francisco and had to be escorted to the Cow Palace by a 
taxicab full of reporters, it only dramatized how comic his "dump Nixon" 
bid had finally become. After finally arriving, he was confronted by Nixon's 
solid delegate count and Dewey's firm support for Nixon-reportedly part 
of a deal that required the vice-president to tone down his speeches in the 
fall. Stassen got nowhere, and after three convention days he surrendered. 
His seconding speech for Nixon-a price Stassen paid for a meeting with 
Ike-was a tribute to the Eisenhower-Nixon party balance and the disarma-
ment advisor's folly in trying to wreck it. Eisenhower remained above the 
GOP factional battle, while Nixon was caught in the middle. The Republi-
can Right Wing, riled by the pretensions of Stassen and his liberal cohorts, 
had aligned itself firmly with the vice-president. 
In his welcoming address to the Republican National Convention, Cal-
ifornia's GOP governor Goodwin Knight declared that the Republicans 
would leave San Franciso "marching arm in arm." They would indeed. Stas-
sen's activities served only to unite the GOP. The Eisenhower grin by now 
seemed to have infected the entire party. "Not since the Democratic conven-
tion of 1936," wrote James Reston, "has a President dominated a political 
rally the way the President is dominating this one. " 41 Senator Knowland 
praised the president's "constructive record of accomplishment" and called 
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upon "the spirit of Bob Taft" to guide all Republicans in the campaign 
ahead. Unlike the 1952 slugfest in Chicago, the Republican gathering in 
San Francisco turned out to be a politicallovefeast, with Taft's ghost being 
used as a unifying element in the "long tribute" to Ike. 
Although the San Francisco convention witnessed the formal unveiling 
of the "New Republican Party," observers were noting well before the gath-
ering that GOP state chairmen in forty-one states had been replaced with 
Ike men, and two-thirds of the RNC was new since 1952. Taft wing war-
horses such as C. Budington Kelland, Werner W. Schroeder, Harrison Span-
gler, and Guy Gabrielson had faded from the GOP organizational scene. 
Mter four years, Ike's magic was even working on Capitol Hill, where, ac-
cording to one Eisenhower braintruster, "conservative" congressional leaders 
like Knowland and Martin were at last "coming around." Those failing to 
do so, the National Review remarked, were being "consigned to outer dark-
ness." "With such skill have [Ike] and his associates conducted the move-
ment," the National Review continued, "that it has become quite clear 
what the Republican Party is not: it is not the Party of Senator Taft." 42 
A change in national party leadership, however, was only one compo-
nent of the new Eisenhower GOP. By the time of the San Francisco conven-
tion, a new party credo was ready, too. The basics of this philosophy were set 
forth in Arthur Larson's A Republican Looks at His Party, published in July, 
1956. Former dean of the University of Pittsburgh Law School and now an 
assistant secretary of labor, Larson had taken it upon himself to delineate the 
ideas animating the Eisenhower administration. His book quickly gained 
Ike's approval. 
Although A Republican Looks at his Party had the whiff of campaign 
propaganda, it represented a serious attempt to define the Eisenhower pro-
gram. The "New Republicanism," according to Larson, represented the 
"Authentic American Center" in politics. Under the New Republicanism, 
the central government would undertake those tasks that the states or cit-
izens could not do for themselves-a paraphrase of a Lincoln quotation that 
Eisenhower often repeated. Arrayed against the New Republicanism were 
the opposition forces of 1896 and 1936. The opposition of 1896, with its 
stress on states' rights and laissez faire economics, represented "bad conser-
vatism." Unlike the good conservatism of the Eisenhower administration, it 
worshipped only the "shell of the past. "43 
Larson's New Republicanism, however, was extremely general and in-
clusive. It lacked real meaning. Stewart Alsop pointed out that Franklin 
Roosevelt had often quoted the same Lincoln words favored by Ike. Conser-
vative comment further attested to the looseness of Larson's thesis. In the 
National Review, Willmoor Kendall noted that no conservative could object 
to New Republican principles. 44 
Eisenhower's San Francisco acceptance speech was pure New Republican 
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language. In tackling the problems of today, declared Ike, Republicans still 
believed in long-range principle over political expediency, and though their 
concern for the citizen was warm, it was not paternalistic. Eisenhower's San 
Francisco address and Larson's book accomplished the same result by sep-
arating Ike from the Republican party. One reviewer of A Republican Looks 
at His Party suggested that a more accurate title might be "A Republican 
Looks at His President," and Eisenhower's San Francisco performance elic-
ited similar comments. 4) 
Still, there was hardly a mumble at San Francisco. Instead of a floor 
fight over the New Republicanism, the Republicans honeyed over their dif-
ferences. Believing "old scars healed" and past issues obsolete, Life hailed 
"The New Republican Harmony. "46 Actually, there was no New Republican 
party. Such talk was little more than campaign oratory that some Republi-
cans came to believe. In San Francisco, the GOP appeared too peaceful, too 
united, and too quiet for a party undergoing such transformation. Where 
was the old Right Wing fire? 
At the time, of course, any Right Wing attack on Eisenhower would 
have been pointless, unless Republicans desired political suicide. Ike was the 
one Republican hope in November, and political wisdom demanded a 
united front. Besides, Larson's and Eisenhower's words meant nothing as far 
as Right Wing Republicans were concerned. It was true that Eisenhower had 
temporarily recast the GOP's public image and had broken the power of the 
Taft wing nationally. But Eisenhower had hardly routed the Republican 
Right within the party. Even if the Old Guard was not in command, it was 
still secure on Capitol Hill. Far more important, Right Wing Republicans 
still held power in numerous state GOP organizations across the country and 
represented a sizable minority in others. Indeed, in some state contests dur-
ing 1956, Right Wing factions had clobbered Ike supporters who were hurt 
by the president's unwillingness to meddle in these contests. 
Clearly, the Right's hopes for the Republican future-a future of 
"unhyphenated" Republicanism-had not waned. As one convention-
watcher wrote, "The stillness at San Francisco was less that of an enemy van-
quished or even cowed than of one patiently biding its time. "47 
It was a chilly fall for the Republican Right. In the public mind, the 
GOP was Eisenhower's. The National Review had written shortly after 
Eisenhower's reelection announcement, "The decisions that must be made 
before November are dreadful ones." Perhaps this was so for conservative in-
tellectuals, who debated through the autumn whether to support Eisen-
hower, but the decision for most GOP politicians was not so agonizing. 
They would, as the new Republican slogan went, "Stick with Ike," as they 
quickly boarded the "Coattail Express." 
One conservative rider was Senator George Bender, who was up for re-
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election in Ohio. This old Taft bugle-blower rapidly converted to Eisen-
hower Republicanism, a philosophy he now claimed to have espoused 
"before I knew there was such an individual. "48 Another "Coattail" passen-
ger was Everett Dirksen of Illinois, who again proved a good gauge of GOP 
political trends. Dirksen, of course, had been the major pro-Taft firebrand 
at the 1952 Chicago convention. Subsequently, the Eisenhower administra-
tion, noting Dirksen's basically friendly attitude in contrast to Knowland's, 
had worked hard to make Dirksen a Taft stand-in among GOP senators. By 
the summer of 1956, the Illinois senator was spearheading the administra-
tion's Senate forces on the issue of aid to Yugoslavia. With a reelection cam-
paign coming up in 1956, Dirksen's shift was politically smart and in keep-
ing with the actions of many other GOP conservatives who decided to stick 
with the Republican party, where a "healthy tendency" toward conservatism 
still existed. 
Such knuckling under to Ike by GOP candidates irked the National 
Review, which had begun to worry about the tendency to "Caesarize" Ike, 
characterizing Republicans who subordinated themselves to Eisenhower as 
"self-immolators." The National Review remarked, "We hope that enough 
of the self-immolators will be defeated to remind the balance of the basic 
character of our political system. "49 
Despite the "stick with Ike" sentiment, all was not harmony for theRe-
publican party during the 1956 campaign. When Leonard Hall announced 
the new RNC executive committee appointments in the fall of 1956, for 
example, Old Guard anger erupted. Excluded from this new group, former 
national chairman B. Carroll Reece sent a bitter letter to Hall, as did Ohio 
national committeewoman Katharine Kennedy Brown, an old Taft ally. 
Brown noted the injustices being visited upon the friends of Taft and told 
Hall, "You thus make yourself a spokesman for the cult who seek to purge 
all conservatives who carried the torch for the Republican Party during the 
lean years." so Her letter eventually appeared in Drew Pearson's newspaper 
column. 
At another point during the campaign, the Old Guard became enraged 
over what the president's friend and political advisor Paul Hoffman wrote in 
October's Collier's magazine. In "How Eisenhower Saved the Republican 
Party," Hoffman stated that Ike had succeeded in transforming the GOP in 
spite of a number of Republican troublemakers, whom Hoffman divided 
into two groups-the "Faint Hopes" and the "Unappeasables." Hoffman 
quoted Ike as saying, "There are some people you cannot afford to have as 
friends," and he even revealed that Ike had sometimes considered breaking 
away from the GOP and running as an independent. 51 
The controversy aroused by the Hoffman article naturally raised concern 
in an election year. Knowland and Bricker both lamented the potential po-
litical damage that it offered. "Faint Hope" Barry Goldwater demanded a 
136 THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT 
fast explanation from the administration. ~ 2 The "Unappeasables," mean-
while, reacted typically to what Welker, who had a tough battle for reelec-
tion in Idaho, called Hoffman's "hatchet job." Malone immediately 
branded Hoffman "an international socialist." McCarthy began a probe of a 
former Hoffman aide and eventually had Hoffman appear before his 
committee "so that the American people could better understand your ha-
tred for those you feel in your arrogance you can read out of the Republican 
Party. " 53 
Eisenhower, when asked about Hoffman's Collier's article at his next 
news conference, finessed that American political parties were state organi-
zations. They, and not the president, decided who is or is not a Republican. 
But Ike hinted that Hoffman was not far off the mark by conceding that 
there were certain party members he had learned not to depend on. Later, 
discussing the matter with Senator Malone, the president upheld Hoffman's 
right to express his own opinion, adding that he (Ike) had not even read the 
article. This was a smart political parry, but hardly true. Hoffman had asked 
Ike to read his piece and make suggestions and comments. The president 
had done so, pointing out only a few minor factual errors, since he had no 
desire to gag Hoffman in any way.~4 Never at issue, however, was Hoffman's 
right of political expression. Ike had not been reluctant in the past to tell 
Hoffman to tone down his divisive political pronouncements, and Ike would 
never have allowed such an article to threaten the Republican campaign ef-
fort in 1952. 
That Hoffman's article gained White House clearance in 1956 illustrates 
the change in Eisenhower's relationship to the GOP after four years. The 
1956 Eisenhower canvass was different than the one four years before. Iron-
ically, the intervening years had widened, and not narrowed, the gap be-
tween the president and his party. Eisenhower's campaign managers made 
their pitch for Eisenhower, not Eisenhower and the Republican party. There 
was, for example, only one reference to the GOP in the final election eve 
campaign appeal-and Nixon made that. This caused Richard Rovere to ob-
serve that in a sense Eisenhower's handlers were "reading him out" of the 
Republican party.~~ 
Still, Eisenhower did not attempt to eliminate Old Guardsmen from 
the Republican party, as a strong party leader might have been tempted to 
do. Even the most obstreperous Right Wing Republican could obtain Eisen-
hower campaign support. Welker discovered this when he asked Ike for help 
in countering the effects of Hoffman's article. 
Thus, GOP conservatives backed the president in 1956 and banked on 
his great popularity. Eisenhower still carried the Republican label, and next 
to the horrors of the Democratic program, the Eisenhower "middle way" 
looked safe. Further, Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson made Eisen-
hower appear and sound conservative by comparison. Finally, it was not that 
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difficult or dangerous to tack and trim with Eisenhower in the White House. 
"Much that sails under the banner of Republicanism today is certainly not 
Republicanism as we know it in Ohio," John Bricker had written earlier. 
"However, if we keep our places in the crew, we can probably have some in-
fluence in determining the final post reached by our good Ship of State." 56 
On election day 1956, Eisenhower won big, amassing 35.5 million pop-
ular votes to Stevenson's 26 million. The president won forty-one states for 
457 electoral tallies, while Stevenson carried seven states for 73 electoral 
votes. The win was nationwide, as Eisenhower extended his 1952 inroads 
into Dixie. Still, Eisenhower could not haul the Republican party along with 
him. The Democrats held on to a 49-to-47 edge in the Senate and beefed up 
their House majority by thirty-three seats to make it 232 to 199. Eisenhower 
told election night GOP revelers, "Modern Republicanism has now proved 
itself. And America has approved Modern Republicanism. " 57 
"Modern Republicanism" -the phrase caught on quickly. The electoral 
returns, however, belied Ike's claims, and even he later admitted that voters 
were still uncertain that Modern Republicanism was the new beacon of the 
entire GOP. Although George Aiken in Vermont and John Sherman 
Cooper in Kentucky were victorious, other Ike-minded Republicans lost. An 
original Eisenhower booster, Pennsylvania senator James Duff, failed in his 
reelection bid, as did the most notable convert to Eisenhower Republican-
ism, Ohio senator George Bender. Douglas McKay in Oregon, Dan Thorn-
ton in Colorado, and Arthur Langlie in Washington were all Modern Re-
publicans whom Eisenhower had encouraged to run for the Senate, and they 
all lost. 
Right Wing Republicans could hardly send up cheers either. Political 
flexibility clearly paid off for conservative incumbents like Dirksen, Cape-
hart, Butler, and Francis Case. But Colorado voters replaced retiring GOP 
conservative senator Eugene Millikin with John Carroll, a Fair Deal Demo-
crat. In Idaho, Democrat Frank Church knocked off GOP diehard Herman 
Welker. Welker blamed the New York "kingmakers" for his defeat, claim-
ing, "The boys from New York put me out of politics and work." 58 Conser-
vative Utah governor]. Bracken Lee, one of Eisenhower's harshest critics, 
also failed to win reelection. Commented William S. White after the elec-
tion, the Taft wing "lies in ruins. " 59 
The nation still liked Ike, but the entire Republican party, including 
the Republican Right, was in bad shape. 
8 
Go Down Grinning 
with Ike 
"I won't give a damn about Ike the day after the election," an old Taft par-
tisan said earlier in the summer of 1956. "He's our meal ticket now. Once 
we're in, the hell with him." 1 
Such sentiment led many GOP watchers to expect trouble on the right 
for the Eisenhower administration during the second term. Not only have 
presidents had more success in passing their programs during their first 
terms, but Eisenhower was the first president to be affected by the Twenty-
second Amendment, which prohibited a president from serving more than 
two terms. This was expected to weaken his power. Moreover, Eisenhower's 
failure to carry along the Republican party in the 1956 elections wounded 
him as a party leader. As for Ike's prospects for further reforming the GOP, 
one observer concluded, "Fat Chance." 2 
Eisenhower's 1957 State of the Union message presaged trouble. Gone 
were the conservative cliches oflke's first State of the Union message. Now, 
Eisenhower's new requests for public health and welfare programs, as well as 
increased school construction, seemed to reaffirm Modern Republicanism. 
Days later, in presenting the administration's budget, Eisenhower called for 
a new budget that was $2 billion higher than the previous one, bringing the 
total request to $71.8 billion-a record for peacetime. These figures raised 
concern even within the administration. Treasury secretary George Hum-
phrey warned publicly that future budgets of this magnimde could bring "a 
depression that will curl your hair." 
The Eisenhower budget instantly became a political "battle flag" for 
GOP conservatives. Ranking Republicans in budget-related committees on 
Capitol Hill all promised some pruning, and minority leader Knowland 
publicly tossed around billion-dollar figures that might be cut from the pro-
posed budget. GOP rebel Joe McCarthy said that the administration's bud-
get "far out does" former President Truman in "his wildest spending 
spree." 3 The conservative outcry was even louder beyond Capitol Hill. Wil-
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liam Loeb's Manchester Union Leader initiated a vicious personal attack on 
President Eisenhower, calling him a "stinking hypocrite." Major business 
organizations such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the 
Chamber of Commerce joined with the Wall Street Journal in protest. 4 
Conservative House Republicans, however, led the charge, which rap-
idly expanded to include an assault on Modern Republicanism in general. In 
mid-January, 195 7, Richard Simpson, chairman of the Republican Congres-
sional Campaign Committee, said that the GOP itself was wasting away 
under the "warm glow" and "great name" of Eisenhower. His House col-
league, Clare Hoffman of Michigan, stated that Republicans had gone 
"dizzy" under Ike and warned that the president's "left-wing, free-spend-
ing, international one world advisors proposed to disinfect, fumigate, pur-
ify, renovate, unify and remake the Republican Party." 5 
This conservative House revolt was only beginning when the RNC met 
in January, 1957, to select a successor to the retiring Leonard Hall, chief 
GOP face-lifter under Ike. Administration forces were able to torpedo Old 
Guard hopes of electing an old-line chairman and to get unanimous RNC 
agreement on H. Meade Alcorn, Connecticut national committeeman, who 
was the president's choice and an enthusiastic Modern Republican. Never-
theless, this RNC meeting, which took place on the day of Ike's second inau-
guration, had its share of Right Wing bellyaching.,For example, after Mary-
land governor Theodore H. McKeldrin exhorted Republicans to follow the 
Eisenhower path, Oregon committeeman Robert Mautz was instantly on his 
feet. He ticked off a series of 1956 Eisenhower Republican losers and said 
that unless the party got some "old-fashioned Republicanism," it would 
find itself "dead as a dodobird." "He's talking Ohio's language," old Taft-
ite Clarence Brown said of Mautz. Such fierce expressions obviously indi-
cated that times had changed since the campaign, and when the newly 
elected chairman Meade Alcorn pledged to fight for Modern Republican-
ism, GOP observers forecast an inevitable clash between him and the Old 
Guard. 6 
Indeed, the issue of "Real Republicanism versus Modern Republican-
ism" preoccupied the whole GOP throughout much of 1957. The Republi-
can Right dominated the debate on "Just What is a Modern Republican?" 
Its definitions were not intended to please the Eisenhower administration. If 
Modern Republicanism were not a "form of bribery," it was simply a mere 
campaign "catch phrase" that had served its purpose. Even liberal Republi-
can George Aiken of Vermont urged the party to drop the term, because it 
was "misleading, badly misused and subject to misinterpretation. " 7 
In the midst of this development, a strong new voice of antiadministra-
tion sentiment came forward in early April, 195 7. In the past, Arizona sen-
ator Barry Goldwater had only quietly differed with the Eisenhower admin-
istration, and in 1956 he had even urged the president to run for a second 
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term. Goldwater was certainly not a member of what Richard Rovere termed 
the GOP's "zany faction" that included Jenner and Welker. This gave 
Goldwater's April 8 pronouncement added weight. On that day, he stood in 
the near-empty Senate chamber and publicly broke with the Eisenhower ad-
ministration. It was, Goldwater later recalled, "the hardest thing I ever 
did." 8 
Goldwater began his Senate speech by applauding the administration's 
first term. Then he came to the point. Goldwater charged that the Eisen-
hower White House was suddenly lured by "the siren of socialism." "For-
eign giveaways" and "slavish economic indigence" at home were part of the 
new order as the administration "aped New Deal antics." The Arizona sen-
ator rebuked Eisenhower for failing to keep his 1952 pledges and for the 
1956 budget-a budget that "subverts the American economy." Goldwater 
then added, "The citizens of this country are tired of the New Deal now 
more than in 1952, when they made the first attempt to throw it over. "9 
Goldwater grabbed headlines. Time immediately called him conservatism's 
"most articulate spokesman" and added that "the Republican Old Guard is 
back on its feet." 10 
The Republican Right at this moment actually had more active vocal 
chords than political muscle, and even the National Review's Bozell con-
cluded in late May that talk of a right-wing revival was just "nonsense." 11 
Still, the Republican party remained clearly split. One indication of this was 
the party's suffering coffers. From the League of Republican Women came 
reports that Old Guard and Modern factions were "close to hairpulling." 
Further, Young Republicans were adopting some antiadministration resolu-
tions. When addressing GOP leaders inJune, 1957, Ike learned about the 
GOP divisions firsthand. These Republicans still liked Ike, but only when he 
talked generally or lambasted Democrats. His bid to drum up support for 
specific legislative proposals prompted few cheers. 
The United States Information Agency (USIA) thus became a natural 
target for antispending GOP conservatives. Eisenhower had rewarded 
Arthur Larson for his 1956 political labors on the administration's behalf by 
making him director of the USIA. Not only did Larson's ties to Modern Re-
publicanism make USIA funding an obvious Old Guard target on Capitol 
Hill, but some extremely partisan Larson remarks had also angered Demo-
crats, especially majority leader Lyndon Johnson. Despite these obstacles, 
administration supporterJacobJavits planned to force a roll-call vote on the 
USIA appropriations request. But Bridges persuaded Javits that he did not 
have the votes, and the New Yorker dropped his plan. Hearing of these 
GOP maneuvers and wanting to embarrass the Republicans, Johnson him-
self brought the USIA funding question to the Senate floor. There, the Sen-
ate voted, 61 to 15, to cut USIA funding from $144 million to $90.2 mil-
lion. In the end, only fourteen Republicans stuck by the president. 
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The USIA cuts became, however, the "highwater marks" of congres-
sional independence in the budget-making process in 1957. The president's 
position generally triumphed on Capitol Hill. The big issue proved to be 
foreign aid, with Right Wing Republicans continuing to rail against what 
they saw as the futile attempt to buy global friendship. But even the more 
independent Senate, after a thirteen-hour session, defeated all bids to alter 
or slash foreign aid funds and gave the president his full request of $3.6 bil-
lion. The vote was 57 to 25 in favor, with thirty-one Republicans backing 
Eisenhower. The eight Republican foes included Bricker,Jenner, and Dwor-
shak. Writing at the close of the "Battle of the Budget," the National 
Review concluded that conservative budget-slashers lacked "relevant leader-
ship. " 12 
The Old Guard could lose the "Battle of the Budget" without surren-
dering in the "Battle of the GOP." For the Old Guard, the "Battle of the 
Budget" was just a battle, while the struggle for the GOP was the war. The 
Republican Right had used the Eisenhower budget to sound off against 
Eisenhower's Modern Republicanism; actual budget cuts seemed only sec-
ondary. This was basically a political battle, with the structure and control of 
the post-Eisenhower GOP being the primary issues. 
Whether the Republican Right's new crusade would be acceptable to 
the voters remained to be seen, and political pundits and Right Wing Re-
publicans looked to developments in Wisconsin in 1957 to offer an electoral 
clue. In a special August election to fill the Senate seat of Joseph McCarthy, 
who had died in early May, Democrat William Proxmire trounced Republi-
can governor Walter Kohler by 122,000 votes, taking 56.7 percent of the 
vote. The upset left Democrats with a 50-to-46 Senate margin and dealt a 
much-publicized blow to Modern Republicanism. The Wisconsin governor 
had advertised himself as an Eisenhower Republican, and the president dis-
patched Interior secretary Fred Seaton to Wisconsin to stump for Kohler. 
Kohler's unpopularity with the Wisconsin Old Guard became obvious as 
soon as the returns were in. An estimated two-thirds of the Republicans who 
had voted in 1956 stayed home in this 195 7 election. 
Eisenhower deemed the Kohler result "a bad licking" and explained 
that Wisconsin voters had "allowed themselves to be misled by a lot of slo-
gans and catch words that really have no validiry in our politics." In private, 
Eisenhower faulted Old Guard Republicans who indulged "their personal 
animosities" against Kohler. Right Wing Republicans, in turn, blamed 
Modern Republicanism for Kohler's loss. Former president Hoover wrote 
that party conservatives were "putting on sitdown strikes" against this new-
fangled Republicanism, and Barry Goldwater proclaimed that Proxmire's 
victory threw "the last clod of dirt on the coffin of Modern Republican-
ism."13 
Proxmire's upset of Modern Republican Kohler symbolized Right Wing 
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resurgence in 1957. The Wisconsin loss and Eisenhower's Capitol Hill diffi-
culties prompted Business Week to conclude: "New Republicanism at New 
Low." Even the National Review's usually cautious L. Brent Bozell wrote in 
November, 1957, "The prospects of conservatives capturing power are 
brighter today than at any time since 1952 ." 14 
During this Old Guard renaissance, the Republican Right was again be-
ginning to nurse some presidential hopes. Senator William Knowland of 
California was the chief prospect. In early 1957 he had announced that he 
would not seek reelection to the Senate at the close of his term in 1958. De-
spite the senator's claims that personal reasons lay behind his decision, "po-
litical cynics" expected Knowland to run for governor of California in 1958 
and use that post as a springboard to the 1960 GOP presidential nomina-
tion. "Knowland, Nixon: Race for Ike's Job is On," ran the US News and 
World Report of January, 1957. In fact, by August, Knowland was telling 
Capitol Hill colleagues from California that he intended to run for governor. 
According to John Bricker, Knowland's move away from the Senate upset 
some conservative senators, who believed the minority leader was "making a 
good record" right there. 15 Know land, however, remained typically tight-
lipped about his long-range political moves. 
Knowland needed some kind of quick boost to realize his ambitions. 
Eisenhower preferred Nixon to Knowland as the future GOP standard-
bearer-and Knowland knew this. The president, according to administra-
tion insider Emmett Hughes, promised to support Knowland for governor, 
"but not a damn thing higher than that." 16 Further, Nixon showed higher 
support and recognition than Knowland in public opinion polls. A success-
ful governor's race might help Know land remedy this problem and also give 
him considerable influence as head of the California delegation at the 1960 
GOP convention. 
As Senate leader, Knowland had also recently worked to win new 
friends and improve relations with the Eisenhower administration. Much to 
the National Review's dismay, Knowland had remained relatively quiet dur-
ing the "Battle of the Budget," and he even opposed anti-Eisenhower for-
eign aid foes in one Senate shoot-out. Moreover, his rabid foreign policy 
pronouncements tapered off. Know land also inched away from a traditional 
conservative position in another area when shepherding the 1957 Civil 
Rights Act through the Senate-some said because California had a consid-
erable black population. Knowland, whom the National Review called "the 
nation's ranking political conservative," was definitely displaying considera-
ble flexibility as 195 7 closedY 
But winning popular support posed real problems for Big Bill. Hard-
driving and meticulous in his Senate leadership, Knowland lacked political 
spark. Only lately had Knowland tried to cultivate his California constitu-
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ency, and when Big Bill appeared at a picnic in an unbuttoned sport shirt, 
some party-goers were surprised and shocked. The National Review held 
that a California gubernatorial win in 1958 would put Knowland in the 
1960 GOP presidential race right to the finish. Still, doubts remained about 
any ultimate Knowland presidential triumph. 
Knowland had some immediate problems in the California GOP, which 
was beset by deep ideological differences and powerful personal allegiances. 
Knowland and Nixon were familiar enough California figures, with the sen-
ator generally seen as being to the right of the vice-president. But there was 
also the current Republican governor of California, Goodwin J. Knight, a 
liberal. As Know land began laying his plans for the California gubernatorial 
race, "Goodie" Knight was promising to "fight to the finish." Meanwhile, 
the state's Democratic party had done some rebuilding and had a popular 
candidate in attorney General Pat Brown. As a result, political soothsayers 
did not think much of Knight's gubernatorial reelection prospects. 
In November, 1957, Governor Knight traveled to Washington to ar-
range a "political truce." Mter a White House meeting, the California gov-
ernor announced that "for the good of the Republican Party," he would run 
for the U.S. Senate. Although this obviously left the GOP gubernatorial 
spot open for Knowland, Knowland insisted that Knight's withdrawal com-
pletely surprised him. In fact, Knowland and most other observers believed 
that Nixon and Los Angeles Times publisher Norman Chandler had pres-
sured Knight to bow out. The National Review's Bozell maintained that 
Nixon did so in order to "whittle down" the impact of a future Knowland 
victory. 18 Ironically, Knight's withdrawal hurt Know land rather than helped 
him. Had Knowland won after a lively contest for the GOP governor's nom-
ination, he would have gained considerable stature with the California elec-
torate. Moreover, Knight's "retirement" announcement was not enough to 
end the GOP feuding, and there were reports that both the Knowland and 
Knight camps were drumming up votes for the other's Democratic rival. 
The biggest source of California GOP wrangling involved the right-to-
work issue. Under the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, states could determine for 
themselves whether to allow the so-called union shop or outlaw it. California 
voters had defeated an antiunion right-to-work proposition in 1944, but 
conservative business groups were ready to tty again in 1958. Knowland 
backed such legislation in his 1958 campaign, and his position terrified less 
extreme Republicans. Knight claimed that Knowland's endorsement of this 
"non-Republican" issue freed him from supporting Knowland. The Califor-
nia governor even hinted that many Republicans might want to consider 
voting Democratic. Some obviously did in the spring GOP California pri-
mary, since both Knight and Know land ran far behind their Democratic 
counterparts in the open primary. Brown, for example, amassed 662,000 
votes more than Know land. 
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Nonetheless, Knowland identified himself even more strongly with the 
issue after the spring primary by getting California Republicans to scrap 
their earlier anti-right-to-work plank of 1956. Right-to-work was, of course, 
a traditional right-wing issue, and Knowland's steadfastness thrilled conser-
vatives. In Newsweek, for example, Ray Moley lauded Big Bill for "speaking 
to the minds and not the prejudices and emotions of the voters. " 19 For pun-
dits and old-line politicos alike, Knowland's crusade recalled Taft's 1950 re-
election campaign in Ohio. Conservative GOP congressman B. Carroll Reece 
looked to that earlier race as a guide for both the California and conservative 
future. Voters still wanted a real choice, explained Reece, and in Know-
land's position they could find it. 20 
As the 1958 elections approached, the Republican party as a whole was 
in trouble over right-to-work and other issues. California was not unique. 
Ohio was another state where right-to-work movements complicated the 
GOP outlook. There, John Bricker, who faced reelection, and Ray Bliss, the 
state GOP boss, at first pleaded with right-to-work forces-normally conser-
vative business allies-not to press the issue. That failing, Bricker then tried 
to minimize the issue's potential damage to his campaign by refusing to 
appear with the Republican gubernatorial candidate, William O'Neil, a 
champion of right-to-work legislation. 
Bricker and O'Neil's problems in Ohio were mild by comparison with 
other GOP factional battles between the Old Guard and Modern Republi-
cans throughout the nation. In Utah, personal and political differences led 
former Governor H. Bracken Lee to mount a third-party challenge to incum-
bent conservative Republican A.V. Watkins. Out of New Jersey came re-
ports that disgruntled party hard-liners were withholding contributions 
from the Republican candidate and sending them instead to Knowland in 
California. Back in Washington, Republican Capitol Hill campaign com-
mittee bosses were publicly advising GOP congressional hopefuls that run-
ning on the Eisenhower record was not necessarily politically wise. Many 
Republicans not only doubted Eisenhower's political coattails in 1958, but 
offered serious complaints about Ike as a party leader. "I guess we'll go 
down grinning with Ike," lamented Congressman Richard Simpson. 21 
In the summer of 1958 the inner agonies of the GOP came to focus on 
one man-Sherman Adams. Adams was Ike's White House chief of staff 
and his most trusted aide. He had an abrupt, if not arrogant, manner, and 
Right Wing Republicans had long grumbled about the "palace guard" and 
what they saw as Adams's favoritism in wielding patronage to advance the 
cause of Modern Republicanism. In any case, a House investigative commit-
tee learned in June, 1958, that Adams had interceded with a federal regula-
tory committee for Bernard Goldfine, a New England textile manufacturer. 
Goldfine, in turn, had given Adams certain gifts, including oriental rugs 
and a vicufia coat. 
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Ike's own continuing popularity kept hostile Republicans from directly 
attacking him, but the Goldfine revelations quickly made Adams a conve-
nient target for conservative Republicans who had chafed under six years of 
his Modern Republicanism. "L' Affaire Adams," B. Carroll Reece wrote in 
late June, resulted from the chief of staff's being "the symbol of piety" in 
the administration. 22 Chicago Republican Robert E. Wood demanded 
Adams's ouster. National Committee members overwhelmingly wanted 
him out. With Knowland and Goldwater publicly urging Adams to resign, 
the outcry for Adams's resignation mounted. 
The president soon decided that Adams had to go, and on September 
22 he sadly accepted his chief of staff's resignation. The Republican Old 
Guard immediately took credit for the sack of Sherman Adams. Within the 
administration, there was considerable bitterness toward "the vultures of the 
Grand Old Party" -the Republican Right Wing. At this particular mo-
ment, the "vulture" symbol was apt, for pundits and party workers were be-
ginning to leave the Republican party for dead. Another metaphor was 
equally applicable after "L' Affaire Adams." "It's a little bit late to make all 
Republicans love one another or even appear to do so the way the Democrats 
do," the Saturday Evening Post admonished. "But the party leadership 
ought to try because people don't take passage on a ship when the officers 
can be seen clobbering one another up on the bridge." 23 
Republican losses in the elections of 1958 were massive. Democrats 
racked up their biggest gains in congressional elections since the Roosevelt 
landslide of 1936. The Democratic majorities were 64 to 34 in the Senate 
and 282 to 154 in the House. There was no break for Republicans in guber-
natorial contests, as the Democrats won rwenty-six such races; only fourteen 
GOP governors remained in office after election day. 
The Republican Right suffered along with the entire party. Barry Gold-
water, however, won big in Arizona, the result being largely attributed to 
Goldwater's attractive personality rather than his right-wing ideology. In 
any case, Goldwater now became the acknowledged leader of conservative 
Republicans, for Pat Brown badly whipped Knowland-the Republican 
Right's long-shot presidential hope for 1960-in the California governor's 
race. Running for the Senate in that state, Republican Goodwin Knight also 
lost to Democrat Clare Engle. 
Republican losses in the Midwest underscored the party's difficulties. In 
this former GOP heartland, Republicans gave up eight seats in the House, 
rwo in the Senate, and also relinquished rwo state houses. In Indiana, high 
taxes, high unemployment, and his own endorsement of right-to-work legis-
lation hurt Governor Harold Handley in his unsuccessful attempt to fill Jen-
ner's Senate seat. Democrat R. Vance Hartke, the mayor of Evansville, was 
the easy winner. Next door in Ohio, Senate right-wing powerhouse John 
Bricker lost his reelection bid along with the Buckeye GOP candidate for 
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governor, William O'Neil. Elsewhere, the story for the Old Guard was the 
same. In Nevada, Democrat Howard]. Cannon won a stunning upset over 
Right Wing Republican Senator George "Molly" Malone. Senate GOP die-
hard Chapman Revercomb of West Virginia lost his Senate seat to Robert 
Byrd, a conservative Democrat whose "country corn" and fiddle playing 
provided the campaign difference. Utah witnessed a blood feud that left Re-
publican conservatism the loser as H. Bracken Lee's third-parry assault 
undid A. V. Watkins in his contest against Democratic winner Frank Moss. 
Conservative Republican candidates were not the only GOP losers. 
Nevertheless, those few Republicans who did win had mainly a liberal tilt-
new senators like J. Glenn Beall of Maryland and Kenneth Keating of New 
York. In Pennsylvania, the pro-Ike Hugh Scott won the Senate seat vacated 
by Edward Martin, a GOP hard-liner. Finally, the GOP bright spot of 1958 
was liberal Republican Nelson Rockefeller, who won a 55 7 ,000-vote major-
icy victory over incumbent New York Governor Averell Harriman, although 
Rocky's victory, like Goldwater's in Arizona, turned more on personality 
than ideology. 
Economic slump across the nation, the unpopularity of Secretary of 
Agriculture Benson in the farm states, and "L' Affaire Adams" were fre-
quently mentioned by political pundits as probable causes for the Republi-
can political bust. But most observers agreed on two main factors-the GOP 
identification with the right-to-work movement and Eisenhower's pitiful 
party leadership. In Ohio, John Bricker believed that right-to-work legisla-
tion had goaded labor unions "to get out one who had never knuckled down 
to their demands." 24 He and Ohio state GOP chairman Ray Bliss estimated 
that the issue brought out a half-million new voters to the polls. Indeed, 
later analysis revealed that in six states with right-to-work issues on the bal-
lot, a million and a half more Democratic voters came to the polls than in 
the 1954 congressional elections. Thereafter, GOP sentiment favored a 
move away from this political loser, as only Kansas passed a right-to-work 
referendum. 25 
Eisenhower, meanwhile, blamed the Republican party's electoral wash-
out on the American people, who failed to understand the "great danger of 
reckless federal spending." Political observers, in turn, held Eisenhower 
largely responsible for the Republican defeat. Even party liberals grumbled 
about Eisenhower's lack of political leadership. 
In the aftermath of defeat the grumbling and name-calling continued, 
as conservative Republicans lamented the current political situation. Con-
gressman Clarence Brown of Ohio maintained that the voters actually fa-
vored Republicans who stood for economy and efficiency in government, 
and he went on to advise that conservative Republicans be given "a voice 
and a place in our national affairs." Brown and other Right Wing Republi-
cans believed that the "stay-at-home" voter wanted to see a real difference 
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between Democrats and Republicans, a difference that Modern Republican-
ism just did not provide. The Wall Street journal indicted Modern Republi-
canism's "fuzzy imitation of the New Deal image" for failing to give inde-
pendent voters a reason to switch from voting Democratic. 26 The Chicago 
Tribune summed it up best: "Having done its best to alienate its only possi-
ble supporters, the Republican party ought not to have been surprised when 
it found itself without friends." 27 
"It seems that the things I have believed in and stood for are losing 
pretty rapidly," wrote a downcast John Bricker after the 1958 elections. 28 
Indeed, whatever the factors behind the GOP disaster, few now denied that 
once again the Old Guard was dead, and the term itself was seldom used 
after 1958. Bricker, Knowland, Malone, Jenner, Martin, McCarthy, and 
Welker-a roster of the conservative "Class of 1946" -had all retired or un-
willingly departed by 1958 from the U.S. Senate, the Old Guard stronghold 
in the Capitol. Elected in the conservative swing of 1946 and reelected in the 
Eisenhower sweep of 1952, these "meatshortage" Republicans were gone by 
the end of the 1958 congressional elections. In the interim, automatic post-
age machines, fluorescent lights, and ghostwriters had come to the Senate, 
along with a gradual dulling of ideological distinctions. According to Russell 
Baker of the New York Times, the Senate had "gone gray flannel." 29 
"The day of the conservative Republican is over. The hard-shelled Re-
publican is a social misfit," said Mayor John T. Capenhaver of Charleston, 
West Virgina. 30 The mood among conservatives was overwhelmingly grim 
after the 1958 congressional elections. "Let us conservatives not look for 
the silver lining," advised Brent Bozell of the National Review. "There is 
none." 31 
Senator George Aiken of Vermont was no stranger to intraparty intrigue 
in the wake of GOP electoral collapse. A decade earlier, after the Dewey 
defeat, the flinty Republican liberal had spearheaded a group of Young 
Turks against the Senate command of Robert Taft. Now, Aiken was at it 
again as the head of the self-proclaimed "Eisenhower Republicans" who met 
in Aiken's Senate office shortly after the 1958 elections to talk GOP politics. 
They traced the party's recent electoral failure to the GOP's "extreme right 
wing fanatical fringe." But Aiken and his visitors also pointed to Senate 
GOP problems that were clearly related to the November drubbing. Not 
only had there been obvious discrimination against Eisenhower Republicans 
in the distribution of committee assignments, but GOP liberals had less 
voice in Senate GOP policymaking under Knowland and Bridges than under 
Aiken's former enemies, Kenneth Wherty and Robert Taft. Consequently, 
Eisenhower heard only from the conservative-dominated Senate GOP 
leadership at the weekly White House legislative conferences. These Repub-
lican leaders might support the administration generally, explained Aiken 
and his cohorts, but party rulers often deserted Ike on the major legislative 
148 THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT 
issues. In those instances, GOP liberals had to "pull Administration chest-
nuts out of the fire." Aiken and his Eisenhower Republicans wanted in-
creased representation in GOP Senate counsels and were ready to revolt to 
get it. The vacancy in the floor leader's post left by Knowland's departure 
offered an immediate opportunity for them. 
The conservative Senate GOP command shared the belief of the Eisen-
hower Republicans that the party leadership needed broadening. Compro-
mise was possible. Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire-whom the 
New Republic now termed "the real boss of conservatives" -offered to let 
the insurgents control the party whip position, but the floor leader's post 
was out of the question. Bridges already had a candidate for Knowland's old 
spot. In fact, he had prepared for this eventuality two years earlier. At that 
time, suspecting that Knowland might be moving on, Bridges had quietly 
gotten the unwitting Leverett Saltonstall, a GOP liberal, to head the impor-
tant Senate Republican Conference Committee and give up his job as party 
whip to Everett Dirksen. The party whip was the logical successor to the floor 
leader, and Dirksen therefore automatically became a candidate for Know-
land's vacated post in early 1959. 32 It was a typical Bridges performance-
accomplished without causing a stir. 
Aiken immediately branded Dirksen as the Old Guard choice. Indeed 
he was, but the Illinois senator was no longer an Old Guardsman himself. 
His aid to the administration in the 195 7 "Battle of the Budget" proved that 
Eisenhower had judged wisely in wooing the senator away from the Republi-
can Right. In fact, when the Eisenhower Republicans finally settled on Ken-
tucky's John Sherman Cooper as their selection for minority leader, it was 
discovered that Dirksen had supported the president more than this "lib-
eral" candidate. 
Obviously, the self-anointed Eisenhower Republicans were counting on 
the president's support in rounding up the half-dozen or more GOP sen-
ators they needed to prevail against Dirksen and Bridges on the leadership 
issue. But Eisenhower quickly dashed that prospect. The president, said 
Bridges, intended to stay out of the leadership struggle. In reality, Eisen-
hower sided with the conservatives. Not only that, but White House aides 
were reportedly "furious" that Aiken's group had even called themselves 
Eisenhower Republicans. 
The combination of Ike's neutrality and Bridges's backroom dealings 
proved too much for the Aiken insurgents. Although they had no hope for 
victory, Aiken's forces still refused Bridges's compromise offer of the party 
whip post. So certain of victory was Bridges that he correctly predicted Dirk-
sen's final victory margin of 20 to 14 in the Senate GOP caucus in early Jan-
uary, 1959. . 
With Dirksen's floor leadership secured, Bridges still had problems, but 
now they were with his fellow conservatives. Angered that the rebels had 
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continued to wage their public battle for the minority leader position know-
ing that their cause was futile and that compromise was possible, certain 
rock-ribbed Republican senators put up Karl Mundt to oppose California's 
Thomas Kuchel, the insurgent hope for party whip. But Bridges's earlier 
offer of the party whip post to a liberal represented more than a timely bar-
gaining chip. He and Dirksen sincerely wanted to broaden the GOP leader-
ship. As a result, after Bridges had circled the conference room and talked to 
certain colleagues, Senate Republicans once again voted, 20 to 14, for the 
rebel Kuchel. 
After the January caucus, having won assurances of increased consulta-
tion, the Eisenhower Republicans pledged to cooperate with the Senate 
Republican leadership. For his part, Dirksen hoped to lead all Senate Re-
publicans, not a single faction, and quickly began to rearrange committee 
assignments in a more equitable way. 
It was rare for leadership fights to break out in both houses of Congress 
simultaneously, but this is what happened in 1959. After the ill-fated 1948 
election, Republican House boss Joseph Martin had faced no challenge to his 
rule, and he expected none after the 1958 debacle. But, shortly after elec-
tion day, about thirty-five GOP solons met at the Congress Hotel in Wash-
ington to ponder the November returns. Led by California representative 
Robert C. Wilson, the congressional group came to blame House GOP chief 
Martin for the party's electoral difficulties. They contended that Martin had 
lost control of the Republican House membership and no longer kept 
abreast of legislative business. Martin, in turn, admitted that he had lost 
support, but for two contradictory reasons. Fighting for the president's pro-
gram left him vulnerable among anti-Eisenhower GOP lawmakers, and 
White House aides wanted a submissive House leader. 33 
That the Congress Hotel Group's complaints about Martin presaged no 
clear-cut ideological shoot-out became clear with word that Charles Halleck 
was the mutineers' candidate to replace Martin. Like Martin, the Indiana 
representative was basically conservative but had proved flexible in fighting 
for Eisenhower legislation. Unlike Martin, Halleck had spunk and political 
savvy. The Martin-Halleck clash was an Old Guard-Modern Republican 
face-off only in the geriatric sense. 
It was a bitter battle. Halleck had been bucking for Martin's job for 
some time and believed that Martin had promised earlier to step down as 
GOP boss if the Republicans lost the House. Halleck had been ready to take 
over for Martin after both the 1954 and 1956 GOP congressional defeats, 
but Eisenhower had counseled restraint in the interest of party unity. 34 In 
1959, however, Halleck had secured an implicit presidential go-ahead. 
Martin finally offered to step down as head of the Policy Committee, 
but that was all. The longtime House leader was, in fact, generally confi-
dent, if not cocky, about the outcome of this leadership struggle. On the 
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way to the House Republican caucus, he told reporters, "I'm going to an ex-
ecution" -meaning, of course, Halleck's. 35 But on a secret, second ballot, 
Martin was the victim and not the executioner, as Halleck unseated him as 
House Republican minority leader. 
Martin wept openly at the result and soon began to cry publicly about 
White House meddling in Capitol Hill affairs. He named administration 
aides who had plotted his removal and specifically blamed Vi~e-President 
Richard Nixon. Martin publicly characterized himself as the "fall guy" for 
the 1958 GOP election defeat. Privately, Martin grumbled that "the same 
forces that knocked Taft out" had done him in, too. The dump-Martin 
movement, he wrote, had all the "earmarks of another Dewey-Madison 
Avenue blitz." 36 
None of the confusions and complexities of GOP scrapping on Capitol 
Hill followed Republicans to Des Moines, Iowa, where the RNC met in mid-
January, 1959. There, the GOP splits were clear-cut. Right Wing Republi-
cans squarely confronted Eisenhower and his Modern Republicanism, and 
they vented their frustration over the direction of the Republican parry 
under Ike. Eisenhower's pep-talk to the National Committee only touched 
off the controversy. Ike told the RNC that GOP political activity had to be 
year-round. The Republican party, said the president, was generally re-
garded as a "hibernating elephant" between elections. Ike urged Republi-
cans to make an "unremitting effort" before the 1960 election. To wake up 
the elephant, chief Republican mahout Meade Alcorn then unveiled yet 
another new plan to overhaul the party. 
It was mainly the congressional Republicans who took on the adminis-
tration in Des Moines. Representative Richard Simpson, the House Cam-
paign Committee chairman, challenged the president to make an "unremit-
ting effort" himself. Simpson's Senate counterpart, Barry Goldwater, con-
tinued the challenge via a telegram from Chicago, where he was snow-
bound. The Alcorn plan was technically "OK," the senator noted, but party 
principles remained crucial to GOP electoral success. Goldwater held that 
the Republican elephant did indeed have to come out of hibernation, but it 
would first have to learn which way to point its trunk. For Goldwater, that 
way was to the right. Unlike Ike's remarks, the words of Simpson and Gold-
water won lusty applause. Clearly the Des Moines meeting of the RNC 
"seethed with discontent," and the Eisenhower administration was on the 
defensive .37 
Eisenhower's big budget, his lack of partisanship, his failure to dish out 
patronage wisely, and the Republican party's rumbling political fortunes at 
the polls had clearly embittered the Des Moines participants. As had not 
been the case in the past, Eisenhower himself came in for direct criticism. 
Katharine Kennedy Brown of Ohio, an old Taft supporter, jabbed at Ike 
and harkened back to the 1952 convention, when "those committed to a 
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'super facelifting' of the GOP, with their despicable untruths cut at the very 
heart of the Republican Party and appliqued its face with a great war 
hero." 38 
Some GOP well-wishers hoped that the "refreshing candor" at Des 
Moines would have some "salutary effects" on the Republican party. Cer-
tainly the new administration commitment to overhaul the party through 
the Alcorn plan held some promise. But Right Wing Republicans were cor-
rect in pointing out that ultimately this was only part of any cure. After six 
years under Eisenhower, the Republican party stood for almost nothing, and 
that had to change or the party would remain dispirited and divided. As 
Congressman Daniel Reed wrote in early 1959, "Our party at the moment is 
one of frustration and is like the General that jumped on his horse and rode 
off in all directions." 39 
Despite these Right Wing-Modern Republican skirmishes, as the 1960 
presidential election approached, the Republican party enjoyed a brief 
period of greater unity than at any time since Ike took office. Eisenhower 
grew more political, taking a greater interest in Capitol Hill matters, as he 
worked closely with the new GOP congressional leaders, Charles Halleck and 
Everett Dirksen. The result was some Capitol Hill success for Eisenhower. 
The president, however, was now basically fighting conservative battles. If 
the president's outlook had not changed since the first term, the issues had. 
Liberal advisors sensed the new mood. 40 Primarily, it was the spending issue 
that brought "The Big Change at the White House." In 1959, for example, 
Republicans blocked Democratic efforts to increase funds for depressed-area 
legislation, housing and airport construction programs, and to expand the 
Eisenhower budget. President Eisenhower, himself, was now wielding the 
budget ax. 
Politically, the starus of the term "Modern Republican" reflected this 
change. By mid-January, Eisenhower himself asserted that he saw no real 
difference between Modern Republicanism and just Republicanism. Two 
months later, a Republican study group under Meade Alcorn recommended 
that "hyphenated" descriptors like "Modern" and "Conservative" be 
dropped. Alcorn offered quick assurance that this was no slap at Eisenhower. 
Actually, Modern Republicanism had died shortly after the 1956 election, 
and this was merely its long-overdue last rites. Another indication of the 
new temporary GOP harmony came in April, 1959, when Meade Alcorn 
resigned as national chairman for personal reasons. With little prevote dis-
sent, Senator Thruston Morton of Kentucky, Ike's candidate, became the 
new Republican national chairman by acclamation. 
Nor was there any real battle for the Republican presidential nomina-
tion of 1960. Vice-President Richard Nixon had a virtual lock on that. By 
campaigning for Republican hopefuls nationwide and riding the celebrated 
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"rubber chicken and peas" circuit, he secured solid GOP organizational 
support. Moreover, the vice-president won added exposure by escaping 
hostile anti-American mobs in Venezuela and engaging Soviet leader Khru-
shchev in the Moscow "kitchen debates." Liberal Republican Nelson Rocke-
feller's victory as governor of New York in 1958 had made him the only ob-
vious challenger to Nixon for the GOP presidential nomination. But a year 
later, Rockefeller had announced his "definite and final" decision to stay 
out of any presidential contest, since, said Rockefeller, "those who control 
the Republican nomination stand against any contest for the nomination. "41 
There was, however, a vigorous contest for Nixon's political soul. 
Despite some contrary assessments, the vice-president was no Right Wing 
Republican. Some pundits were, in fact, placing Nixon closer to the liberal 
Republicans. There were rumors that he had favored increased spending for 
social programs, against the opposition of Treasury secretary George Hum-
phrey. Conservative sources also linked Nixon to Aiken's recent insurgent 
revolt in the Senate. Bozell of the National Review believed that the vice-
president was "essentially a trimmer." 42 Nixon was certainly no ideologue. 
His position was hard to fix, and he reminded many observers of Robert 
Taft. WilliamS. White considered the vice-president the "perfect model of 
the political leader who finds his inspiration and ultimate mode from the 
public. "43 It was therefore useless to speculate on Nixon's conservatism or 
liberalism. Nor did Nixon go in for intraparty labels; he had resented Eisen-
hower's impolitic use of the term "Modern Republicanism." 
If Nixon was not the darling of the Republican Right Wing in 1960, 
GOP conservatives at least preferred him to Nelson Rockefeller. The Repub-
lican Right also realized that Nixon would respond to conservative pressures. 
The Republican Right Wing therefore sought to push him in their direction. 
Senator Barry Goldwater, for instance, met with Nixon to tell him of the 
general disappointment in the party over his failure to take firm conservative 
stands. Nixon, in rurn, assured Goldwater of his fundamental conservatism 
but explained that he could not appear to be taking stands at odds with 
Eisenhower's. This and subsequent Nixon assurances that he would make no 
concessions to party liberals satisfied Goldwater. 44 
Despite Gallup poll evidence and warnings by Goldwater and national 
chairman Thruston Morton that he was slipping because of his failure to 
rouse party conservatives, Nixon waited for the mid-April, 1960, Republican 
primary in New Jersey to provide a clear signal of GOP trends. Liberal Re-
publican incumbent Senator Clifford Case faced a strong challenge from 
conservative hard-liner Robert Morris, who had served as counsel for Wil-
liam Jenner's Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. The primary cam-
paign was especially bitter, with Case labeling Morris an "irreconciliable 
McKinleyite" and Morris attacking Case's "unRepublican" spending record. 
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A Morris victory, Right Wing Republicans believed, would convince Nixon 
to steer a conservative course in the campaign ahead. 
When Case took 63.7 percent of the GOP vote, it was a dreadful blow 
for GOP conservatives. "The defeat of Robert Morris in New Jersey," the 
National Review lamented, "is explainable in terms which are not pleasing 
to hear: a principled conservatism is not what the majority of the American 
people, or even, apparently, the majority of voting Republicans wants. "45 
That was all Nixon needed to know. 
For Nixon, counterconservative pressures continued to mount. A month 
after Case's victory for GOP liberalism, Governor Rockefeller, contrary to his 
earlier claim, said he would be available for a Republican draft. Rockefeller's 
self-styled "inactive candidacy" continued as he expressed his "deep" con-
cern about the Republican platform committee's proposed planks on certain 
issues, such as civil rights. Hoping to avoid a floor fight that might trigger a 
Rockefeller presidential boom, Nixon traveled to New York on the Friday 
before the opening of the GOP convention in Chicago. At Rockefeller's 
Manhattan apartment on Fifth Avenue, the two Republicans had dinner 
and talked into the early hours of the next morning. Nixon offered Rockefel-
ler the second spot on the ticket, but despite Nixon's promises to reinvig-
orate the office, Rockefeller declined. Their discussion, however, mainly 
concerned national issues. When it finally ended, they had hammered out a 
compromise document, which they telephoned to the Chicago convention. 
The Nixon-Rockefeller pact called for "aggressive action" to abolish 
racial discrimination in all areas of national life and explicitly endorsed the 
Negro sit-in demonstrations then spreading across the South. It advocated 
government efforts to stimulate the economy through the free enterprise sys-
tem, as well as a program of medical care for the aged. In foreign policy, 
Rockefeller and Nixon both supported a beefing up of American defense 
programs. Although the Rockefeller-Nixon agreement generally reflected 
Nixon's view, it became known as "The Surrender of Fifth Avenue" -Vice-
President Nixon's surrender-for a number of reasons. First, the pressure 
that drove Nixon to Fifth Avenue had come from Rockefeller. Moreover, the 
language of the pact was Rockefeller's, and he made the statement public. 
Finally, while Nixon insisted that the statement defined their areas of 
mutual agreement, the New York governor treated it as a personal triumph. 
"If you don't think that represents my views you're crazy," he said, arriving 
in Chicago with the statement in his hand. 46 
The Rockefeller-Nixon pact rocked the Chicago convention. Right 
Wing Republicans immediately concluded that Nixon had come out of New 
York the loser. "Grant Surrenders to Lee," intoned the Chicago Tribune. 
The head of the Texas GOP delegation branded the Nixon-Rockefeller pact 
"a damned sellout." Nixon, GOP conservatives believed, had bowed to the 
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New York "kingmakers." The "ultra-liberal" civil rights section in partic-
ular outraged conservatives, especially the southerners, and they threatened 
a floor fight over it. The National Review's L. Brent Bozell wrote that 
Nixon's Fifth Avenue retreat now made the nickname "Tricky Dick" real to 
Republicans. 47 
Among the angriest of the Right Wing Republicans was Arizona Sen-
ator Barry Goldwater. Believing that Nixon had double-crossed him, Gold-
water exploded. He dubbed the Nixon-Rockefeller agreement "the Munich 
of the Republican Party" and talked about spearheading a counteroffensive 
on the convention floor. While Goldwater maintained that he still sup-
ported the vice-president for the nomination, Nixon's Fifth Avenue moves 
did alter Goldwater's convention activities. Previously, South Carolina Re-
publicans had, without any Goldwater prodding, voted to send a pro-Gold-
water delegation to the Chicago convention. Goldwater, however, had come 
to Chicago ready to bow out early and endorse Nixon. The news out of New 
York changed that. The Arizonan now directed his aide to sit on his pre-
pared withdrawal statement. 48 
Goldwater's South Carolina backing indicated that his following had 
ballooned since his initial blast against Eisenhower in 195 7. The first signs of 
a GOP conservative revival appeared in the"Americans for Goldwater," 
"Goldwater for President," and "Youth for Goldwater" groups that 
descended on Chicago. Indeed, Goldwater arrived at the GOP convention 
with much support as a vice-presidential candidate-an opportunity Gold-
water said he would have to have "marijuana in my veins" to pass up. 
Goldwater quickly became the spearhead of conservative resentment 
against the "Munich of the Republican Party." Certain "eager beavers" 
wanted him to make a move for the presidential nomination immediately, if 
only to advertise conservative strength in the GOP. Mter the "damned sell-
out," Texas released its delegation from its commitment to Nixon, and pro-
Goldwater backers promised the senator about 287 delegate votes. Nixon 
strategist Leonard Hall judged potential Goldwater strength at about 300 
votes. 
Resurgent conservative sentiment at Chicago surprised even Goldwater. 
Although he knew that he had no chance of defeating Nixon, the Arizonan 
briefly considered remaining a candidate in order to test conservative senti-
ment. But, fearing that commentators might unfairly judge conservative 
strength by his vote total, Goldwater eventually decided to withdraw. Still, 
diehard conservatives in the South Carolina delegation would not give up 
their Goldwater votes. Goldwater therefore arranged to have someone from 
Arizona nominate him; he would then appear on the platform and with-
draw. 
As agreed, on Wednesday evening Arizona governor Paul Fannin nom-
inated a "non-me-too" Republican-Barry Goldwater. After a spontaneous 
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floor demonstration (Goldwater later claimed that a planned one had been 
squelched), Goldwater came to the podium to withdraw. He chided party 
conservatives for nursing grudges in the past and refusing to vote for less-
than-stalwart GOP candidates. This only elected Democrats, he said. The 
Republican party platform was not petfect, but it certainly beat the Demo-
crats' "blueprint for socialism." After Goldater urged the Republican Right 
to "grow up" and work for Nixon, he also held out some hope for the future 
of GOP conservatism. Declared Goldwater, "Let's get to work if we want to 
take this party back-and I think we can. "49 Loud cheers went up from the 
floor. It was the high spot of the Chicago convention. 
After Goldwater's withdrawal, the convention gave Nixon 1, 321 first-
round votes. Louisiana voted for Goldwater on the ftrst ballot in protest but 
quickly switched to make Nixon's nomination unanimous. Nixon's control 
of the Chicago convention was almost absolute. He had remained cool, 
although the "cannibalistic urge" of Republican diehards angered him. 50 
His own Fifth Avenue gambit had paid off, as Rockefeller quickly an-
nounced that he would not permit his name to be put before the conven-
tion. Moreover, the platform according to Nixon and Rockefeller was ac-
cepted without debate, and Nixon selected Henry Cabot Lodge-a high 
priest of Modern Republicanism and an archenemy of the Republican 
Right-as his runningmate. 
Goldwater, for his part, showed that he had a grip on Republican hearts 
in Chicago. But Right Wing Republican observer L. Brent Bozell found 
fault with the Arizonan's convention leadership. Goldwater had failed to 
sustain his challenge to Nixon by threatening conservative defection. Rocke-
feller's public challenge had swayed Nixon far more than Goldwater's pri-
vate persuasion. 51 As a result Right Wing Republicans had lost the battle for 
Nixon's political soul-in 1960 at least. 
In the end, after all the campaigning and television debates, only 
112,881 votes separated the Democratic and Republican standard-bearers on 
election day in November, 1960. Switches amounting to 32,500 votes in 
Texas and Illinois would have altered the result. But after election day,John 
F. Kennedy was the new Democratic president of the United States, andRe-
publican Richard Nixon, the former vice-president, was the loser. 
The congressional returns also reflected the keen party competition, as 
well as the relative health of the Republican party. The GOP gained twenty 
seats in the House, but this still left the Democrats with a 259-to-178 major-
ity. In the Senate, the Democratic majority was now 64 to 36, the Republi-
cans having won a total of two seats. GOP conservatives had managed to 
hold their own in Senate races. Bridges was reelected to a fifth term, and 
Dworshak of Idaho, Schoeppel of Kansas, and Mundt of South Dakota were 
also among Right Wing GOP reelection winners. That midwestern Republi-
cans (unlike GOP liberals such as Case and Saltonstall from the East) ran 
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behind the national ticket could be explained by the Catholic issue, which 
gave Nixon an advantage in the protestant Midwest. The election of Ohio's 
young John Ashbrook, the former chairman of the Young Republican 
National Federation, highlighted only the most prominent of a new crop of 
young conservative House Republicans. Indeed, considering the electoral 
trends of the late 1950s, the election outcome had a sunny side for Republi-
cans. GOP deterioration on Capitol Hill had been arrested, and a Republi-
can had almost won control of the White House without the heroic Ike. 
Right Wing Republicans, however, were sore losers. They blamed the 
GOP presidential defeat on Nixon's "pulling his punches." They had long 
eyed Nixon warily and were ready to fault him in spite of his near miss. Barry 
Goldwater, who had worked hard to drum up conservative (especially south-
ern) support for Nixon, raised the loudest cry. Given his well-known ideas 
on the future of the Republican party, Goldwater's comments on the elec-
tion hardly came as a surprise, although his harshness did. Goldwater 
blamed the Republican party's defeat on its "me-too" candidate. Nixon was 
just a new Dewey-another Republican loser who had eschewed conservative 
stands. 
Goldwater simultaneously proved his point and fired the first shot of 
the 1964 Republican presidential wars by pointing out that Arizona had 
gone for Nixon while liberal Nelson Rockefeller's New York went Demo-
cratic. Goldwater clearly indicated even at this early date that he wanted to 
figure in the 1964 presidential picture, although not necessarily as a candi- · 
date. "But I don't want Rockefeller in that spot," he declared. "The next 
election," Goldwater went on, "should be contested by conservatives-not 
by people who ape the New Deal. " 52 Bozell, however, doubted that Nixon's 
"liberalism" had lost the election. Bozell held that the returns exploded the 
Republican Right's traditional notion that electoral "stay-at-homes" were 
conservatives. In fact, new voters overwhelmingly tended to vote for liberal 
candidates-a fact that past and future surveys upheld. Considering "the 
country's present level of political consciousness," Bozell concluded that 
Goldwater's "principled offerings" would have scared away a lot of anti-
Kennedy votes that went to Nixon. The conservative consciousness of the 
United States, according to Bozell, still needed raising. 53 
"Some years back," Leonard Hall wrote to President Eisenhower shortly 
after the 1960 election, "I remember that you discussed with me the possi-
bility of doing something about the realignment of our two political parties. 
Perhaps this is the time?" 54 But this was hardly the time for any such ven-
ture, and this suggestion by Hall, an able political professional, remains per-
plexing. Eisenhower had long before stopped talking about any realigning 
of the American party system or even "remaking" the Republican party. In 
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fact, his efforts to "revitalize" the GOP had left him increasingly disap-
pointed as the end of his second term neared. 55 
Not that Eisenhower failed completely as a Republican party leader. 
Historian Gary Reichard has pointed out in his study of Eisenhower and the 
Eighty-third Congress that Ike worked GOP wonders on Capitol Hill. Not 
only did his domestic legislation enjoy wide support among congressional 
Republicans, but Eisenhower generally convinced GOP lawmakers of the 
wisdom of his "internationalist" foreign policy stands-a considerable polit-
ical feat. Nonetheless, on dometic issues at least, Eisenhower was "reaffirm-
ing" rather than "reshaping" traditional Republicanism. Therefore, accord-
ing to Reichard, Eisenhower Republicanism proved "a subtle modifier 
indeed." 56 
Reichard, political scientist Fred Greenstein, and others have also 
pointed out, accurately, that the traditional portrait of Eisenhower as the 
hands-off, nonpolitical president is in error. The question then becomes: 
What kind of political president was Eisenhower? Reichard has provided an 
answer as far as Ike's Capitol Hill role is concerned. But what did the Eisen-
hower years mean to the future of the party itself? Specifically, how success-
ful was Ike in the major task he took upon himself-reshaping the image 
and texture of the Republican party? 
Although Eisenhower was not the nonpolitical president that legend has 
it, he was also not the aggressive and sophisticated political master that 
Franklin Roosevelt was. In fact, Ike's political interest was never sustained. 
Clearly, the golf course had greater allure for the general over the long haul 
than politics. This was certainly not what was required of a party leader com-
mitted to recasting the GOP. Revamping a party is an arduous task. Franklin 
Roosevelt, who brought much more energy, skill, and commitment to the 
venture than Ike, discovered this and ultimately failed to fashion a "pure" 
New Deal party. Related to Eisenhower's lack of sustained political commit-
ment were his refusal to meddle in GOP affairs at the state level, his reluc-
tance to use the political patronage and punishments, his virtual slavery to 
the concept of established chains of command on Capitol Hill, and his over-
confidence in his own ideas and powers of conciliation. Eisenhower could 
claim some political successes: he had maneuvered successfully against 
McCarthy; he had gained concessions from a hard-line Senate aspirant in 
Illinois; and Dirksen, Bridges, and Halleck were conservative GOP leaders 
who proved responsive to Ike's attentions. But these were offset by both 
large and small failures. 
Finally, there was Eisenhower's grandest flop-Modern Republicanism. 
Proclaimed in the ecstacy of his 1956 victory, Modern Republicanism was a 
blunder for a number of reasons. It was first of all a hazy concept that left 
Republicans and pundits alike arguing about its ttue meaning. Modern Re-
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publicanism amounted to little more than a smorgasbord of liberal and con-
servative offerings. It lacked philosophical backbone. Nor did Ike make any 
real effort to build up Modern Republicanism or attend to state and local 
political affairs in order to bring about such a change in his political party. 
About the only thing that Modern Republicanism did achieve was a good 
deal of internal GOP ill-will. It implied that old-fashioned, regular, unhy-
phenated Republicanism was not good enough, and it made the Republican 
party an object of abuse by its own leader. Conservative Republicans, espe-
cially, resented this. 
Nor had the Republican party prospered politically under Eisenhower 
and his Modern Republicanism. While Republicans controlled the White 
House, the GOP lost about 24 percent of the total offices it had held before 
1953. In 1951, there were 47 GOP senators, in 1959, there were only 34; 
during that same period, the number of House Republicans dropped from 
199 to 153, and Republican gubernatorial strength went from 25 to 14. The 
story was the same at the local and state levels. Naturally, conservative Re-
publicans constantly brandished these depressing figures in making their as-
saults on Modern Republicanism. 
In short, voters liked Ike-but not the GOP. As for the GOP, when 
Eisenhower left the White House, the Republican party found itself with the 
same configuration of internal factions as when he had arrived. Eisenhower's 
presence had merely postponed a decision on the Republican party's future. 
Actually, his reluctance to wage intraparty war for his kind of Republicanism 
made things much easier for conservative Republicans. Eisenhower had none 
of the commitment, the savvy, or the savagery that a Dewey would have 
brought to the task of remodeling the Republican party along more liberal 
lines. 
As for Right Wing Republicans, they had not fared well during the 
Eisenhower period either. But Eisenhower was hardly to blame for this. Old 
Guard ranks had been decimated during the 1950s, as retirement, poor pol-
iticking, right-to-work movements, and other factors accounted for its elec-
toral decline. Further, during this time, conservative Republicans had 
become the party outcasts. Most dramatically, Joseph McCarthy was both a 
cause and a consequence of this. Also, while conservative forces were still 
alive in the Republican party, they had lost what had been theirs eight years 
earlier-command of the GOP structure. On the other hand, the pre-Eisen-
hower election assumptions of the Old Guard remained intact. Conservative 
Republicans explained away Ike's 1952 and 1956 victories by citing his great 
personal popularity born of his wartime experiences. Conservatives still 
firmly believed that a forthright, conservative alternative to Democratic pro-
grams would insure national and presidential political success after Eisen-
hower. 
9 
A Choice Not an Echo 
The Republican Right had finally found a pin-up boy-Senator Barry M. 
Goldwater of Arizona. Goldwater presidential talk for 1964 had begun even 
before election day 1960. Indeed, the senator himself took time off from 
stumping for the Nixon-Lodge ticket to say that he might run in 1964 
should Nixon fall short in 1960. Aftei: Nixon's electoral defeat, Goldwater 
emerged as the spokesman of GOP conservatism, promising "to spend the 
next four years discovering why the conservative majority of this country has 
no effective voice against the radical minority-and doing something about 
it." I 
Goldwater did that and more in the next few years. On television talk 
shows and the lecture circuit, in magazine feature stories and his own 
writings, Goldwater set forth the conservative Republican credo. The GOP 
had no more popular after-dinner speaker. Goldwater's newspaper column 
"How Do You Stand, Sir," started in 1960 in the Los Angeles Times, was 
carried by 162 other newspapers by 1962. His books quickly became best-
sellers. The Republican Right-so long without an attractive advocate-now 
boasted Barry Goldwater, the self-styled "salesman" of the conservative 
vtew. 
This being politics, the salesman quickly became synonymous with the 
product. Goldwater-for-President buttons began to appear everywhere. By 
mid-1961, a poll of 1960 GOP convention delegates and alternates showed 
Goldwater to be their overwhelming favorite; 49.3 percent wanted Gold-
water to top the Republican ticket in 1964, while only a combined 44.4 per-
cent favored either Nixon or Rockefeller instead. Time called the Arizona 
senator "the hottest political figure this side of Jack Kennedy." 2 
Indeed, in an age of image and charisma, Senator Goldwater stood as 
the perfect GOP match against President John F. Kennedy. Goldwater had 
"it." Tall and tan with a handsome, ruggedly sculptured face, dark horn-
rimmed glasses, and wavy gray-white hair, Goldwater looked like a pres-
ident. The Arizonan was so handsome, Senator Hubert Humphrey once 
spoofed, that he had landed a Hollywood movie contract-with 18th Cen-
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tury-Fox. Even more than his good looks, Goldwater had both tremendous 
charm and energy or, as it was then called, "vigor." He not only flew jet 
planes, but, like Kennedy, he also wrote books. If Goldwater was notJFK's 
oratorical equal, he was at least an effective speaker in informal settings-his 
easy, colloquial manner ably communicating his quiet sincerity. 
Comparisons between this new darling of the Republican Right and 
Robert Taft were also inevitable. Goldwater was the first rea/leader of the 
Republican Right since Taft. Through the difficult 1950s, Right Wing Re-
publicans had remained "Taft Republicans" -a reflection on the state of 
the Republican Right and William F. Knowland's spiritless leadership. By 
1960, however, GOP candidates were beginning to bill themselves as 
"Goldwater Republicans." 
But Goldwater and Taft each dominated the Republican Right in differ-
ent ways. If Goldwater was the salesman of conservative Republicanism, 
Robert Taft had been its legislator. Unlike Taft, Goldwater had no major 
piece of legislation bearing his name. Taft had had his greatest influence in 
the Senate, where Goldwater, though a member of the Senate "club," was 
hardly a ruling member. Goldwater Republicanism was, in fact, strongest in 
the House of Representatives. 
Taft's and Goldwater's personalities mirrored their respective Capitol 
Hill power bases. Like the Senate, Taft had been more deliberate. While his 
pronouncements were often as sharp and indiscreet as Goldwater's, they 
nevertheless seemed to be the culmination of his thought process. Gold-
water's statements, on the other hand, constantly prompted charges that he 
was "shooting from the hip." Goldwater, however, was a far more stalwart 
conservative than Taft. The Arizona senator's political canon, unlike Taft's, 
had little room for federal action on pressing social problems. 
Ultimately, Goldwater's pure and simple message made him the Right 
Wing Republican best suited to the realities of presidential politics in post-
war America. Taft had never been the Right Wing publicist that Goldwater 
was to become. Goldwater stepped forward as a kind of political celebrity, a 
role Taft could never have assumed. Wrote commentator Ralph DeTole-
dano, "Where Taft was the rock, Goldwater is the flint and steel which can 
strike fire in the electorate." 3 
With a directness that characterized the man himself, Barry Goldwater's 
past helped to explain his new role on the American political scene. The sen-
ator's grandfather, Mike Goldwasser, a Polish emigre, had arrived in the 
New World in 1852 via England, where he had taken an Anglican bride and 
name. After selling hard goods and whiskey from a wagon to the miners of 
Sonora, California, "Big Mike" Goldwater packed off to Arizona to cash in 
on new gold strikes. There, in 1870, he founded the store he subsequently 
left to his three sons. His son Baron (Barry's father) also inherited Big Mike's 
business sense and built up the Goldwater enterprise. When Baron died, 
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Barry left the University of Arizona, where he burned more gas in his con-
vertible than midnight oil, and returned home to run the family business. 
He proved a far better businessman than student, further developing the 
Goldwater department stores and displaying a talent for merchandizing. 
His design of red ants on men's undershorts-" antsy pants" -sparked a 
national fad. 
Politics in the Goldwater tribe had been the special domain of Barry's 
Uncle Morris, who helped establish Arizona's Democratic party and instill 
Barry with his own unreconstructed Jeffersonian Democratic philosophy. In 
1949 Barry Goldwater had won a seat on the Phoenix City Council on an 
independent ticket. A year later, Goldwater managed the successful guber-
natorial campaign of radio announcer Howard Pyle, a Republican in one-
party Democratic Arizona. Goldwater, however, won more notoriety than 
his gubernatorial candidate. As a result, Goldwater himself ran for the U.S. 
Senate in 1952. He upset the Senate Democratic majority leader Ernest 
McFarland, largely by hanging on to Eisenhower's coattails, a fact which 
Goldwater readily admitted. 
But that was about all Goldwater depended on Ike for. He certainly 
took few political cues from the Republican president, moving further away 
from Ike during the 1950s. Goldwater fit easily in the Senate Republican 
club and secured an important position as chairman of the Republican Sen-
ate Campaign Committee, where he utilized his marketing skills. One fact 
soon became clear. Whether battling the Eisenhower administration's "me-
too" trends, labor racketeers, or the Democrats, Goldwater had a knack for 
grabbing press space. By the end of the 1950s, politics and publicity had 
come together profitably for Barry Goldwater. Time was calling him "the 
salesmanager for the Republican Old Guard with a New Look." 4 
Clarence Manion, an Old Guard martyr to Eisenhower Republicanism, 
early recognized Goldwater's potential importance to the conservative cause 
and urged the senator to write down his conservative philosophy in bold and 
simple terms. The National Review's L. Brent Bozell was recruited as a 
ghostwriter. Neither Manion nor Goldwater expected big sales from this 
undertaking, and Manion contracted with the Victor Publishing Company 
of Shepherdsville, Kentucky, for an initial printing of only 10,000, with the 
publisher to retain subsequent printing rights. Unbelievably, Goldwater's 
Conscience of a Conservative took off. Published in 1960 with little critical 
notice, the book had sold 700,000 copies and gone into a paperback edition 
by mid-1961. Sales continued to mount during the early 1960s. 
Although the political Goldwater was sometimes forced to modify cer-
tain positions of the literary Goldwater, the Conscience of a Conservative 
and other early Goldwater writings expressed Right Wing Republicanism in 
its fullest form ever. Goldwater not only rejected the Democratic New and 
Fair Deals, he also attacked the "me-too Republicanism" of Eisenhower's 
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"Dime-Store New Deal." The senator's political beliefs remained un-
abashedly pre-New Deal; he held that he could happily run for president on 
Franklin Roosevelt's 1932 platform with its calls for sound currency, a re-
duced and balanced budget, and a slashed federal payroll. 
Goldwater insisted on a strict construction of the Constitution. Since 
the New Deal, he claimed, the federal government had usurped the legit-
imate powers of the states. The Arizonan wanted the federal government to 
get out of the areas of business, agriculture, and education. But Goldwater 
believed he offered more than the cranky Old Guard's opposition to govern-
ment programs. "The weakness of conservatives is that they have been just 
plain 'aginners," he explained. "I try to be for something. I don't just say 
I'm against Federal aid-period. I say let the federal government reduce its 
costs and its burdens, and allow state and local governments to assume more 
responsibility. " 5 
Despite this "positive" approach, Goldwater's domestic policy hardly 
deviated from standard Old Guard conservatism. Few basic changes could 
be expected, considering Goldwater's words in the Conscience of a Conser-
vative: "The laws of God and of nature have no dateline. " 6 What Goldwater 
did was to express the conservative position with clarity and consistency and 
without regard to practical political considerations. Goldwater ruled out any 
more federal welfare programs. On the contrary, he advocated a staged with-
drawal-perhaps 10 percent per year-from all existing domestic programs 
outside of what he deemed the federal government's constitutional man-
date. Social Security, Goldwater also wrote, should be made "flexible and 
voluntary." The Tennessee Valley Authority should be sold to private indus-
try. 7 This was stern stuff that not even the most diehard Right Wing Repub-
lican with political ambitions had gone so far as to advocate. 
But there was more. Goldwater wanted to end all federal farm programs 
and return the farmer to the free market. On labor matters, Goldwater not 
only favored a ban on union political activities and industry-wide bargain-
ing, but he supported a national right-to-work law. Goldwater even came 
out against the graduated income tax as "repugnant to my notions of jus-
tice" and an artificial decree for "enforcing equality among unequal men." 8 
Finally, Goldwater rejected federal action on two major issues of the early 
1960s-civil rights and aid to education-because of his respect for states' 
rights and his fear of federal control of American life. 
In his Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater was equally direct on 
foreign policy questions. The Russian Communists, said Goldwater, had 
stated their goal of overrunning the world and imposing "slavery" -and 
they meant it. He insisted therefore that American foreign policymakers re-
member always that the Soviet Union and the United States were at war-a 
cold war certainly but nevertheless a war. The United States, said Gold-
water, had to proclaim immediately that its purpose remained "complete 
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victory over the forces of international Communism." That the United 
States had so far failed to do so was "incredible. "9 
While the senator's foreign policy objectives never included military 
"victory" over Russia, Goldwater insisted on continued military superiority 
over the Soviet Union and held that a great power could never make the 
avoidance of war its chief objective. The United States had to convince the 
enemy, Goldwater wrote in his characteristically colorful way, "that we 
would rather follow the world to kingdom come than consign it to hell 
under Communism." 10 Such blustery Goldwater declarations actually of-
fered little that was concrete regarding essential American foreign policy in-
terests, but they did leave the impression of a rather "trigger-happy" anti-
communist. 
Along with his "Better Dead than Red" proclamations, Goldwater 
maintained that the United States must never surrender "another single 
inch" to the Communists. In fact, Goldwater wanted to help "freedom 
fighters" in Communist-dominated lands to retake their homelands and 
even suggested that the United States might initiate military opposition 
against vulnerable Communist regimes. 
Goldwater also claimed that withdrawing recognition from "Mr. Khru-
shchev's murderous claque" would quickly improve the international scene. 
Furthermore, the United States should quit favoring the Communists with 
trade or technology and stop negotiating with the Soviets. As a result of such 
beliefs, Goldwater voted against the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
in which the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union pledged to 
conduct nuclear weapons testing only underground. 
If Goldwater was far more inclined to interfere in spots around the 
globe than Taft, Wherry, and earlier Old Guard Republicans with isolation-
ist pasts, he did share their frustration with our allies and betrayed an incli-
nation to "go it alone" in foreign affairs. Our allies, Goldwater believed, 
remained too fearful and cautious in this holy war with communism. He 
argued that the United States could not continue to conduct its foreign pol-
icy in paralytic deference to the United Nations and had to stop "humor-
ing" neutral countries. 
Goldwater also voiced traditional Right Wing criticisms of foreign aid. 
Along with waste and extravagance, these "giveaways," said Goldwater, fos-
tered anti-Americanism among its proud recipients and socialism in its gov-
ernment-to-government mechanisms. He would give military and technical 
assistance only to our true friends-those countries that demonstrated the 
will to resist communism. 
Republicans returned to Capitol Hill after the 1960 elections in a feisty 
mood. Political observers expected Goldwater and other Capitol Hill Repub-
licans to battle Kennedy and the Democrats with zeal. GOP conservatives 
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would no longer be shackled by the moderate Eisenhower administration. 
Moreover, Goldwater talked early in the new Congress of submitting specific 
legislative proposals dealing with critical national problems to show that 
viable conservative policy alternatives existed. 
Right Wing prospects seemed especially bright in the House, where a 
band of young hard-liners from small towns and rural areas won seats in the 
early 1960s. In the Ninety-fourth Congress, for instance, forty of the fifty-
eight House newcomers were Republican, most of them proud and uncom-
promising conservatives. These "Young Fogies," as their colleagues dubbed 
them, hoped to reinvigorate the free enterprise system. One of them, 
Donald Bruce of Indiana, hailed the "beginning of a philosophical revolu-
tion based on devotion to principle." In the late summer of 1961, Bruce and 
other GOP rookies launched "Operation Survival," a series of speeches that 
outlined their conservative views on such subjects as the growth of the fed-
eral government. 
Despite the gung-ho talk of these Young Fogies, Goldwater, and other 
Republicans, it soon became apparent that the Republicans-especially 
Right Wing Republicans-were going to have difficulities on Capitol Hill. 
President Kennedy was hardly the "wild-eyed" Democratic blueprinter of 
GOP propaganda, and his moderation tempered GOP opposition. More-
over, Bourbon Democratic members of the conservative alliance were gener-
ally proving unreliable, much to the disappointment of the coalition's chief 
GOP drumbeater, South Dakota senator Karl Mundt. In the House, espe-
cially, Republicans had to share the blame for the failure of Capitol Hill con~ 
servatives to meet initial expectations. Early in the session, renegade liberal 
Republicans helped Kennedy have his way in fights over the Rules Commit-
tee, the minimum wage and depressed areas legislation, and the extension 
of unemployment compensation. 
Inevitably, the GOP's Capitol Hill leadership came under ftre. In the 
House, the Young Fogies faulted Charles Halleck's less-than-staunch con-
servatism and joined moderate GOP solons in complaining about Halleck's 
more general legislative shortcomings. Senate GOP minority leader Everett 
Dirksen also came in for some sharp criticism. The National Review accused 
him of "fawning over" Kennedy's appointments and gagging his more con-
servative GOP brethren. Furthermore, conservatives charged, Dirksen failed 
repeatedly to blast the Kennedy administration for foreign policy ftascos like 
the Bay of Pigs. Goldwater, for his part, criticized both Halleck and Dirksen 
for merely reacting to Democratic initiatives and not setting forth Republi-
can alternatives. 
Conservatives already distrusted Halleck and Dirksen for having prosti-
tuted themselves during the Eisenhower years in the "fleshpots" of Modern 
Republicanism. The two GOP leaders, however, soon became "the joke of 
the Capitol" for other reasons that upset Republicans of all persuasions. 
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Hoping to cut into Kennedy's monopoly of the television airwaves, Dirksen 
and Halleck inaugurated their own television show to rebut the president 
and present the GOP point of view. What became known as the "Ev and 
Charlie" show proved a total disaster. Mixing Republican apologetics with 
vapid comedy, the gruesome twosome of the GOP was no match for the 
attractive and witty president and the rest of the cast that would later be 
called Camelot. Goldwater and the young hard-liners in the House regarded 
themselves as attractive, dynamic advocates of new-look conservatism. "Ev 
and Charlie," on the other hand, presented a different image. Common-
weal called them "wheezy and old-fashioned," a "turn of the century 
vaudeville act." Conservative Republicans resented both the image and the 
reality ofEv and Charlie's leadership. 11 
For one day in July, 1962, GOP-watchers shifted their gaze from the 
developing Goldwater boom and this "Ev and Charlie" show to a green and 
white suiped tent in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. There, former President 
Dwight Eisenhower played host to a GOP unity rally at his farm. The 
Gettysburg gathering had all the earmarks of earlier party conclaves during 
the Eisenhower administration. In apparent harmony and good cheer, about 
one hundred Republicans listened to Eisenhower pronouncements on GOP 
politics. Ike told them that he "hated and despised" the "shopworn and 
meaningless" terms "liberal" and "conservative" and recommended that 
these divisive labels be junked. The Republican party would move ahead, he 
concluded, if it "quit magnifying" its differences and stood for "prog-
ress." 12 These were the perfect words to gloss over GOP party splits, but 
Eisenhower's harmonics bore little relevance to the deep rifts that still 
threatened to tear the Republican party apart. 
Far more meaningful-and divisive-were the actions taken under the 
Gettysburg bigtop. Plans were unveiled to establish an All-Republican Con-
ference, a consultative body of about one hundred leading Republicans who 
would meet periodically to help shape party policy and do political research. 
While initially suspicious of any encroachment on their policymaking 
powers, congressional Republican leaders finally acquiesced in the establish-
ment of the conference. 
Also at the Gettysburg meeting it was decided to create a National 
Republican Citizen's Committee. This voluntary organization would fund 
the All-Republican Conference and include nonorganization Republicans, 
independents, and even some Democrats. For GOP hard-liners, the word 
"citizens" was a "dirty word" that recalled the independent groups behind 
Eisenhower's two presidential campaigns. They naturally feared that this 
"forum of meddlesome liberals" was merely the first move by "me-too" Re-
publicans to control the 1964 Republican nomination. 
Although Goldwater did not attend the Gettysburg affair, he had 
plenty to say about what went on there. He minced no words in speaking 
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out against the National Republican Citizen's Committee. The forces 
behind this plan were the same ones "who caused our present problems," 
said Goldwater; "they should not be given another opportunity to lead us 
down the path to political destruction." 13 Goldwater and other Right Wing 
Republicans charged that the Citizen's Committee would ultimately siphon 
off funds from the Republican party itself. 
In the end, the July Gettysburg rally brought little harmony to Republi-
can ranks. The All-Republican Conference floundered from the start and 
eventually achieved almost nothing. Continued party splits prevented any 
united GOP action. If Eisenhower believed the terms "conservative" and 
"liberal" to be irrelevant, other Republicans had to wrestle with the reality 
that these labels really did mean something in GOP politics. 
The Republican unity problem persisted after the 1962 congressional 
elections. While all Republican factions-liberal, moderate, and conserva-
tive-could claim some victories, the big electoral winners were the Demo-
crats, who retained a 259-to-176 House majority and built up a 68-to-32 
margin in the Senate. 
The most noteworthy and portentous election news turned out to be the 
defeat of former Vice-President Richard M. Nixon in the race for governor of 
California. A key national Republican figure and a fairly popular bridge 
between the GOP's left and right wings, Nixon had returned home to Cal-
ifornia to build up the political base that most observers believed he needed. 
But he entered the fall campaign against the popular Democratic incumbent 
Pat Brown hampered by a bitterly divided California GOP and dogged by 
the popular belief that he was only running for governor as a way station to 
the presidency in 1964. Despite his disclaimers, Nixon furthered this notion 
by blundering late in the campaign, "When I take over as President-! 
mean Governor of the United States-California." After his decisive loss, 
Nixon went out in a blaze of invective against the press, which, he said, 
"wouldn't have Nixon to kick around anymore." 14 
The GOP did, however, boast gubernatorial winners in several indus-
trial states. Former American Motors president George Romney ended four-
teen years of Democratic rule in Michigan with his triumphant race for gov-
ernor. One-term congressman William Scranton defeated Philadelphia 
mayor Richardson Dilworth to become chief executive of Pennsylvania, and 
in neighboring Ohio, James Rhodes ousted Michael DiSalle. Along with 
Nelson Rockefeller's reelection win in New York, these state house victories 
thrilled GOP liberals and moved New Jersey senator Clifford Case to pro-
pose an alliance between liberals on Capitol Hill and Republican governors. 
This progressive axis, Case believed, could develop new policies and work to 
influence the Republican presidential choice in 1964. But there was another 
view. The failure of Nixon in California and the fact that Rockefeller in win-
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ning New York ran behind his 1958 victory margin convinced conservative 
political strategists like the National Review's William Rusher that the GOP 
could not defeat Kennedy in the major industrial states in 1964. 15 
There were indeed various-and sometimes contradictory-lessons in 
the 1962 GOP electoral returns. Americans for Conservative Action (ACA) 
chairman Ben Moreel, noting that 74 percent of the ACA-assisted Republi-
can and Democratic conservatives had won their elections, hailed the "rising 
tide of constitutional conservatism." He and other conservative well-wishers 
found promise in the election of conservative Peter Dominick over incum-
bent Colorado senator and New Frontiersman John Carroll, and of conserva-
tive Millward Simpson over J.J. Hickey in Wyoming. Conservative hard-
liners also tended to blame the defeat of Indiana senator Homer Capehart 
by Birch Bayh on Capehart's earlier dalliance with Eisenhower's Modern Re-
publicanism. With GOP stalwarts such as John Ashbrook of Ohio, Donald 
Bruce of Indiana, and Robert Dole of Kansas also claiming or retaining seats 
in the House, the National Review suggested, "If you're going to get re-
elected, it doesn't hurt to show a good conservative record to your constit-
uents." 16 
Conservative cheerleaders could offer no more positive pronouncements 
on the future of American political conservatism. There was, after all, little 
reason for revelry. The 1962 elections were generally regarded as a defeat for 
the Republican Right. The newly hatched Conservative party of New York 
received enough votes to secure a permanent spot on the Empire State ballot 
but fell short of its anticipated totals. No Right Wing Republican had a 
greater stake in the 1962 elections than Barry Goldwater, and he found little 
to cheer about in the showing of conservative Republicans nationwide. 
Before election day, he had targeted liberal Democratic senators Joseph 
Clark of Pennsylvania, Wayne Morse of Oregon, and John Carroll of Col-
orado for defeat. Only Carroll lost. Neither Goldwater's name nor campaign 
aid seemed to help Republicans around the country. Sighed a disappointed 
Goldwater after the elections, "I can't figure it out." 17 
In the wake of the 1962 elections, all Republicans could agree on one 
thing: the current image of the party had to change. Also, the belief spread 
that the "Ev and Charlie" show had to go. One immediate result of this 
GOP image-changing was the replacement of Charles B. Hoevan of New Jer-
sey as House GOP conference chairman with Gerald Ford, a handsome, 
young former University of Michigan football player. While some observers 
construed the Ford-Hoeven contest as a liberal-conservative clash, the switch 
amounted to little more than a party primping. 
Another party preoccupation in the wake of the 1962 election returns 
was the GOP future in the South. Republicans posted big gains there in 
1962. Most notably, five new Republican congressmen would come from 
below the Mason-Dixon line, and Alabama Republican James Martin almost 
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upset veteran U.S. Senator Lister Hill. Elsewhere in the South, Republicans 
forced Democratic senators such as Arkansas's). William Fulbright and 
South Carolina's Olin Johnston into some uncharacteristic fall campaigning. 
Republicans in three North Carolina counties swept all state and county 
offices and defeated the Democratic Speaker of the North Carolina House of 
Representatives. In North Carolina and Georgia, Republicans elected their 
first state senators since Reconstruction. "The tide is coming in now in the 
South," said I. Lee Potter, head of Operation Dixie, the GOP program 
started in the 1950s to capitalize on Eisenhower's largely personal southern 
gains in his two presidential campaigns. 18 
Republican inroads in the South provided the only true bright spot for 
Right Wing Republicans as they pondered the 1962 election outcome. These 
returns confirmed Barry Goldwater's belief in the coming new Republican 
age in Dixie. The Arizonan had heavily barnstormed the South for Richard 
Nixon in 1960 and later bemoaned Nixon's failure to make his political 
stand there. Nixon, for his part, had vacillated between appealing to the 
South or the northern urban-industrial areas. 
The South versus the City-this Republican tug-of-war-had continued 
after the 1960 election, with urban advocates initially holding sway. TheRe-
publican party, they argued, had lost by narrow margins in states like Penn-
sylvania and Illinois because the Democrats had piled up huge majorities in 
the big cities where Republican organizations had all but disappeared. The 
first proposals of urban-oriented Republicans to close the "big-city gap" 
were ludicrous. Reacting to charges of political foul play in the Chicago vote 
in 1960, some GOP leaders discussed hiring college football players in the 
future to guard city polling places. More serious plans followed, however, as 
the Republicans prepared to follow the lead of Ray Bliss, the Ohio state 
chairman whose revitalized urban organizations had helped hold Ohio for 
Nixon in 1960. 
Dixie, however, continued to have its Republican drumbeaters. They 
contended that the GOP must win over the 85 electoral votes of the South 
through a conservative appeal. Including the 70 electoral votes of the border 
states, GOP victory in 1964 could then come, argued GOP southern strat-
egists, with the addition of the Midwest and the mountain states-a union, 
said one writer, of "the cornbelt and cornpone." 19 This southern strategy 
had received a big lift with the May, 1961, election of Republican John G. 
Tower to fill the Senate seat vacated by Vice-President Lyndon Johnson. A 
"conservative of conviction, not convenience" and a self-proclaimed Gold-
water Republican, Tower had even declined Richard Nixon's offer of cam-
paign help in becoming the first Republican senator from Texas since Recon-
struction. 
Goldwater, meanwhile, had kept up his calls for continued GOP exer-
tions below the Mason-Dixon line. At a GOP conference on the two-party 
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system in the South in November, 1961, Goldwater advocated watering 
down the civil rights section of the 1960 Republican platform. Afterward, 
Goldwater had to answer charges that he was "writing off' the Negro vote 
and the industrial urban areas. The Republicans would "write off' no group 
or area, said Goldwater, but it was prudent to do "our strong hunting where 
the ducks are flying." For him, that was clearly not among black voters 
since, as he had explained earlier, "We [Republicans] have literally bent 
over backwards to attract the Negro vote, but they don't vote for us." 20 
By early 1962, the southern strategists appeared to be gaining within 
the GOP. On Capitol Hill, for example, GOP opposition to the proposed 
Department of Urban Affairs led some observers to conclude that the Re-
publican party had indeed settled on a southern strategy. Naturally, the 
1962 electoral tallies, which showed a 244 percent rise in Republican south-
ern strength as compared with the Democrats' 41 percent, made that deci-
sion all the easier. Kennedy appeared vulnerable in the South, whichJames 
J. Kilpatrick called "Goldwater Country," and RNC chairman William Mil-
ler promised "a major penetration" of the South in 1964. 
There were several reasons for recent Republican gains in the South. The 
GOP was contesting more southern elections and fielding more able candi-
dates than the post-office Republicans of an earlier era. The influx of north-
erners into Texas, Florida, and Virginia also helped alter southern politics. 
The advancing modernization and industralization of the South had 
attracted these Yankees, who appreciated GOP opposition to high taxes, 
federal spending, and government centralization. Goldwater and others 
contended that it was the "economic issue" that drove southerners into the 
Republican ranks. 
Still, the specter of racism hung over the Republican Right's southern 
strategy. Would the new Republican party in Dixie be built on the backs of 
the Negro? Meade Alcorn, for one, felt that southern racists were subverting 
Operation Dixie, which he had launched as RNC chairman. Eastern opinion 
makers and liberal Republicans publicly argued that the GOP would inev-
itably turn "lily white" racist in "immorally" turning South. The GOP's 
Dixie jackpot in the 1962 elections only fueled this debate. 21 
The Republican Right fought back against these charges. Contending 
that "the greatest GOP gains in the past 15 years have been in the South," 
Goldwater characterized the charges of racism and segregation as "absurd." 
Actually, the progressive urban elements of the South, not the country 
crackers, were backing Republican candidates, countered Goldwater; Re-
publican inroads had come in direct proportion to southern moderation on 
the race issue. The National Review pointed to critics' inconsistency in 
damning the Republican party as racists while saying nothing about the 
Democratic party with its Bourbon contingent. 22 
These conservative replies notwithstanding, the racist bogey would not 
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go away. And it never could as long as Goldwater and conservative Republi-
cans persisted in championing states' rights under the circumstances. How-
ever broadminded Goldwater and other states' rights Republican champions 
were, their doctrine meant the unrelieved suppression of the Negro. More-
over, Goldwater's talk of new southern moderation seemed strange in the 
face of increased Ku Klux Klan activity, gunpoint integration battles, and 
Bull Connor's brutalities against Negro demonstrators in Birmingham, Ala-
bama, in 1963. Indeed, racial politics seems at least partly responsible for 
Republican gains in the South during this period, especially following 
reports of veiled segregationist appeals by some southern GOP candidates. 
Unlike these, the Democratic party's Bourbon contingent was a product of 
history, and not cynical wooing by national leaders who had advertised their 
willingness to appease the South on the race issue. 
"On and on the Great Debate of the '60's rages: Liberal! Conserva-
tive!" proclaimed author M. Stanton Evans in 1961. "Such venerable con-
versation standbys as sex, religion and baseball are left trailing in its 
wake." 23 Although a question might be raised about how typical Evans's 
conversational set was, the early 1960s did witness a "conservative resur-
gence." 
This right-wing revival had been a long time coming. The demise of the 
1930s Liberty League, with its blind rage against "that man," FDR, had left 
American conservatism without organization and drive-an ideological shill 
for selfish economic "interests." By the mid-1950s, however, there was talk 
of" creeping conservatism," and not "creeping socialism." Ironically, Eisen-
hower, the right's chief Republican adversary, had contributed to the 
growth of the conservative sentiment; his administration had given new 
"currency" to the language of conservatism. 24 Mid-1958 witnessed the 
founding of the Americans for Constitutional Action, a lobby to "aid in the 
promotion and preservation of the American system of constitutional gov-
ernment, free enterprise and private property." The Americans for Consti-
tutional Action rated the relative conservatism of Washington lawmakers 
and supplied conservative candidates with speechwriters, fundraisers, and 
political fieldmen. If the Americans for Constitutional Action was the con-
servative answer to the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) of the lib-
erals, so too was the newly hatched Conservative party in New York a re-
sponse to the Empire State's Liberal party. 
A conservative intellectual movement was well in the making by the 
early 1960s, its roots deeply embedded in the recent past. In 1944 Austrian 
Frederick A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom, a bold call for individualism 
and limited government-classical liberalism-had quickly become an 
American best-seller. Subsequently, two American writers-Peter Viereck in 
Conservatism Revisited (1949) and Russell Kirk in The Conservative Mind 
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(1953)-stepped forward as proponents of the "new conservatism," with its 
distress over modern society's erosion of traditional religious and cui rural 
values. Already by the mid-1950s, the American intellectual right, no 
longer unsure of its own existence, had entered a period of self-definition. 25 
Yet conservative intellectuals of all types wanted more than ivory-tower 
debate. They wanted to affect public policy, to rout American political lib-
eralism. Only topnotch conservative weekly journals could accomplish this, 
John Chamberlain had written in the early 1950s. Such periodicals would 
prepare the public for conservative initiatives, as the Nation and New 
Republic had once done for American liberalism. Robert Taft, who had 
often griped about the media's New Deal bias, believed that conservatives 
had to "build up" their own "word-stingers" in order to attract articulate in-
tellectuals. 26 
Although journals like The Freeman and Human Events existed in the 
decade after World War II, the concerns of Taft, Chamberlain, and others 
were answered with the founding of the National Review in 1955. This jewel 
of American conservative periodicals was the brainchild of William F. Buck-
ley, a bright, young right-wing intellectual who had first gained national 
attention in 1951 with the publication of God and Man at Yale, an attack on 
the liberal tilt of his alma mater. Buckley was a brilliant, uncompromising 
conservative, with a literary style that effectively mixed wit and scorn. Not 
only did his National Review provide the magazine that Taft and Chamber-
lain had longed for, but, in Buckley, the conservative intellectual force 
boasted its own national celebrity-a right-wing television talk show person-
ality. 
The National Review, combining the various strains of conservatism-
classical liberalism, "new conservative" traditionalism, and hard-line anti-
communism-soon became the "cohesive intellectual force" of the postwar 
conservative movement. 27 A sounding board for conservative politicians and 
a newsletter on the politics of the Republican Right, the National Review 
also served as a springboard for such conservative newspaper columnists as 
James]. Kilpatrick and, later, George Will. 
Despite his desire for rightish intellectuals and "word-stingers," Taft 
had generally remained aloof from this budding conservative intellectual 
movement-Taft once remarking, "I'm a politician, not a philosopher." 28 
Indeed, there was only minimal contact between politicians in general and 
this group during the 1950s. But the gap between conservative literati and 
politicians closed considerably by the early 1960s. Human Events, for exam-
ple, held a two-day conference in early 1962 on how to elect conservative 
candidates in the upcoming congressional elections. Ultimately, Goldwater 
himself became the major link between the political and intellectual worlds 
of the conservative movement. L. Brent Bozell, National Review writer and 
brother-in-law of William F. Buckley, helped Goldwater write his own Con-
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science of a Conservative. Russell Kirk occasionally pitched in on Goldwater 
speeches. Conservative economists like Milton Friedman of the University of 
Chicago, Gottfried Haberler of Harvard, and Warren Nutter of the Univer-
sity of Virginia offered economic advice, and Professor Gerhardt Neimeyer 
of Notre Dame schooled the senator on foreign policy matters. Unlike FDR 
andJFK with their liberal advisors, however, Goldwater used these intellec-
tuals for periodic brainstorming rather than any permanent brain trust. 
Like Taft, Goldwater realized that the worlds of the philosopher and the 
politician differed considerably, and the down-with-the-ship attitude of 
some conservative intellectuals could exasperate him. Still, this new relation-
ship between conservative politicians and intellectuals did serve to enrich the 
politics of the Republican Right. There was some irony in this, considering 
the Eisenhower administration's earlier efforts to interest "eggheads" in 
Modern Republicanism. 
One conservative intellectual, in particular, had been working since 
1953 to make one of his ideas a practical reality. Frank Chodorov had long 
noted the "radical movement's" emphasis on enlisting the sympathies of 
the young. As a conservative counterbalance, Chodorov established the 
Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, which distributed conservative lit-
erature to college students. Whatever the direct impact of the society's lit-
erature, conservatism among the young did spread rapidly in the 1950s. The 
Young Republicans, for instance, moved steadily to the right during the 
Eisenhower years, expressing a growing dissatisfaction with the administra-
tion's moderate policies. Given Eisenhower's oft-expressed concern for "the 
youngsters," this too was ironic. The extent of that irony became apparent 
when young college conservatives descended on the 1960 GOP convention 
infatuated with the Republican Right's foremost critic of the Eisenhower 
administration, Barry Goldwater. "Today's youngsters," remarked former 
Indiana senator William Jenner at the Chicago GOP convention, have "a 
damn sight more sense than their mommies and daddies." 29 
In thanking one of these pro-Goldwater youth groups at the close of the 
Chicago convention, Goldwater suggested they form a national youth orga-
nization for conservatives. That September, about one hundred young con-
servatives met at William F. Buckley's estate in Sharon, Connecticut. There, 
the Young Americans for Freedom (Y AF) was launched, as participants 
pledged themselves to the "eternal truths" of limited government and the 
market economy and "victory" over international communism. This was the 
so-called Sharon Statement. In less than six months, the YAF claimed about 
27,000 members with chapters on one hundred college campuses. 
The movement grew. In March, 1961, about 6,000 young conservatives 
jammed the Manhattan Center in New York City to hoot at "soft-headed" 
liberals, President Kennedy, and even former President Eisenhower, and to 
howl for Herbert Hoover and Barry Goldwater. A year later, not even Mad-
A Choice Not an Echo 173 
ison Square Garden could hold all the young conservatives who wanted to 
attend a YAF rally; thousands were turned away at the door. Inside, amid 
the red-white-and-blue bunting, speakers like John G. Tower and L. Brent 
Bozell regaled the youthful right-wing hordes. The main attraction, how-
ever, was Senator Barry Goldwater, who received a five-minute ovation and 
acclamation as the obvious Republican presidential candidate for 1964. 
This Madison Square Garden rouser highlighted the new conservative 
craze on American campuses. Goldwater's Conscience of a Conservative was 
enjoying brisk sales at student book stores. Goldwater badges and Gold-
water clubs were making the college scene. Harvard's Student Council pres-
ident was reportedly a "stern conservative." The right-wing columnist for 
the University of Wisconsin's student newspaper observed that the word 
"conservative" was no longer a "nasty word" on campus. Indeed, he added, 
a student now had to be an "ultra-conservative" to be truly respectable. The 
election of arch-Goldwater conservative Donald E. Lukens as the Young Re-
publicans' chairman in March, 1964, only bolstered M. Stanton Evans's con-
tention that preppy conservatism had finally emerged "full-blooded and 
purposeful. " 30 
What had gotten into these young hard-liners? All observers, citing the 
age-old rebellion of the young against the old, saw student conservatives re-
acting against the liberal conformity of their parents and college professors. 
Another student hard-liner offered a fairly unconservative explanation for 
his own politics. "You walk around with your Goldwater button," he 
remarked, "and you feel that thrill of treason." 31 Of course, adult conserva-
tives preferred to view this movement as more solidly based. M. Stanton 
Evans attributed campus conservatism to an "apprehension about the way 
things have worked out under Liberal stewardship." 32 Ascribing such good 
sense to the college crowd would subsequently pose problems for conserva-
tives when the late 1960s ushered in a new fashion in campus politics-the 
New Left. But whatever its staying power, the preppy conservatism of the 
early 1960s temporarily cheered the Republican Right, so long identified as 
the sole, stuffy purveyor of conservatism. 
An ominous aspect of the conservative scene came to light in March, 
1961, when an organized letter campaign got underway demanding the 
impeachment of Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren. By the end of 
the year, a new reality in American politics had emerged-the "Radical 
Right." Far-out right-wing groups had, of course, always existed on the 
fringe of American politics. But the 1960s' Radical Right was different. No 
longer were the fabled "little old ladies in tennis shoes" the sole members of 
these groups. Ultra-conservative activity, financed by the newly rich, quickly 
spread through the middle- and lower-middle class suburbs of the South 
and West. Week-long seminars on communist subversion, right-wing read-
ing lists, and patriotic rallies were some of the signs of this Radical Right 
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boom. In Dallas, for example, there were one hundred anticommunist study 
groups meeting at one time in 1961. In southern California, ultra-conserva-
tives took their politics into the streets on automobile bumperstickers: 
"AMERICANISM-THE ONLY ISM FOR ME," "NO ON RED CHINA," 
and "SOCIALISM IS COMMUNISM." 
The main message of these ultra-conservative organizations was unqual-
ified anticommunism. All current problems were blamed on a communist 
plot. America's enemies were not overseas; they were at large in the United 
States, boring from within. The Radical Right saw the federal income tax, 
the proposed registration of firearms, and even attempts to flouridate com-
munity drinking water as major communist threats. 
The media quickly discovered the Radical Right and, along with certain 
overwrought politicians, gave the phenomenon an importance out of all 
proportion to its numbers. Soon, the American public became familiar with 
the inner workings of various Radical Right organizations. There was, for 
example, the Minutemen, a group of some 2,400 patrioteers. Divided into 
about twenty-three guerrilla bands, the Minutemen intended to rely only on 
their firearms in the final battle against communism. In the meantime, they 
held "guerrilla warfare" seminars and often ran afoul of local firearm stat-
utes. Another approach included the National Indignation Convention and 
Dr. Fred Schwarz's Christian Anti-Communist Crusade. Schwarz's widely 
televised anticommunist revivals pulled in up to 15,000 people, who came 
to see such stars as John Wayne and James Stewart and hear Schwarz's pro-
nouncements on Americanism delivered in the twangy tones of his native 
Australia. 
What became the most widely known element in the Radical Right 
movement began indirectly in a car traveling toward New York City in 
December, 1954. One of the passengers was Robert Welch, a candy manu-
facturer from Cambridge, Massachusetts, with a keen interest in Republican 
politics. On this rainy night in 1954, Welch, an unreconstructed Taft sup-
porter, was telling his fellow travelers that Taft's 1952 conqueror, Eisen-
hower, had double-crossed conservative GOP candidates for the House and 
Senate in the recent congressional campaign. One rider asked Welch for a 
written account of these incredible views. Welch responded, and then later 
elaborated this written reply into a book entitled The Politician. Privately 
printed, the book's conclusion was that Dwight Eisenhower was "a ded-
icated conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy." 
To combat further the grand machinations of the "Commies," Welch 
founded the John Birch Society in December, 1959. Welch's society took its 
name from a soldier from Macon, Georgia, who had been killed on patrol by 
the Chinese Communists-ten days after V-J Day-to become "the first ca-
sualty of World War III," a present reality for Welch and his Birchers. In 
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this struggle against the Communists, the John Birch Society enlisted the 
services of a number of political notables, such as former State Department 
official Spruille Braden, T. Coleman Andrews, one-time Internal Revenue 
Service director and 1956 presidential candidate of the right-wing Constitu-
tion party, not to mention Clarence Manion, right-wing activist since being 
fired from the Eisenhower administration for his "orthodox" views. 
The Birch Society's political first step came in early 1961, when it 
mounted a letter-writing campaign to demand Earl Warren's impeachment. 
Shortly thereafter, aJohn Birch Society beachhead on Capitol Hill was dis-
covered as two California Republicans in the House-John Rousselot and 
Edgar Hiestand-confirmed they were Birchers. By the spring of 1962, the 
society had become a definite political factor in California, backing Assem-
blyman Joseph Shell in his GOP gubernatorial primary race against Richard 
Nixon, who had repudiated the organization. Despite Nixon's springtime 
victory over Shell and numerous other Birch Society casualties in the 1962 
elections (Hiestand and Rousselot lost reelection bids), the society's mem-
bership rolls continued to swell on into 1964. 
The widespread attention given to ultra-conservatism and to the John 
Birch Society in particular posed special problems for the Republican Right 
and other less fanatical conservatives. Although not directly related to resur-
gent conservatism among intellectuals and the young, these ultras shared 
major conservative fears regarding communism and big government. Hence, 
they had to be handled delicately. Robert Taft had always remained wary of 
the "nuts" on the fringe of the American Right, and now the danger 
seemed even greater, since the Republican Right of the early 1960s had so 
much to lose by a close identification with right-wing crazies. "This crowd 
can blow the whole bundle if we're not careful," admitted one Washington 
State GOP leader. But he went on to say: "If we can keep a balance, the 
party will come out stronger." 33 
Efforts to maintain some kind of balance came first at a political action 
conference by Human Events in February, 1962. Although the presence of 
chairman William Miller and House GOP campaign chief Robert Wilson 
pointed up the Republican attempt to capitalize on the new right-wing 
boom, the main theme of the meeting was that conservatives had to set real-
istic goals and pursue them in a reasonable manner. Texas senator John G. 
Tower declared that conservatives would never gain power by branding every 
adversary a "communist." Right-wing columnist Fulton Lewis warned right-
wing extremists, "You're not going to get anymore to the right than Barry 
Goldwater." 34 
At the same time,John Birch Society founder Robert Welch came in for 
some sharp criticism. In February, 1962, the National Review stated that 
Welch was actually harming the anticommunist cause. Barry Goldwater spe-
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cifically rebuked Welch in an unsolicited advertisement in the National 
Review suggesting that either Welch retire as society chairman or the Birch-
ers regroup without their founder. 
Ultimately, the major issue for conservative Republicans like Goldwater 
became not merely Robert Welch, but the entire John Birch Society and the 
Radical Right. Goldwater persistently maintained that the Birch Society was 
acting within its constitutional bounds and that he knew many Birchers who 
were fine American citizens. Still, with ultra-right leaders promoting Gold-
water for president and an Old Guard warrior like Joseph Martin publicly 
branding the Arizonan an "extremist," the Radical Right problem would 
remain one that Barry Goldwater could never solve. 35 
One Republican who worked hard to keep this Radical Right issue alive 
was Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York. Rockefeller had emerged an 
even more forceful spokesman for Eastern Republicanism than his predeces-
sor, Thomas Dewey. According to Rockefeller, the nation's future political 
battles would be fought in the great urban areas, and the GOP had to 
appeal to city voters by offering expanded programs in housing, education, 
and welfare, as he had done in New York. Rockefeller Republicanism also 
embraced aggressive federal action in behalf of Negro civil rights-Rockefel-
ler himself deriding the Kennedy administration's weak leadership in this 
area. 
Many Right Wing Republicans saw "Rocky's" approach as typical "me-
too Republicanism." Of course, conservative hostility toward Rockefeller 
was hardly new. Even before his 1958 election as governor of New York, 
Rockefeller's service under the Democrats had made him an "FOR pet" in 
the eyes of party hardliners. 36 Few GOP conservatives could forgive Rockefel-
ler for his role in the Nixon-Rockefeller platform pact on the eve of the 1960 
Republican national convention. Still more galling for Right Wing Republi-
cans, Rockefeller, unlike Dewey, had genuine popular appeal. Rocky could 
rival John F. Kennedy as a political celebrity with a famous name, an engag-
ing smile, plenty of cash for any presidential campaign, and an exciting 
campaign style. Soon after Nixon's presidential defeat in 1960, GOP officials 
around the country came to regard Rockefeller as the only Republican capa-
ble of beatingJFK in 1964. There were periodic reports that Rocky's nom-
ination drive was "unstoppable." 
Goldwater, Rockefeller, and their advisors met regularly during the 
early Kennedy years to discuss major national issues and prevent any intra-
party dogfights. Goldwater, Rocky's chief GOP rival, seemed to share the 
belief that Rockefeller was unstoppable and thought their talks were ex-
tremely valuableY The meetings, in fact, had some effect on both Gold-
water and Rockefeller as 1962 became 1963. When Goldwater remarked 
that Rockefeller was not "as liberal as people think," observers detected a 
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possible mellowing on Goldwater's part. Reportedly, the Arizonan paved 
the way among conservative GOP professionals when Rocky toured the 
country in early 1963. Rockefeller, in turn began to sound increasingly con-
servative. In one Midwest swing, Rocky blistered the Kennedy administra-
tion and emphasized the importance of private property, individual initia-
tive, and fiscal integrity in his own political creed. Echoing Eisenhower, the 
master of GOP homogenization, Rockefeller described the terms liberal and 
conservative as "meaningless and shopworn." He also publicly called Gold-
water a "great" Republican. 
Although Rockefeller's adjustment to conservative sensitivities did not 
diminish his high ratings in national opinion polls, there was, hanging over 
all of this, the public matter of the New York governor's private life. In 
November, 1961, Rockefeller had ·announced his separation and probable 
divorce from Mary Rockefeller, his wife of thirty years and the mother of his 
five children. GOP leaders expected this personal tragedy to have considera-
ble impact on the governor's political future, divorce then being very rare 
among prospective presidential candidates. This situation was compounded 
when in May, 1963, shortly after his divorce was final, Rockefeller married 
Mrs. Margaretta "Happy" Murphy, an attractive young mother of four chil-
dren who was herself a divorcee of only one month. Many GOP conserva-
tives, who were already hostile to Rockefeller, now used this domestic situa-
tion as one more reason to oppose the New Yorker. Rockefeller, however, 
became so agitated by this new Right Wing obsession with his family life 
that, according to Goldwater, Rocky personally asked him to intervene with 
Right Wing Republicans on this matter. 38 
The unofficial Rockefeller campaign for the Republican nomination 
came to a standstill after the May 4 wedding ceremony. Rockefeller plunged 
drastically in several popular opinion surveys. Suddenly, Pennsylvania gov-
ernor William Scranton and Michigan's George Romney were being men-
tioned as alternative GOP presidential possibilities. Against this backdrop, 
Rockefeller left on vacation in mid-July, 1963. Before departing, however, 
the governor reportedly told his aides that he was "off the unity kick" and 
would now run for the GOP presidential nomination as Rockefeller, and not 
a Goldwater clone. 39 He also left behind a 2,000-word statement for release 
on July 14-Bastille Day. 
In this pronouncement, Rockefeller laid seige to the "Radical Right 
lunatic fringe," naming the John Birch Society and implicating Goldwater 
and the Republican Right. The Republican party, he warned, was in danger 
of subversion by a "radical well-financed, highly disciplined minority" that 
utterly rejected the heritage of Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and 
Robert Taft. Rockefeller accused these "purveyors of hate and distrust" of 
having already used "ruthless, roughshod tactics of totalitarianism" to wrest 
control of the Young Republican convention weeks before in San Francisco. 
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The New York governor also found the GOP southern strategists talk of 
"writing off" the nation's industrial areas and minorities, specifically the 
Negro, to be "completely incredible." States' rights was just a "pretext" for 
Republican southern strategists. The "time for temporizing is over," Rocke-
feller declared. 40 
Rocky had clearly declared war on Goldwater. Although he never men-
tioned Goldwater's name in his Bastille Day remarks, the implications were 
obvious enough, and several days later Rockefeller said Goldwater was in 
danger of capture by these radical elements unless he quickly disavowed 
them. Goldwater, for his part, initially shrugged off Rocky's Bastille Day 
statement as the formal declaration of the governor's presidential candidacy. 
Still, Rockefeller's "double-cross" stung Goldwater, and he replied to 
Rocky's charges in subsequent weeks. Rockefeller, said Goldwater, was em-
ploying the old Democratic tactic of guilt by association-a statement that 
must have puzzled old McCarthy adversaries. The Arizonan repeated that 
right-wing groups like the John Birch Society were acting well within their 
constitutional rights and he would not disavow them. The "radical left" 
inside the government was a far greater menace than the "radical right" out-
side the government, Goldwater contended. 
Goldwater's comments were mild compared with other Right Wing Re-
publican responses to Rockefeller. Texas senator John G. Tower charged that 
Rockefeller had been "taken in" by liberal braintrusters whose only goal was 
GOP discord. Conservative Nebraska senator Carl Curtis exclaimed on the 
Senate floor that Rockefeller's Bastille Day statement typified the "self-
serving tactics of a man desperately trying to retrieve his declining political 
fortunes. "41 Clearly, if Governor Rockefeller had gone "off the unity kick," 
the Republican Right had gone right along with him. Rocky's declaration of 
war on the Radical Right achieved few political gains for him and instead 
provoked already antagonistic GOP conservatives. His battle cry definitely 
placed him in the tradition of his New York predecessor and Right Wing 
bete noire, Tom Dewey. Like Tom Dewey before him, Rockefeller sense-
lessly incited party conservatives, personalized the battle for the Republican 
party, and complicated his already formidable task of capturing the GOP 
nomination. Nevertheless, Rockefeller's declaration did point up Gold-
water's and the Republican Right's vulnerability on the Radical Right issue. 
Assessing future conservative chances shortly after the 1960 election, the 
National Review's L. Brent Bozell warned the Republican Right against 
attaching too much importance to winning the Republican nomination 
under the "wrong circumstances"; party rivals might "set-up" Goldwater 
for a "we-told-you-so" defeat, Bozell wrote. 42 While such warnings over-
looked the preference of party professionals for a popular presidential candi-
date who would help local candidates even if his cause were hopeless, peri-
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odic reports during the next few years stated that GOP chieftains would 
indeed "hand" Goldwater the nomination ifJFK looked unbeatable. 
Goldwater, for his part, remained both cautious and nonchalant about 
a possible run for the Republican presidential nomination. There was noth-
ing paradoxical about this. Goldwater feared that a failed Goldwater pres-
idential bid would damage the conservative cause. In addition, Goldwater 
displayed a "genuine reluctance" to become a presidential candidate. When 
asked to characterize his own activities regarding any presidential drive, 
Goldwater would merely say he was "just pooping around. " 43 
Goldwater's easygoing approach was clearly not shared by the twenty-
two Goldwater enthusiasts who met secretly at Chicago's Avenue Motel in 
October, 1961. This group (which included Steven Shadegg, manager of 
Goldwater's two Senate campaigns, F. Clifton White, a knowledgeable New 
York political pro, conservative congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio, and 
Donald Bruce of Indiana) would form the "nucleus" of the later draft-
Goldwater movement. They unanimously wanted Goldwater atop the Re-
publican ticket in 1964, but wisely-if somewhat fictitiously-dedicated 
themselves instead to building up a nationwide conservative force in the Re-
publican party. The Avenue Motel participants chose F. Clifton White to 
head the operation, which took no name and operated inconspicuously out 
of Suite 3 505 of the Chanin Building in New York. 
For a time, the" 3505 Project" struggled along, a virtual one-man show. 
White traveled through twenty-eight states in the spring of 1962 and at-
tended all RNC meetings. He gathered Republican convention delegate lists 
back to 1948 and prepared a synopsis of laws governing delegate selection 
for the 1964 Republican convention. White also established ties with the 
Young Republicans and the National Federation of Republican Women. He 
even dipped into his own savings to keep the one-room operation afloat. 
But this hush-hush movement was growing. A meeting at Chicago's 
Essex Inn Motel in early December, 1962, included fifty-five participants 
from almost every major state. Although the 1962 elections had proved dis-
appointing for most conservatives, the mood of the Essex motel conferees 
was surprisingly upbeat. White, for instance, saw the fall election as a 
"stand-off," a fairly respectable GOP performance, considering it took place 
during the Cuban missile crisis. 44 The group believed that GOP troubles in 
California and New York demonstrated that the party's future depended on 
making a strong conservative bid in the South, the Midwest, and the moun-
tain states. As for Project 3505, the leaders felt that the time had now come 
to mount a presidential campaign for standard-bearer Barry Goldwater-
and the Essex Inn conclave immediately committed itself to his candidacy. 
Project 3505 organizers had reason to be pleased. But then word of the 
Essex Inn meeting leaked to the press, and CBS television crews quickly de-
scended on the Chicago meeting room. There was an instant outcry from the 
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New York Herald Tribune, which condemned the "bad timing, narrow mo-
tives and poor politics" of the Chicago conspirators. "Neither the plotting to 
promote Senator Goldwater for President," observed that voice of liberal 
Republicanism, "nor the conspiracy to block Governor Rockefeller contrib-
utes to the health or harmony of the party. " 45 Perhaps the contemporary 
concern over the Radical Right made such a reaction understandable, but 
the Tribune was either naive or extremely cynical in its outrage. After all, 
the Chicago conservatives were hardly the first Republicans to lay plans for 
future political action. 
But even Goldwater was furious. The Chicago revelations surprised and 
embarrassed him. Goldwater had long known-and approved-of Project 
3505's existence. But he had assumed that the group was working solely to 
further GOP conservatism and he claimed to have no idea that Clifton 
White was a paid organizer. When White met with Goldwater in mid-
January, 1963, the senator complained vehemently about those taking liber-
ties with his "political neck." White returned from his appointment, ac-
cording to National Review publisher William Rusher, "looking for a 
job. " 46 Afterward, however, the Chicago "conspirators" tried to interest 
Goldwater in the organization they were developing. Their original purpose 
had been to develop general GOP conservatism, they assured him. But that 
phase of the operation had passed. It was now time to begin the 1964 Re-
publican nomination race. Desperately ttying to capture their candidate, 
Rusher and White portrayed Goldwater as the last great hope of the conser-
vative cause. "I am profoundly convinced," Rusher wrote to Goldwater, 
"that the organization we have built is very probably the last one that will 
ever seek, in a serious and systematic way, to turn the GOP into more con-
servative channels." 47 Goldwater held firm. For the moment, he was not a 
candidate for the GOP presidential nomination and was opposed to any 
draft movement. 
The mood was downcast when the executive committee of Project 3 505 
met on February 17, 1963, in Chicago. The group had to gamble. They 
decided to draft Goldwater without his consent. Their only hope was that 
Goldwater would not publicly repudiate them. To reduce that risk, the 
group named an important party figure, Texas state GOP boss Peter O'Don-
nell, as chairman of the new Draft Goldwater Committee. F. Clifton White 
would serve as executive director, and senators Curtis and Tower and 
Arizona congressman John Rhodes would round up support on Capitol Hill. 
On April 8, 1963, the National Draft Goldwater Committee officially 
opened for business. There was no repudiation by Goldwater. But neither 
was there any encouragement, as Goldwater studiously avoided Draft Gold-
water headquarters and its July Fourth rally in Washington, D.C. "Gold-
water's not running the conservatives," the New York Times's James Reston 
wrote in the fall of 1963, "the conservatives are running him. "48 
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But Goldwater was ignoring neither the Draft Goldwater developments 
nor the larger Goldwater boom. Since early in 1963, Goldwater and other 
Republicans had come to believe that Kennedy could be defeated in 1964. 
As Rockefeller's appeal fell in national surveys, Goldwater's strength rose 
during the spring of 1963. Gallup polls indicated that no conservative 
Republican had measured higher since Robert Taft in 1952. Meanwhile, the 
Arizonan's hold on the GOP professionals grew tighter. ''I'm a poker 
player," he remarked in the fall of 1963, "and I'm sitting with a pair and I 
don't know what the draw will be. If it's a good one I'll say yes. " 49 
All political bets were off after the assassination of President John F. 
Kennedy on November 22, 1963. Among its many meanings for the nation, 
Kennedy's murder in Dallas was certainly a political development. Iron-
ically, it set off a wave of anti-Radical Right sentiment. Moreover, although 
Republicans pledged to observe a moratorium on politicking, Kennedy's 
tragic departure only intensified speculation regarding the 1964 presidential 
sweepstakes. 
Goldwater had lost more than a respected and friendly adversary inJFK; 
Kennedy's death drastically upset the senator's political plans. By late Octo-
ber, the Arizonan had determined to make the run. Now a "depressed" 
Goldwater immediately ordered the Draft Goldwater movement to suspend 
all activities. Meanwhile, polls registered a dramatic drop in Goldwater sup-
port. One state GOP boss from the Midwest best summed up this new anti-
Goldwater sentiment: "He just doesn't look the same against Johnson that 
he did against Kennedy." 50 Goldwater's political strategy, of course, had 
rested on capturing the South. But with Lyndon Johnson, a Texan, sitting in 
the White House, the South was "up for grabs." LBJ could not be defeated, 
Goldwater confided to his wife. 51 
Goldwater, therefore, decided to "recognize reality" and skip the 1964 
race. He met on December 8 with friends and advisors such as Arizona asso-
ciate Dean Burch, Draft Goldwater chairman Peter O'Donnell, and senators 
Norris Cotton of New Hampshire and Carl Curtis of Nebraska. "Our cause is 
lost," said Goldwater, who then outlined his reasons for staying out of the 
1964 Republican race. Senator Cotton protested. Nothing had really 
changed, he claimed. The issues were still the same. Cotton then appealed 
to Goldwater's sense of duty to both the conservative cause and the country. 
Goldwater made no commitment on that December day, but Cotton's 
argument did it. Goldwater ultimately decided to run because of his feeling 
of responsibility to the conservative movement. Actually, Goldwater had lit-
tle choice if he entertained any hopes of ever becoming president. An orga-
nization was in place, soldiers were ready to march, and there was the much-
publicized "wave of conservatism" already sweeping through the country. 
So, although the specific political signs were far from favorable for Gold-
water, he elected to take the plunge. 
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US News and World Report had good reason to state that "Barry Gold-
water has climbed on his own bandwagon" after the senator formally an-
nounced his candidacy for the GOP presidential nomination on January 3, 
1964. Standing on the patio of his hilltop home in Phoenix, this latest Right 
Wing Republican presidential aspirant promised to make his campaign "an 
engagement of principle." "I will not change my beliefs to win votes," 
Goldwater declared. "I will offer a choice, not an echo. " 52 
10 
Extremism in the Pursuit 
of Liberty Is No Vice 
Senator Barry Goldwater's bid for the presidency in 1964 was in trouble 
from the very beginning. 
Goldwater and his handlers, initially regarding the primaries as "polit-
ical booby traps," had decided to stay out of all such 1964 contests except 
California's. But Goldwater was finally persuaded to enter the 1964 opener 
in New Hampshire, where his prospects seemed especially bright. Early pri-
vate polls had Goldwater the overwhelming favorite in New Hampshire, and 
his forces had put together a star-studded delegate lineup that included 
moderate senator Norris Cotton and Doloris Bridges, widow of the Granite 
State's rock-ribbed Republican Styles Bridges. Goldwater also had the sup-
port of the state's leading newspaper, the ultra-conservative Manchester 
Union-Leader. As a result, the Goldwater camp anticipated a four-to-one 
New Hampshire triumph for their man. 
But problems developed for the Goldwater team as the New Hampshire 
primary campaign got underway. Disappointed at failing to enlist former 
RNC chairman Leonard Hall-"the only real pro in the Republican 
Party" -to head his campaign, Goldwater called on Arizonan Denison 
Kitchel. 1 In doing so, Goldwater slighted such draft Goldwater organizers as 
F. Clifton White and Peter O'Donnell and opted for personal familiarity 
over professional competence. Kitchel sadly lacked national political experi-
ence and tended to rely only on former Arizona associates. 
Furthermore, Goldwater's apparent advantages had a way of turning 
into political liabilities. The Goldwater camp quickly discovered the pitfalls 
inherent in the support of the vitriolic William Loeb, publisher of the Man-
chester Union-Leader. Loeb's paper so savaged Rockefeller-"the wife-
swapper" -that Goldwater urged Loeb to soften his language. Conversely, 
when the senator attacked Teamster's Union boss Jimmy Hoffa, he ran up 
against Loeb, who had once received a loan from the union's Central State 
Pension Fund. 
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In another campaign twist, Goldwater's extreme candor, so disarming 
and helpful in his rise to power, now caused many embarrassments and con-
tributed to the "shoot-from-the-hip" charge, a charge that dogged Gold-
water throughout 1964. As early as mid-January, former Draft Goldwater 
chairman Peter O'Donnell urged Goldwater to "control the issues by only 
discussing those things which you have considered in advance." 2 Despite 
O'Donnell's advice, Goldwater gave few prepared speeches in New Hamp-
shire and instead took questions from audiences, speaking in great detail on 
almost all issues and remaining staunchly conservative-and equally contro-
versial. In the process, Goldwater came under intense fire for calling Amer-
ican missiles "undependable," for proposing that Social Security be made 
voluntary (which the press interpreted as a move to end the program), and 
for allegedly suggesting that NATO commanders control nuclear weapons. 
Sighed pro-Goldwater New Hampshire senator Cotton, "He seems to make 
a fetish of frankness." 3 Eventually, Goldwater handlers were forced to scale 
down their New Hampshire predictions to about a 40 percent share of the 
vote. 
Was history repeating itself? Goldwater conservatives could well wonder 
as the New Hampshire returns came in. In the end, the Arizonan took 23 
percent of the New Hampshire Republican vote to edge out New York gov-
ernor Nelson Rockefeller at 20 percent. Just as in 1952, an attractive person-
ality who was on overseas assignment and had waged no campaign in the 
Granite State won a stunning victory. Henry Cabot Lodge gained 35.4 per-
cent of the New Hampshire Republican vote and complete control of the 
state's fourteen-member delegation with a write-in campaign spearheaded 
by some old 1952 Eisenhower backers. 
Right Wing Republicans saw Lodge as the architect of Taft's 1952 
defeat, the foremost apologist of Modern Republicanism, and a lazy cam-
paigner as Nixon's vice-presidential runningmate in 1960. Moreover, in 
becoming the Kennedy administration's ambassador to South Vietnam, 
Lodge had implicated the GOP in a potential foreign policy disaster and 
thus lived up to the Republican Right's nickname for him-Henry 
Sabotage. 
Conservative quarters brushed aside Lodge's New Hampshire victory 
and concentrated on the damage inflicted on Rockefeller. But Goldwater 
also came in for his share of criticism. The National Review's Washington 
insider, "Quincy," wrote that the senator had "bumbled and fumbled," 
leaving New Hampshire voters unsure of his policy stands. Goldwater had to 
learn, "Quincy" added, the difference between leading the faithful and 
reaching out to undecided yet essentially like-minded voters. Goldwater, for 
his part, conceded he had "goofed up somewhere. " 4 
Although Goldwater's New Hampshire loss heightened suspicions of 
Goldwater's nonelectability, Lodge's victory, coupled with his decision to 
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remain in Saigon, benefited Goldwater by keeping moderate Republican, 
anti-Goldwater forces divided and off balance. The New Hampshire primary 
returns also prompted needed changes in the Goldwater nomination drive. 
The loss galvanized the Goldwater team and resulted in a more efficient 
organization in the future. Former Draft Goldwater director F. Clifton 
White was promoted to "co-ordinator of field operations." The candidate, 
too, began to accept advice more willingly. He made fewer campaign ap-
pearances and took greater care when he did speak. Moreover, the Gold-
water organization began to rely more heavily on television and radio to 
bring the Goldwater message directly to the voter, thus by-passing, accord-
ing to the National Review's WilliamS. Rickenbacker, the "Eastern Estab-
lishment" media that insisted on "distorting and quashing the Goldwater 
news." 5 
Primary wins followed. On April 13, Illinois Republicans gave Gold-
water 64 percent of their vote compared with 26 percent for Maine's Senator 
Margaret Chase Smith. The Arizonan picked up about 40 of the 48 Illinois 
convention delegates at stake that day. A month later in the Nebraska pri-
mary, Goldwater triumphed over Ambassador Lodge and former Vice-Pres-
ident Nixon, both organized write-in candidates. 
Although primary news monopolized newspaper headlines during the 
1964 preconvention period, only sixteen states selected convention delegates 
this way. The vast majority of GOP delegates to the 1964 San Francisco con-
vention were to be chosen in state caucuses and conventions, and Goldwater 
strategists had long concentrated their organizational efforts in these states. 
Here Goldwater had real strength. 
The Goldwater organization, under F. Clifton White's direction, har-
nessed tireless Goldwater partisans, who inundated local organizations and 
eventually came to control state Republican parties. Consequently, Gold-
water collected 47 convention delegates even before the New Hampshire 
polls opened. A week after his Granite State setback, South Carolina Repub-
licans awarded the Arizonan its full sixteen-member delegation. By mid-
May, after Goldwater victories in state conventions in Kansas, Nevada, 
Oklahoma, Wyoming, and Washington, the Goldwater camp was claiming 
over 290 delegates and had even more "sleepers" (secret pro-Goldwater del-
egates) in tactical reserve. 6 
Goldwater's overwhelmingly successful state convention tactics could 
not be used in California. Here success in a winner-take-all primary on June 
3 remained crucial to the Goldwater nomination strategy. Although White 
calculated that Goldwater could still win a first-ballot nomination without 
California, the candidate himself stated publicly that a loss there would rule 
him out as the Republican nominee. The Arizonan's Illinois and Nebraska 
primary victories had failed to impress numerous party professionals and 
political pundits; his Nebraska primary performance had even disappointed 
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Goldwater himself. National opinion polls continued to show the senator 
with only second-rank support. Goldwater still had to prove himself as a 
popular vote-getter. Recognizing the importance of a California victory, 
Goldwater pulled out of the Oregon primary in order to devote full time to 
the campaign to the south, lifting Rocky's campaign with an Oregon victory 
and huge amounts of favorable publicity. 
In California, Goldwater stuck with his post-New Hampshire campaign 
tactics. The Goldwater message mainly came to voters over the airwaves. 
Indeed, drastic cutbacks in the number of Goldwater campaign stops 
prompted William F. Knowland, the nominal head of Goldwater's Califor-
nia drive, to threaten rwice to resign. Goldwater also watered down the con-
tent of his message. He assured California voters that he had no plans to 
make Social Security voluntary. Nor did he now advocate selling the entire 
TV A. Although Goldwater did get entangled on the issue of the use of low-
yield atomic bombs in Vietnam, detailed policy proposals generally gave 
way to "Fourth of July Oratory." 
While not as slick as the well-heeled Rockefeller operation, the Gold-
water forces were well organized and had been hard at work since March-
registering voters and marshalling Goldwater activists down to the precinct 
level. "Zeal" was the watchword of the Goldwater drive in California, espe-
cially in the ultra-conservative strongholds of Los Angeles. Another impor-
tant factor in Goldwater's California crusade was "luck." On the weekend 
before the California vote, Nelson Rockefeller's wife gave birth to a son and 
this highlighted the Rockefeller divorce issue, an issue that some Goldwater 
partisans were exploiting with the slogan, "Do You Want a Leader or a 
Lover in the White House?" 
"Do You Want a Leader or a Loner?" countered the Rockefeller camp, 
attempting to cast Rocky as the representative of mainstream Republicanism 
against Goldwater's extremism. Lodge partisans, having failed to get the 
ambassador's name on the ballot, were in fact openly supporting Rockefeller 
in California. Even so, attempts for a full-blown stop-Goldwater coalition 
ultimately failed in California. Responding to Rockefeller campaign litera-
ture picturing the New Yorker as their California stand-in, Nixon, Romney, 
and Governor William Scranton of Pennsylvania all publicly announced 
their neutrality in the California clash. 
Nevertheless, stop-Goldwater talk persisted, with former President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower being at the center of such speculation. Goldwater-
Eisenhower political differences were, of course, well known. Goldwater had 
earlier characterized Eisenhower's administration as little more than a 
"dime-store New Deal" and had met the possible presidential future of 
Ike's brother Milton with the remark, "one Eisenhower in a decade is 
enough." On the New Hampshire hustings in January, Goldwater had 
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stated that he definitely included the Eisenhower administration in his 
charges regarding "30 years of fiscal irresponsibility." 7 
Eisenhower, for his part, distrusted Goldwater's "shoot-from-the-hip" 
approach. Still, Goldwater received an Eisenhower pat on the back upon 
entering the GOP nomination race, as did all other Republican presidential 
aspirants. Hibernating in Palm Springs, California, Ike seemed satisfied to 
play the benign, hands-off elder statesman and a lot of golf, activities 
encouraged by former administration associates like postmaster General 
Arthur Summerfield and treasury secretaty George Humphrey, who were 
both Goldwater enthusiasts. 
As the preconvention campaign heated up, however, Ike's anti-Gold-
water associates-his brother Milton, former Minnesota governor Elmer 
Anderson, and Walter Thayer of the New York Herald Tribune, for exam-
ple-urged him to take a more active role in the GOP nomination struggle. 
In the end they prevailed-to a degree. On May 25, almost a week before 
the California balloting, Ike described his "ideal" GOP presidential candi-
date for 1964 in an article in Thayer's paper. The New York Herald 
Tribune, in turn, released Ike's piece to the New York Times as well as to 
the national wire service. 
While mentioning no names, Eisenhower stressed that his kind of can-
didate should support both the 1956 and 1960 GOP platforms. The former 
president underscored the importance of support for the United Nations 
and civil rights, and he especially praised the GOP congressional leadership 
for its support ofPresidentJohnson's civil rights bill then being debated on 
Capitol Hill. Goldwater, of couse, was known to oppose this legislation, and 
Eisenhower's profile generally seemed to rule out Goldwater as an Ike-
approved standard-bearer in 1964. The Tribune left no doubt about this, 
running Eisenhower's piece along with an article by its national political cor-
respondent Roscoe Drummond, who flatly made the point. 
Out in California, Rockefeller rushed to stress his past support for the 
Eisenhower administration and the 1956 and 1960 GOP platforms. Already 
worried by Rockefeller's large and enthusiastic California crowds, the Gold-
water camp was jolted by the news out of New York. Goldwater, himself, 
gamely noted the similarity between his foreign policy and the old Eisen-
hower-Dulles approach. Although Goldwater refused to say that Eisen-
hower's portrait was a planned anti-Goldwater attack, he did charge that a 
"mysterious clique in the East" had prevailed on Ike to write the portrait 
article. Further, the Arizonan subsequently appeared at one campaign stop 
with an arrow tucked under his arm, giving the profile appearance of having 
been shot in the back-a pose that would show "some of the problems I've 
had in the last few days. "8 
Meanwhile, Eisenhower, after a call from his pro-Goldwater friend 
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George Humphrey, professed to be startled by press interpretations that his 
portrait "read Goldwater out of the GOP." Whatever Ike intended, his por-
trait actually had little political impact. According to one survey, 76 percent 
of the California voters had no knowledge oflke's profile, let alone the rea-
sons behind it. 
In the end, Goldwater won the important June 3 California primary and 
full control of the state's 86-member delegation. The Goldwater organiza-
tion was jubilant. Yet Goldwater's slim victory margin-51.4 percent to 
Rockefeller's 48.6 percent-could be attributed mainly to the zeal of Gold-
water's California workers. Doubts remained about Goldwater as a national 
vote-getter. 
Although some GOP moderates now wnated to make peace with Gold-
water in order to gain some say in the upcoming GOP campaign, the Re-
publican party's nomination struggle was far from over. Stop-Goldwater 
forces were only regrouping after the California primary. Former Vice-Pres-
ident Richard M. Nixon emerged as their new champion by saying it would 
be a "tragedy" if Goldwater's views went unchallenged and unrepudiated 
within the Republican party. Goldwater thought Nixon sounded "more like 
Harold Stassen everyday," but other Republicans saw political doom in 
Goldwater's prospective nomination. 
Any hopes of averting a GOP debacle, however, rested not with Nixon, 
but with Governor William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania. Here was a fresh 
political face. Elected congressman in 1960 and governor in 1962, Scranton 
had wide political appeal and impeccable GOP credentials. High among 
Scranton's accomplishments as Pennsylvania governor was the unification of 
the long-fractured Keystone State GOP. Politically, his dead-center Repub-
licanism placed him closer to Ike than almost any other GOP figure. As 
Scranton himself said, "I am a liberal on civil rights, a conservative on fiscal 
policies and an internationalist on foreign affairs." 9 Like Ike, Scranton also 
lacked the all-consuming political lust of the normal presidential aspirant. 
Unlike Ike, however, Scranton needed this to get ahead. 
Encouraged by Scranton's Harrisburg advisors, some GOP leaders had 
been expressing interest in Scranton since early 1963. But the governor him-
self had sidestepped all serious presidential talk by saying only that he would 
accept a "sincere and honest draft." Initially, no wide gulf separated Scran-
ton and Goldwater. Scranton served in the Air Force Reserve under Gold-
water, who considered Scranton his only "friend" among possible GOP 
presidential contenders. In fact, Goldwater wanted Scranton as his vice-pres-
idential runningmate and even considered making some springtime ar-
rangement with the Keystone State governor to lock up the nomination. 
Scranton, for his part, stated after the California primary that he could see 
no "basic differences" between Goldwater and himself, an admission that 
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left the stop-Goldwater movement gasping, with the Republican national 
convention in San Francisco only weeks away. 10 
On June 6, however, the sagging stop-Goldwater movement tempo-
rarily revived when news broke of an Eisenhower-Scranton meeting in 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Scranton claimed afterward that Ike had asked 
him to make himself "more available" for the GOP presidential nomina-
tion. At that same moment, Pennsylvania senator Hugh Scott also an-
nounced the formation of a Congressional Committee to Elect Scranton 
President. 
The Eisenhower-Scranton parley, coming as it did on the weekend of 
the National Governors' Conference in Cleveland, fired speculation about 
possible anti-Goldwater maneuvers by GOP governors. Would Republican 
governors help torpedo Goldwater in 1964 as they had done to Taft in Hous-
ton in 1952? Goldwater partisans had reason to fear. Not only were liberal-
moderate GOP governors trying to draft a progressive declaration of Re-
publican principles, but Michigan's Governor George Romney was telling 
colleagues that he would battle Goldwater's "suicidal destruction of the 
Republican Party." 
At the conference, Arizona governor Paul Fannin (one of the three out-
right Goldwater backers among the sixteen Republican governors) quickly 
stepped in to quash any statement of "progressive" principles, and Oregon 
governor Mark Hatfield, though no Goldwater backer, publicly ridiculed 
Romney's belated bravado before the other Republican chief executives. 
That left only Scranton. He had departed Gettysburg convinced that Ike was 
urging him to enter the GOP race and on Sunday arrived in Cleveland ready 
to announce his presidential candidacy on that morning's "Face the Nation" 
television broadcast. 
Goldwater's handlers had feared that the Gettysburg meeting might 
spark a pro-Scranton move, and Clifton White had already called George 
Humphrey at his home in Cleveland. Humphrey, a strong Goldwater 
backer, was to be Eisenhower's host while the former president also visited 
Cleveland for the governor's conference. According to White, Humphrey 
telephoned Eisenhower on Saturday evening and bluntly told the former 
president that it would be embarrassing to entertain him at his home if Ike 
were simultaneously masterminding a dump-Goldwater campaign. When 
Ike later arrived in Cleveland, Humphrey never left his side. 
One result of host Humphrey's careful shepherding of Eisenhower was 
the former president's speech to the Republican governors on Monday, 
which was seen as a call for GOP unity behind Barry Goldwater. An even 
more important Eisenhower call had taken place a day earlier. Two hours 
before Scranton's "Face the Nation" broadcast, Ike got in touch with Scran-
ton and told the Pennsylvanian that he hoped that he (Ike) had not 
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conveyed the wrong impression at Gettysburg the day before. Ike wanted 
Scranton to join no "cabal" against any other GOP contender. Scranton was 
devastated. He folded his announcement statement and put it in his coat 
pocket, where it remained. On "Face the Nation," Scranton gave a clumsy 
and confusing performance, even saying that Goldwater would be an accept-
able and electable GOP nominee. 
But Scranton, now labeled the "Hamlet of Harrisburg," and certain 
stop-Goldwater Republicans were not finished-or did not realize that they 
were finished. A few days after the Cleveland governors' conference, the 
Senate voted 71 to 29 to invoke cloture and end a 75-day filibuster on the 
currently pending Johnson civil rights legislation. Goldwater joined Repub-
licans John Williams of Delaware and Carl Curtis of Nebraska in opposing 
cloture. In reality Goldwater had taken a stand against the civil rights bill. 
(Goldwater voted against the measure shortly thereafter.) In Harrisburg, 
Scranton, humiliated only days earlier, was "sick" over Goldwater's stand 
and gave up all hope of reasoning with the Arizonan. Despite the odds 
against nomination, Scranton decided that some Republican had to cham-
pion the principles of Lincoln against Goldwater's conservatism. 
On June 12, therefore, Pennsylvania governor William Scranton 
declared himself a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, a 
"progressive Republican" who offered a "real choice," and not an "echo of 
fear and reaction." The Keystone State governor's chances in his battle 
against Goldwater's "easy answer" and "dimestore feudalism" were always 
extremely doubtful at best. But one result of the Scranton crusade was 
decidedly not. The Republican convention would be, predicted one top Re-
publican, "the bloodiest damn convention you've seen in a long, long 
time." 11 
Goldwater perfunctorily welcomed Scranton to the GOP nomination 
race, but privately he seethed. Distressed by the possible harm of Scranton's 
"destructive attacks" and the "Goldwater can't win" arguments, the Arizo-
nan blamed Scranton's late entry on the eastern "Republican Establish-
ment," specifically Richard Nixon. The GOP's eastern wing did indeed rally 
around Scranton. Three days after Scranton's announcement, Rockefeller 
withdrew from the nomination race and threw his support to Scranton-"a 
candidate," said Rocky, "in the mainstream of American political thought 
and action." 12 The New York governor estimated that he could deliver over 
85 of New York's 92 delegates to the Pennsylvanian, as well as his 18 Ore-
gon supporters. The National Draft Lodge committee quickly got behind 
Scranton, and Lodge himself returned from Saigon at the end of June to 
command the Scranton forces. 
Goldwater's actual vote against the civil rights bill made the clamor of 
anti-Goldwater Republicans all the more shrill. But no Scranton delegate 
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boom ensued. It was too late for that, as most Republican leaders realized. 
Signs of Goldwater delegate strength abounded. Many former Rockefeller 
delegates were reportedly slipping into the Goldwater column. The New Jer-
sey delegation, which was known to favor Scranton, refused to make an out-
right commitment to the Keystone State governor. And in spite of Scran-
ton's personal pleas, Senator John Williams of Delaware dropped out as a 
favorite-son candidate and came out for Goldwater. 
Throughout this maneuvering, the Goldwater force remained intact. 
Not only did Goldwater delegates hold solid for the Arizonan, but the sen-
ator's bandwagon kept rolling along. Scranton still hoped that Illinois sen-
ator Everett Dirksen would become a source of anti-Goldwater support. 
Dirksen, the GOP Senate minority leader, had lined up Republicans for the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and had publicly ridiculed Goldwater's opposition to 
the measure. Now, Scranton urged Dirksen to stand as the "Land of Lin-
coln's" favorite son. But Dirksen gave Scranton no commitment. The rabid 
grassroots Goldwater sentiment in Illinois had definitely impressed the Sen-
ate minority leader. 
Dirksen's deficiencies as a political kamikaze became apparent when the 
Illinois convention delegation met in Chicago on June 30. After a personal 
Scranton pitch to the delegation, Dirksen led the Illinois Republicans in vot-
ing unanimously to back Goldwater. A day later Dirksen confirmed that he 
would nominate Barry Goldwater at the GOP convention in San Francisco. 
The Republican party had ridden "the grey ghost of me-too" for too long, 
claimed Dirksen, who unlike Goldwater had often supportedJFK and LBJ. 
"That old boy's got an antenna three feet long," said Goldwater. 13 What-
ever the minority leader's reasons, Goldwater managers termed Dirksen's 
support the "clincher," and they now claimed 690 first-ballot votes, with 
only 655 needed to nominate. 
As for Scranton, the real knockout blow came on the eve of the San 
Francisco gathering when Ohio governor James Rhodes, who now believed 
that Goldwater could win the presidency on the strength of an urban back-
lash vote in the North, urged the Pennsylvania governor to pull out of the 
race and join Goldwater on the Republican ticket. Then Rhodes freed the 
Ohio delegation from its favorite-son commitment to him and endorsed 
Goldwater. A Buckeye stampede to Goldwater at the convention appeared 
likely. 
San Francisco proved a curious jumble of carnival and conflict. As the 
Republicans gathered in July, 1964, there was little of the outright physical 
hostility that had marked the Taft-Eisenhower political slugfest in 1952. 
While a seething subsurface bitterness existed, no factional tug-of-war was 
forecast. The Goldwater forces had the delegates-overwhelmingly-and 
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this fact colored the atmosphere in the Cow Palace and in the city's hotel 
lobbies. Most Republicans had come to San Francisco anticipating the final 
triumph of Barry Goldwater and the Republican Right Wing. 
San Francisco was Goldwater's during convention week. Clay busts of 
the Arizona senator sold for $65 at one local hotel. The city's jammed cable 
cars shared street space with muletrains, complete with little boys in ten-gal-
lon hats and girls in sombreros and tasseled boots. At the senator's hospital-
ity suite, grown-up Goldwater gals in cowboy outfits dispensed "Gold 
Water"-" the right drink for the conservative taste." But not all was conviv-
ial. On Sunday, 25,000 to 40,000 people demonstrated against Goldwater's 
stand on civil rights in a parade sponsored by the Congress on Racial Equal-
ity and attended by baseball star Jackie Robinson. All week long, civil rights 
demonstrators picketed outside the Cow Palace, while inside the flag-draped 
arena a silhouette of lincoln hung. 
Confidence and communications distinguished the Goldwater camp. A 
final preconvention Gallup poll that showed the senator trailing Scranton 
(60 percent to 34 percent among the nation's Republicans) worried Gold-
water handlers not at all. Goldwater had the convention delegates, 7 30 to 
800 of them, according to Goldwater advisors. Scranton's talk of stopping 
Goldwater on the first ballot was just convention gabble, as even Scranton 
had to know. Basically, all the Goldwater camp had to do was avoid making 
any major mistakes. To guarantee a smooth-running convention, the Gold-
water organization installed a communications network of hitherto un-
matched technological sophistication and expense. Years before, faulty 
organization had worked against Right Wing Republican Robert Taft's pres-
idential drives. Goldwaterites would not make a similar mistake. 
The 1964 Goldwater effort conjured up memories of Taft in yet another 
way. A memorandum circulated by the Goldwater high command entitled 
"Possible Opposition Tactics" showed that Right Wing Republicans still re-
membered the Eisenhower coup of 1952 with deep bitterness. Goldwater 
managers now dredged up all the machinations-"threats and cajolery," 
business and financial favors, blackmail, bullying and spying-that the 
Eisenhower camp had used "shamelessly" in Chicago to "rob" Taft of the 
nomination. "The Eastern wrecking crew of '52 is back in almost identical 
form," this Goldwater camp memo stated. "The 1952 violent tactics were 
successful against Bob Taft .... This time it will be much tougher." Wil-
liam F. Knowland publicly alerted Goldwater supporters to the probable 
"Super Madison Avenue Approach" of the Scranton operation. 14 
The first Scranton ploy was far less subtle. Desperately searching for 
some disruptive "incident" on the eve of the San Francisco parley, Scranton 
decided to challenge Goldwater to a debate before the entire convention. 
Written by a young aide, the "Scranton letter" characterized Goldwater del-
egates as "little more than chickens whose necks will be wrung at will." It 
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went on to accuse Goldwater himself of "casually prescribing" nuclear war-
fare, "irresponsibility in the serious question of racial holocaust," and being 
the dupe of "radical elements." "In short," the Scranton letter concluded, 
"Goldwaterism has come to stand for a whole crazy-quilt collection of 
absurd and dangerous positions that would be soundly repudiated by the 
American people in November." 15 
Receiving Scranton's challenge on Sunday, the day before the GOP con-
vention was to begin, Goldwater was "boiling mad," despite White's assur-
ances that it would increase his first- ballot total to at least 1,000 votes. Hav-
ing photocopied the letter for distribution to the convention delegates, 
Goldwater returned it to Scranton, saying he did not believe the governor 
had written it. Goldwater naturally declined Scranton's "ridiculous" invita-
tion to debate. Scranton, for his part, had never seen the letter and said so 
the next day. The Pennsylvania governor also conceded that the challenge 
was too strongly worded. But Scranton accepted full responsibility for the 
letter and refused to apologize to Goldwater. In the end, Scranton's literary 
efforts proved not only to be a disaster for his own nomination, but also for 
Goldwater and the Republican party. No matter how much Scranton suf-
fered, his broadside helped to fasten further a distorted image on Gold-
water, the prospective Republican standard-bearer. LyndonJohnson and the 
Democrats should have paid for such publicity. 
Actually, the Scranton letter was the result of the failure of party moder-
ates to create any "incident" in the Platform Committee procedures of the 
previous week. Scranton forces had hoped to nail down certain liberal plat-
form planks that Goldwater would find unacceptable; some Goldwater del-
egates might then desert him for Scranton. Pursuing this strategy, Scranton 
had appeared before the Platform Committee and had delineated eleven 
major issues-civil rights, extremism, and Social Security-on which he dif-
fered dramatically with the Arizona senator. 
Goldwater strategists, in turn, were determined not to hand the Scran-
ton forces any real issue over the GOP platform, and the pro-Goldwater 
Platform Committee members expressed a willingness to make enough com-
promises so that continued squabbling by Scranton forces would look like 
nitpicking. The committee subsequently accepted moderate Scranton lan-
guage on planks dealing with the United Nations, foreign aid, and Social 
Security but rejected Scranton planks on civil rights, extremism, presidential 
control of nuclear weapons, and a national right-to-work law. 
Platform Committee moderates naturally complained about the Gold-
water camp's "steamroller" and "Gestapo tactics," and proceeded to take 
their platform fight to the convention floor. On Tuesday evening, the long 
party platform was droned from the Cow Palace rostrum, as Goldwater man-
agers got the convention through the peak television viewing hours in most 
of the nation without incident. Following the platform presentation, how-
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ever, Scranton lieutenant Hugh Scott stepped forward to offer an "anti-
extremism" plank that singled out the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch 
Society. Not only were many Goldwater delegates offended that eastern Re-
publicans regarded them as political extremists, but 100 of the 1,300 Re-
publican delegates at San Francisco were bonafide Birchers, according to a 
society spokesman. 16 
Boos filled the Cow Palace as Scott made his proposal. Then, Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller came forward to speak for the plank against extremism. 
The Cow Palace erupted. Boos, hisses, catcalls, and cries of "We Want 
Barry" filled the hall as Rocky excoriated the infiltration and takeover of 
established political organizations by communist and Nazi methods. At 
points, Rocky could not go on-a martyrdom Goldwater managers thought 
he enjoyed. 17 Convention chairman Thruston Morton pounded the gavel in 
a futile attempt to maintain order. 
In their command trailer, Goldwater managers ordered regional direc-
tors to stop the booing. But the dazzling Goldwater communications system 
proved useless. Except for some noise making in the Texas delegation, the 
major commotion came from the galleries, from rabble-rousers unknown to 
the Goldwater command. When this was determined, Goldwater operatives 
dispatched messengers to the galleries to try to stop the harmful racket. 
The uproar ended, but not before the factional hostility was driven out 
into the open. When the convention voted, it gave a "thunderous no" to 
Scott's plank condemning the KKK and the Birch Society. Then, wanting 
no appearance of weakness, Goldwater convention managers directed their 
forces to vote down a mild proposal by Michigan's George Romney that 
decried extremism without singling out specific organizations. San Francisco 
Republicans also crushed other Scranton moves to broaden the platform's 
civil rights plank and to reaffirm presidential control over nuclear weapons. 
Finally, at 12:36 A.M., after eight hours of debate and contention, the con-
vention adopted-without amendment-the Platform Committee's draft. 
Goldwater remarked that the unamended platform merely reflected the 
Republican party's new "conservative majority." 18 The 1964 GOP platform 
did mark the changes in the Republican party since 1960, although it was 
hardly emphatic enough for some Goldwater zealots. On civil rights, for 
example, the 1960 platform had called for "vigorous enforcement" of exist-
ing civil rights statutes. The 1964 civil rights plank rather weakly pledged 
the "full implementation and faithful execution" of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 but stood against "inverse discrimination." The 1964 platform also 
backed away from the social-welfare and education commitments of the ear-
lier document. The 1964 planks on defense and foreign policy betrayed a 
greater militance than Republicans had had in 1960. At that time, Republi-
cans had termed military superiority an impossibility in the nuclear age. In 
1964 Republicans pledged to achieve military supremacy. Further, the 1960 
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platform had expressed a faith in international negotiation that the 1964 
document seemed to preclude. While not as nationalistic and aggressive as 
some earlier Goldwater foreign policy pronouncements, the 1964 Republi-
can platform called for the "eventual liberation" of Communist-dominated 
regimes via peaceful means and for the recognition of a Cuban government 
in exile, as well as for aid for Cuban "freedom fighters." The aim of Amer-
ican foreign policy under the Republicans would be, declared the 1964 San 
Francisco statement, "victory." 
If the 1964 Republican platform was no ringing right-wing manifesto, 
its calls for less government at home and victory abroad at least offered "A 
Choice Not an Echo." This fact was also underscored by the voting for the 
nomination on Wednesday evening which, at the completion of the first 
ballot, gave Goldwater 883 votes to Scranton's 214. Rockefeller held on to 
114 votes and George Romney, 41. Scranton then came to the podium and 
asked all Republicans to rally round Goldwater. The Cow Palace throng 
whooped, shrieked, bellowed, and howled. A Right Wing Republican had 
captured the GOP nomination at last. 
The Republican nominee still had to win over his entire party if there 
was any hope of driving Lyndon Johnson out of the White House. Gold-
water lost no time in muffing every opportunity to do so. His first major 
blunder was his choice of a vice-presidential runningmate, Representative 
William E. Miller, who had taken over for Thruston Morton as RNC boss in 
June, 1961. A cocky, dapper little man given to grey homburgs and cigarette 
holders, this upstate New York congressman was sharp, even savage, in 
political debate-a perfect, low-roading "hatchet man" to complement 
Goldwater's high-road philosopher-king approach. Goldwater selected 
Miller, the GOP nominee told party state chairmen, because "he drives 
Johnson nuts." But Miller had other attributes. He came from the East, was 
a Roman Catholic, and some of Goldwater's advisors believed that the selec-
tion ofRNC chairman Miller would help unite the GOP. 
That notion proved badly mistaken. While hailing from New York, 
Miller was no "Eastern Republican," but an upstate conservative who had 
actually opposed Eisenhower policies more often than Goldwater. Moreover, 
Goldwater never even consulted with Eisenhower, Nixon, or other impor-
tant party leaders on the choice. As a result, GOP moderates immediately 
complained about the Goldwater camp's "heavy-handed tactics" and "rub-
bing our faces in the dirt." But party moderates were themselves partly to 
blame. Their overblown anti-Goldwater rhetoric and last-ditch Scranton 
drive had gone far to tear apart the GOP and virtually rule out any GOP 
moderate for the second spot. The "Scranton letter" definitely shot down 
the most obvious vice-presidential selection-Scranton himself. Still, Gold-
water remained responsible for his failure to try to reunite the party through 
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consultation or creative compromise. In the fall, Goldwater would be asking 
the American people to make sweeping policy changes, and he needed a 
reassuring figure on the ticket. Miller was hardly that. Liberal and moderate 
Republicans in San Francisco viewed the Goldwater-Miller ticket as an ideal 
ticket-but only for the Titanic. 
Goldwater's Thursday night acceptance speech provided him with an-
other opportunity to bind the party, and again he failed. Thursday night got 
off to a promising start when Richard Nixon presented the new GOP stan-
dard-bearer to the convention in a masterful speech designed to gloss over 
party differences. The Cow Palace shook for fifteen minutes. Red, white, 
and gold balloons cascaded from the rafters. Delegates broke into the "Bat-
tle Hymn of the Republic" and, of course, the "We Want Barry" chant. 
This was Goldwater's moment. And Goldwater certainly gave Goldwater 
diehards some hard-line rhetoric to cheer about. But he offered moderate 
Republicans nothing at all. "Any who join us in all sincerity, we welcome," 
Goldwater declared in a flat, if not harsh, tone punctuated by popping bal-
loons. "Those who do not care for our cause we do not expect to enter our 
ranks in any case." There was even more to disquiet moderate Republicans, 
as Goldwater added, "I would remind you that extremism in the defense of 
liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit 
of justice is no virtue." 19 
Although Goldwater partisans loved it, the GOP nominee had man-
aged to make his acceptance speech a campaign issue for some of his own 
party brethren. His rhetorical indulgences regarding extremism and modera-
tion left Republican moderates and liberals alike deeply troubled. That 
Goldwater's acceptance speech presaged further problems within the party 
could be seen by television viewers, who watched New York Senator Keating 
and several other delegates leave the convention floor as the Goldwater 
faithful went wild. Despite the New Yorker's later claim that he had left 
only to seek medical attention to a sore throat, Keating became something 
of a hero for Republican moderates and liberals. Not surprisingly, Rockefel-
ler reacted the most vehemently, expressing his "amazement and shock" 
over Goldwater's "dangerous, irresponsible and frightening" address. 
Eisenhower said he would campaign for Goldwater only after the sen-
ator cleared up these "confusing" remarks. Goldwater told Ike the next day 
that his historic Normandy landing had itself been an act of extremism. "I 
have never thought of it that way," the former president replied. Other Re-
publicans, however, were not so easily appeased, and Goldwater initially 
made no real attempt to clarify his remarks. 20 
Conservatives, of course, delighted in Goldwater's nomination triumph 
as the upshot of past struggles and "the wave of the future." Conservative 
Newsweek columnist Raymond Moley saw the Goldwater nomination as the 
"culmination" of protest from within the party that had grown since 1948, 
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and the Chicago Tribune hailed the victory of the "little guy" over the 
bankers and big city bosses of the GOP. "The 'liberals' and lachtymose ele-
ments of the crepe-hanging press," crowed the Tribune, "can't reconcile 
themselves to the fact that the people have at last taken over the Republican 
party. "21 
This Goldwater nomination also signaled certain other basic changes in 
American politics. The triumph of the Goldwater forces marked a political 
power shift both in the nation and in the Republican party from the East 
and Northeast to the South and West, the new American industrial frontier 
that would become known as the Sun Belt. The Goldwater nomination 
struggle had pitted the burgeoning power centers of the South and West 
against the eastern seaboard, with the Midwest now representing the crucial 
balance of power. Of course, this kind of regional conflict-primarily mid-
western conservative Republicans against liberal "me-too" Republicans from 
the East-had long existed in the GOP. As previously noted, the Chicago 
Tribune and Newsweek's Moley both placed the conflict in its historical con-
text, and the Goldwater camp's "Possible Opposition Tactics" memo clearly 
established Goldwater as Taft's successor in the Republican Right's ongoing 
battle with eastern "kingmakers." Midwestern old-line Republicans could 
find much to exploit and enjoy in this transformation. 
The organizational skill of the Goldwater forces had simply hastened 
this GOP power shift. In San Francisco, Goldwater controlled more del-
egates than any other contender even without delegates chosen in state pri-
maries. This was not only a supreme tribute to the Goldwater organization, 
but also a comment on the opposition to Goldwater, belated, fragmented 
and ineffective. The general Republican belief that the Democrats were un-
beatable in 1964 may have discouraged early organizational efforts by other 
Republican candidates. Unable to match the Goldwater organizational 
prowess, once the GOP nomination race got under way, moderate Republi-
cans had to rely on creating an appealing and meaningful image in opposi-
tion to Goldwater Republicanism-a successful moderate approach in past 
battles with the Republican Right. 
But this approach failed moderate Republicans in 1964. Far away in 
South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge could offer little more than a faint echo 
of the GOP Camelot-Eisenhower Republicanism. Governor Nelson Rocke-
feller probably offered the clearest alternative, but he could not rise above 
his personal family and campaign problems. Scranton, for his part, consis-
tently played down his differences with Senator Goldwater until the last mo-
ment of his noncandidacy, by which time it was too late. 
Ultimately, Scranton's nomination bid was little more than a gesture to 
retain the "progressive image" of the Republican party. Powerless in San 
Francisco and knowing it, the Scranton forces could only whimper as the 
Goldwater camp wielded its hard-won convention power. Admittedly, the 
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Goldwater forces were unnecessarily and unwisely uncompromising in their 
convention control. But moderate Republicans often acted like spoilsports, 
and conservative Republicans had reason to complain about their "rule-or-
ruin" tactics. 
If GOP conservatives suspected their moderate brethren of rule-or-ruin 
tendencies, Republican moderates feared that Goldwater partisans were 
bent on a party purge after their nomination triumph. Goldwater's choice of 
Dean Burch, an obscure Arizonan with no national political stature, as the 
new national committee chairman suggested to party moderates-and even 
to some Goldwater loyalists-that certain Goldwater Republicans were more 
interested in ousting moderates from the GOP hierarchy than in ousting LBJ 
from the White House. 
Goldwater men came to monopolize key spots in the national organiza-
tion. They removed GOP national research director William B. Prender-
ghast and took RNC executive committee posts away from party moderates, 
leaving New York unrepresented for the first time in history. Moderate Re-
publicans complained of getting little campaign aid from the national party 
organization. Furthermore, Republican middle-roaders now suspected the 
"Citizens for Goldwater" committee of being an apparatus for the "ruthless 
purge" of the GOP, as Old Guard Republicans had earlier eyed the "Cit-
izens for Eisenhower." Reports that Burch deputy John Grenier had ordered 
the removal of all Lincoln and Eisenhower portraits from the walls of GOP 
headquarters said it all for anti-Goldwater Republicans. 
Indeed, some postconvention personnel changes were only natural. 
Moderate Republicans under Dewey and Eisenhower had earlier done like-
wise. Reveling in the "completed occupation" of the Republican party 
apparatus and mocking the distress of GOP moderates, the National Review 
wondered, "What did they expect?" 22 Still, such callous attitudes certainly 
did not enhance GOP unity. 
And that problem grew worse in the weeks following the San Francisco 
convention. Many businessmen who had traditionally been Republican were 
beginning to organize on behalf of Democrat Lyndon Johnson. Former 
Rockefeller delegates were steering clear of the Goldwater-Miller campaign 
efforts. In New York, Republican senators Keating andJavits and Represen-
tative John V. Lindsay of Manhattan's silk stocking district declared that 
they would not support the GOP nominee. Representatives James Fulton of 
Pennsylvania and Silvio Conte of Massachusetts joined other GOP moder-
ates deserting Goldwater. Finally, governors Romney and Rockefeller con-
tinued to hold off on any endorsement. The Republican party was in dis-
array. 
Belatedly, Goldwater uied to reassure factional rivals and patch up the 
GOP. In a publicized letter to Nixon, Goldwater tried to undo the damage 
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of his San Francisco remarks on "extremism in the defense of liberty." He 
contended that these words "were examples of a quality of devotion to lib-
erty and justice-'firmness in the right,' as Lincoln put it-for which no Re-
publican, and, indeed, no American need apologize." Goldwater added, 
"It goes without saying that such devotion would not countenance illegal or 
improper means to achieve proper goals. " 23 
Goldwater's major Republican harmony bid came shortly thereafter in 
Hershey, Pennsylvania. There, almost thirty GOP governors and gubernato-
rial candidates met with Goldwater, Miller, Eisenhower, and Nixon. Sig-
nificantly, Pennsylvania governor William Scranton played host. At the 
Hershey session, Goldwater promised to continue the Eisenhower-Dulles 
foreign policy and to consult with Ike on key national security appoint-
ments. He also pledged to support Social Security and live up to his legally 
mandated civil rights responsibilities as president. Goldwater, moreover, 
repeated his repudiation of extremist groups and character assassins, singling 
out the KKK, but pointedly excluding the John Birch Society. 
Goldwater also asked the Hershey Republicans for some straight talk of 
their own. They fully obliged. In fact, the Hershey conclave was marked by 
more candor on Goldwater's liabilities than political creativity on ways by 
which the Republicans could defeat LBJ and the Democrats. While some 
Hershey conferees lamented Goldwater's failure to spell out positions on 
specific issues, the consensus was that Goldwater's "shoot-from-the-hip" ex-
tremist image was continuing to bog down his campaign. Rockefeller, for his 
part, pressed Goldwater to make an emotional plea for civil rights that "fel-
lows on the lower level" could grasp. Although the Hershey conference was 
generally amiable, Goldwater's own frustrations surfaced at one point. "I 
think it's time that we decide that you've got a candidate for the President 
and Vice President," he said. "You might not like us, but you're stuck with 
, 24 us .... 
The Hershey conference ended with a superficial picture of GOP 
harmony. Although Goldwater proudly insisted that he had made no concil-
iations at all, political observers generally interpreted his Hershey perfor-
mance as a peace offering to party moderates. One participant with a sense 
of history said that the Hershey gathering represented Ike's reclaiming of 
Morningside Heights, the site of the famous Taft-Eisenhower harmony con-
ference in 1952. 25 
In the end, the Hershey conference triggered neither a rush of GOP 
endorsements nor an outpouring of popular support for Goldwater. While 
encouraged by Goldwater's Chocolate Town gestures, governors Romney 
and Rockefeller still refrained from outright endorsements and ruled out any 
pro-Goldwater stumping outside their respective states. Senators Javits, 
Keating, and Case all withheld their backing from Goldwater. 
Goldwater had at least made a nod to Republican party moderates. But 
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he was about a month too late. While the actual campaign time lost in that 
month was hardly crucial, the actions of Goldwater and his enthusiasts in 
those four weeks had reinforced the Goldwater image painted by his Demo-
cratic and Republican foes-that of a right-wing devil with hornrimmed 
glasses bent on the complete conservative takeover of the Republican party. 
Hershey, in turn, did not cause Goldwater to emerge as the leader of all Re-
publicans. It did serve, however, as the final gavel of the Republican San 
Francisco convention. The Republicans were hardly happy and harmonious, 
but Goldwater could at last begin his campaign against Lyndon Johnson and 
the Democrats. 
Since Goldwater had confounded political bettors who had counted 
him out several times before, the experts warily admitted as the fall canvass 
began that a Goldwater presidential victory was not impossible. True, John-
son had the powers of incumbency, the issue of peace and prosperity and, 
said Goldwater backers, the support of the national media. Johnson, more-
over, enjoyed a wide lead in the popular opinion polls. But two new factors 
in American politics left observers unsure of potential Goldwater strength. 
The frantic political activity of super-patriot groups like the John Birch Soci-
ety might disrupt standard voting patterns in California and Texas, and 
working-class resentment against black civil rights gains-white backlash-
might cut into traditional Democratic majorities in northern cities. The 
Goldwater campaign organization also seemed extraordinarily designed to 
enhance Goldwater prospects. 26 
A few weeks into the 1964 campaign, Massachusetts senator Leverett 
Saltonstall introduced the GOP presidential nominee at a rally in Boston's 
Fenway Park. Goldwater, declared Saltonstall, was neither "trigger happy" 
nor "irresponsible." 27 This, after all, was the major issue of the 1964 cam-
paign. Would Goldwater's foreign policy lead to the "disaster of nuclear 
war"? Would Goldwater's domestic prescriptions foster, as LBJ charged, an 
"atmosphere of hate and fear" and threaten "the whole course of American 
development"? That Republicans like Saltonstall had to address such ques-
tions indicated the nature of the troubles hounding the Goldwater crusade. 
Goldwater, for his part, tried periodically to snuff out the "trigger-
happy" issue. At his campaign kickoff, for instance, he contended that Re-
publicans were "preoccupied with peace," and he pledged to end the mil-
itary draft. But a split in the Goldwater camp hampered any sustained effort 
to moderate the Goldwater image. Conservative academicians and publicists 
such as the American Enterprise Institute's William Baroody and Karl Hess 
were elbowing out the conservative political technicians who had been 
largdy responsible for Goldwater's nomination triumph. 
One directive of the conservative think tank that proved especially disas-
trous stated that Goldwater would not stoop to discussing problems of local 
interest at campaign stops across the nation. Goldwater's campaign would 
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be high-minded in principle and would not represent politics as usual. As a 
result, Goldwater passed up numerous opportunities to apply his conserva-
tive message to the legitimate special concerns of the voters-the public and 
private power problem in Idaho, for example. Thus, the Goldwater cam-
paign took on a callous and sometimes downright comic quality, as the sen-
ator assailed the antipoverty program in poverty-stricken West Virginia or 
discussed crime in the streets in the peaceful retirement community of St. 
Petersburg, Florida, where, for some, the only crimes were Goldwater's 
opposition to Medicare and his various proposals to make Social Security vol-
untary. 
Goldwater hoped for a presidential campaign that would amount to a 
broad debate of liberalism versus conservatism, a clear clash of philosophies. 
Goldwater declared at the beginning of the campaign, "I want to talk about 
freedom." And he often did, dealing with basic problems of American gov-
ernment and the contribution of liberal philosophy to the decline in Amer-
ican values, morals, and manners over the past thirty years. "You know in 
your hearts," Goldwater said repeatedly, "that something is wrong in our 
land .... " 28 
Star-spangled sloganeering that eschewed complicated issues, however, 
could not convince the American voter, enjoying both peace and prosperity, 
that there was indeed a threat to freedom or that the Goldwater way offered 
a better and brighter future. Throughout the fall of 1964, Goldwater groped 
futilely for a winning issue. Frequently, he hammered away at corruption in 
government, assailing the Johnson administration's "curious crew" and per-
sonally attacking the president as an "arm-twisting powergrabber" who only 
knew the art of "buying and bludgeoning votes." He once tarred the ad-
ministration as being "soft on communism." In early October, hoping to 
ignite his campaign, Goldwater looked back to Eisenhower's 1952 "I shall 
go to Korea" crowd-pleaser and announced that as the next president he 
would ask Ike to head a military fact-finding expedition to Vietnam. How-
ever, the old 1952 magic was not there. The Goldwater campaign slogged 
on. 
"In Your Heart You Know He's Right" ran the Republican campaign 
slogan. Yet the Goldwater campaign actually made no pitch to passions. 
Steering clear of the volatile civil rights issue, Goldwater denied himself any 
chance of directly cultivating the white backlash vote, although his remarks 
on "crime in the streets" and "law and order" were widely interpreted as 
code words in a racist appeal. Nor did he distinguish himself as a campaign-
er. His speeches, which usually followed no consistent theme and were deliv-
ered in an easy, colloquial manner, lacked punch. Goldwater seldom 
worked the crowds, avoiding the sidewalk tours and hand-pumping that are 
part of American presidential campaigns. Unfortunately, even Goldwater's 
approach to campaigning seemed to offer "A Choice Not an Echo." The 
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New Yorker's Richard Rovere summed up what political writers felt 
throughout the fall when he wrote, "The whole [Goldwater] enterprise has 
the air not of a great political campaign but of a great political caper-a 
series of pranks and calculated errors. " 29 
Adding to the problems of the Goldwater campaign's ham-handedness 
were the wholesale desertions from the 1964 GOP cause. While political car-
toonists and columnists savaged Goldwater, traditionally Republican news-
papers and periodicals came out against the GOP nominee in record num-
bers, leading conservative Republicans to belabor the liberal bias of the 
communications media. While less partisan quarters also criticized the news 
media's "shabby" treatment of Goldwater, the GOP nominee and his staff 
were partly to blame, having made little effort to establish cordial relations 
with the working press. 
Business also ran out on Goldwater, who grew bitter about "materially 
minded" corporate heads. 3° Fortune spoke for many Republican business-
men in chiding Goldwater Republicans for failing to consider the "great and 
subtle role" of fiscal policy. 31 The opening day of the Goldwater presidential 
campaign brought reports that a group of predominately Republican busi-
ness leaders, led by Eisenhower's former cabinet officers Robert B. Anderson 
and Marion Folsom, had met at the White House with LBJ to form an inde-
pendent business committee to support the Democratic ticket. 
Even more damaging, numerous prominent Republican politicians 
joined the anti-Goldwater exodus, an exodus made all the easier by the 
Goldwater camp's failure to woo back liberal and moderate Republicans 
after the campaign got underway. In New York, neither Keating norJavits 
enclosed the GOP ticket. Nor did California's Senator Thomas Kuchel or 
Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey. Governor George Romney of Michigan 
pointedly stated that he only "accepted" the Goldwater candidacy. Certain 
disgruntled Republicans took positive action. Former Eisenhower aides 
Arthur Larson and Maxwell Rabb headed the National Citizens for Johnson 
and Humphrey organization. Robert Taft's brother Charles spearheaded the 
National Committee to Support Moderate Republicans, and some GOP 
middle-roaders launched Project '68, a magazine devoted to the anti-Gold-
water Republican future. Indeed, the steady stream of GOP defectors 
prompted Washington humor columnist Art Buchwald to uncover the little-
known political outfit of the 1964 campaign-"Republicans for Gold-
water. " 32 
Not that Johnson's campaign thrilled anti-Goldwaterites interested in 
any kind of meaningful debate of great national issues. The New York 
Times, for example, bemoaned LB]'s "pious platitudes" and "cloudy vi-
sions of the Great Society. " 33 Nevertheless, Johnson's canvass was a master-
piece of American political campaigning-an effective blend of advertising 
(the famous daisy commercial), tub-thumping, and flesh-pressing in the 
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grand style. "He could sell sand to a beachcomber," said one admirer of 
LBJ's "ya'll-come-to-the-speakin"' approach. 34 But Johnson would neither 
engage in Goldwater's hoped-for debate of liberalism versus conservatism 
nor respond recklessly to Goldwater-Miller barbs. Further, the incumbent 
never became an issue in the campaign. Instead, Johnson constantly placed 
Goldwater on the defensive, taking over where Rockefeller, Scranton, and 
other GOP moderates had left off. Goldwater and the nuclear issue-
"Whose finger do you want on the nuclear button?" -became a major 
Democratic thrust of the 1964 campaign. Johnson succeeded, moreover, in 
making the election a referendum on "the whole course of American devel-
opment." He established himself as the "safe candidate," the "true conser-
vative." Conversely, public opinion surveys indicated that almost half the 
voters regarded Goldwater as a "radical." 
Well before the end of the campaign, a deep gloom settled over Repub-
lican national headquarters. Despite Goldwater's victory claims to the end 
of his 80,000-mile political pilgrimage, there was no chance for a GOP pres-
idential victory. The only question to be answered was the margin of a Gold-
water defeat. 
After the polls closed on election day 1964, the answer was not long in 
coming. President Lyndon Johnson, in fact, won an unprecedented land-
slide, racking up 43.1 million votes or 61 percent of the total electorate and 
gaining majorities in forty-four states, for 486 electoral votes. Goldwater 
trailed with 27.1 million popular tallies or 38.8 percent of the vote. He cap-
tured only six states, barely holding on to his home state of Arizona, for a 
total of 52 electoral votes. 
Republicans of all kinds got caught in the Goldwater debacle. The elec-
toral arithmetic was staggering. In the Senate, Democrats built up a power-
ful68-to-32 majority by gaining two seats. The list of GOP survivors showed 
no special tilt, although moderate Republicans generally ran ahead of the 
Goldwater-Miller ticket. Goldwater hard-liners John]. Williams of Del-
aware and Roman Hruska of Nebraska turned in reelection victories, as did 
party middle-roaders Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania and Winston Prouty of 
Vermont. But conservative Edwin Mechem of New Mexico fell short in his 
reelection run against DemocratJoseph Montoya, while moderates]. Glenn 
Beall of Maryland lost to Joseph Tydings and Kenneth Keating of New York 
went down to defeat in his reelection bid against Robert F. Kennedy. 
Among Republicans seeking election to the Senate for the first time, Gold-
water protege Paul Fannin of Arizona won his race. And conservative former 
actor George Murphy defeated former Kennedy press secretary Pierre Salin-
ger in California. But a strong Goldwater supporter, John S. Wold, lost to 
liberal Democrat Gale McGee in Montana. Moreover, traditional Right 
Wing Republicans such as Robert Taft, Jr., in Ohio and football coach Bud 
Wilkinson in Oklahoma also failed in their Senate bids. 
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In the House of Representatives, Republicans lost 38 seats, leaving the 
Democrats with a commanding 295-to-140 majority. Significantly, of the 
fifty-four Republican signers of a preconvention statement boosting Gold-
water as a boon for GOP congressional candidates, seventeen retired invol-
untanly. Two House GOP conservative giants-Bruce Alger, a Texan seek-
ing his sixth term, and Iowa's Ben Jensen, the ranking Republican on the 
House Appropriations Committee-also fell in the Goldwater massacre. In 
New York, right-wing stalwarts were especially hard hit, among them being 
Katharine St. George, John R. Pillion, and Steven Derounian. In Iowa, only 
one Republican remained in the state's seven-member congressional delega-
tion, a delegation that had included only one Democrat before election day. 
There was no GOP disaster relief at the state level. While Republicans 
lost one state house, leaving seventeen GOP governors in office, the party 
retained control of only six state legislatures after suffering losses in such 
strongholds as Iowa, Indiana, and Colorado. Republicans lost 62 seats in the 
Maine legislature, 35 in New Hampshire, 34 in North Dakota, and so on-
this particular political body count rising to over 500 nationwide. 
"I have every confidence that with all of you behind me, I could be an-
other AlfLandon," Barry Goldwater had joked in accepting the Washington 
Alfalfa Club's mock presidential nomination in the lighter days of 1962. 35 
Now, in 1964, Goldwater was not prepared to blame himself or the Republi-
can Right for the Goldwater disaster that almost rivaled Landon's 1936 bust. 
Even in defeat, Goldwater managed to continue both the bumbling and bit-
terness of his campaign. The senator's belated concession statement con-
ceded little to Johnson and contained no comfort for Republican losers. 
Explaining that Republicans would have fared better had they whole-
heartedly supported the Goldwater-Miller ticket, he observed, "You cannot 
in this game of politics fight your own party. It just doesn't work." 36 
Here was irony-unintended irony. 
Goldwater returned to Washington on the Friday after election day. 
The day was sunny yet brisk, and the landing strip at Dulles International 
Airport seemed perfect for one last campaign appearance. But there was no 
rally; the RNC had planned none, although RNC boss Dean Burch was at 
the airport along with vice-presidential nominee William Miller and Nebras-
ka Senator Carl Curtis. About fifty other Goldwater diehards-most of 
them women-were also there to greet the defeated GOP standard-bearer. 
Some still sported their "Goldwater girl" straw hats and campaign buttons. 
Others held up placards-"Freedom: Born 1776 Died 1964" and "In Our 
Hearts We Still Know He's Right." When Goldwater alighted from his cam-
paign jet, the meager assemblage began to chant "We want Barry." As he 
headed for a waiting automobile, some followers cried "Don't quit" and 
"See you in '68." 
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This modest Washington reception offered less welcome than welcome 
relief for Goldwater-relief from the postelection salvos already being 
directed against him and his Right Wing Republican allies. Moderate Re-
publican senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, whose connection to the 
failed 1948 Dewey White House bid made him something of an authority, 
charged that Goldwater's campaign was the worst run in presidential his-
tory. Idaho's Robert Smylie, an anti-Goldwater leader among Republican 
governors, claimed that the Republican nominee had come down on the 
"wrong side of every major issue." Anti-Goldwater Republicans had no 
doubts about 1964's electoral lessons. The campaign and its dreadful out-
come, Rockefeller declared flatly, had answered all questions regarding 
Goldwater's role in the Republican future. Readers of the rabidly anti-Gold-
water New York Times got a stern post-election day lecture on the folly of 
"right-wing extremists" in making a "revolutionary break" with the "cen-
trist tradition" in American politics. "The great task for the G.O.P.," the 
Times pontificated, "will be to move back into the sunlight of modern-
ism." 37 
Even Goldwater partisans were finding fault with the senator's run for 
the presidency. The Los Angeles Times, one of the few major newspapers to 
endorse the Arizonan, subsequently admonished Goldwater for his "poorly 
drawn issues, badly executed campaign and deliberate division within the 
minority party's ranks." 38 Conservative political scientist and Goldwater 
advisor Harry Jaffa of Claremont Men's College blamed unnamed Gold-
water aides who failed to gauge the national mood and isolated the candi-
date. Numerous other conservative intellectuals believed that Goldwater, 
himself, had helped turn the campaign into an unenlightened personality 
contest. 
Although such statements by GOP conservatives exceeded the usual 
postelection carping of a losing team and prompted William F. Buckley,Jr., 
to scold hard-line "backbiters," most Republican conservatives publicly 
remained downright bullish about the Goldwater bid and the GOP future. 39 
The Chicago Tribune hailed the Goldwater tallies as an "impressive fact." 
Goldwater allies contended simplistically that November's GOP devastation 
paled in comparison with the party's earlier 1958 setback under Eisenhower. 
South Dakota senator Karl Mundt pointedly reminded Goldwater critics 
that GOP liberals and moderates had controlled "the circle ofleadership for 
29 of the last 30 years, and their string of successes is not very long." Right 
Wing Republicans simply countered GOP "gloom and doom" talk by 
pointing out, as did William F. Knowland, that "a party that pulls over 25 
million votes is neither bankrupt nor on its deathbed." 40 Overall, GOP die-
hard sentiment was summed up best on the bright orange bumper stickers 
that began to appear shortly after election day: "Twenty-six Million Can't 
Be Wrong." 
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Goldwater, for his part, shared this hopeful sentiment and initially 
admitted to no major campaign mistakes. Indeed, he contended that his 
electoral showing and the million-dollar surplus remaining in the GOP cof-
fers proved the success of his campaign. Goldwater flatly rejected the con-
tention that his humiliation had damaged the conservative cause, despite his 
earlier remarks that an electoral share of less than 43 percent would do so. 
Goldwater and the Republican Right had a ready-and in spots con-
vincing-explanation for the Goldwater defeat. First and foremost, a Gold-
water victory in 1964 was an impossibility after the Kennedy assassination. 
According to Newsweek, GOP vice-presidential candidate William Miller 
said with his characteristic tartness-or tactlessness, "The American people 
were just not in the mood to assassinate two Presidents in one year. "41 
Right Wing Republicans insisted further that any hope for even a re-
spectable showing in this "no-win" situation was dashed well before the fall 
campaign began. Johnson and the Democrats had only to repeat the anti-
Goldwater remarks of the senator's Republican rivals. Choosing to ignore 
independent polls that minimized the electoral impact of such GOP defec-
tions, many Goldwater Republicans held these "me-too" Republican muti-
neers mainly responsible for the Goldwater-Miller debacle. Ohio national 
committeewoman Katharine Kennedy Brown expressed vintage midwestern 
Republicanism in assailing the "Eastern seaboard financial interests" as a 
"forefront of defectors. "42 
Of course, Right Wing Republicans also gave Lyndon Johnson some 
credit for the rout of Goldwater and the GOP, though not for his statesman-
ship. Johnson not only benefited enormously from incumbency, being pres-
ident in this fragile and difficult period following the assassination, but, 
claimed Goldwater and the conservative faithful, Johnson ruthlessly used 
the powers of the presidency to insure his election by politicizing the White 
House as no previous president had done and throwing the "full muscle and 
power of the federal government" against Goldwater. 
Inevitably, Right Wing Republicans reserved a special resentment for 
the national media's role in Goldwater's demise. As far as Right Wing Re-
publicans were concerned, the press's treatment of Goldwater in 1964 gave 
full and disturbing meaning to the term "adversary relationship." The 
"total collapse of press responsibility " was readily apparent to Right Wing 
Republicans during the 1964 campaign. The press, in branding Goldwater 
"irresponsible" and "trigger happy," had helped to keep him on the defen-
sive from the outset. The report of CBS television newsman Daniel Shorr, in 
which he speculated wildly on Goldwater's "move to link up with" the Ger-
man right-wing forces, was only the most glaring example of Goldwater's 
press problem. More generally, the media highlighted Goldwater campaign 
difficulties while ignoring such Johnson problems as the Bobby Baker influ-
ence scandal. Conservative media critics noted that the press gave banner 
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coverage to GOP defections while downplaying anti-Johnson bolts by South 
Carolina senator Strom Thurmond and other southern Democrats. 43 
Even before the fall canvass, the candidate himself had complained bit-
terly about the "utter dishonesty" and "out-and-out" lies of the New York 
Times and the San Francisco Chronicle. He also had lashed out at political 
sages such as Walter Lippmann and Joseph Alsop. Goldwater was madder 
still after the election, telling columnist Westbrook Pegler that he had never 
realized how many "s.o.b.'s" there were in the press. 44 So vexed was one 
RNC member after election day that he came to the conclusion that Repub-
lican syndicates should buy control of all available media in order to "keep 
any Republican from being crucified." 4) 
The November, 1964 humiliation of Goldwater, the GOP postelection 
party changes, and the advent of "one-party dominance" in the Eighty-
ninth Congress, all prompted severe reactions of one kind or another. Con-
servative humorist Morris Ryskind, for example, was hardly laughing when 
he ordered "another round of hemlock on the rocks." Among the strong 
reactions were those of the New York Times's James Reston and the New 
York Herald Tribune's Roscoe Drummond. Reston concluded shortly after 
the polls closed, "Barry Goldwater not only lost the Presidential election 
... but the conservative cause as well." Drummond agreed, observing a few 
months later, "Goldwater is out. The Moderate Republicans are back in con-
trol. ... Thus ends the party's experiment with extreme conservatism. "46 
What such pronouncements failed to consider, however, was the fact 
that the Republican Right had been entombed time and again since 1932, 
and-in whatever reincarnation-it had always returned to battle for control 
of the GOP. Political coroners failed once again to detect important Repub-
lican Right Wing vital signs. In fact, GOP conservatism was healthier in 
many respects in 1964-1965 than it had been since the 1920s. Although i:he 
presidency still remained, in Ambrose Bierce's phrase, "the greased pig of 
American politics," Right Wing Republicans had finally snared the Repub-
lican presidential nomination-a true triumph of will and organization. Of 
course, Goldwater's defeat was humiliating and harmful, inasmuch as it was 
commonly assumed to be the definitive test of the political appeal of Repub-
licanism. 
With opinion surveys showing, contrary to the statements of liberal 
political pundits, that conservative sentiment had apparently not suffered as 
a result of the Goldwater debacle, it was clear that in 1964-1965 conserva-
tism remained as much a part of the American political mainstream as lib-
eralism. It also became obvious-if it had not before this-that American 
political pundits should dispense with their biennial or quadrennial death 
notices of conservatism. In the case of Goldwater, the persistent feeling that 
he was not a bona fide conservative in 1964, but a "radical," showed that 
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many considered him outside the mainstream even of the Republican Right. 
This assessment was as much a fault of the overblown reaction of Gold-
water's enemies, partisan and otherwise, as it was the result of the inept 
Goldwater campaign. Indeed, in the end, Goldwater suffered the electoral 
setback, and not conservatism. As Goldwater organizer F. Clifton White saw 
it, "Conservatism was not defeated in this campaign, it was not even de-
bated."47 
Right Wing Republicans still firmly believed in the basic appeal or 
soundness of their credo. For them, external and nondoctrinal circumstances 
provided enough reason for the "unmaking" of Goldwater in November, 
1964. They consoled themselves with the fact that only four years after 
Eisenhower and his Modern Republicanism, the Right Wing, party outlaws 
during most of the 1950s, had emerged again with vigor. In itself, this was a 
thrilling reaffirmation of the vitality of hard-line conservatism within the 
Republican party. Further, even in defeat, the Goldwater campaign had 
marshaled a record-breaking door-to-door canvass and an unprecedented 
number of financial contributions. Using direct mail and television appeals, 
the Goldwater Republicans had put together a far broader financial base 
than the Democrats. 48 
The organizational zeal of conservative-minded members of the GOP 
was not diminished by the 1964 defeat, and their continued dedication 
would be a significant factor in view of the gradual continued decline in the 
discipline of both American political parties. Hastened by the nonpartisan 
approaches ofWillkie and later Eisenhower, this decline-ironically for lib-
eral Republicans-left the GOP open to more issue-oriented conservatives 
who valued ideological purity over party victory. The Goldwater element 
within the GOP included numerous highly motivated, ideologically ori-
ented political newcomers who by 1964 had captured control of many state 
organizations from the bottom up. Following Goldwater's electoral setback 
and failure to gain full control of the national party apparatus, Right Wing 
strength at the local and state level remained strong, and GOP office seekers 
thereafter had to take such strength into account. "As it is now," Goldwater 
himself wrote in early April, 1965, "the conservatives are still in control of 
the Republican Party and they will continue to be if they retain control of 
the state organizations. " 49 Moreover, the Goldwater nomination signaled a 
shift of GOP intraparty power to the South and West. Regardless of the 
1964 November returns, Goldwater's selection firmly established the Sun 
Belt region as a conservative challenger to the once dominant liberal "me-





The spirited charges and countercharges concerning the Goldwater debacle 
settled little as far as the GOP future was concerned. Goldwater and the 
Right Wing certainly gave no sign of factional retreat. Goldwater himself 
continued to talk of making the GOP a truly conservative party. Recent con-
servative Republican Strom Thurmond of South Carolina even invited 
Rockefeller and other Republican "radical leftists" to switch to the Demo-
cratic party. Right Wingers also brandished a November Harris survey show-
ing that most Republicans favored continued conservative control of the 
party. Further, there was talk of new conservative prospects such as Texas 
senator John Tower, Colorado senator Peter Dominick, and Hollywood's 
Ronald Reagan. The Right Wing actor Reagan, who had set conservative 
hearts thumping during the 1964 campaign with a thrilling, pro-Goldwater 
speech over national television, kept up the courtship by commenting, "I 
don't think we should turn the high command over to leaders who were 
traitors during the battle just ended. The conservative philosophy was not 
repudiated." A day after the election, a group of Michigan conservatives 
formed "Republicans for Ronald Reagan" as the first step in pointing him 
toward the White House. 1 
Although Right Wing Republicans obviously had no intention of sur-
rendering the GOP to their "me-too" rivals, Goldwater and his allies were 
aware that the electoral returns had made painfully clear that that day had 
not yet come. Despite their long-range goals, healing words were now a 
necessity. Under heavy fire for the Goldwater camp's "exclusive" fall cam-
paign, RNC boss Burch urged party members to forge a consensus "which 
represents all elements of our party." Goldwater agreed, likening the GOP 
to a "tent" that had room enough for liberals and conservatives alike. In-
deed, conservatives temporarily took up an old Eisenhower theme and called 
for an end to intra-party labeling that was only "misleading, divisive and 
stigmatic. " 2 
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Such chummy pronouncements could not long put off the power strug-
gle within the party that was inevitable after the Goldwater defeat. And this 
came finally over the continuation of Goldwater ally Dean Burch as Republi-
can national chairman. Hugh Scott, who had battled GOP hard-liners to 
remain as RNC boss after Dewey's 1948 defeat, now led the cry for Burch's 
gavel. Not long thereafter, Republican governors met in Denver and 
demanded Burch's departure, as well as a return to Republican "progres-
sive" principles. 3 
Although Burch maintained, just as Scott had in 1948, that he pos-
sessed a four-year contract, Burch's retention was more than a simple con-
tractual arrangement as far as Goldwater and his supporters were concerned. 
Goldwater wrote in a letter to all RNC members that the removal of Dean 
Burch now would be a "repudiation of a great segment of our party and a 
repudiation of me." Goldwater even suggested that Burch's dismissal might 
threaten the two-party system. 4 
Burch and Goldwater might have beaten down a simple challenge by 
Scott and by the Republican governors. But the anti-Burch drive ultimately 
enlisted several party powerhouses. Along with former president Eisen-
hower, important Goldwater backers such as F. Clifton White and George 
Humphrey gradually came to the conclusion that Burch had to go. So did 
Donald Ross of Nebraska, a Republican national committeeman and an erst-
while Goldwater backer who had become disgusted by Goldwater's inept 
1964 campaign. After the election Ross secretly went to work with several 
like-minded midwestern colleagues to form an "Anti-Burch Society." 
Hoping to replace Burch with Ohio state chairman Ray Bliss, Ross's soci-
. ety ultimately controlled enough RNC votes to embarrass Burch, at the very 
least. Goldwater had to back down. On January 12, 1965, he reluctantly 
announced that Burch would be replaced by Bliss on Aprill. Later inJan-
uary when the RNC ratified this arrangement, Goldwater kept up the har-
monics-but on his own terms. Before the RNC, the Arizonan accepted full 
responsibility for all fall campaign mistakes and said that he was "sorry so 
many good men went down with me." Still, self-flagellation had never been 
the style of Goldwater or his allies, and the defeated standard-bearer mixed 
his mea culpas with declarations on "the false liabilities that were hung 
around my neck on July 15" and the LBJ-engineered opposition of the entire 
federal government. Despite the senator's claim that conservative Republi-
cans were "not destroying our weapons," some hard-core Goldwaterites 
never reconciled themselves to their leader's "unnecessary" capitulation. 
Goldwater, in turn, resented the cries of "double-cross" from right wing 
ultras, but the National Review correctly noted that Goldwater's own initial 
intransigence made Burch's forced exit much more of an "embarrassment 
and a setback" than it had to be. 5 
Actually, the election of Ray Bliss helped Goldwater and most of his 
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partisans to accept rather gracefully a change at national headquarters. 
Robert Taft himself had made Bliss chairman of the Ohio GOP after Tru-
man's statewide victory over Dewey in 1948. Also, Bliss, whom Goldwater 
had wanted as national chairman in 1962, was known as a hard-working, 
"nuts-and-bolts" political manager who was not likely to try to lead Repub-
licans along particular ideological lines. "If the Democratic Party is big 
enough for Harry Byrd and Hubert Humphrey," the new RNC head liked to 
say, "then the Republican Party is big enough for Jack Javits and Barry 
Goldwater. "6 
Bliss's live-and-let-live approach reflected the emerging Republican 
attitude of late January, 1965. So did the major postelection GOP change on 
Capitol Hill-the replacement oflndiana's Charles Halleck with Michigan's 
Gerald Ford as minority leader. Although Halleck blamed the GOP's fall 
defeat for his ouster, dump-Halleck talk had actually begun well before elec-
tion day, and political observers generally regarded the Halleck-Ford duel as 
more of a "beauty contest" than an ideological showdown. Nevertheless, 
the attractive and energetic Ford was definitely no Right Wing Republican, 
and the election results had clearly impressed him. He subsequently pro-
claimed himself a "constructive moderate" and promised to recapture the 
"middle road of moderation" -a road most Republicans were happy to 
travel after the 1964 detour. 7 
Halleck's sack by House Republicans did highlight one of the major 
changes involving the Republican Right in the post-World War II period: 
the loss of a conservative-led Republican opposition on Capitol Hill. In 1945 
and the immediate postwar years, Martin and Halleck in the House and 
Wherry, Taft, and Bridges in the Senate had commanded the GOP and its 
powerful Old Guard contingent. But the days of hard-line, anti-New Deal 
opposition were long gone. The consolidation of the New Deal programs 
and many of its fundamental assumptions under the Eisenhower administra-
tion enormously complicated Republican politics. Not only had former Old 
Guard stalwarts such as Martin and Halleck been compromised by their pro-
Ike stands during the Republican 1950s, but Old Guard strength had suf-
fered along with the Republican party, which had never prospered under 
Ike's Modern Republicanism. The dreadful GOP returns in the 1964 House 
and Senate races only capped the overall decline in Republican congressional 
strength since 19 52 . 
The makeup of the new Senate GOP command also testified to reduced 
conservative influence. Illinois's Everett Dirksen remained as GOP minority 
leader. Despite the senator's nomination of Goldwater at San Francisco, 
Dirksen had actually dropped his Right Wing tag by the late 1950s. Indeed, 
the Right had often criticized Dirksen for his appeasement of JFK and LBJ. 
His nominating speech was significant mainly because it had signaled main-
line GOP recognition of Goldwater's lock on the party nomination. 
212 THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT 
Mter the election, not only did Dirksen remain Senate GOP leader, but 
he reportedly urged Thruston Morton to stay on as Republican Senate cam-
paign committee head, thus keeping Right Wing Peter Dominick out of the 
post that Goldwater had used as a stepping-stone to the GOP nomination. 8 
Furthermore, Senate Right Wing Republicans mounted no challenge to 
minority whip Thomas Kuchel, despite the Californian's desertion of Gold-
water in the fall campaign. Goldwater himself had never been a Senate GOP 
power by any means, but the fact that he would hold no seat in the Eighty-
ninth Congress further illustrated the decline since the days of Wherry, Taft, 
and, even more recently, Bridges. 
The scarcity of GOP conservative leaders and followers on Capitol Hill 
reflected the Republican Right's more general leadership problems follow-
ing the 1964 elections. As far as national politics was concerned, Right Wing 
Republicans, unlike their factional rivals, had focused on a single leader in 
the postwar period. Taft had dominated the Republican Right when he was 
not dominating the entire Republican party. By the early 1960s, Goldwater 
had succeeded Taft as the spokesman of GOP conservatism. Mter Gold-
water's November loss, however, the Republican Right had no strong, single 
leader. Repudiated at the polls, Goldwater remained largely a symbol of the 
Republican Right Wing, though it was still too early in 1965 to tell just what 
he symbolized-past failures or future prospects. 
Despite hopeful hard-line talk regarding new conservative heroes, 
Tower of Texas and Dominick of Colorado were relative newcomers to the 
Senate, outside GOP leadership circles, and far from established political 
figures nationally. Ronald Reagan had potential, especially as Republicans 
proposed a new emphasis on television communication in the light of the 
Goldwater campaign's shortcomings in this area. Conceivably, Republican 
conservatives could move from supporting a candidate who looked like an 
actor to a candidate who was an actor. In 196 5, however, Reagan appeared as 
little more than an accomplished television speechmaker with a deep inter-
est in conservative politics. Consequently, the Goldwater defeat temporarily 
left Right Wing Republicans without effective, well-recognized national 
leadership in the face of the onslaught of]ohnson's Great Society. 
And the anticipated wave of liberal legislation came in a flood not seen 
since the high-water mark of the New Deal in the mid-1930s. Lyndon John-
son compensated for the lack of a crisis atmosphere with an overwhelming 
determination and a personal knowledge of Capitol Hill politics that went 
back to Roosevelt's prewar days. Like Roosevelt, LBJ benefited from an 
opposition in disarray-small, divided, intellectually and pragmatically 
unsure of itself. Before the 1964 election, Johnson had tried to establish his 
credentials as a friend of business and a sharp-eyed watchdog of government 
spending by, among other things, cutting back on lighting at the White 
House. But he had also set forth his abundance-for-all Great Society, and 
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during the Eighty-ninth Congress the lights on Capitol Hill burned late into 
the night as legislators codified Johnson's visions of the Great Society. 
Johnson succeeded in pushing Medicare, federal aid to education, the 
Voting Rights Act, housing legislation, and the enlargement of the antipov-
erty and Appalachian development programs through the Eighty-ninth 
Congress-a series of Great Society bills that read like an ADA dreamer's 
laundry list. Congress's failure to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act's right-to-work 
provision (section 14b) and its rejection of home rule for the District of 
Columbia stood as the lonely exceptions to LBJ's legislative wizardry. The 
14(b) issue remained the single-if questionable-example for conservatives 
of what staunch opposition could still accomplish, although LBJ allegedly 
only made a halfhearted effort of this issue in exchange for Dirksen's sup-
port on the Voting Rights Act. 9 About the only other thing Right Wing Re-
publicans could cheer was the end of each session of the Eighty-ninth Con-
gress. As the National Review's "Quincy" noted, at least the solons could 
then rest "the muscles of their hands wracked by cramps induced from the 
over-frequent use of the rubber stamp of Administration legislation." 10 
The Right Wing Republican reaction to LBJ's Great Society was surpris-
ingly feeble, reflecting the weakened state of the Right in the immediate 
post-Goldwater years. Although a successful battle against the Great Society 
proposals was never a possibility anyway, the Republican Right's demoral-
ized state on Capitol Hill manifested itself even more dramatically in its fail-
ure to wage a real intraparty struggle in the first congress after the Goldwater 
defeat. 
Of course, conservative commentary bemoaned "liberal [GOP] com-
plicity" in the Great Society victories. An American Conservative Union 
(ACU) brochure entitled "Democratic Majority for Victory" pointed out 
that the defection of a small but noisy "clique" of Republican liberals 
"allowed the Johnson Administration to whoosh through the Great Soci-
ety." And Republican congressional leaders allowed these GOP rubber-
stampers to go unpunished. Conservatives expected as much. Eschewing any 
antireform alliance with conservative southern democrats, the Republican 
Capitol Hill command was currently enamored of the concept of "construc-
tive leadership," which provided that Republicans should not merely op-
pose Johnson initiatives, but supply "responsible" Republican alternatives 
instead. But such constructive leadership fell flat, as minority leader Gerald 
Ford quickly discovered when four of his poorly publicized legislative substi-
tutes for Great Society proposals went down to defeat in the House. The 
National Review's "Quincy" contended bitterly that the Republican leader-
ship on Capitol Hill remained so afraid to upset "the Eastern liberal wing of 
the GOP that it does nothing." 11 
Soon, even cheerleaders of constructive leadership such as James Reston 
and the New York Times were conceding its failures, although blaming 
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it mainly on the personal leadership of Ford and Dirksen. 12 Conservative 
M. Stanton Evans saw clearly that the "constructive leadership" was inher-
ently flawed because it allowed any debate to proceed on terms favorable to 
the Democratic majority." Even if Republican constructivists won the de-
bate, Democratic self-interest made it unlikely that the victory would be re-
peated in congressional votes. Moreover, this approach implicated Republi-
cans in any future programatic failures and, as Right Wing Republicans had 
claimed since 1933, made it difficult to convince voters that any real differ-
ence existed between the GOP and the Democratic party. Bereft of clear 
focus and animating intellectual drive, Ford and Dirksen's Republican con-
gressional leadership during the Johnson years was bland, reactive, contra-
dictory, when not incoherent. Republicans could only take heart there was a 
Democratic party. 
Although Evans and other conservative commentators criticized this 
"constructive" approach, Representative John Ashbrook of Ohio, head of 
the ACU, was the only noteworthy GOP lawmaker who openly challenged 
the GOP leadership in this regard. The 1964 election returns may have 
made a deeper and far different impression on conservative Republicans on 
Capitol Hill than their defensive postelection comments initially indicated. 
It is also possible that these Right Wing Republicans remained mute as part 
of an altogether understandable effort to foster unity in the GOP after the 
internecine battles of 1964. But for now these are simply speculations. The 
precise reasons for Right Wing silence may only be known when historians 
can better piece together this period through manuscript collections that are 
not now available. Conservative Republicans saw no purpose in holding up 
the Great Society. They were convinced the Great Society "would choke on 
its own excesses." "There are lots of chickens that are going to start roosting 
on its doorstep when the costs of the Great Society are added," Dean Burch 
wrote in his chairman's report of early 1965. 14 
Needing no empirical evidence to oppose these programs, Right Wing 
Republicans certainly wasted no time in identifying the problems accom-
panying the Great Society. High taxes and the high cost of living (by 1960s 
standards), as well as the various problems in administering these new pro-
grams, simply confirmed the Right Wing Republicans' initial suspicions. 
"After reviewing the several programs on the Great Society," Wyoming sen-
ator Milward Simpson stated at the time, "and studying their excessive costs, 
tremendous wastes, and exorbitant salaries, I found that little was being ac-
complished other than the scandals, corruption and political shenanigans of 
the party in power." Furthermore, pollsters also soon began to chart the rise 
of the "big government" issue, especially among traditionally Democratic 
urban whites. 15 The latter were obviously coming to resent the pro-black 
tendency of Great Society legislation and the related intrusion of court-
ordered school busing to achieve school desegregation. "White backlash," 
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only speculated about in the 1964 election, became a definitive part of 
American political realities by early 1966. 
Then there was Vietnam. "In 1964 I was told," a listener wrote to the 
right-wing radio commentator Fulton Lewis, "that if I voted for Barry Gold-
water it would mean massive escalation of the war in Vietnam and defolia-
tion of the jungles. Well, I did vote for Goldwater, and sure enough it hap-
pened." 16 Indeed, Right Wing Republicans took considerable satisfaction as 
Johnson ordered air strikes against North Vietnamese military installations 
and generally increased the American military commitment to South Viet-
nam. Unlike their liberal and moderate GOP brethren, Right Wing Repub-
licans supported-unequivocally supported-the United States' role in 
Vietnam, and backed similar LBJ moves such as the dispatch of troops to 
Santo Domingo. For them, the conflict was the same-the global fight 
against Communist aggression. Although specific strategic reasons for an 
American presence in South Vietnam existed, Republican conservatives saw 
the fight in Southeast Asia mainly in its larger global context. South Viet-
nam-a sovereign anticommunist government in Right Wing eyes-could 
never be allowed to fall to the North Vietnamese. 
GOP conservatives disagreed in the long run with the restraint of John-
son's Vietnam policy and with Johnson's failure to spell out the goals and 
objectives of his policy. Goldwater privately told LBJ that there could be no 
victory until the commander in chief "took off the hobbles" of the military 
in Vietnam. Defeat, remarked Goldwater, would be better than Johnson's 
halfway measures. As seen earlier, the Right's foreign policy had changed 
since the immediate post-World War II period. During the early Cold War 
years and the Korean War, the Republican Right had slowly shed its legacy 
of prewar isolationism. Taft biographer James Patterson notes that an 
undated paper on Taft's desk at his death read, "No Indo China-Except in 
case of emergency invasion by the Chinese," a message consistent with 
Taft's isolationist past. But there was no such feeling on the part of Right 
Wing Republicans by 1964. "Vietnam-without a question, Yes," was the 
message they would leave to history. Barry Goldwater bitterly attacked 
"dovish" Republicans such as Charles Percy and George Romney as "tired, 
tempting voices of appeasement and isolation." In another ironic twist, 
Right Wing Republicans now championed the war powers of the president 
against the one-time internationalist Senator William ). Fulbright, who, 
said M. Stanton Evans in the National Review, could now reintroduce what 
he had once so scorned-the Bricker Amendment. 17 
LB]'s foreign and domestic troubles had obvious political implications 
as the 1966 elections approached. The 1966 elections were crucial to Repub-
licans of all shades, but they mattered most to GOP conservatives who had 
lost so much in 1964. The elections would demonstrate whether Republican 
conservatism-by now a more articulated and self-conscious movement than 
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at any time since World War 11-was sufficiently organized and in tune with 
the major trends of American life to bounce back after the Goldwater disas-
ter. Polling data had already detected a drop in support for certain Great 
Society programs, particularly among traditionally Democratic groups, and 
if this trend could translate into votes then the Republican Right would 
acquire a crucial tool in its rehabilitation program. The year 1966-and not 
1964-would thus become the key year in the post-World War II history of 
the Republican Right. 
Republican and Republican Right prospects were naturally tied together 
in the immediate post-1964 years and the GOP as a whole depended heavily 
on the organizational genius of Ray Bliss. The new RNC chairman quickly 
set to rebuilding the party organization which he had described upon his 
arrival as a "second-echelon answering service." Hurriedly, Bliss not only 
built up the party structure, especially in reviving the party's urban out-
posts, but also guarded the party's institutional integrity by condemning the 
proliferation of Republican organizations or splinter groups. Conservatives 
often complained that the emphasis was on condemning rightist groups, 
although Bliss, according to approving observers, saw the future of the GOP 
in pragmatic rather than ideological terms. Such an emphasis prompted 
David Broder to write, on the first anniversary of the Goldwater nomina-
tion, "To all appearances the Goldwater era has ended." 18 
Appearances could deceive. The debacle of 1964 had taught and had 
changed Right Wing Republicans. But conservatism was still their creed. 
They had lost no faith in their objectives or in the ultimate willingness of the 
American people to choose conservative, limited government. The con-
tinued movement of the Young Republicans to the right both exemplified 
and enriched the power and persistence of conservative Republicanism. 
Political commentators were wrong in mistaking the Republican Right's 
growing political sophistication with abandonment of their conservative 
designs for the future of the GOP and the United States. Barry Goldwater 
and other conservatives joined Republicans such as Thruston Morton and 
Dirksen in "kicking the John Birch Society in the tail." Goldwater's refusal 
to repudiate the John Birch Society specifically became a symbol-and a 
costly symbol-of Goldwater's Radical Right problems in the 1964 cam-
paign. Almost a year later, however, Goldwater himself urged Republicans 
to quit the Birch Society and finally admitted his error in blocking the anti-
extremism plank at the San Francisco Republican convention. The distinc-
tions involved in Birch Society "tail-kicking" were no doubt finer ones than 
those of 1964. 19 But they were made for chiefly tactical reasons. 
When the Republican party roared back in 1966, the Republican Right 
roared back with it. GOP gains were the greatest in twenty years, as Republi-
cans netted forty-seven House seats, three Senate seats, and eight governor-
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ships. In the state legislature races, Republicans more than recovered their 
1964 losses in what Ray Bliss described as "victory in depth." If the 1966 
elections presaged an emerging Republican majority, as Kevin Phillips later 
claimed, GOP conservatives focused on the conservative winners to explain 
what kind of Republicanism was triumphant. M. Stanton Evans cautioned 
that the eastern media, in highlighting the election of GOP Senate liber-
als-Mark Hatfield of Oregon, Charles Percy of Illinois, and Edward Brooke 
of Massachusetts-were ignoring the new conservative trend among the gov-
ernors-Claude Kirk in Florida, Paul Laxalt in Nevada, John Williams 
in Arizona-and the new GOP congressmen from the South. 
On balance, the 1966 elections represented a predictable return to the 
political center after the excesses of Johnson's Great Society. LBJ appeared to 
have been mistaken in reading the 1964 returns as anything more than a 
vote to preserve the status quo. The 1966 trend was conservative, but there 
was no conservative tide. In clear-cut liberal versus conservative clashes, 
Democrats Tom Mcintyre in New Hampshire and Lee Metcalf in Montana 
were headed for the Senate after defeating conservative Republicans. 
Although John Tower won reelection to the Senate, even he had spent the 
years since 1964, as he put it, "accenting the more positive things, instead of 
constant opposition." The repeal of the Great Society was highly doubtful, 
but one thing was certain. As US News and World Report asserted, "The big 
bash is over. " 20 
The eye-opening election of a Republican governor of California reaf-
firmed the proposition that the 1966 elections marked simply a rightward 
drift back to the political middle. "I've a feeling the people want a pause," 
was the decidedly moderate analysis of Ronald Reagan, the new hope of 
Right Wing Republicans after his election as governor of California. Former 
actor, former union activist, and former Democrat, Reagan had been on 
Right Wing minds since his sensational pro-Goldwater address in 1964. 
Handsome and telegenic, with an easy way that masked his consuming 
interest in politics, Reagan had all the attributes that the Republican Right 
needed in the wake of the Goldwater defeat. He had wisely concluded after 
the 1964 election that the Republican Right was in need of the "soft sell" in 
order "to prove our radicalism was an optical illusion." 21 F. Clifton White, 
the Goldwater political strategist, had in December, 1964, combined his 
efforts with those of California businessmen in urging Reagan to run for 
governor. Two years earlier, the popular Democratic incumbent Pat Brown 
and the deep and historic divisions of the California GOP had frustrated the 
veteran Richard Nixon in his ill-fated gubernatorial attempt. But, having 
moderated his essential conservatism during the campaign, Ronald 
Reagan-"citizen politician"-had managed to unite Republicans and in 
1966 dispatched Brown with a surprising million-vote majority. 
Reagan's political emergence, with all that it implied about conservative 
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stands, political flexibility, and political communications, precisely met the 
needs of the Right Wing after 1964. Even more important, the election of a 
conservative as governor of California underscored the shift to the Sunbelt 
and to suburbia in American politics. California was, after all, the most 
western, most suburban state, and Reagan's election quickly became a rally-
ing point for these new political forces. Significantly, on November 17, 
shortly after his California victory, Ronald Reagan and his inner circle gath-
ered at his Pacific Palisades home to discuss his chances for the presidency. 22 
The successes, excesses, and distresses of the Democrats made Right 
Wing Republicans all the more confident that history and the future were 
on their side. The Democratic party, so triumphant in the 1964 elections 
and so successful in putting through the Great Society programs, was com-
ing unglued by 1966 and would cannibalize itself by 1968. "War," "anti-
war," "black," "white," "hawk," "dove," "protest," "reaction," "nonvi-
olence," "violence," and above all, "change" were words that helped 
explain the reason. Unrelenting, even revolutionary, changes were shaking 
the structures of American society-structures that the Democratic party had 
done so much to shape since 1933. Northern white urban voters were joining 
southern Democrats in becoming more and more resentful of Great Society 
programs that favored Black America. In the Black community, moderate 
civil rights leadership had given way to Black Power advocates, apologists for 
the rioting that was becoming a summer ritual. "Law and order" rapidly 
ceased being a "code word" for racism and emerged as an issue in its own 
right among frightened whites. Meanwhile, the New Left scorned the 
assumptions of both Johnson's foreign and domestic programs. More tradi-
tional Democrats such as Richard Goodwin joined in blistering Johnson's 
Vietnam policy and, in a critique echoed by Robert F. Kennedy, attacked 
the Great Society's big-government domestic liberalism. Ultimately excom-
municated from the liberal community because of his war escalation policy, 
LBJ decided not to stand for reelection. American liberalism, lamented Eric 
Goldman, the brilliant historian of the movement, had run out of fresh 
ideas and was in disarray. The National Review put it more bluntly: "The 
liberal approach to human problems has reached a dead end." 23 
Welcome as they were for conservatives, these developments first bene-
fited Richard Nixon, not Ronald Reagan. Major Right Wing Republicans 
were responsible for this, having thrown their post-1964 support early to 
Nixon. Nixon had emerged from the 1964 campaign as both an astute judge 
and a beneficiary of Right Wing strength in the Republican party. A tireless 
campaigner for the Goldwater-Miller ticket, Nixon after the election ap-
plauded Goldwater's "very courageous campaign," called for a moratorium 
on "kicking Goldwater," and castigated Rockefeller and other "Eastern Re-
publican dividers" as "spoilsports." Nixon obviously fancied "more than a 
backstage role" for himself in future GOP politics. 24 
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Goldwater did too. Grateful for Nixon's support before and after the 
election and convinced that Nixon was the most conservative candidate that 
Right Wing Republicans could hope for in the near future, Goldwater 
announced in January, 1965, that the former vice-president was his choice 
for the 1968 Republican presidential nomination. Not that all doubts about 
Nixon's right-wing credentials had vanished. As Nixon himself commented 
on his new Right Wing backers, "They don't like me, but they tolerate 
me."25 
Nixon saw to it that his Right Wing backers continued to be tolerant, 
emphasizing conservative domestic themes and never wavering in his com-
mitment to a free South Vietnam. Not only did Nixon court the conserva-
tives, but he also built up solid organizational support by traveling cease-
lessly on behalf of GOP congressional candidates in 1966. Perhaps a few 
GOP conservatives actually believed that the much-publicized "New 
Nixon" embraced a new-found ideological conservatism that set him apart 
from the earlier pragmatic Nixon. In any case, most Right Wing Republi-
cans, all too familiar with Nixonian pragmatism, believed that he would 
always respond to popular political pressures and that these were now mainly 
conservative and would remain so. Moreover, a successful Nixon candidacy 
would keep the Republican nomination from a liberal Republican such as 
Romney or Rockefeller. Nixon thus became the "conservative" candidate. 
Former Goldwater backers such as John Ashbrook, William F. Buckley, and 
senators Strom Thurmond and John Tower followed Goldwater's example 
and backed Nixon. Richard Kleindienst, using his earlier Goldwater experi-
ence, even served as Nixon's director of field operations in the 1968 pri-
maries. This was not the first time that GOP conservatives had allowed 
personal and practical political considerations to overrule strict ideological 
constraints, yet the National Review's William H. Rusher later wrote that 
conservatives who opted for Nixon in 1969 owed history an accounting for 
this "uncharacteristic but unavoidable streak of opportunistic calculation." 26 
The early endorsements of Nixon by these conservatives mortally 
wounded a Reagan bid for the GOP nomination in 1968. But there were 
also other factors. A, homosexual scandal in Reagan's administration in the 
summer of 1967 hampered an early all-out Reagan drive. And, ironically, 
Robert Kennedy's assassination in a California hotel hall eliminated what 
F. Clifton White, one of the foremost political strategists in the Republican 
Right, claimed was Ronald Reagan's strongest argument. The California 
governor would be the perfect GOP candidate-image for image-if the 
Democrats selected Kennedy. Pursuing the nomination right up to the 
Miami convention, Reagan also ran headlong into Nixon's solid conservative 
support in the South, held firm by South Carolina senator Strom Thur-
mond. Nixon won on the first ballot, garnering 692 votes compared with 
Rockefeller's 277 and Reagan's 182 (other candidates divided up the re-
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maining 182 delegates) before the convention made the decision unan-
imous. Reagan supporters congratulated themselves on coming so close; 
White later maintained not too convincingly that the change of six votes in 
certain unit-rule states would have opened up the convention for a third-
ballot Reagan victory. 27 
The loss was Reagan's, not GOP conservatives'. If anything, Reagan's 
unsuccessful bid presaged bountiful conservative tomorrows. In the mean-
time, the autumn of 1968 disappointed neither Nixon's nor Reagan's con-
servative backers. From his Miami acceptance through the final campaign 
stop, the Nixon message was solidly conservative. A hard line on law and 
order, warnings against the decline of national prestige and military might, 
attacks on an increasingly impersonal bureaucracy, and paeans to voluntary 
solutions for the nation's economic and social problems-these Nixon 
themes encouraged conservatives. The nation's mood was conservative, 
wrote James]. Kilpatrick, but it was not as much a reactionary impulse as a 
national desire to "sit still for a while. " 28 Nixon's final victory in November 
tasted all the sweeter to Republican conservatives when Wallace's totals were 
added in-votes which they figured as largely conservative votes. 
Keven Phillips, a lawyer in Nixon's justice department and a careful stu-
dent of American electoral patterns who had served as a campaign strategist 
in 1968, believed that the 1968 electoral results signaled nothing less than 
"an emerging Republican majority." It would be a distinctly conservative 
majority. As set forth in a book entitled The Emerging Republican Majority, 
Phillips claimed that the New Deal era of a Democratic majority was coming 
to a close; the 1966 elections had foreshadowed and the 1968 election con-
firmed that the GOP was hovering at the brink of majority party status. 
Conceivably, Goldwater's 1964 electoral debacle would be to the forthcom-
ing Republican political revolution what Al Smith's 1928 defeat had been to 
Roosevelt's Democratic Revolution. 29 That would depend chiefly on bring-
ing the bulk of the Wallace vote into the Republican fold. This "emerging 
Republican majority" was being built in middle-class suburbs whose growth 
now exceeded that of urban areas, and in the booming new areas of the Sun 
Belt and the new industrial frontiers of the South and Southwest. Even in 
the older urban areas of the Northeast and Midwest, where the vote was fall-
ing off, Wallace and Nixon had made gains among blue-collar workers, 
white ethnics, and Catholics, traditionally Democratic voters. Although the 
Negro problem, according to Phillips, was mainly responsible for the Demo-
cratic coalition's demise, the Republican emergence would depend upon a 
slowing down of government spending, taxes, and social experimentation, 
as well as administration support for positive economic programs such as aid 
to parochial schools. 3o 
Quickly branded the "Southern Strategy," Phillips's "emerging Repub-
lican majority" thesis delighted GOP conservatives, but it required some 
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political artistry on Nixon's part. No doubt mindful of Goldwater's earlier 
difficulties in publicly mulling over political strategies, Nixon explained to 
reporters in 1969 that he had not read Phillips's work, although he instantly 
rejected its conclusions as "writing off' certain sections of the country.3 1 
Other Nixon moves, however, showed that the president fully compre-
hended the political forces Phillips had delineated in such detail. The nom-
inations of Clement F. Haynsworth and G. Harold Carswell to the Supreme 
Court, repudiated by the Senate, remained imponant thrusts in Nixon's so-
called "Southern Strategy" that included administration opposition to bus-
ing school children to achieve racial desegregation and recommendations for 
weakening amendments to the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
If Phillips's "emerging Republican majority" with its southern-strategy 
implications was too controversial to find a place on Nixon's reading list, 
The Real Majority by Ben Wattenburg and Richard Scammon was not. 
Indeed, the president had reportedly read an advance copy of what William 
Rusher later described as little more than a "pallid rewrite" of Phillips's 
"emerging Republican majority." Scammon and Wattenberg explained in 
their book that the "Social Issue" -'-the concerns of the average person-was 
the main political issue for Democrats and Republicans alike. A successful 
American political pany must move to the "center," and at this time that 
meant addressing the "Social Issue" -presumed voter resentment over vi-
olence, crime, drugs, pornography, and permissiveness.32 
In Nixon, Scammon and Wattenberg had found an ardent disciple. In 
the 1970 congressional campaign, Nixon sent out Vice-President Spiro 
Agnew, an ethnic and a Catholic, to lay claim to the "Social Issue" by using 
conservative rhetoric and warnings against "radical liberalism." The admin-
istration was in electoral pursuit of the "Silent Majority." The White House 
targeted Democratic Senate incumbents Joseph Tydings of Maryland and 
Albert Gore of Tennessee for defeat. In the end, Gore lost to Republican 
William Brock, identified as a "moderate conservative," and Tydings fell to 
]. Glenn Beall, Jr., a pro-administration moderate. In the process, Demo-
crats were not the only targets of the Nixon-Agnew gambit, as Republican 
senator Charles Goodell ruefully discovered in his New York election race. 
Exasperated by Goodell's "dovish" attacks on the president's Vietnam pol-
icy, the White House endorsed Conservative party candidate James Buckley 
(brother of William) over the "rad-lib" Goodell. Calling to mind Goodell's 
political about-face since Rockefeller had selected him to fill Roben Ken-
nedy's Senate seat, Agnew dubbed him the Christine Jorgensen of Amer-
ican politics-a reference to a British call girl who had undergone a sex 
change operation. 33 
Although Goodell's defeat stood as one of the White House's more sig-
nificant victories, the dramatic pany realignment prophesied by Phillips did 
not occur. White House favorite George Bush, a second-term congressman 
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from Houston, came up short in his Texas Senate race against Democrat 
Lloyd Bentsen. And the Senate, where Republicans gained only two seats, 
remained in Democratic hands. Republicans suffered nine net losses in the 
House, small only when one failed to consider that Nixon was the first mod-
ern president to begin his presidency with the opposition in control of Con-
gress. Further White House disappointment came when not even a biparti-
san conservative majority materialized in the variegated 1970 congressional 
election returns. New York Times correspondent R.W. Apple wrily sug-
gested that 1970 therefore be called, "the year of the non-emerging Repub-
lican majority." 34 
Indeed, by 1971, a potential but as yet unrealized Republican majority 
and Agnew's alliterative attacks were about all that Right Wing Republicans 
could actually call their own. Conservatives, to be sure, appreciated both 
Nixon's unsuccessful and successful appointments to the Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices William H. Rehnquist and Harry 
Blackman moved the court away from the liberal activism and criminal 
rights emphasis of the Warren court.35 But what about the executive branch? 
Hugh Scott, elected Senate Majority leader after the death of Everett Dirk-
sen in 1969, reportedly said, "The conservatives get the rhetoric, we (lib-
erals) get the action." The words of this Right Wing bete noire stung be-
cause they were true. 36 
Many top administration appointments did go to suspicious Republi-
cans and Democrats. Nixon's appointments of James E. Allen as U.S. Com-
missioner of Education and Henry Kissinger, a Harvard University professor 
and former Kennedy advisor, as National Security Advisor annoyed Right 
Wing Republicans. One writer counted fourteen Kissinger staffers who had 
earlier advised Kennedy and Johnson. F. Clifton White later wrote that con-
servatives remained political outcasts during the Nixon yearsY What could 
GOP conservatives conclude when Nixon made Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
Harvard professor and former advisor to Kennedy and Johnson, his domestic 
affairs advisor? Right Wing Republicans would later read the press reports 
detailing Moynihan's White House musings on the similarities between 
Nixon and "conservative reformer" Benjamin Disraeli. They were not sur-
prised-even if they were horrifted-when the latter-day Tory reformer 
accepted such Great Society programs as model cities and rent subsidies, and 
embraced Moynihan's own Family Assistance Plan, which conservatives 
believed would make welfare more comfortable and increase the number of 
welfare recipients. 
Early in 1969 Barry Goldwater privately warned Nixon of the power of 
LBJ holdovers in the bureaucracy to frustrate any effort to take charge of his 
own administration. 38 Ultimately, Great Society agencies and programs not 
only survived, but new bureaucratic impositions such as wide-ranging Envi-
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ronmental Protection Agency regulations and racial quotas in the form of 
the Philadelphia Plan actually took root. 
Even Nixon himself became highly suspect once again. In 1971 he pro-
posed an unbalanced budget, a new health plan, and reportedly an-
nounced, "I am now a Keynesian." Furthermore, his New Economic Plan 
(NEP) embraced wage, price, and credit controls. For those who needed 
reminding or documentation, a brace of books-Evans and Novak's Nixon 
in the White House and Richard]. Whalen's Catch the Falling Flag-
appeared in the fall of 1971. These volumes spelled out Nixon's themeless 
pragmatism. Whalen, a highly regarded conservative who had quit as a 
Nixon speech writer just before the 1968 GOP convention, bemoaned 
Nixon's amorality and absence of" ideology or central commitment." 39 
In foreign affairs and defense policy, conservative theoreticians were far 
less pleased with Nixon, despite their stalwart support of his Vietnam policy. 
The administration's policy of detente with the Soviet Union posed a the-
oretical dilemma for Right Wing Republicans, whose hard-line anticommu-
nism had persisted since before 1945. Conservatives believed that accommo-
dation with the Soviets and U.S. acceptance of the post-World War II map 
of eastern Europe might be interpreted as approval of the Soviet system and 
its foreign policy of aggression and intimidation. Further, conservative intel-
lectuals doubted the practical benefits of detente. While the Soviets gained 
American technology, grain, and a strategic arms agreement that left them 
with more missiles, the United States was left only with the warm feelings 
brought on by big power summitry and the release of Soviet Jews, as Patrick 
Buchanan later wrote. 40 According to conservative critics, Nixonian detente 
was "a one-way street" that masked simple business greed and the absence 
of a coherent foreign policy. 
The administration's position on detente was all the more perilous 
because of what the National Review saw as Nixon's "approximation of the 
Liberal Left" on matters of national defense. 41 Indeed, the coincidental 
deterioration of American defenses and the buildup of Soviet weaponry 
prompted conservative Republican lawmakers such as James Buckley, Gor-
don Allot, Peter Dominick, and others to call on the administration to 
strengthen the American military and naval position. This represented a rare 
public criticism of the Nixon administration by conservatives who were not 
intellectuals or commentators. 
The distinction between conservative politicians and conservative intel-
lectuals and commentators continued to hold up when inJuly, 1971, Pres-
ident Nixon announced his forthcoming trip to Communist China. This trip 
heralded a new era in Sino-American relations, as did the subsequent deci-
sion of the United States not to oppose Communist China's admission to 
the United Nations, These developments struck at the very center of 
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Nixon-Republican Right accommodation-a hard-line anticommunist for-
eign policy. No matter how wayward the domestic policies had been and 
continued to be over the years, conservatives could count on his unstinting 
anticommunism. A young Nixon had once savaged the Truman administra-
tion's Asian policy and, along with conservatives and the "China Lobby," 
had made recognition of the Communist Chinese out of the question. Now, 
the bedrock of Nixon's relationship with the Republican Right and the basis 
ofU.S. Asian policy were both jeopardized. 
Yet the reaction on Nixon's Right was mild indeed, as major conserva-
tive Republican political figures left it to a few conservative pundits to rail 
against the president's planned foreign policy odyssey. Although Goldwater 
maintained his opposition to mainland China's admission to the United 
Nations, his major concern was the safe future of Taiwan. Assured by the 
administration, the senator from Arizona gave his approval to Nixon's effort 
to improve the dialogue between the United States and the Communist 
Chinese. Nor was there any outcry from the other political leader of Right 
Wing Republicans, Governor Ronald Reagan of California. Having been 
notified in advance of Nixon's China announcement, Reagan hailed the 
"bold and decisive move" and assured conservatives that Nixon was going to 
China "only to talk." Newspaper reporters in search of political revolt 
sparked by Nixon's foreign policy departure had to settle for a story on 
Nixon's own congressman, John Schmitz of Orange County, who "disestab-
lished relations with the White House. " 42 
But Right Wing pundits and publicists reacted to Nixon's China initia-
tive with shock and anger. William Loeb of the Manchester Union Leader, 
whose strident rhetoric often served as a measure of the intensity of conserva-
tive feeling, railed against the China initiative as being "immoral, indecent, 
insane and frought with danger." Up until mid-March, 1971, the National 
Review had found in favor of the Nixon administration, but by the end of 
that summer that was no longer the case. Nixon's China policy taxed its 
patience to the breakpoint. William F. Buckley described the China trip as a 
"real blow to American Anti-Communism." Likening it to the Soviet-Nazi 
pact of 1939, an angry and betrayed Buckley retained little hope that a pop-
ular reaction would force a reconsideration on the administration's part, 
because "the public is hell bent on appeasement. " 43 
But, despite the rather mild reaction of the Republican Right to Nixon's 
China sortie, there were still some political repercussions. "The China thing 
was a major shock," the ACU's director, Jeffrey Bell, remarked at the time. 
"It crystallized a lot of things already in the docket." The upshot of this crys-
tallization came in July, 1971, when the so-called "Manhattan 12"-a 
prominent group of National Review intellectuals that included William F. 
Buckley, William Rusher, and William Burnham-resolved to "suspend 
support for Nixon." Kevin Phillips subsequently claimed that the Manhat-
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tan 12's break with Nixon was not a trivial act, and, indeed, the suspension 
of support by this cadre of conservative intellectuals soon led to the emer-
gence of a bona fide conservative candidate for the GOP nomination, John 
Ashbrook. Ashbrook's ACU had complained within weeks after Nixon's 
inauguration in 1969 of the president's "suspected" liberal tendencies. The 
passing of time merely confirmed early ACU fears. By early 1972 Ashbrook 
was asking, "What major conservative tenet do we have that hasn't under-
gone reversal?" 44 
The Ashbrook candidacy had no intention or hope of taking the 1972 
Republican nomination away from Nixon. Ashbrook's supporters only 
wanted to scare Nixon into a more conservative stance. In the end, cam-
paigning without organization, without funds, without even a campaign 
manager after the New Hampshire primary, Ashbrook waged little more 
than a protest, and a weak one at that. Ashbrook garnered only 11 percent 
of the New Hampshire vote and 10 percent of the Florida vote, thereby 
inconspicuously taking his campaign right into the GOP convention in 
Miami. Indeed, Ashbrook's dismal effort convinced one future New Right 
leader, Richard A. Viguerie, that the conservative movement badly lacked 
effective political leadership. 45 
In January, 1972, the New York Times could coo that President Nixon 
during the past several years had abandoned "outmoded conservative doc-
trine." "The old issues have faded," continued the Times, "and the old 
controversies collapsed. "46 
Significantly, the same actions that elicited such praise from the Times 
brought no public shrieks of anger from the Right Wing politicians. Earlier, 
in the face of Eisenhower's much more modest transgressions, conservative 
commentators and conservative GOP solons alike had complained regularly 
and loudly. Even Taft, committed to cooperation with Ike, had not hes-
itated to chide the administration openly. Yet, as Nixon decreed wage and 
price controls and tripped off to China, the Republican Right politicians 
remained publicly mute, reserving their grumbling for one another in pri-
vate. In so doing, Republican Right Wing politicians were continuing a 
public silence regarding any intraparty differences that dated back to 1965. 
Later, conservatives would blame themselves for not exerting more leverage 
on this Republican president during his first term. Evans and Novak would 
single out Barry Goldwater as the primary culprit. Perhaps Goldwater and 
other conservative Republicans deliberately refrained from criticizing a Re-
publican president who was under fire on too many other fronts. In any case, 
only future examination of the manuscript collections of current prominent 
Right Wing political figures will yield clues to their private doubts or an 
explanation for their virtual silence during this period. Whatever their moti-
vations, Right Wing Republicans such as Barry Goldwater and Ronald 
Reagan remained Nixon supporters. Goldwater, for his part, met murmur-
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ings of conservative dissension by asking for patience from his former follow-
ers. 47 Nixon, in turn, shrewdly realized that an occasional invitation to the 
Oval Office or a cross-country telephone consultation was enough to keep 
most Right Wing Republicans quiet. Practicing conservative politicians such 
as James Buckley and Ronald Reagan remained behind the president and 
Barry Goldwater, trying to discourage dissension. 
Yet Ashbrook and other GOP conservatives could afford a few sincere 
smiles in the months after his protest campaign. Vice-President Spiro 
Agnew, a hero to many GOP conservatives, was retained on the Republican 
ticket. And the whole tenor of the Miami convention restirred conservative 
hopes in Richard Nixon and the GOP. The National Review remarked after-
ward that the convention of 1972 "may turn out to have been one of the 
great turning points in American politics. " 48 The Republican party was 
shown to be a "center right" party, and its rank and file were generally con-
servative. Moreover, Nixon himself subsequently campaigned mainly on 
conservative issues-antibusing and a slowdown in social spending. Mean-
while, George McGovern, Nixon's Democratic opponent, would have made 
any Republican from Wendell Willkie to Nelson Rockefeller look like a 
straitlaced Old Guardsman or Goldwaterite. 
The November election results proved beyond doubt that the president 
had put together a bipartisan conservative majority. Significantly, Philadel-
phia's Democratic mayor, Frank Rizzo, had supported the president, and 
the AFL-CIO's George Meany, unable to go quite that far, had denied 
McGovern his endorsement. Conservatives saw the Nixon landslide as less a 
McGovern-induced Democratic defeat than an indication of their longed-for 
emerging Republican majority. More thrilling for conservarves, Nixon evi-
dently did too. Beginning his second term, President Nixon immediately set 
out to cut down the size of the federal government. As the New York Times 
was forced to admit only two years after its claims of Nixon's abandonment 
of outmoded conservative doctrine, "the tide of reaction that is sweeping 
across America is more than a Republican effort to cancel out the remnants 
ofJohnsonian egalitarianism. It is rather a break with more than 40 years of 
essentially liberal momentum." 49 
Nixon's efforts to turn the nation to the right, along with conservative 
dreams of a bright political future, were quickly overwhelmed as Watergate 
and related scandals began to unravel in early 1973. Only months after 
McGovern's defeat, and only weeks after Nixon had set a conservative 
domestic course, the administration began to lose the capacity to govern as 
Watergate consumed all. Ironically, Watergate represented Nixon's final 
sell-out of the Republican Right. Frustrated and disappointed during the 
first term, conservatives had regained hope with Nixon's new conservative 
initiatives. From 1969 to 1972, conservatives had gotten only the rhetoric; 
now it seemed they were about to get both the rhetoric and the action. But 
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just as Nixon was obviously moving toward the right, he fell into increasing 
legal and political trouble over Watergate. 
Watergate thus presented a special dilemma for Right Wing Republi-
cans. Before the seamy details of the scandal became clear, the National 
Review, foe example, dismissed Watergate as merely a "power struggle," a 
media storm aimed at undoing the results of the 1968 and 1972 elections. 
The ultimate target of Nixon's enemies was the "emerging new majority." 
As Nixon's tactics and misdeeds came to merit censure, conservatives held 
that the character flaws in Nixon and his associates must be distinguished 
from the administration's conservative rhetoric and proposals. Even so, 
breaking with Nixon was no easy decision for Right Wing Republicans. It 
meant opposing a Republican president and, according to William F. Buck-
ley, agreeing at least on one issue with the New York Times, "an abject form 
of capitulation." 50 
Conservatives nevertheless finally condemned Nixon's Watergate 
behavior. And their words carried added weight, because of the unspoken 
belief that conservatives made up the bulk of Nixon and GOP support. Early 
on, columnist James]. Kilpatrick urged Nixon to disclose more information. 
When the president refused, Kilpatrick recommended in October, 1973, 
that he resign. Goldwater, in turn, was unprepared to go so far so fast. How-
ever, his bluntly stated disgust with White House tactics during the Water-
gate investigation received much popular attention. "It's beginning to smell 
like Teapot Dome," said Goldwater in April, 1973. Consequently, anti-
Nixon liberals embraced Goldwater as their favorite conservative by late 
1973. 51 Other prominent Right Wing figures also spoke out. Worried about 
the popular, if mistaken, impression that Nixon was a true conservative, 
John Ashbrook asked Nixon to step down in the spring of 1974. Senator 
James Buckley of New York did the same. 
Nixon's troubles were one thing; Vice-President Spiro Agnew's were 
another. Nixon's ties to the Republican Right although significant, had 
always been tentative, temporary, and suspect. But Agnew's criticisms of the 
media and the liberal community had made him the conservative darling in 
the administration from the beginning. In many eyes, in fact, Agnew had 
eclipsed California governor Ronald Reagan as the conservative candidate for 
the GOP nomination in 1976. Thus, when Agnew resigned in October, 
1973 for accepting bribes while Maryland's governor, conservatives were 
devastated. "It is a terrible irony," William F. Buckley told the New York 
Conservative party on the night of Agnew's departure, "that at the moment 
of history when liberalism is sputtering in confusion, we should be plagued 
by weak and devious men." 52 
Nixon's own subsequent resignation in August, 1974, was met by Re-
publican conservatives with ambivalence. Never fully sold on Nixon, theRe-
publican Right realized that his destiny and theirs were inextricably linked. 
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His demise was therefore no cause for joy. On the other hand, Watergate 
had transformed him into an unalloyed embarrassment. Thus it was that the 
National Review, striving to put the best face on the matter, gamely wrote 
after the resignation, "The future is filled with hope." 53 
Nixon's resignation was all the more difficult for conservatives because 
of the known tendencies of his successor, Gerald Ford. At the time of the 
election of Ford as vice-president, GOP conservatives recalled without fond-
ness his dubious "constructive leadership" as House minority leader during 
the Johnson years. Although Ford's popularity on Capitol Hill had assured 
his easy confirmation as vice-president, his first appointments and actions as 
president rekindled conservative fears. Former Pennsylvania governor Wil-
liam Scranton moved into the White House as a transition advisor. Ford's 
proposal for amnesty for Vietnam draft resisters incurred Right Wing dis-
pleasure, which was further intensified when he selected former New York 
senator Charles Goodell to head the program. 
But nothing embittered Right Wing Republicans as much as Ford's 
selection of Nelson Rockefeller as his vice-president. Although Rockefeller's 
recent moves to the right may have been enough to earn editorial rebukes 
from the New York Times, the Right had never approved of Rockefeller. 
William Rusher claimed that the selection of the New Yorker revealed the 
new president's "profound ignorance of the basic forces dominating theRe-
publican party." Richard Viguerie later attributed the birth of the New 
Right to Rockefeller's nomination. Still, there was no open Right Wing 
fight against the Rockefeller nomination; such internecine party strife was 
unthinkable in the aftermath ofWatergate. Goldwater, for his part, decided 
instead to concentrate his efforts on blocking Rockefeller's vice-presidential 
nomination in 1976. 54 Ultimately but belatedly, Ford acknowledged the 
dominant forces at work in the party when he agreed to Rocky's replacement 
on the ticket in 1976. 
Conceivably, some political observers might wonder whether the White 
House were in Republican hands if there was no Right Wing Republican 
squawking about administration appointments. But Ford's subsequent per-
formance as president was no more confidence-inspiring for many Right 
Wing Republicans. His support of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and 
a budget that included a $52 billion deficit set him apart from the Right 
Wing of his party. Even when Ford moved in the proper direction, such as 
his response to the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, he did so 
too late for some conservatives. Actually, the final Communist takeover of 
South Vietnam underscored for all conservatives the utter futility of the 
Nixon and current Ford policy of detente, not only in Southeast Asia, but 
evetywhere else in the world. Conservative concerns multiplied when Ford 
fired Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who openly disagreed with the 
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primary architect of detente, Henry Kissinger, and who persistently warned 
against the shifting power balance in favor of the Soviet Union. Finally, 
Ford's refusal to see Russian emigre Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, who represented 
for the Right the greatest moral voice against Soviet communism, dem-
onstrated again that the policy of detente was bereft of moral and logical 
meamng. 
By 1974-1975, a frustration that had been growing among the GOP 
Right Wing since before the first Nixon administration burst into the open. 
What, conservatives asked themselves, had over six years of Republican gov-
ernance accomplished? South Vietnam had gone under, Red China had 
been recognized, detente had become the entrenched foreign policy, and 
the military balance of power was shifting in the Soviets' favor. More school 
children were being bused than ever before, and a Republican administra-
tion had even established racial quotas. One Republican president had 
declared himself a Keynesian and surrendered to wage and price controls, 
while his successor had proposed huge budgets with huge deficits. All the 
while, Great Society programs survived and grew. And, despite the Republi-
can electoral victories of 1968 and 1972, the party had reached by mid-1974 
its lowest voter-identification level since the Gallup poll began asking such 
questions in 193 7. 55 In the November election, moreover, Republicans 
watched as Democrats gained forty-nine House seats and four governor-
ships. 
"Has the Republican vessel been so severely damaged in the Watergate 
battering that it is no longer seaworthy?" asked Patrick Buchanan, former 
Nixon speech writer and now conservative columnist. He was not alone in 
posing this particular question. A series of books, including Buchanan's own 
Conservative Votes, Liberal Victories, proclaimed that now was the time for 
a conservative third party. National Review publisher William Rusher pre-
sented the most comprehensive proposal along this line, even recommend-
ing that it be named the Independence party. Rusher's new party would try 
to reclaim Nixon's old "new majority" by joining the social conservatism of 
Catholics, ethnics, blue-collar workers, and independents to more tradi-
tional conservative economic and foreign policies. The Independence party 
would simply replace the GOP as the Republican party had long ago sup-
planted the moribund Whig party. 56 
A new party of their own was indeed the main talk when conservatives 
convened in Washington in February, 1975. The result of this meeting was 
the establishment of a Committee on Conservative Alternatives. Practicing 
GOP politicians, however, stayed aloof from this venture, fearing its impact 
on their political futures. Yet, they were intrigued with the idea and espe-
cially with the prospect that it might force changes within the GOP as it 
existed. According to Evans and Novak, former governor Reagan publicly 
broached the idea only to dismiss it after a talk with Holmes Tuttle, a friend, 
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advisor, and influential California Republican. 57 Although also rejecting a 
third-party move, some Right Wing Republicans, meeting at the invitation 
of James Buckley, ominously issued President Ford a warning that conserva-
tive Republican support should not be taken for granted. 58 
As Ford prepared to seek the Republican presidential nomination in 
1976, he made a number of moves to secure support on his right. Dean 
Burch, former RNC chairman during the Goldwater campaign, was made a 
prominent advisor in the Ford political organization. As his campaign chair-
man, Ford selected Secretary of the Army Howard Calloway, a prominent 
southern conservative who immediately began talk that helped to encourage 
Rockefeller's subsequent withdrawal as Ford's 1976 runningmate. In addi-
tion, Ford vetoed more and more congressional spending bills. He was prov-
ing educable if not entirely accceptable. Yet these attentions and presiden-
tial actions merely kept the Right's frustrations from spilling over, but only 
partly accounted for Ford's success in securing the endorsements of several 
Right Wing powers. Ford was, after all, a Republican presidential incum-
bent seeking his party's nomination. Goldwater was convinced that the 
party needed continuity above all else after Watergate and therefore en-
dorsed Ford. 59 Along with Goldwater, the president could count on the sup-
port of GOP Capitol Hill and organization leaders, and the vast majority of 
governors, including such Republican conservatives as minority leader John 
Rhodes of Arizona and Texas senator John Tower. 
But again, as in 1968 and 1972, the Republican Right remained split. 
Before Nixon's resignation, the demise of Spiro Agnew had projected 
Reagan into the front-runner position among all Republican presidential 
possibilities. Indeed, in one poll, Reagan claimed 29 percent support, com-
pared with Rockefeller's 19 percent and former treasury secretary and Demo-
crat John Connally's 16 percent. Ford's elevation to the presidency naturally 
altered the equation for Reagan, who became a syndicated radio commenta-
tor after the end of his second term as California governor. Reagan advisor 
John Sears, however, believed that Ford was far from a typical incumbent. 
His claims to the Republican nomination were illegitimate and therefore 
vulnerable. In addition, personal reasons were tempting Reagan to take on 
Ford. Unlike Nixon, Ford failed to consult with Reagan, especially on 
appointments. And Evans and Novak have written that Reagan quite simply 
considered himself a better man than Ford. 60 
Ford and Reagan also differed on foreign policy and in their political 
styles. Reagan spoke a blunt conservative rhetoric, while Ford had compro-
mised and accommodated far too often on Capitol Hill not to have acquired 
a flatulent verbiage. Reagan consistently moved audiences with emotional 
calls for a new national sense of mission and greatness. The Republican 
party, he declared, must "raise a banner of no pale pastels, but bold colors 
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which makes it unmistakably clear where we stand on all the issues troubling 
the people." Ford's well-established nice-guy reputation and feckless mono-
tones allowed no such fervent appeals. Conservative George Will found 
Reagan only "marginally" more conservative than Ford. Their major differ-
ences lay in Reagan's superior rhetorical skills, but Will held this as a "very 
important" difference in modern American politics. Significantly, this dis-
tinction was crucial to the Reagan Right's political approach, as North Caro-
lina senator Jesse Helms later demonstrated in saying of the Right's hopes, 
"What we're talking about is a conservatism that leaves absolutely no 
doubt." 61 
Pledged to a balanced budget, tough law-and-order policies, and a 
strong national defense, Ronald Reagan ultimately decided on a second bid 
for the Republican presidential nomination. He would run as an outsider-
outside the "Washington buddy system" that he claimed was insensitive to 
the American taxpayer. He enlisted the aid of less established Capitol Hill 
figures such as Idaho senator James McClure, Jesse Helms ofNorth Carolina, 
and Illinois congressman Phillip Crane. The two Reagan backers among 
GOP governors were South Carolina's james Edwards and New Hampshire's 
Meldrim Thomson. Reagan did have the endorsement of major conservative 
periodicals and theoreticians, as well as the benefit of armies of hard-line 
workers. Even Ford later conceded, "We had most of the generals on our 
side, but Reagan had most of the troops. " 62 
The Reagan strategy called for a few quick primary wins that would 
force Ford out of the race early. Yet Reagan was immediately placed on the 
defensive by his earlier suggestion that $90 billion could be cut out of the 
federal budget by returning certain federal programs to the states. This 
widely criticized proposal highlighted Reagan's more general difficulty in 
exploiting domestic issues in his struggle against Ford. Jules Witcover, in his 
book on the 1976 presidential race, regarded the $90 billion speech as "the 
ultimate undoing" of Reagan's political fortunes. 63 
As in 1952 and 1964, New Hampshire Republicans once again disap-
pointed the conservative candidate. Reagan lost to Ford by only 1, 317 out of 
108,000 votes, but publicly stated expectations of some prominent Reagan 
supporters had been higher. What Reagan gamely called his "moral victory" 
in New Hampshire was followed by unmitigated defeat in Florida, where 
Ford claimed 53 percent of the vote to Reagan's 47 percent. In both New 
Hampshire and Florida, Reagan was placed on the defensive by his own dis-
cussion of the problems of the Social Security system. Again, the so-called 
Goldwater problem resurfaced, as it would do once more when Reagan, dur-
ing the Tennessee primary campaign, said that selling the TV A "would be 
something to look at." Philosophically, of course, Reagan had no objection 
to being compared with Goldwater. The Californian believed that Gold-
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water was "ahead of his time" and unfairly portrayed by his foes. In 1976, 
however, Reagan observed that Goldwater's 1964 campaign taught him the 
value of placing his qualifiers before any policy declaration. 64 
Reagan advisors, who obviously were not totally impressed by emerging 
Republican majority theses and the electoral data of 1968 and 1972, had 
failed to contest Ford in big northeastern states, and losses here added even 
greater pressure on Reagan to pull out of the race midway into the primary 
season. But a dramatic turnaround started suddenly in North Carolina after 
Reagan began hammering away at Ford's and Kissinger's policy of detente. 
He restated his earlier promise to replace Kissinger upon taking office. In 
addition, North Carolina television viewers saw new Reagan advertisements 
that were bold and unabashedly conservative in contrast with his earlier 
bland spots. In subsequent appearances, Reagan continued to lambast 
Ford's foreign policy, especially the alleged surrender of the Panama Canal. 
Indeed, so sharp did Reagan's assaults become that, according to Evans and 
Novak, even some conservatives grew alarmed at his aggressiveness. Gold-
water himself criticized Reagan's Panama Canal position as "irresponsi-
ble."65 Nevertheless, after his North Carolina victory, Reagan went on to 
defeat Ford in the important Texas primary, followed three nights later by 
wins in Indiana, Alabama, and Georgia. 
Dramatic as this late spring comeback was, Reagan could not claim the 
GOP nomination. But with the formal selection of the delegates over, nei-
ther could President Ford. The Ford-Reagan nomination struggle therefore 
became a tug-of-war for groups of uncommitted delegates-and even single 
uncommitted delegates. And the president had an obvious advantage on 
this front. Reagan's top advisor, John Sears, believed that Reagan had to 
gamble in order to stay alive until the GOP convention in Kansas City. 
Sears had a well-deserved reputation as a political tactician. When but 
thirty-four years old, he had helped to mastermind the political comeback of 
Richard Nixon. Sears's current presence in the Reagan camp attested to 
Reagan's own tactical pragmatism, as well as indicating that such sentiment 
now also dominated the Reagan camp. Sears knew that in the end Reagan 
had to secure delegates from the North and East if he was to have a chance. 
The crucial Mississippi delegation was reportedly tilting to Ford. In a fateful 
eleventh-hour gamble Sears recommended, and Reagan agreed, that Penn-
sylvania senator Richard Schweiker, a certified liberal Republican with ADA 
and AFL-CIO approval, be designated as his vice-presidential runningmate. 
Sprung upon an incredulous party just before the convention opened, the 
Schweiker selection also created doubts about Reagan among certain party 
conservatives. Howard Phillips of the Conservative Caucus declared that 
Reagan had "betrayed the trust of those who look to him for leadership." 
Mississippi GOP chairman Clark Reed found the Schweiker pick "wrong and 
dumb." George Will sneered, "Their caper is another subtraction from the 
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dignity of the political vocation. Neither Reagan nor Schweiker understands 
how to broaden a political base without cracking political foundations." 66 
What is astonishing is that Reagan's naming of Schweiker never sparked 
a full-fledged rebellion among a significant number of Reagan followers. 
Not that Reagan delegates were delighted by the Schweiker choice; they 
certainly were not. Yet considering the Right's abhorrence of Schweiker's 
political outlook and the earlier Right Wing Republican anger over Ford's 
selection of Rockefeller, the Reagan Right's relative quiescence remains 
noteworthy. Either they realized the early selection of Schweiker was a last-
ditch effort on Reagan's part or were demonstrating the political flexibility 
and understanding that Reagan possessed naturally. The move failed to 
break off the Pennsylvania delegation from Ford, although Jules Witcover 
later wrote that it did "buy time" by putting Mississippi in a "holding pat-
tern." Ultimately Sears's gambit was credited with keeping Reagan's candi-
dacy alive when Ford appeared on the brink of victoty. 67 
Unwilling to break open the convention with a serious fight over sub-
stantive issues, Reagan aides John Sears and Martin Anderson instead pro-
posed a change in the convention rules. Their proposed rule (16-C)-
labeled the "misery loves company amendment" by Ford people-would 
require candidates to name their vice-presidential runningmates before the 
presidential balloting. 68 It was on this issue that the Reagan forces would test 
their strength at the Kansas City convention. Although the Reagan camp's 
strategy was all too obvious, and all too contrary to political tradition, they 
came remarkably close to winning this punchless issue. On rule 16-C, 
Reagan garnered 1,069 votes to Ford's 1,180. Afterward, Ford's managers 
allowed the more catalytic plank reaffirming "morality in foreign policy" 
(an anti-Kissinger, anti-detente statement) to pass. 
The subsequent and unsurprising nomination of Gerald Ford proved to 
be no more than a minor defeat for those conservative Republicans who had 
lined up with Ronald Reagan. First, Reagan had clearly made his point by 
coming so close to denying Ford the GOP nomination. Conservative backers 
of both Ford and Reagan had reason to be pleased at the conclusion of the 
convention. Reagan conservatives, led by Jesse Helms, had redrafted much 
of the original White House platform draft, and Ford's convention man-
agers conceded to Reagan forces on almost all foreign policy planks. Further, 
there was the Reagan-approved selection ofFord's vice-presidential running-
mate, conservative Kansas senator Robert Dole. The former RNC chairman 
was no factional heavyweight, but his place on the November ticket was 
enough to leave the GOP united at the close of the Kansas City convention. 
The Ford-Reagan struggle amounted to little more than a "family argu-
ment," according to F. Clifton White, himself a Ford aide in 1976. 69 
Still, Ford was not entirely satisfactory and never had been for many 
conservatives. Although he promised to campaign on the issues of free 
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enterprise and a strong national defense, his conservatism remained the 
milder conservatism of the older Republican party of the Midwest and 
Northeast. It was moderate on such social issues as the ERA, busing, and 
abortion. Ford Republicans-as contrasted with numerous GOP conserva-
tives who were simply backing the president-entertained a greater faith in 
detente and a lesser concern over the shifting strategic balance. Reagan Re-
publicanism, with its greater aggressiveness, sharper ideological focus, and 
growing Sun Belt flavor, certainly differed in degree, if not in kind. "Kansas 
City was a watershed," the National Review correctly noted after the 1976 
election; "it was a conservative convention, almost entirely so, but its conser-
vatism was incompletely defined." 70 
12 
Our Time Has Corne 
OnJanuary 20, 1981-a brieffour and one-half years after the Kansas City 
convention-Washington was preparing for the inauguration of Ronald 
Wilson Reagan as the fortieth president of the United States. Reagan Re-
publicans had captured Washington by election on November 4, 1980, by 
invasion in the weeks following, and by extravaganza in the days immedi-
ately preceding inauguration day. 
President-elect Reagan had, as the phase went, "played" the capital in 
the weeks after his electoral landslide. Proving that his anti-Washington 
rhetoric would apply only to policy matters and not the social and cultural 
affairs or the political courtesies of the nation's capital, Reagan dropped in 
on the Supreme Court justices, called on both houses of Congress, and con-
ferred with Republican and Democratic leaders alike in mid-November. 
"Tip" O'Neill, Speaker of the House, warned ex-Governor Reagan that he 
had now come up to the big leagues, after only minor league experience in 
California. The recently repudiated presidency of Georgia's Jimmy Carter 
gave O'Neill's blunt words added weight. 1 
But this was a time of Republican-Right Wing Republican-celebra-
tion. At a dinner for Republican senators and the president-elect hosted by 
Senator Howard Baker, Reagan paid tribute to the first Right Wing Republi-
can candidate for president, Barry Goldwater. "If he hadn't walked that 
lonely road," Reagan said, "some of us wouldn't be here tonight." In all, 
there was wide agreement that Reagan was off to an excellent start. Even in 
the Georgetown· salons, where Nixon and Carter had always remained out-
siders, Reagan hobnobbed with Washington high society at a December 
party given by Washington Post chairman Katharine Graham. Even Gra-
ham's newspaper praised the "special sensitiviry and class" demonstrated by 
the president-elect during his November visit. 2 Reagan's high style encour-
aged the belief that class and elegance would now quickly replace Carter's 
Dogpatch on the Potomac, as observers of these matters unfairly portrayed 
Washington's recent social atmosphere. 
The days immediately preceding the inauguration showed clearly what a 
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change Reagan's Washington would mark from Carter's asceticreign. The 
much-maligned "three-martini lunch" of the Carter years became a symbol 
of the underclass by comparison with the private jets, limousines, and dia-
monds that dazzled Washington in the preinaugural whirl of concerts, 
receptions, parties, and fireworks. It was "Hollywood East," sneered the 
critics. Following a candlelight dinner on Sunday,January 18, came Monday 
evening's night club entertainment at the Capital Center, a Frank Sinatra 
production with Johnny Carson as emcee. Although critics universally 
panned the show, the Reagans, seated in purple stuffed chairs, seemed to 
enjoy the occasion. Many words-both serious and silly-would be written 
on the new age of media politics and Ronald Reagan's crucial place in it. 
Still, the Reagans' enjoying the Sinatra spectacular certainly symbolized one 
important change in the Republican Right Wing since 1945-could one 
possibly imagine Robert Taft, the Dagwood Bumstead of American politics, 
uncomfortably seated in one of the purple chairs, presiding over such a spec-
tacle? Indeed, even Barry Goldwater's "conscience of a conservative" com-
pelled him to protest the garishness of the inaugural week at a time when 
many Americans were undergoing economic difficulties. 3 It was significant 
itself that neither Goldwater nor Taft arrived at such a day of triumph. 
On the balmy Washington morning ofTuesday,January 20, the first of 
an estimated crowd of 150,000 was filling up the Capitol grounds to see the 
inauguration of Right Wing Republican Ronald Reagan. The ceremonies 
would take place for the first time on the Capitol's West Front, and com-
mentators made much of the symbolism of this break with tradition. Prom-
ising his own new departures, former California governor Ronald Reagan, 
who represented the rise of the Sun Belt, would face west in taking the oath 
of office. It was indeed the signal for a new political day. 
Working through the night and into the dawn of that new day was Pres-
ident Jimmy Carter. His final hours in the White House were devoted to 
winning the freedom of fifty-two Americans who were suffering through 
their 444th day of captivity in Iran. Their plight had been a central focus of 
the previous year's presidential campaign, and at 8:30A.M., Carter would 
call President-elect Reagan and inform him of the final agreement that 
secured their release. Even Jimmy Carter was helping to make Ronald 
Reagan's inauguration truly a "new beginning." 
The hostage release was the coda of a troubled presidency. Someday, 
historians may look back at the Carter administration as some now view Her-
bert Hoover's presidency. Both of these engineers headed administrations 
that preceded precedent-shattering administrations. Both Carter and 
Hoover were driven from office by the inadequacy of their halfway mea-
sures, their own political ineptitude, and the unrelenting pressure of exter-
nal forces. F. Clifton White has written that Carter came across in 1976 as 
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something of a conservative. Well into his administration, a Gallup poll 
showed that 45 percent of the American people believed Carter to be a 
"conservative," while 36 percent regarded him as being "liberal. " 4 Clearly 
Carter was conservative in many respects. A balanced budget remained an 
unrealized Carter goal, but deregulation, civil service reform, cuts in the 
growth of domestic spending, and a belated increase in military spending 
made up part of the Carter record. There was then some measure of validity 
in Senator Kennedy's fevered assertion that Carter was a "Reagan clone." 
Whatever historians conclude, Kennedy's charge did point up Carter's 
center-right position in the Democratic party. By 1976 the party reforms of 
1968 and the failed "new politics" of George McGovern in 1972 had left the 
Democratic party a wrangling mass of ethnic and interest groups. The story 
of the "emerging Republican majority" had been little more than an ac-
count of the breakup of Franklin Roosevelt's Democratic coalition. The 1972 
Democratic condition illustrated, Theodore White observed, how the par-
ty's "liberal idea of progress of a previous half-century had hardened into 
liberal theology which terrified millions of old clients." 5 Yet Nixon's 1972 
inroads into the Democratic coalition quickly disappeared in the wake of the 
Watergate tragedy. 
Mildly conservative southerner Jimmy Carter came out of nowhere to 
capture the much-coveted Democratic presidential nomination of 1976. 
Claiming the support of a Democratic South that had outgrown George 
Wallace's manifestos and gaining a reputation as a supreme political contor-
tionist, Carter reunited FOR's Democratic party for perhaps its final time. In 
reclaiming the South for the Democrats, however, Jimmy Carter did for 
southerners what John Kennedy had done for Catholics-freed them of any 
future automatic loyalty to group or sectional candidate. Nevertheless, on 
election day 1976, this majority party candidate's talents as the "Great 
Homogenizer" proved only a secondary reason for his slim victory over 
Gerald Ford, as polls indicated that Watergate-specifically Ford's pardon 
of Nixon-primarily explained the election results. 6 
The uncertainty of President Carter's hold on the Democratic party 
became apparent even before domestic or foreign crisis tested his adminis-
tration. His relations with the Democratic Congress were generally awful. In 
the face of high inflation and unemployment, the Soviet invasion of 
Mghanistan, and the American hostage crisis in Iran, Carter watched as 
party liberals deserted him for Teddy Kennedy. Kennedy's bid for the 
Democratic nomination failed miserably, but it forced Carter to accept a 
series of liberal platform amendments, including a proposal for a $12 billion 
jobs program. 
Among the many ironies of the Carter presidency was that his personal 
unpopularity by 1980 forced him to dwell upon his place in the tradition of 
the Democratic party in his fall campaign against Ronald Reagan. Yet even 
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if Carter could have claimed that tradition, which Kennedy followers had 
said he never could, the utility of that tradition had become questionable 
indeed some time before. Jimmy Carter had helped reconstitute the Roose-
velt coalition in 1976, but he was a spent force by 1980-in and out of the 
Democratic party. One final indication of Carter's strained relationship with 
his party came when he conceded to Reagan hours before the polls had 
closed on the West Coast. This last, selfish act of a political leader, whose 
party leadership had been under attack for some time, especially hurt the 
prospects of congressional Democrats who had worked earlier in the fall to 
dissociate themselves from the Carter ticket. 
Neither Carter nor the Democratic party was strong enough in 1980. 
Exit polling revealed the vote to be an overwhelming personal rejection of 
Carter. A New York Times-CBS News poll showed 38 percent of Reagan's 
supporters voted for the Republican because of their dissatisfaction with 
Carter. A Washington Star editorial best summed up the widely accepted 
anti-Carter interpretation of the election: "Whatever the American people 
want from a president, they weren't getting it from Jimmy Carter." Carter 
himself naturally rejected the contention that the American people had 
turned against him personally. Meeting with reporters on the day after the 
election, he blamed his downfall on a number of factors that were beyond 
his control-the hostage crisis, for example, and OPEC oil price hikes and 
inflation. Also responsible for his defeat, Carter maintained, was the post-
Watergate mood of skepticism toward political leaders (a sentiment that had 
favored him four years earlier), and the natural tendency of the American 
voter to turn out incumbent presidents. 7 
After the November defeat, Democrats alternately debated overhauling 
the party structure, exploiting the latest political technologies, and redefin-
ing the party philosophy-the same things the GOP had done in response to 
the Roosevelt revolution. Carter, for his part, finished out his sad presidency 
working to assure "the best transition ever" and laboring right up to the end 
for the release of the American hostages in Iran. Indeed, after two virtually 
sleepless nights, the haggard and worn president rushed to meet his succes-
sor at the north portico of the White House for their ride to Capitol Hill and 
the inaugural ceremonies. 
At the inaugural ceremonies on the West Front of the Capitol, majority 
leader Howard Baker led the Senate to its place. Vice-President-elect George 
Bush followed. The roles of Baker and Bush on this day pointed up crucial 
changes in the Republican party and the Republican Right over the preced-
ing fifteen years. 
Not in twenty-eight years had the GOP controlled the Congress, but 
Ronald Reagan would at least begin his presidency with a Republican Sen-
ate. And this Republican majority was a conservative Republican majority at 
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that. Indeed, young GOP conservatives from the West had established 
themselves by the late 1970s as "the virtual leaders of the Republican oppo-
sition in the Senate." GOP conservative senators such as Orrin Hatch and 
Jake Garn of Utah, Harrison Schmitt of New Mexico, James McClure of 
Idaho, and Paul Laxalt of Nevada quite consciously stood apart from older 
GOP conservatives like Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond, and John 
Tower. Not only were they far more at home with the media, but they 
prided themselves on their practical effectiveness. Considering the latter, it 
was no wonder that Robert A. Taft was mentioned on their list of heroes. 8 
Operating through their Senate Steering Committee, they quickly 
made a difference on Capitol Hill, helping to kill a Carter labor reform bill, 
working relentlessly to stop Medicare payments for abortions, and almost 
preventing the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties. Indeed, Laxalt took 
the minority leader's desk to direct the Republican opposition to the treaties 
after Baker decided to support them. (An indication of the power and 
sophistication of this new group became apparent when Baker relinquished 
the minority leader's desk to Laxalt for the Panama Canal treaties debate, 
and Laxalt wisely refrained from attacking Baker for his apostasy on such a 
charged issue.) Their strong opposition to abortion (the unifying element of 
the group) indicated the emergence of new issues of legislative concern, but 
their agenda also included more traditional Right Wing Republican stands. 
In delineating the goal of the "new" Senate Republicans in 1979, Nevada's 
Paul Laxalt was simply reiterating the age-old conservative Republican hope 
when he said that the Republican party msut be made "to stand for some-
thing." 
The election to the Senate in 1978 of such Right Wing Republicans as 
William Armstrong of Colorado, Roger Jepsen of Iowa, and Gordon Hum-
phrey of New Hampshire added to this "new" conservative block, and 
Laxalt reportedly now had enough votes to further his goal of standing for 
something by ousting Howard Baker as minority leader. Laxalt, however, 
was thinking about 1980 politics. Then, he would be running for reelection 
and, he hoped, directing another Reagan presidential bid. Laxalt therefore 
decided not to challenge Baker in 1979. 9 
Baker, for his part, relied on his "statesmanlike" moderate Republican-
ism in his campaign for the Republican nomination in 1980. But tied down 
by Senate business, Baker never waged an effective campaign and withdrew 
early in the race. After the Republicans captured the Senate in November, 
Baker was assured of his unanimous election as majority leader only after 
Reagan backed and Laxalt nominated him in the interest of party unity. 
Baker publicly promised to help the new president carry out his campaign 
commitments. Laxalt, moreover, hardly needed the title. Like Taft in the 
Eightieth Congress, he had all the influence he needed as the new pres-
ident's "eyes and ears" in the Senate. 10 Moreover, Laxalt's western conser-
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vative colleagues, who had come to Washington in the Republican-poor 
post-Watergate days, would now take over the major posts and committee 
chairmanships in the Senate. 
Vice-President George Bush would be presiding over the new Republi-
can Senate. His role onJanuary 20, 1981, also helped to illustrate the great 
changes in Republican politics since 1964. In 1964, Houston businessman 
George Bush, an energetic young conserVative, had won praise even as he 
lost his race for the Senate. In the intervening years, Bush had built a solid 
record as a congressman from Houston (1967-1971) and as Republican 
national chairman, ambassador to the United Nations, U.S. Representative 
to mainland China, and CIA director. As ex-Governor Carter floundered in 
Washington and ex-Governor Reagan tried to convince voters that Califor-
nia was simply a microcosm of the United States, Bush tried to parlay his 
experience into the Republican presidential nomination. 
Bush's impressive resume was only one of his strengths as he stalked the 
GOP nomination in 1980. His age-fifty-six-was initially believed to be 
important in the contest against the sixty-nine-year-old Ronald Reagan. 
Bush's daily jogs while on the campaign trail silently made the distinction-
a crucial distinction. Reflecting the rightward trend in the GOP that had 
gained force beginning in the early 1960s, Ronald Reagan's principal rival 
for the Republican nomination in 1980 was initially content to be cast basic-
ally as a younger Reagan. Bush's foreign and domestic policies-gas and oil 
decontrol, less taxation, and opposition to the SALT II, the latest strategic 
arms limitation treaty-placed him safely within the conservative main-
stream of the GOP. Only on the post-1964 social issues-his opposition to a 
constitutional ban on abortion and his support of the ERA-did Bush differ 
greatly from Reagan. And Bush had no desire to make these latter issues the 
basis for his campaign for the nomination. Indeed, early in the race, Bush 
reportedly feared being pinned with a "moderate" labeJ.Il Considering 
both the Baker and Bush candidacies for the 1980 GOP presidential nom-
ination, even the National Review found good things to say about political 
trends within the Republican party: "In the year 1979, be it noted, 'moder-
ate Republicanism' is represented by ... a) a former CIA director, and b) a 
Border State hawk-both of whom favor deep tax cuts and a tough foreign 
policy. Things aren't that bad." As the National Review concluded, "Ron-
ald Reagan had already won the principal policy issues within the Republi-
can Party." 12 
It was largely Bush's ceaseless campaigning paired with Reagan's light 
campaigning that brought Bush a victory in Iowa caucuses. Bush now had 
what he called "Big Mo" (momentum) for the primary battles beginning in 
New Hampshire. After Iowa, with Reagan now fully engaged in the contest 
and retiring the age issue, Bush had to set himself apart from Reagan. 
Although favoring tax cuts, Bush rejected the Kemp-Roth plan to slash tax 
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rates by 30 percent in three years. Reagan, of course, had endorsed this 
approach for some time, and Bush now characterized it as "voodoo econom-
ics," a nifty campaign phrase that boomeranged when the Democrats began 
using it during and after the fall campaign. Reagan supporters especially 
opposed Bush's stands on the ERA and abortion. Many also found the but-
toned-down Bush-a Yale "preppy" and son of former Connecticut senator 
Prescott Bush-to be too much of the "Northeastern establishment." His 
membership in the much-maligned Trilateral Commission, a group of 
worldwide businessmen, scholars, and public officials concerned with eco-
nomic and foreign policy issues-could provoke bitter charges of "interna-
tionalism" and "elitism" in certain Right Wing quarters. Here was an old 
yet still strong prejudice of Right Wing Republicans. 
Bush lost "Big Mo" forever after Reagan's victory in the New Hamp-
shire primary. Despite his primary victories in Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and Michigan, Bush never challenged Reagan in any Republi-
can stronghold. Reluctantly, Reagan's final and foremost opponent with-
drew at the end of May. 
The selection of George Bush as Ronald Reagan's vice-presidential run-
ningmate will long intrigue historians, especially as new information 
becomes available on the unsuccessful negotiation to put together a "dream 
ticket" of Reagan and former President Ford. The impetus behind the failed 
and the final selections contrasts sharply with the intraparty dynamics of the 
GOP in 1964. First, Reagan showed a flexibility and an imagination in find-
ing a ticketmate that Barry Goldwater never evidenced. Conservatives had 
taken some valuable lessons from 1964. For his part, Ronald Reagan demon-
strated again his own political shrewdness. Still, Reagan had far more room 
to operate than Goldwater had in 1964. Detroit in 1980 was a lovefeast com-
pared with the San Francisco slugfest in 1964. Ford and Bush were much 
closer to Reagan philosophically than Rockefeller was to Goldwater; and 
Bush's "voodoo economics" or Ford's publicly expressed doubts about 
Reagan's electability hardly compared with the notorious "Scranton letter" 
or other anti-Goldwater statements uttered by Republicans in 1964. Repub-
licans in 1980 were more generally agreed than at any time since 1945. And 
this agreement was on essentially conservative positions. Reagan did not 
have to reach too far left on the GOP spectrum to tap Bush for the second 
spot in 1980. 
Having agreed to support the platform fully, Bush told reporters, ''I'm 
not going to be nickled and dimed to death. I'm not permitting myself to 
accent differences we've had during the campaign." Bush's reference to the 
slight differences was appropriate. Of course, ideological fights are relative; 
doctrinal disputes can be the most vicious. There was plenty of muttering 
over the Bush selection. Howard Phillips snarled, "Governor Reagan 
sounded like Winston Churchill but behaved like Neville Chamberlain." 
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But these Republicans smelled victory, too. Bush's pledge to support the en-
tire platform was enough to prevent North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms 
from having himself nominated as an alternative to Bush. Paul Weyrich of 
the National Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress was alone 
among prominent conservatives in refusing to work for the Reagan-Bush 
ticket. 13 
At 11:34 A.M., Ronald Reagan stepped to the podium on the West 
Front of the Capitol. Half a world away, the fifty-two American hostages 
traveled by bus in the Iranian night to Teheran's Mehrabad Airport, where 
they would board an Algerian airliner that would take them to freedom. 
Back in Washington, Reagan, dressed in a charcoal gray club coat, striped 
pants, and a gray vest and tie, stepped forward at 11:57 A.M. to take the 
oath of office. As the fifty-two Americans inched toward the end of their 
captivity, Chief Justice Warren Burger administered the oath to Ronald 
Reagan, the fortieth president of the United States. It was, Time wrote, an 
"extraordinary conjuncture of events." 14 
The new challenges of governance-fundamentally different gover-
nance-awaited. The long crusade of Ronald Reagan and the longer crusade 
of the Republican Right to control the Republican party and the White 
House had succeeded-magnificently. But how secure, how conclusive was 
the triumph of the Republican Right? There were claims that Reagan was 
the indispensable figure in the Republican Right. And what about Reagan 
himself? There remained memories of his pragmatism and flexibility as gov-
ernor of California and questions about his commitment to certain Right 
Wing positions. 
"Our time has come," Maryland representative Robert Bauman had 
said back in early 1979, referring to the prospects of conservative Right Wing 
Republicans. The chairman of the ACU had few doubters since a widely dis-
cussed conservative surge had occurred during the Carter years. More Amer-
icans were calling themselves "conservative," even if these conservatives 
often simultaneously took "liberal" positions on specific issues-positions 
favoring increased funds for medical care, schooling, the elderly, and the 
unemployed. One Gallup poll reported that 47 percent of the American 
people now considered themselves to be "conservative," while 32 percent 
claimed to be "liberals" and 10 percent, "middle roaders." In 1964 self-
styled conservatives made up 30 percent of the American populace. 
National magazines in 1977 featured cover stories on the rising conservative 
mood in the United States. In explanation, Alaska's Republican senator Ted 
Stevens speculated that Republican conservatives "simply had to watch as 
the Democrats tried to prove that government could do everything in order 
to show it could not." Columnist George Will explained that inflation-
which jumped to a double-digit rate during the Carter years-was the great 
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"conservatizing agent." The growing influence and financial well-being of 
the conservative think tanks such as the Hoover Institute, the American 
Enterprise Institute, and the Heritage Foundation demonstrated that Amer-
ican conservatism had become a dynamic force of many components. 16 
Not even the Republican Right could claim sole political proprietorship 
of the new conservative trend. Indeed, political developments in 1978 
proved that at least fiscal conservatism had become fashionable across the 
political spectrum. It had been the year of the American tax revolt. In June 
of that year, the passage of Proposition 13 in California sparked similar 
movements across the nation to limit government taxing directly and gov-
ernment spending indirectly. Reagan's successor, California governor Jerry 
Brown, a Democrat, secured his reputation as a political maverick by leading 
the drive for a balanced budget amendment. Across the country in Massa-
chusetts, Democrat Edward King used conservative fiscal and social policies 
to upset incumbent Governor Michael Dukakis in the Democratic primary, 
going on to be elected governor in November. Indeed, Democrats as a whole 
began to present themselves in the fall of 1978 as born-again fiscal conserva-
tives. Conceivably, their success in doing so prevented further party defeats. 
But postelection analysts also had to conclude that the days of brave new 
Democratic social programs were gone. Carter's cutbacks in domestic pro-
grams would face far less opposition from his own party. 17 
Republican conservatives could hardly revel as Democrats turned conser-
vative policies to their own advantage. But the signs of a significant conser-
vative trend were present in the emergence at this same time of the New 
Right. Right Wing Republicans assumed that the GOP, with the Right in 
control, would be in the best position to capitalize on this particular move-
ment. Political observer Kevin Phillips had first used the term "New Right" 
to describe "social conservatives" such as Paul Weyrich, Howard Phillips, 
and Terry Dolan. By 1977 "New Right" had become synonymous with a 
growing coalition of single-issue and multi-issue grassroots groups and indi-
viduals working against everything from gun control to drugs, high taxes to 
abortion-and the "liberal" candidates who supported these policies. Essen-
tially, New Right politics involved "organizing discontent" against the lib-
eral social policies of the past fifteen years. 18 
Led by Phyllis Schlafly, who organized the Eagle Forum and Stop-ERA, 
the New Right had helped prevent by 1980 what had once been considered a 
foregone conclusion upon its passage by Congress in 1972-the final ratifi-
cation of the Equal Rights Amendment. Even though it successfully battled 
to end federal financing of abortions, the New Right made a constitutional 
ban on abortion its ultimate goal. Besides opposing gun control, relaxation 
of drug laws, and homosexual rights legislation, the New Right embraced an 
issue that earlier conservatives such as Barry Goldwater had championed-a 
constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court ruling against 
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public school prayer. Critics charged that these New Right constitutional ini-
tiatives contradicted traditional conservative opposition to government reg-
ulation and interference. New Right theorists, on the other hand, countered 
that far-reaching government social programs and Supreme Court rulings 
had interfered already; a counteroffensive in behalf of traditional values was 
now needed. For example, the intrusion of federal programs into the affairs 
of the American family led Senator Paul Laxalt to introduce the family pro-
tection bill in 1979. Such New Right initiatives demonstrated the move-
ment's conscious dissimilarity to the earlier conservatism of the Republican 
Right. New Right activist Paul Weyrich, organizer of the Committee for the 
Survival of a Free Congress, made the point succinctly: "We are radicals who 
want to change the existing power structure. We are not conservative in the 
sense that conservative means accepting the status quo." 19 
New Right activists saw themselves as different from the old Right in yet 
another way. The New Right got things done. Richard Viguerie contended 
that conservatism had long been primarily an intellectual movement; Old 
Right lawmakers were content to make their speeches in opposition to the 
latest liberal proposal and keep their constituents happy. Viguerie noted 
that New Right leaders were indebted to the 1964 Goldwater campaign for 
giving them their initiation in practical politics. Since then, however, the 
New Right single- and multi-issue organizations had pioneered in the appli-
cation of high technology to politics. Viguerie himself had learned direct 
mail techniques in the 1950s and 1960s under the tutelage of Marvin Lieb-
man, an organizer of Right Wing causes, including the fabled "China 
Lobby." With a list of about 12,000 Goldwater campaign contributors, 
Viguerie started his own direct mail company in 1965. Almost a decade 
later, as Viguerie tells it, the conservative nonreaction to Gerald Ford's selec-
tion of Nelson Rockefeller as vice-president convinced him that the Right 
needed not more intellectuals, but marketers. Viguerie soon became identi-
fied with the use by the conservative cause of direct mail, which, he claimed, 
had the advantage of "bypassing the Left's monopoly of national news me-
dia." Direct mail, computers, telephone marketing, and cable television 
were soon bringing the New Right's messages directly to the gamut of dis-
contented groups. Before long, the New Right had identified an estimated 4 
million contributors and counted 15 million people on its computer tapes. 20 
The New Right's expanding political reach translated into legislative 
victories. The consumer protection agency, federal financing of congres-
sional elections, post-card voter registration-the New Right gained credit 
for the defeat of these Carter proposals. The New Right's opposition to the 
Panama Canal treaties reportedly made the Senate ratification vote as slim as 
it was. Later, in 1978, the New Right turned from contesting issues to trying 
to swing elections. The first news of New Right electoral prowess came out of 
New Jersey, where conservative Jeffrey Bell edged out liberal Republican fix-
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ture Senator Clifford Case in the GOP primary. That fall, a New Right orga-
nization-the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), 
directed by Terry Dolan, won national no'toriety. NCPAC targeted for 
defeat liberal Senator Dick Clark of Iowa and Senator Thomas Mcintyre of 
New Hampshire and went about publicizing-critics charged, distorting-
their "liberal" voting records for the voters at home. When Roger Jepsen in 
Iowa and Gordon Humphrey in New Hampshire beat those liberal war-
horses, the New Right established itself as a major electoral force. Subse-
quently, Terry Dolan and his NCPAC marked six major liberal senators for 
electoral extinction in 1980. 
The Moral Majority represented another element of the amorphous New 
Right. Actually, Moral Majority was the name of the organization founded 
in 1979 by television preacher Jerry Falwell, but the term itself came to apply 
generally to present-day political activism of fundamentalists and evangel-
ists. Weyrich had undertaken to enlist television ministers such as James 
Robinson, Pat Robertson, and Jerry Falwell in the conservative cause. The 
importance of the "born agains" in American politics had become apparent 
in 1976 when Democrat Jimmy Carter corralled their vote by virtue of his 
much-publicized religious conversion. Not since William Jennings Bryan 
and the 1920s had religious fundamentalism taken on such importance in 
American politics. Unfortunately, however, Carter's personal rebirth could 
not compensate for the liberal policies of his administration. Thus the reli-
gious right, with Weyrich's aid, took on a Republican identification. "In the 
last several years," Falwell contended, "Americans have literally stood by 
and watched as godless, spineless leaders have brought our nation flounder-
ing to the brink of death." 21 But now Falwell appealed to his flock to vote 
only for candidates who supported the Bible. According to his reading of 
scripture, that meant candidates pledged to such things as increased defense 
spending, a balanced budget, and a constitutional ban on abortion. 
Of course, the early 1960s had witnessed the emergence of the Christian 
Right. Preachers such as Billy Hargis and Dr. Fred Schwarz had earlier called 
the multitudes to the banner of Barry Goldwater. But these precursors of the 
Moral Majority were old-fashioned in their medium and message. Where 
Hargis and Schwarz were preoccupied with the communist threat, the Moral 
Majority concentrated on the evils of liberal humanism and the welfare 
state. The radio evangelists and big-top crusaders of the earlier Christian 
Right had little of the technological sophistication of the Falwells-and no-
where near the political influence of the contemporary Religious Right in 
combination with the larger New Right. 
The New Right and the Moral Majority were natural allies of the Repub-
lican Right Wing as 1980 approached-but it was only an alliance. New 
Right leaders remained loyal to the "movement," and not to the Republican 
party-or even to the Republican Right. As they saw it, the goals of each 
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were not the same, even if their interests might run parallel. New Right 
organizations such as NCPAC not only aided Democratic candidates, but 
wanted to become even more bipartisan. Indeed, New Right leaders dispa-
raged the Republican party as both an institution and a marketing vehicle. 
"The Republican Party is a fraud," NCPAC's Dolan declared. "It's a social 
club where rich people go to pick their noses." 22 
New Right leaders further believed it would be "crazy" to tie the move-
ment to the patently unappealing Republican label. "I don't believe that in 
my lifetime you will ever again be able to market the word 'Republican,"' 
said the New Right's marketing genius, Richard Viguerie. "You could as 
easily sell the Edsel or Typhoid Mary." 23 This lack of commitment to the 
GOP-an attitude symptomatic of the general weakening of both major 
political parties in the post-World War II era-raised a number of problems 
for Right Wing Republicans who retained their allegiance to the Republican 
party and who hoped to include the New Right in their winning Republican 
presidential coalition. 
"I cannot remember a time," James J. Kilpatrick wrote in December, 
1978, "not even in the heyday of Barry Goldwater 14 years ago, when there 
has been so much interest in conservatism." Unlike its posture in that earlier 
period, however, the Republican party stood essentially united-united on 
conservative fundamentals. The ideological gap between the GOP's right 
and left wings had narrowed since 1976, when, as seen previously, it was not 
that great. The National Review's marked tolerance of the candidacies of 
moderate Republicans Bush and Baker illustrated the change. At the other 
end of the Republican spectrum, the Ripon Society, once the guardian of 
liberal Republican virtue, was now bestowing favorable ratings to one-time 
Republican foes like Barry Goldwater and Jesse Helms. As economic issues 
became more important, Ripon Republicans were moving away from their 
earlier assumption that government should play an active role in the econ-
omy.John C. Topping, society president, now believed the time had come 
for conservatives and "progressives" to work together for the "good of the 
GOP." Shifts like this gave weight to Ronald Reagan's statement of early 
1979, "Never has the Republican Party been more unified. " 24 
Reagan was one Republican who could capitalize on both the recent 
conservative upsurge and GOP unity. He had assured his supporters atKan-
sas City that, despite his failed bid for the Republican nomination, "the 
cause" would go on. Shortly after the November election, Reagan's transfor-
mation of his "Citizens for Reagan" campaign organization into "Citizens 
for the Republic" convinced F. Clifton White, for one, that Reagan himself 
would see to it that "the cause" went on by again running for the pres-
idency. On November 13, 1979, Reagan formally announced his candidacy 
for the nomination. Since 1976, he had worked to woo party moderates by 
proving that he was, in Laxalt's words, a "responsible conservative" and 
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"not a right-wing nut with horns coming out of his ears. "25 Still, there were 
doubts about Reagan's ability to overcome the age issue; he would be sixty-
nine in 1980. But Ronald Reagan quickly disposed of this and six major Re-
publican opponents in the spring of 1980. In beating Bush in New Hamp-
shire, John Connally in South Carolina, and John Anderson in Illinois, 
Reagan demonstrated he could draw support from Republicans and Demo-
crats alike. Yet all of this contrary contemporary evidence was not enough to 
keep former President Gerald Ford from repeating the conventional wisdom 
of the last half-century. Ford, who privately still resented what he regarded 
as Reagan's halfhearted fall campaign effort in 1976, publicly declared in 
mid-March that Reagan was "unelectable." A flurry of meetings-one 
between Ford and John Sears, who had been fired the day of the New 
Hampshire primary as Reagan's campaign director-and press reports cen-
tered on a possible Ford bid for the GOP nomination. In the end, however, 
Ford stayed out of the race after finding little support from Capitol Hill Re-
publicans for such a last-minute effort. 26 Indeed, the Republican nomina-
tion race was over well before Bush's withdrawal in late May. 
Ronald Reagan had persevered to become the second bona fide Right 
Wing Republican in sixteen years to win the GOP presidential nomination. 
Unlike Goldwater, however, Reagan had firm control over the party-and 
worked to keep it that way. The Republican convention in Detroit was more 
on the order of a coronation, with the unprecedented "dream ticket" nego-
tiations precluding the usual lifelessness of such affairs. 
Although the Republican platform agreed to in Detroit was vintage 
Right Wing Republicanism, some Old Guard Republicans might not have 
recognized some of its planks. Detroit Republicans remained the guardians 
of the private sector and the enemies of government intetference in the mar-
ketplace. The platform proposed cutbacks in the twin scourges of govern-
ment spending and government regulation. However, both Reagan and the 
platform were vague about which programs would be cut; only the educa-
tion and energy departments were ticketed for extinction. Both were Carter 
creations. Reagan's and the Republican party's general laissez faire approach 
could best be seen in the platform's call for the decontrol of oil and gas 
prices. There were also planks opposing gun control, school busing for the 
purposes of racial desegregation, and affirmative action or racial quotas. In 
addition, Republicans advocated a tougher foreign policy and a buildup of 
conventional and strategic forces. 
Well into the spring, Reagan admitted that his 1980 campaign speeches 
were a rehash of what he had been saying for the last twenty-five years. The 
1980 Republican platform confirmed this fact, but it also outlined some 
changes in programs and new concerns. As Evans and Novak pointed out in 
their book on the Reagan revolution, Reagan broke with the Republican tra-
dition of austerity economics. He did so as early as 1978 by embracing the 
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Kemp-Roth proposal to cut marginal tax rates by 30 percent over three years. 
"Supply-side" theorists maintained that such a cut would precipitate a burst 
of economic activity which high marginal tax rates had long held back. The-
oretically, government revenues would climb because of increased taxable 
earnings. This would allow for the increased military spending and the bal-
anced budget promised in the GOP platform. Indeed, some supply-siders-
Representative Jack Kemp of Buffalo, for instance-rejected any spending 
cuts, and Reagan talked vaguely of making savings by eliminating fraud and 
abuse. Of course, cutting taxes had long been part of the conservative creed. 
Traditional wisdom, however, said that tax cuts would require attendant 
cuts in government spending. In this way GOP conservatives would achieve 
their sine qua non, what Howard Buffet in 1945 called the "all-American 
goal" -the balanced budget. The fact that the term "voodoo economics" 
originated with Republicans underscored the break that Ronald Reagan, 
Kemp, and the supply-siders had made with traditional Republicans. 
The social issue planks of the Republican platform and Reagan's ques-
tioned commitment to them reflected the changes in the post-1964 Repub-
lican Right and in American political issues. In 1964 Goldwater had intro-
duced "quality of life" issues-crime in the street, school prayer, and the 
larger question of America's moral tone-into political debate. But Gold-
water's major. themes centered on traditional conservative concerns of big 
government growth and foreign policy weakness. The New Right insured 
that the Republican platform of 1980 would have to address or finesse a 
series of social issues that since the mid-1970s had noisily taken their place 
on the American agenda. 
The New Right had two possible candidates in the GOP-Philip Crane 
and Ronald Reagan. Having enlisted the services of Richard Viguerie, Illi-
nois congressman Philip Crane, a forty-eight-year-old who faintly resembled 
John Kennedy, became the first announced candidate in August, 1978. For-
mer chairman of the ACU, Crane matched Reagan's conservatism on tradi-
tional economic and foreign policy issues and spoke out more strongly on 
such social issues as abortion and school prayer. Although Crane's candidacy 
reflected the vigor and variety of Republican conservatism, his competition 
was not universally viewed as healthy. In a tight race, he could harm the 
major conservative candidate, Ronald Reagan. But Crane simply could not 
contend with the electoral force of Reagan. He withdrew quietly midway 
through the primary season, having won no convention delegates. He had 
won, however, the resentment of Reagan supporters upset by Crane's dan-
gerous pretentious. 27 
But Reagan's New Right bona fides were suspect and remained so. As 
California governor he had signed the nation's most liberal abortion law. 
Also, Reagan had initially supported the ERA (a cause Taft had supported). 
But these earlier Reagan positions changed. He later explained away the dra-
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matic increase in California abortions as the result of an unanticipated loop-
hole in the statute and ultimately endorsed a constitutional ban on abor-
tions. He had also reversed his position on the ERA. 
Overall, however, Reagan treated the New Right as simply one constitu-
ency-a potentially troublesome constituency-of the Republican Right and 
the Republican party. He could woo or steer clear of them as the situation 
dictated. Evans and Novak have concluded that New Right social issues were 
of secondary importance to Reagan. When these forces put through a plat-
form plank advocating the appointment of judges who respected family 
values and the sanctity of human life, the Reagan camp reportedly regretted 
its failure to exert enough control over the platform writing. Reagan's later 
trip to Dallas, where he spoke before 14,000 fundamentalist preachers and 
praised the awakening of religious America, was but the wedding ceremony 
in what Evans and Novak characterized as a risky "marriage of conve-
nience. " 28 
The New Right and the Religious Right were simply elements of a Re-
publican party that assembled in Detroit injuly, 1980. Yet, even as political 
observers dissected the Republican party and its now dominant Right into 
different components, unity and intraparty goodwill distinguished this sec-
ond triumph of conservative Republicanism. Colorado senator William 
Armstrong, a hard-liner on all conservative issues, said unabashedly that dif-
ferences on social issues were no longer that important. 29 Obviously, Right 
Wing Republicans could have quarreled with their rivals within the party or 
even among themselves. But the likely prospects of unseating the disastrous 
Carter encouraged Republicans of all kinds to temper their hostilities. 
Further evidence of this came when after the primaries certain Right 
Wing Republicans made a move to dump Bill Brock as the Republican 
national chairman. Since 1977, after taking over a party that was described 
as an "emptying shell" and a small shell at that, Brock had won wide praise 
for his efforts to "bring about the emerging Republican majority from the 
bottom up" by utilizing direct mail solicitation and reaching out to urban, 
female, and black constituencies. His successful effort to hold the 1980 
Republican national convention in Detroit symbolized this new Republican 
commitment. Nevertheless, conservatives-Senator Laxalt, for example-
still burned over Brock's refusal to bankroll their fight against the Panama 
Canal treaties. Reportedly, Laxalt and other Reagan intimates such as Lyn 
Nofziger and Edwin Meese wanted the campaign strictly in Reaganite 
hands. Brock had to go. F. Clifton White, however, had witnessed in 1964 
Goldwater's manifold difficulties stemming fro!D Republican organization 
changes-"purges," said his critics-ranging from RNC research positions 
to the chairmanship itself. White joined with House GOP minority leader 
John Rhodes, Jack Kemp, and Reagan campaign advisors like William Casey 
in urging Reagan to keep Brock at his current post. The prominently 
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reported Brock issue came to be regarded as an important indicator of the 
Reagan organization's relation to all factions of the Republican party. 30 Ulti-
mately, Reagan's decision to keep Brock as RNC boss presaged the can-
didate's wise leadership at the Detroit convention, where he successfully 
mollified black and female Republicans who were unhappy with certain 
platform planks. 
Reagan's masterful Detroit performance, which included his selection 
of Bush, as well as his moves after the convention to incorporate establish-
ment Republicans into his campaign (and later into his administration) 
demonstrated that Reagan had profited from the lessons of sixteen years ear-
lier. He was not alone. "Back in the Goldwater convention we disagreed 
viciously," remarked one California delegate to both the San Francisco and 
Detroit triumphs. "Maybe I'd like some of that old excitement here, but 
this time we sense that the odds are better with Reagan, and while our con-
servative views haven't changed we've mellowed." 3l 
The 1980 fall presidential campaign recalled the 1964 contest between 
Goldwater and Johnson in several major ways. Indeed, the struggle of six-
teen years before served as a history lesson for both Carter and Reagan-
unavailing for Carter and invaluable for Reagan. 
President Carter campaigned against a Right Wing Republican under 
far less favorable circumstances than had President Johnson. The same con-
ditions that sustained Senator Kennedy's challenge would continue to 
plague Carter throughout the fall. Unlike Johnson, Carter had no fully 
united party behind him and had to scramble desperately to reunite the 
Democrats and also to reclaim the Democratic tradition. Unlike Johnson, 
Carter could not take credit for economic prosperity and could capitalize on 
peace only if the maddening humiliation of the Iranian hostage crisis and 
renewed Soviet adventurism were forgotten. Perhaps Carter's achievements 
were every bit as respectable as LB]'s by 1964, but Carter had much more to 
be defensive about and could never indulge in anything similar to Johnson's 
1964 campaign promises of the Great Society. 
But Jimmy Carter seemed to plagiarize the attacks on the GOP candi-
dates of the 1964 campaign. Johnson had called the 1964 election a referen-
dum on "the whole course of American development"; Carter correctly 
emphasized the "profound difference" between himself and Reagan. John-
son had scored against Goldwater by asking voters, "Whose finger do you 
want on the nuclear button?" Carter, in turn, flatly stated that Reagan's 
election could lead to war and that the election was a choice between "peace 
or war." "I'm not insinuating that he's a war monger," Carter insisted 
lamely in mid-October. 32 There were other Carter insinuations and accusa-
tions during the campaign, and these too, made use of rhetoric that had 
proved so telling against Goldwater sixteen years earlier. Reagan, Carter 
charged, had injected "racism" and "hatred" into the campaign by his use 
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of "code words" such as states' rights. Reagan's election, Carter went on, 
would be "divisive" to the country by separating people of different races 
and religions. Unlike 1964, however, the Democratic and not the Republi-
can Right Wing candidate became the issue as the mean-spirited negativism 
of the incumbent's campaign tactics drew widespread admonition. Carter 
himself acknowledged that he had gotten "carried away" in several of his 
attacks on Reagan, although no one accused him of "shoot-from-the-hip" 
tendencies. 33 
The shoot-from-the-hip charge, which had so bedeviled Goldwater, 
briefly plagued Reagan when he made some damaging gaffes early in the 
fall. He drew sharp criticism for, among other things, claiming that Carter 
had opened his campaign "in the city that gave birth to and is the present 
body of the Ku Klux Klan," and for calling the Vietnam War "a noble 
cause." But Reagan's managers moved quickly and effectively to kill this po-
tential issue, limiting the press's access to the candidate. 34 Thus, only briefly 
did Reagan's fall campaign effort repeat one of the many Goldwater mis-
takes of 1964. As he showed at various times since 1964, Reagan had learned 
valuable lessons from the Goldwater experience; they helped him to avoid 
making mistakes that campaign observers were only too ready to see another 
Right Wing Republican presidential candidate make. Reagan would not be 
a 1980 Goldwater. There were many reasons for this, but Ronald Reagan's 
cheerful smile and campaign style, even as he articulated Goldwater-like 
policies, were major factors. Carter's full realization of this came when he 
gave viewers of his televised debate with Reagan the opportunity to compare 
his own harsh characterizations with the affability and thoughtful demeanor 
of the Republican candidate before them. 
Actually, Reagan's fall campaign amounted to much more than avoid-
ing the mistakes of or comparisons with a defeated standard-bearer of the 
Republican Right Wing. Indeed, against a Democratic candidate who was 
ostentatiously attempting to associate himself with the Democratic tradi-
tion, Right Wing Republican Reagan made claims to the heritage of John 
Kennedy, Harry Truman, and even Franklin D. Roosevelt. Reagan, with the 
aid of his upbeat supply-side economic assumptions, worked to become this 
election's master of coalition or consensus politics. In a splendid acceptance 
speech in Detroit, Reagan occasionally spoke of fascism in the New Deal, 
quoting Franklin Roosevelt with approval-although he cited FDR's 1932 
platform promises of a balanced budget and cuts in government spending, a 
longstanding GOP tactic. After Detroit, Reagan maintained that he, not 
Carter, represented the traditional Democratic values of John Kennedy and 
Harry Truman. Supply-side Republicans were now using John Kennedy as 
an authority in their pitch for tax cuts, and both Truman and John Kennedy 
quotations could bolster the arguments of foreign policy hard -liners. 
As if Reagan's exploiting the words of departed party heroes were not 
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galling enough for Democrats, he was also aggressively pursuing longtime 
vulnerable constituencies. Notions of an emerging Republican majority 
resurfaced. Reagan's states' rights pronouncements had obvious appeal in 
Carter's own back yard, the South. The Republican candidate's stands in 
favor of tuition tax credits and a constitutional ban on abortion were 
designed to appeal to Democratic Roman Catholics and white ethnics in the 
northeastern and midwestern industrial states. Furthermore, Reagan's ten-
ure as president of the Screen Actors Guild made his moves to appeal to 
rank-and-file workers all the more credible. If Right Wing positions had 
changed little since 1945, the rhetoric of the Right as represented by Reagan 
had undergone some astonishing alterations. 
"Mr. Carter Must Go!" shouted the Republican party plarform of 1980. 
Ultimately, making and keepingJimmy Carter as the issue in the 1980 cam-
paign stood as Reagan's major campaign accomplishment. Reagan resur-
rected the "misery index," a combined measure of inflation and unemploy-
ment that Carter had used successfully against Ford in 1976. The "misery 
index" had shot up under Carter, and Reagan now asked Americans if they 
were better off than they were four years ago. The answer was obvious, and 
renewed Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan and the "galling metaphor" of 
the American hostages in Iran suggested a similar response to any such for-
eign policy question. 35 The question still remained: could high disapproval 
ratings of Carter and doubts about his competence be turned into Reagan 
votes in a year when neither candidate was said to be eliciting very positive 
support from the American voter? 
The 1980 presidential campaign resembled the one of sixteen years ear-
lier in one other crucial respect. It culminated in an electoral landslide trig-
gered in part by the overwhelming personal rejection of the loser. But the 
similarities ended there, for it was the Right Wing Republican challenger 
who triumphed over the Democratic incumbent president. The extent of 
Ronald Reagan's victory surprised not only the pollsters but Reagan's most 
ardent supporters. Reagan claimed 51 percent of the popular vote and won 
44 states to collect 489 electoral votes. President Carter's 42 percent of the 
popular vote allowed him to capture six states and the District of Columbia 
for 49 electoral votes. Moreover, even in the unlikely event that all of inde-
pendent candidate John Anderson's support (7.8 percent of the popular 
vote) had gone to Carter, Reagan still would have won the presidency. The 
American people had elected a Right Wing Republican as their president. 
In the end, Reagan further upset the conventional wisdom by demon-
strating considerable coattail pull for congressional Republicans. Not since 
1928 had Republicans won control of the Senate, but they did on November 
4, 1980. Also, the GOP gained 46 additional seats in the House of Repre-
sentatives on election day, although it would still remain in the minority. 
The many and varied electoral postmortems began immediately. Some 
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pundits scurried back to their notes on the "emerging Republican major-
ity." Former Nixon speech writer and current resident conservative colum-
nist at the New York Times, William Safire, wrote the most colorful com-
ment on the Reagan victory. "Like a great soaking wet shaggy dog," Safire 
wrote, "the Silent Majority-banished from the house during the Watergate 
storms-romped back into the nation's parlor and shook itself vigorously." 
"Emerging Republican majority" notions only became more firmly en-
trenched upon inspection of Reagan's raid on traditional Democratic con-
stituencies. This Right Wing Republican had left Carter with only his home 
state of Georgia in the South and had attracted significant numbers of blue-
collar workers, ethnics, Roman Catholics, and Jews. Republicans stuck with 
Reagan in landslide-making numbers. RNC chairman Bill Brock caught the 
GOP mood by saying, "We have brought together the elements of a new co-
alition." He quickly added, however, "The cementing of that depends on 
our performance in office." 36 
Obviously, the Reagan administration's performance in office would af-
fect the Republican party future. But there was considerable reason to doubt 
that even a sterling Reagan performance would usher in a new partisan 
realignment and a Republican era. Political scientists and political observers 
had documented the declining influence of American political parties. Six 
years after his Emerging Republican Majority, Kevin Phillips himself had 
meditated on the media's role in weakening American political parties-
and particularly the Republican party of postindustrial AmericaY The 1980 
elections offered up evidence that called into question the possibility of an 
era of GOP national party dominance. First, exit polling attested that much 
of the Reagan vote was a personal rejection of Jimmy Carter and his feckless 
presidency. Pollsters blamed their astonishing failure to divine the winner 
on the belated choice of the many American voters who lacked strong com-
mitment to either candidate or party. 38 However limited, the showing of 
John Anderson made a similar point, and the appalling 52 percent voter 
turnout-the lowest in thirty-two years-had implications beyond partisan 
political realignment. 
A cause and an expression of the decline of American political parties 
could be seen during and immediately after the presidential campaign in 
the form of the New Right. Single-issue and ideologically oriented political 
action groups had in recent years pushed their way into the political process. 
The NCPAC had targeted six Democratic liberal senators for defeat in 1980. 
Four of the hunted-Birch Bayh oflndiana, Frank Church ofldaho, George 
McGovern of South Dakota, and John Culver of Iowa-fell on election day. 
NCPAC's Terry Dolan, calling the election "a massive conservative man-
date," issued a new "tentative" hit list for 1982 that included such liberal 
Democrats as Senator Ted Kennedy and even liberal Republican senators 
Robert T. Stafford of Vermont, John Chafee of Rhode Island, and Lowell 
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Weicker of Connecticut. Dolan warned, "Liberals ought to be very intim-
idated by the mood of the American public." 39 The Reverend Jerry Falwell 
of the Moral Majority claimed to have registered 4 million voters and 
brought out 10 million voters to the polls. Falwell hailed the Religious Right 
as being "the primary factor" in the election of a conservative Senate. 40 
Without deep allegiance to the Republican party, these new ward heelers of 
the media age wanted their share of the credit for the election of Ronald 
Reagan and others. 
Other quarters on the Right quarreled with the style and substance of 
this New Right analysis. Senator-elect Dan Quayle, who had beaten New 
Right target Birch Bayh in Indiana, charged that the New Right political 
organizations actually helped their intended victims by causing a backlash 
against their negative advertising and bully-boy image. Vice-President elect 
George Bush, already being warned to step in line by the New Right, 
declared defiantly that Ronald Reagan owed his victory to no one group, and 
columnist George Will admonished the "banty roosters" of the New Right 
for their "unpleasant crowing." Wrote Will, the outcome "does not mean 
that the meanies won. "41 
Will argued that Reagan had "forced and won a national referendum 
on alternative economic and defense policies." Clearly, there was a wide-
spread disenchantment with the economic and foreign policies of Carter and 
the Democratic party. They had failed. End inflation and shore up Amer-
ica's global stature were the twin messages of the 1980 election. President-
elect Reagan had won an opportunity to try his conservative approach, but 
there remained much evidence to call into question Reagan voters' commit-
ment to the full conservatism of Reagan and the Republican Right. Amer-
icans were still, as they had been since their beginning, a pragmatic people. 
Results counted. Carter had surrendered millions of voters to Reagan 
because of his general lack of competence and his specific inability to 
dampen inflation. 
The overwhelming personal rejection of Carter does nothing to dimin-
ish the fundamental importance of Reagan's triumph. Reagan had demon-
strated an ability to capitalize on anti-Carter sentiment, and anti-Carter 
Reagan voters had still selected a candidate who promised the most funda-
mental shift in national policies since Barry Goldwater promised to become 
the most conservative president after Calvin Coolidge. The anti-Carter vote 
therefore underscored the growing conservative sentiment in the nation 
since the mid-1960s. 
But the pragmatism of the American voter was also clearly demon-
strated in the 1980 election. Earlier national surveys showed that self-
described conservatives were taking decidedly unconservative positions on 
specific issues. Self-described "liberals," likewise, reportedly made up 27 
percent of the Reagan vote. 42 These realities, combined with the many 
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diverse elements in and out of the Republican Right that constituted the 
Reagan majority, made the ultimate triumph of Ronald Reagan and the Re-
publican Right all the more questionable. For some time columnistJamesJ. 
Kilpatrick had perceptively pointed out that the recent conservative boom 
still was far from ideologically grounded. After election day 1980, Kilpatrick 
penned the most punchy and prudent message for the now many-shaded 
Republican Right Wing: Reagan "won a glorious victory. The millennium, 
it ain't. "42 
Whether such a millennium ever arrived would be determined over the 
next decade-in the White House, in the Congress, and in voting booths 
across the United States. On inauguration day 1981, however, two things 
were clear. One of the great political cliches of the post-New Deal age was 
now a fatality of history-the long-held belief that a Right Wing or Old 
Guard Republican could win the Republican presidential nomination, but 
never the presidency. Second, Ronald Reagan and the Republican Right 
were interpreting his 1980 victory as an unmistakable mandate for the pol-
icies Reagan had preached on his long road to the presidency. And one of 
the ironies of American history remained: election "mandates" are more 
matters of will and skill after an election than of vote tallies, as the presiden-
cies of Polk, Lincoln, and Wilson demonstrated. 
Upon completing the oath of office, Ronald Reagan, fortieth president 
of the United States, delivered an inaugural address that simultaneously 
restated familiar themes and signaled new national policies for the coming 
years. Calling for an "era of National renewal," Reagan promised swift and 
bold action to confront the problems of inflation and unemployment. But 
Reagan, who was already being called the "Roosevelt of the Right," out-
lined an approach that differed fundamentally from that of the New Deal. 
"In the present crisis," he declared, "government is not the solution to our 
problem; government is the problem." Reagan promised to curb the size 
and influence of the federal establishment and restore the balance between 
the various levels of government. 44 The new president's twenty-minute 
address was not without its stirring moments, but it was chiefly a simple and 
upbeat call for action-conservative action-to solve the nation's problems. 
As Reagan reached the end of his inaugural address, an Algerian plane 
full of Americans in their first moments of freedom left the runway in Iran. 
Yet this was not the only happy coincidence shining on the first moments of 
the Reagan presidency. In 1933 reporters had made much of the symbolism 
of the sun's emergence at the dramatic point in Franklin Roosevelt's inaugu-
ral address. OnJanuary 20, 1981, reporters would do likewise when the sun 
peeked through to spotlight Reagan-" the Roosevelt of the Right" -as he 
reached peroration of his inaugural message. 45 The Reagan presidency had 
begun. 
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